New Materialism:Interviews & Cartographies
Author: Rick Dolphijn; Iris van Der Tuin
Date: 2012-07-14T16:00:00+00:00
Keywords: 哲学; NewMaterialism; 理论; new-materialism; 学术; 女性; critical_theory; critical-theory; PostHumanism; 社科
Description: This book is the first monograph on the theme of “new materialism,” an emerging trend in 21st century thought that has already left its mark in such fields as philosophy, cultural theory, feminism, science studies, and the arts. The first part of the book contains elaborate interviews with some of the most prominent new materialist scholars of today: Rosi Braidotti, Manuel DeLanda, Karen Barad, and Quentin Meillassoux. The second part situates the new materialist tradition in contemporary thought by singling out its transversal methodology, its position on sexual differing, and by developing t
Publisher: Open Humanities Press

New Materialism:
新唯物主义

Interviews & Cartographies
访谈与制图

New Metaphysics
新形而上学

Series Editors: Graham Harman and Bruno Latour
丛书编辑：格雷厄姆-哈曼和布鲁诺-拉图尔

The world is due for a resurgence of original speculative metaphysics. The New Metaphysics series aims to provide a safe house for such thinking amidst the demoralizing caution and prudence of professional academic philosophy. We do not aim to bridge the analytic-continental divide, since we are equally impatient with nail-filing analytic critique and the continental reverence for dusty textual monuments. We favor instead the spirit of the intellectual gambler, and wish to discover and promote authors who meet this description. Like an emergent recording company, what we seek are traces of a new metaphysical ‘sound’ from any nation of the world. The editors are open to translations of neglected metaphysical classics, and will consider secondary works of especial force and daring. But our main interest is to stimulate the birth of disturbing masterpieces of twenty-first century philosophy.
世界应该重新兴起原创性的投机形而上学。新形而上学》丛书旨在在专业学术哲学令人丧气的小心翼翼和谨小慎微中，为这种思想提供一个安全的栖身之所。我们无意弥合分析学派与大陆学派之间的分歧，因为我们对钉钉子式的分析批判和大陆学派对尘封文字古迹的推崇同样不耐烦。相反，我们崇尚知识分子的赌徒精神，并希望发掘和推广符合这种精神的作者。就像一家新兴的唱片公司一样，我们所寻求的是来自世界任何国家的新的形而上学 "声音 "的痕迹。编辑们对被忽视的形而上学经典作品的翻译持开放态度，并将考虑具有特别力量和胆识的次要作品。但我们的主要兴趣是促进二十一世纪令人不安的哲学杰作的诞生。

Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin
Rick Dolphijn 和 Iris van der Tuin

New Materialism:
新唯物主义

Interviews & Cartographies
访谈与制图

()

OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS
开放人文出版社

An imprint of MPublishing — University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor, 2012
密歇根大学图书馆，安娜堡，密歇根大学出版社，2012 年

First edition published by Open Humanities Press
第一版由开放人文出版社出版

Freely available online at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11515701.0001.001
可在 http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11515701.0001.001 免费在线查阅

Copyright © 2012 Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin and the respective authors
版权所有 © 2012 Rick Dolphijn 和 Iris van der Tuin 及相关作者

This is an open access book, licensed under a Creative Commons By Attribution Share Alike license. Under this license, authors allow anyone to download, reuse, reprint, modify, distribute, and/or copy this book so long as the authors and source are cited and resulting derivative works are licensed under the same or similar license. No permission is required from the authors or the publisher. Statutory fair use and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Read more about the license at creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0
这是一本开放获取的书籍，采用知识共享署名共享许可协议授权。在此许可下，作者允许任何人下载、重用、重印、修改、分发和/或复制本书，但必须注明作者和出处，并且由此产生的衍生作品必须获得相同或类似许可。无需获得作者或出版商的许可。法定的合理使用权和其他权利不受上述规定的任何影响。有关许可证的更多信息，请访问 creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0

Design by Katherine Gillieson
设计：凯瑟琳-吉利森

Cover Illustration by Tammy Lu
封面插图：Tammy Lu

The cover illustration is copyright Tammy Lu 2012, used under a Creative Commons By Attribution license (CC-BY).
封面插图版权归 Tammy Lu 2012 所有，采用知识共享署名许可协议 (CC-BY)。

ISBN-10 1-60785-281-0
ISBN-10 1-60785-281-0

ISBN-13 978-1-60785-281-0
ISBN-13 978-1-60785-281-0

Open Humanities Press is an international, scholar-led open access publishing collective whose mission is to make leading works of contemporary critical thought freely available worldwide. Books published under the Open Humanities Press imprint at MPublishing are produced through a unique partnership between OHP’s editorial board and the University of Michigan Library, which provides a library-based managing and production support infrastructure to facilitate scholars to publish leading research in book form.
开放人文出版社是一个国际性的、由学者领导的开放存取出版团体，其使命是在全球范围内免费提供当代批判思想的主要作品。开放人文出版社与密歇根大学图书馆建立了独特的合作关系，由密歇根大学图书馆提供以图书馆为基础的管理和生产支持基础设施，为学者以图书形式出版领先的研究成果提供便利。

Publishing
出版
www.publishing.umich.edu
o
o

OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS
开放人文出版社
www.openhumanitiespress.org

Contents
内容

Acknowledgements 9
致谢 9

Introduction: What May I Hope For? 13
导言我还能希望什么？13

I Interviews
I 采访

- 1. Interview with Rosi Braidotti 19
1.采访 Rosi Braidotti 19

- 2. Interview with Manuel DeLanda 38
2.采访 Manuel DeLanda 38

- 3. Interview with Karen Barad 48
3.采访 Karen Barad 48

- 4. Interview with Quentin Meillassoux 71
4.采访 Quentin Meillassoux 71

II Cartographies
II 制图

Introduction: A “New Tradition” in Thought  85
导言：思想中的 "新传统" 85

- 5. The Transversality of New Materialism  93
5.新唯物主义的横向性 93

- 6. Pushing Dualism to an Extreme 115
6.将二元论推向极端 115

- 7. Sexual Differing 137
7.性别差异 137

- 8. The End of (Wo)Man 158
8.人的终结 158

Bibliography 181
参考书目 181

Permissions 195
权限 195

Matter can receive a form, and within this form-matter relation lies the ontogenesis.
物质可以接受一种形式，而在这种形式与物质的关系中存在着本体。

-Gilbert Simondon
吉尔伯特-西蒙顿

Acknowledgements
致谢

This book is the result of intense interaction between the two authors and many others. Giving names to the particular elements that form this swarm is an impossible but necessary undertaking, since the two names on the cover of this book definitely do not exhaust what made the book. Most of all, of course, the four wise and generous minds that are given a voice in the first part of this book, and whose voices are rewritten in the second part, should be thanked: Prof. Rosi Braidotti, Prof. Manuel DeLanda, Prof. Karen Barad, and Prof. Quentin Meillassoux. Our long-distance interview of Prof. Barad at the “7th European Feminist Research Conference” (Utrecht University, June 2009) opened up the idea of the interviews. We would like to thank Heleen Klomp for transcribing the encounter with Prof. Barad, and we would like to thank Prof. Wolfgang Schirmacher (the European Graduate School) for getting us in touch with Prof. Manuel DeLanda. Thank you to Dr. Marie-Pier Boucher for translating the interview with Prof. Quentin Meillassoux and Sterre Ras for formatting the entire book. Also, we would like to thank the editors that run the series “New Metaphysics” at Open Humanities Press, Prof. Graham Harman and Prof. Bruno Latour, for their enthusiasm, their support and care, and their inspiring scholarly work that has also been of great influence on this book.
本书是两位作者和其他许多人激烈互动的结果。给组成这个蜂群的特定元素命名是一项不可能但却必要的工作，因为本书封面上的两个名字绝对不能概括本书的全部内容。当然，最应该感谢的是四位睿智而慷慨的思想家，他们在本书的第一部分发表了自己的观点，并在第二部分重写了他们的观点：罗西-布雷多蒂教授、曼努埃尔-德兰达教授、卡伦-巴拉德教授和昆廷-梅拉苏教授。我们在 "7 th 欧洲女权主义研究会议"（乌得勒支大学，2009 年 6 月）上对巴拉德教授进行的远程访谈开启了我们的访谈思路。感谢海琳-克隆普（Heleen Klomp）为我们誊写与巴拉德教授的谈话，感谢沃尔夫冈-施尔马赫教授（欧洲研究生院）为我们联系到曼努埃尔-德兰达教授。感谢 Marie-Pier Boucher 博士翻译了与 Quentin Meillassoux 教授的访谈，感谢 Sterre Ras 为全书排版。此外，我们还要感谢开放人文出版社 "新形而上学 "丛书的编辑格雷厄姆-哈曼教授和布鲁诺-拉图尔教授，感谢他们的热情、支持和关怀，以及他们鼓舞人心的学术成果，这些也对本书产生了巨大影响。

Let us also thank our home institution, the Department of Media and Culture Studies, Faculty of Humanities at Utrecht University, and in particular the Graduate Gender Programme directed by Prof. Rosemarie Buikema, and Media Theory, run by Prof. Joost Raessens. The Research Institute for History and Culture, previously directed by Prof. Maarten Prak and now by Prof. Frank Kessler, and managed by Dr. Frans Ruiter should also be mentioned. Finally, we want to thank Utrecht’s Center for the Humanities, run by Prof. Rosi Braidotti, for being our second home and for supporting us in organizing seminars and conferences.
我们还要感谢我们的母校--乌特勒支大学人文学院媒体与文化研究系，特别是由 Rosemarie Buikema 教授指导的性别问题研究生课程和 Joost Raessens 教授负责的媒体理论课程。历史与文化研究所以前由 Maarten Prak 教授领导，现在由 Frank Kessler 教授领导，并由 Frans Ruiter 博士负责管理。最后，我们要感谢乌特勒支人文中心，该中心由 Rosi Braidotti 教授管理，是我们的第二个家，并在组织研讨会和会议方面给予我们支持。

The gust of fresh air that got this whole project started and kept pushing us forward was the Contemporary Cultural Theory (CCT) seminar series that we organized for the past four years. With its more than one hundred seminars, it has created a tremendously rich ecology in which the book was able to flourish. After it started as a reading group for the two of us, it caught the interest of staff members and graduate students and others interested from outside Utrecht University, and it received the generous support of the Centre for the Humanities, Media and Culture Studies, and later the Research Institute for History and Culture. It is impossible to name all those who have shared their valuable thoughts with us in the seminar over the past years, but several of its “usual suspects” have to be named (in no particular order): Marianne van den Boomen, Dr. Birgit Mara Kaiser, Dr. Kathrin Thiele, Nikos Overheul, Dr. Bram Ieven, Beatriz Revelles Benavente, Prof. Frank Kessler, Paulina Bolek, Marietta Radomska, Jannie Pranger, Richard van Meurs, Dr. Nanna Verhoeff, Dr. Paul Bijl, Adinda Veltrop, Freya de Mink, Alex Hebing, Dr. Kees Vuijk, Prof. Paul Ziche, Dr. Kiene Brillenburg Wurth, Prof. Ed Jonker. The seminar series “New Materialism: The Utrecht School” featured our colleagues Prof. Rosi Braidotti, Prof. Maaike Bleeker, Prof. Joost Raessens, Dr. Kathrin Thiele and Dr. Birgit Mara Kaiser.
过去四年来，我们组织了当代文化理论（CCT）系列研讨会，这股清新之风让整个项目得以启动，并不断推动我们前进。它举办了一百多场研讨会，创造了一个极其丰富的生态环境，使本书得以蓬勃发展。从我们两人的读书小组开始，它引起了乌特勒支大学以外的教职员工、研究生和其他感兴趣者的兴趣，并得到了人文、媒体和文化研究中心以及后来的历史与文化研究所的慷慨支持。无法一一列举多年来在研讨会上与我们分享其宝贵思想的所有人的名字，但不得不提及其中几位 "常客"（排名不分先后）：Marianne van den Boomen、Birgit Mara Kaiser 博士、Kathrin Thiele 博士、Nikos Overheul、Bram Ieven 博士、Beatriz Revelles Benavente、Frank Kessler 教授、Paulina Bolek、Marietta Radomska、Jannie Pranger、Richard van Meurs、Dr.Nanna Verhoeff、Paul Bijl 博士、Adinda Veltrop、Freya de Mink、Alex Hebing、Kees Vuijk 博士、Paul Ziche 教授、Kiene Brillenburg Wurth 博士、Ed Jonker 教授。新唯物主义 "系列研讨会：乌特勒支学派 "系列研讨会邀请了我们的同事 Rosi Braidotti 教授、Maaike Bleeker 教授、Joost Raessens 教授、Kathrin Thiele 博士和 Birgit Mara Kaiser 博士。

As part of CCT we had the pleasure to welcome national and international guest speakers (Dr. Marcel Cobussen, Prof. John Protevi, Prof. Rosemarie Buikema, Prof. Gloria Wekker, Dr. Vicki Kirby) and organize conferences. On November 19, 2010 we hosted “Intra-action between the Humanities and the Sciences” with Prof. Rosi Braidotti, Dr. Birgit Mara Kaiser, Jannie Pranger, Prof. Peter Galison, Dr. Fokko Jan Dijksterhuis, Dr. Kathrin Thiele, and Dr. Bibi Straatman. On April 7, 2011 we hosted “New Materialism: Naturecultures” with Prof. Donna
作为 CCT 的一部分，我们有幸接待了国内外特邀演讲人（Marcel Cobussen 博士、John Protevi 教授、Rosemarie Buikema 教授、Gloria Wekker 教授、Vicki Kirby 博士），并组织了各种会议。2010 年 11 月 19 日，我们与 Rosi Braidotti 教授、Birgit Mara Kaiser 博士、Jannie Pranger、Peter Galison 教授、Fokko Jan Dijksterhuis 博士、Kathrin Thiele 博士和 Bibi Straatman 博士共同举办了 "人文与科学之间的内部行动"。2011 年 4 月 7 日，我们举办了 "新唯物主义：新唯物主义：自然文化"。

Haraway, Dr. Cecilia Asberg, Dr. Vicki Kirby, Prof. Rosemarie Buikema, LeineRoebana (Heather Ware and Tim Persent, and Andrea Leine and Harijono Roebana), Dr. Adrian MacKenzie, Dr. Jussi Parikka, Dr. Milla Tiainen, Dr. Melanie Sehgal, and Prof. Rosi Braidotti. The first “New Materialism” conference, organized by Dr. Jussi Parikka and Dr. Milla Tiainen, took place in June 2010 at Anglia Ruskin University/ CoDE in Cambridge, the UK. Our second conference was funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, the Posthumanities Hub (Tema Genus, Linkoping University), the Center for the Study of Digital Games and Play, the Graduate Gender Programme, the Center for the Humanities, and the Research Institute for History and Culture (Utrecht University). On November 17, 2011 we organized “Lissitzky Space: New Materialist Experiments” at the Van Abbe Museum (Eindhoven) with Dr. Jondi Keane, Dr. Linda Boersma, Dr. Leslie Kavanaugh, Willem Jan Renders, Annie Fletcher and Piet van de Kar.
哈拉维、塞西莉亚-阿斯伯格博士、维基-柯比博士、罗斯玛丽-布克马教授、莱恩-罗巴纳（希瑟-瓦尔和蒂姆-珀森特，以及安德烈娅-莱恩和哈里约诺-罗巴纳）、阿德里安-麦肯齐博士、尤西-帕里克卡博士、米拉-蒂艾宁博士、梅拉妮-塞加尔博士和罗西-布雷多蒂教授。第一次 "新唯物主义 "会议由 Jussi Parikka 博士和 Milla Tiainen 博士组织，于 2010 年 6 月在英国剑桥的安格利亚鲁斯金大学/CoDE 举行。我们的第二次会议得到了荷兰科学研究组织、后人文中心（Tema Genus，林克平大学）、数字游戏与游戏研究中心、研究生性别项目、人文中心以及历史与文化研究所（乌得勒支大学）的资助。2011 年 11 月 17 日，我们举办了 "李西茨基空间：2011 年 11 月 17 日，我们与 Jondi Keane 博士、Linda Boersma 博士、Leslie Kavanaugh 博士、Willem Jan Renders、Annie Fletcher 和 Piet van de Kar 在 Van Abbe 博物馆（埃因霍温）举办了 "新唯物主义实验"。

Finally we would like to thank our loved ones.
最后，我们要感谢我们的亲人。

Utrecht, December 2011
乌得勒支，2011 年 12 月

Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin
Rick Dolphijn 和 Iris van der Tuin

Introduction
简介

What May I Hope For?
我有什么希望？

In academia, revolutionary and radical ideas are actualized through an engagement with scholars and scholarly traditions of the canonized past. Contemporary generations read, or more often reread older texts, resulting in “new” readings that do not fit the dominant reception of these texts. Also, academics tend to draw in scholars from an unforeseen past, those who come from a different academic canon or who have been somewhat forgotten. It is in the resonances between old and new readings and re-readings that a “new metaphysics” might announce itself. A new metaphysics is not restricted to a here and now, nor does it merely project an image of the future for us. It announces what we may call a “new tradition,” which simultaneously gives us a past, a present, and a future. Thus, a new metaphysics does not add something to thought (a series of ideas that wasn’t there, that was left out by others). It rather traverses and thereby rewrites thinking as a whole, leaving nothing untouched, redirecting every possible idea according to its new sense of orientation.
在学术界，革命性和激进的思想是通过与过去的学者和学术传统的接触而实现的。当代人阅读或更多地重读旧文本，会产生与这些文本的主流接受不符的 "新 "解读。同时，学术界也倾向于从未曾预料到的过去，那些来自不同学术典籍或在某种程度上已被遗忘的学者中汲取营养。正是在新旧解读和重读之间的共鸣中，"新形而上学 "才有可能显现出来。新形而上学并不局限于此时此地，也不只是为我们投射未来的图像。它宣布了我们可以称之为 "新传统 "的东西，它同时赋予我们过去、现在和未来。因此，新形而上学并没有为思想增添什么东西（一系列原来没有的、被别人遗漏的思想）。相反，它穿越并因此改写了整个思维，没有任何东西未被触及，并根据其新的方向感重新引导了每一种可能的思想。

“New materialism” or “neo-materialism” is such a new metaphysics. A plethora of contemporary scholars from heterogeneous backgrounds has, since the late 1990s up until now, been producing (re-)readings that together work towards its actualization. This book is written on the new materialism simultaneously with its fleshing out of the new materialist ambition. The negotiations concerning the new tradition are carried out in the first part of this book. This part consists of four interviews with the most prominent new materialist scholars of today: Rosi Braidotti, Manuel DeLanda, Karen Barad, and Quentin Meillassoux. The second part is made up of four chapters that situate this new tradition in contemporary scholarly thought. The problematics shared by the interviewed scholars are the subject matter of the chapters in Part Two, but it is new materialism that is active everywhere and always throughout. New materialism is the metaphysics that breathes through the entire book, infusing all of its chapters, every statement and argument. New materialism is thus not “built up” in this book: its chapters are not dependent upon one another for understanding their argument. The different chapters of the book can be read independently, although there are many different transversal relations between them.
"新唯物主义 "或 "新唯物主义 "就是这样一种新的形而上学。自 20 世纪 90 年代末至今，大量来自不同背景的当代学者一直在进行（重新）解读，共同致力于实现新唯物主义。本书在阐述新唯物主义的同时，也充实了新唯物主义的雄心壮志。有关新传统的讨论在本书的第一部分进行。这一部分包括对当今最著名的新唯物主义学者的四次访谈：罗西-布雷多蒂、曼努埃尔-迪兰达、卡伦-巴拉德和昆廷-梅拉苏。第二部分由四章组成，将这一新传统置于当代学术思想之中。受访学者共同面临的问题是第二部分各章的主题，但新唯物主义无处不在、始终活跃。新唯物主义是贯穿全书的形而上学，渗透到全书的所有章节、每一个陈述和论证中。因此，新唯物主义在本书中并不是 "堆砌 "出来的：书中各章的论证并不相互依赖。本书的不同章节可以独立阅读，尽管它们之间存在着许多不同的横向关系。

The interviews in Part One are intra-actions rather than interactions. The former term was introduced by Barad and is central to her new materialism. Qualitatively shifting any atomist metaphysics, intra-action conceptualizes that it is the action between (and not in-between) that matters. In other words, it is not the interviewers or the interviewee or even the oeuvre of the interviewee that deserves our special attention, but it is the sense of orientation that the interview gave rise to (the action itself) that should engender us. For it is in the action itself that new materialism announces itself. We have emphasized this by making strong connections between the individual questions and answers in Part One and the individual chapters of Part Two. This allows the reader to go back and forth between the two parts, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the new materialist tradition.
第一部分中的访谈是内部互动而非互动。前者由巴拉德提出，是她的新唯物主义的核心。从质的角度看，"内部行动 "改变了任何原子论形而上学，它认为重要的是 "之间的行动"（而不是 "中间的行动"）。换言之，值得我们特别关注的不是采访者或被采访者，甚至不是被采访者的作品，而是采访所产生的方向感（行动本身）。因为，新唯物主义正是在行动本身中宣告自己的存在。我们强调了这一点，在第一部分的各个问答和第二部分的各个章节之间建立了紧密的联系。这样，读者就可以在两部分之间来回阅读，从而加深对新唯物主义传统的理解。

The interview with Rosi Braidotti revolves, firstly, around the issue of the genealogy of new materialism, and around new materialism as genealogical. The latter can be read either as an instance of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s “rewriting” or of Gilles Deleuze’s “creation of concepts.” The genealogical element of Braidotti’s take on new (feminist) materialism, Braidotti herself being an (un)dutiful daughter of great Continental materialists such as Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault and Deleuze (van der Tuin 2009), most certainly pervades the remainder of the book. Braidotti makes clear how it is important to draw situated cartographies of (new) materialisms, and to traverse these maps at the same time in order to produce visionary alternatives, that is, creative alternatives to critique. When it comes to Braidotti’s precise take on the matter of materialism, we encounter a
对罗茜-布雷多蒂的访谈首先围绕新唯物主义的谱系问题和作为谱系的新唯物主义展开。后者既可以被解读为让-弗朗索瓦-利奥塔（Jean-Francois Lyotard）的 "重写"，也可以被解读为吉尔-德勒兹（Gilles Deleuze）的 "概念创造"。作为乔治-康吉伦（Georges Canguilhem）、米歇尔-福柯（Michel Foucault）和德勒兹（Deleuze）（van der Tuin，2009 年）等伟大的大陆唯物主义者的（不）孝顺女儿，Braidotti 对新（女性主义）唯物主义的看法中的谱系元素无疑贯穿了本书的其余部分。Braidotti 清楚地表明，绘制（新）唯物主义的情景图，同时穿越这些地图，以产生富有远见的替代方案，即批判的创造性替代方案，是多么重要。在谈到布莱多蒂对唯物主义的准确看法时，我们遇到了一个问题："我们如何看待唯物主义？

Deleuzean “univocity” or “single matter,” while we simultaneously find Braidotti acknowledging difference as a force of sexual differing on the one hand, and a sexual difference that needs to be traversed in order to come up with post-human, post-anthropocentric, and post-secular visions of sustainability and (intergenerational) justice on the other.
与此同时，我们发现布赖多蒂一方面承认差异是一种性差异的力量，另一方面也承认性差异需要被穿越，以实现后人类、后人类中心主义和后世俗的可持续发展和（代际）正义愿景。

The next interview, with Manuel DeLanda, demonstrates how new materialism is indeed filled with a visionary force, and how an attentive study of a material world asks us to look again at notions such as the mind or subjectivity from which this material world is independent. Braidotti’s genealogy comes back in DeLanda’s formulation of the new materialism, but initially in the form of dynamic morphogenesis as a historical process that is constitutive of the material world. It is only in a secondary instance that DeLanda is interested in the way in which for instance postmodernism or linguisticist idealism has led us away from theorizing scholarly processes as material processes, and as having dynamic, morphogenetic capacities of their own. DeLanda’s univocal methodology is at work from the word go, so it could also be argued that the “new” subjectivity or mind, including significant, not signifying, power differences, is always already implied instead of a priori established.
下一篇与曼努埃尔-德兰达的访谈表明，新唯物主义确实充满了远见卓识的力量，对物质世界的专注研究要求我们重新审视诸如心灵或主观性等概念，而物质世界是独立于这些概念之外的。在德兰达对新唯物主义的表述中，又出现了布赖多蒂的谱系，但最初是以动态形态发生作为构成物质世界的历史过程的形式出现的。德兰达对后现代主义或语言唯心主义等导致我们偏离将学术过程理论化为物质过程，以及将学术过程理论化为自身具有动态形态发生能力的方式感兴趣，这只是其次。德兰达的单义方法论从一开始就在发挥作用，因此也可以说，"新的 "主体性或心智，包括重要的而非符号化的权力差异，总是已经隐含其中，而非先验地建立起来。

In the subsequent interview with Karen Barad, this discussion that cuts across the epistemological and the ontological is continued. For the visionary aspect of a new materialism that she calls “agential realism,” Barad brings in a “diffractive” methodology, which is a methodology that allows one to establish the genealogical aspect of Braidotti and the univocity of DeLanda in their entanglement (not interaction). This entanglement comes first, Barad demonstrates via feminist theory and Bohrian quantum physics. She explains how the so-called subject, the so-called instrument, and the so-called object of research are always already entangled, and how measurements are the entanglement of matter and meaning. Barad also singles out the ways in which what she calls “onto-epistemology” is always already ethical, that is, how possibilities for post-human agency are part of what Braidotti would call (sexual) differing, and what DeLanda would call morphogenesis. All of this opens up for a notion of matter that, as Barad says in the interview, affirms that matter “feels, converses, suffers, desires, yearns, and remembers” because “feeling, desiring and experiencing are not singular characteristics or capacities of human consciousness.”
在随后与卡伦-巴拉德的访谈中，这种跨越认识论和本体论的讨论得以继续。对于她称之为 "行动现实主义 "的新唯物主义的愿景方面，巴拉德提出了一种 "衍射 "方法论，这种方法论可以让人们在它们之间的纠缠（而非互动）中建立布雷多蒂的谱系性和迪兰达的单一性。巴拉德通过女性主义理论和玻里安量子物理学证明，这种纠缠是第一位的。她解释了所谓的主体、所谓的工具和所谓的研究对象是如何始终纠缠在一起的，以及测量是如何将物质和意义纠缠在一起的。巴拉德还特别指出了她所称的 "认识论"（to-on-epistemology）是如何始终存在于伦理之中的，也就是说，后人类机构的可能性是如何成为布赖多蒂（Braidotti）所称的（性）差异和德兰达（DeLanda）所称的形态发生的一部分的。正如巴拉德在访谈中所说的那样，所有这些都为物质概念开辟了道路，肯定了物质 "感觉、对话、痛苦、欲望、渴望和记忆"，因为 "感觉、欲望和体验并不是人类意识的单一特征或能力"。

The final interview with Quentin Meillassoux seems to go back to the new materialism proposed by DeLanda. Whereas Barad and Braidotti work towards a new materialism that is immediately ontological, epistemological, and ethical, DeLanda and Meillassoux seem to be more interested in the ontological, either at the expense of an immediate or simultaneous interest in epistemology and ethics (DeLanda) or by leading up to epistemological questions of the classificatory kind (Meillassoux). This reading, however, would itself be classificatory, and would divide the terrain to an extent that may overstate differences and overlook similarities. Meillassoux produces a new materialism (a “speculative materialism”) that radicalizes the relation between epistemology and ontology, thus producing a new materialism that can access the in-itself. Similar to the projects of the three other interviewees, it is especially a subjectivism (also known as a social constructivism, a linguistic idealism, or an identity politics) that is qualitatively shifted in the anti-anthropocentric work of Meillassoux. Here, a “realism” is brought forward that intends to do justice to matter and the contingency of nature most radically, while stressing the limitlessness of thought.
与昆廷-梅拉苏的最后一次访谈似乎又回到了迪兰达提出的新唯物主义。巴拉德和布赖多蒂致力于建立一种立即具有本体论、认识论和伦理学意义的新唯物主义，而德兰达和梅拉苏似乎对本体论更感兴趣，这或者是以牺牲对认识论和伦理学的直接或同时兴趣为代价（德兰达），或者是通过引出分类学式的认识论问题（梅拉苏）。然而，这种解读本身就具有分类性，而且会在一定程度上划分领域，可能会夸大差异而忽略相似性。梅亚苏提出了一种新唯物主义（一种 "推测性唯物主义"），彻底改变了认识论与本体论之间的关系，从而产生了一种能够进入本体的新唯物主义。与其他三位受访者的项目相似，梅亚苏的反人类中心主义作品中，主观主义（又称社会建构主义、语言理想主义或身份政治学）尤其发生了质的转变。在这里，提出了一种 "现实主义"，意在最彻底地公正对待物质和自然的偶然性，同时强调思想的无限性。

In terms of academic attention, new materialism is in many ways a wave approaching its crest. The amount of publications on this topic is growing, especially in cultural and feminist theory (see e.g. Alaimo and Hekman eds. 2008; Coole and Frost eds. 2010; Bolt and Barrett eds. forthcoming). As the authors of this book we have engaged actively in the constitution and application of new materialism (e.g. Dolphijn 2004; van der Tuin 2008; Dolphijn 2011; van der Tuin 2011). With this book, which is the result of an intense cooperation over several years, we have aimed at producing an open cartography of new materialism that radically explores this new tradition in thought, and that aims at including all that it can virtually do.
就学术界的关注而言，新唯物主义在许多方面都是一个接近波峰的浪潮。有关这一主题的出版物数量不断增加，尤其是在文化和女性主义理论方面（参见 Alaimo 和 Hekman 编著，2008 年；Coole 和 Frost 编著，2010 年；Bolt 和 Barrett 编著，即将出版）。作为本书的作者，我们积极参与了新唯物主义的构成和应用（如 Dolphijn 2004; van der Tuin 2008; Dolphijn 2011; van der Tuin 2011）。本书是我们数年来密切合作的成果，我们的目标是绘制一幅新唯物主义的开放地图，从根本上探索这一新的思想传统，并将其所能做到的一切纳入其中。

I
I

Interviews
访谈

- Chapter 1
第 1 章

“The notion of the univocity of Being or single matter positions difference as a verb or process of becoming at the heart of the matter”
"存在或单一物质的单一性概念将差异作为动词或成为的过程置于问题的核心"。

Interview with Rosi Braidotti
采访罗西-布雷多蒂

Q1: In your contribution to Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook’s Deleuze and Feminist Theory you coined the term “neo-materialism” and provided a genealogy of it. Focusing on theories of the subject, one of the red threads running through your work, your genealogy “Descartes’ nightmare, Spinoza’s hope, Nietzsche’s complaint, Freud’s obsession, Lacan’s favorite fantasy” (Braidotti 2000, 159) is followed by a definition of the subject, the “I think” as the body of which it is an idea, which we see as the emblem of the new materialism:
Q1: 在您为伊恩-布坎南（Ian Buchanan）和克莱尔-科勒布鲁克（Claire Colebrook）的《德勒兹与女性主义理论》（Deleuze and Feminist Theory）所撰写的文章中，您创造了 "新唯物主义 "一词，并提供了其谱系。主体理论是贯穿您作品的一条红线，您的谱系 "笛卡尔的噩梦、斯宾诺莎的希望、尼采的抱怨、弗洛伊德的痴迷、拉康最爱的幻想"（Braidotti 2000, 159）之后是对主体的定义，"我思 "作为主体的一种理念，我们将其视为新唯物主义的标志：

A piece of meat activated by electric waves of desire, a text written by the unfolding of genetic encoding. Neither a sacralised inner sanctum, nor a pure socially shaped entity, the enfleshed Deleuzian subject is rather an ‘in-between’: it is a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous unfolding outwards of affects. A mobile entity, an enfleshed sort of memory that repeats and is capable of lasting through sets of discontinuous variations, while remaining faithful to itself. The Deleuzian body is ultimately an embodied memory (ibid.).
欲望的电波激活了一块肉，基因编码的展开书写了一段文字。既非神圣化的内心圣殿，也非纯粹的社会形态实体，德勒兹式的 "充血主体 "是一种 "介于两者之间 "的存在：它是外部影响的折叠，同时也是情感的向外展开。它是一个流动的实体，是一种被充实的记忆，它不断重复，能够通过一系列不连续的变化而持续，同时又忠实于自身。德勒兹的身体归根结底是一种具身的记忆（同上）。

In this text you stay close to the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze when developing the new materialism. The term, however, can already be found in Patterns of Dissonance, where you state that “a general direction of thought from its strictly Marxist definition. […] The neo-materialism of Foucault, the new materiality proposed by Deleuze are […] a point of no return for feminist theory” (Braidotti 1991, 263-6), and in Nomadic Subjects where it is stated that “What emerges in poststructuralist feminist reaffirmations of difference is […] a new materialist theory of the text and of textual practice” (Braidotti 1994, 154). How is “genealogy” important for you, and how is it that the full-fledged conceptualization of the new materialism came about in a text that focused on the philosophy of Deleuze?
在这篇文章中，您在阐释新唯物主义时紧扣吉尔-德勒兹的哲学思想。不过，在《失调模式》中已经可以找到这个术语，您在文中指出："从严格的马克思主义定义来看，新唯物主义是思想的大方向。[......]福柯的新唯物主义、德勒兹提出的新唯物主义是[......]女性主义理论的不归路"（Braidotti 1991, 263-6），而在《游牧主体》（Nomadic Subjects）一书中，您指出 "后结构主义女性主义对差异的重申是[......]一种关于文本和文本实践的新唯物主义理论"（Braidotti 1994, 154）。对您来说，"谱系学 "有什么重要意义？新唯物主义的全面概念化是如何在一篇以德勒兹哲学为重点的文章中产生的？

Rosi Braidotti: You’re right in pointing out the progressive development of and identification with the label “neo-materialism” within the corpus of my nomadic thought. Patterns of Dissonance announces my general project outline in theoretical terms, which are expressed in the mainstream language that is typical of book versions of former PhD dissertations. Then there follows a trilogy, composed by Nomadic Subjects, Metamorphoses and Transpositions. Nomadic Subjects—which incidentally has just been reissued by Columbia University Press in a totally revised second edition seventeen years after its original publication (Braidotti 2011b)—already has a more controversial message and a more upbeat style. Metamorphoses and Transpositions pursue the experiment in a conceptual structure that has grown more complex and rhizomatic and a style that attempts to do justice to this complexity, while not losing touch with the readers altogether.
罗西-布赖多蒂：你说得很对，在我的游牧思想中，"新唯物主义 "这一标签是逐步形成并被认同的。失调模式》以理论术语公布了我的总体项目大纲，用主流语言表达，这在以前的博士论文书籍版本中很典型。接下来是由 "游牧主体"、"变形 "和 "转换 "组成的三部曲。游牧题材》（Nomadic Subjects）--顺便提一下，哥伦比亚大学出版社在该书出版十七年后重新出版了经过全面修订的第二版（布莱多蒂，2011 年 b）--已经具有了更具争议性的信息和更加乐观的风格。蜕变与转换》在概念结构上进行了更复杂、更根深蒂固的实验，在文风上则试图对这种复杂性做出公正的处理，同时又不与读者完全脱节。

More theoretically, I would argue that, throughout the 1980’s, a text such as Althusser’s “Pour un materialisme aleatoire” had established a consensus across the whole spectrum of his students—Foucault, Deleuze, Balibar. It was clear that contemporary materialism had to be redefined in the light of recent scientific insights, notably psychoanalysis, but also in terms of the critical enquiry into the mutations of advanced capitalism. It was understood that the post-‘68 thinkers had to be simultaneously loyal to the Marxist legacy, but also critical and creative in adapting it to the fastchanging conditions of their historicity. That theoretico-political consensus made the term “materialist” both a necessity and a banality for some poststructuralists. Leading figures in the linguistic turn, such as Barthes and Lacan, wrote extensively and frequently about “the materiality of the sign.” In a way there was no real need to add the prefix “neo-” to the new materialist consensus at that point in time. That, however, will change.
从理论上讲，我认为在整个 20 世纪 80 年代，像阿尔都塞的《为无形的唯物主义》这样的文章已经在他的学生--福柯、德勒兹、巴利巴--中达成了共识。很明显，当代唯物主义必须根据最新的科学见解，特别是精神分析，以及对先进资本主义变异的批判性探索来重新定义。68年后的思想家们必须忠于马克思主义遗产，同时也要具有批判性和创造性，使其适应快速变化的历史条件。这种理论政治共识使得 "唯物主义 "一词对一些后结构主义者来说既是必要的，也是平庸的。语言学转向的领军人物，如巴特和拉康，广泛而频繁地论述 "符号的物质性"。在某种程度上，当时的新唯物主义共识并不需要加上 "新 "这个前缀。然而，这种情况将会改变。

What is clear is that by the mid-1990’s the differences among the various strands and branches of the post-structuralist project were becoming more explicit. The hegemonic position acquired by the linguistic branch—developed via psychoanalysis and semiotics into a fully-fledged deconstructive project that simply conquered intellectually the United States—intensified the need for clearer terms of demarcation and of theoretical definition. Thus “neo-materialism” emerges as a method, a conceptual frame and a political stand, which refuses the linguistic paradigm, stressing instead the concrete yet complex materiality of bodies immersed in social relations of power.
显而易见的是，到 20 世纪 90 年代中期，后结构主义项目各分支之间的分歧越来越明显。语言学分支所获得的霸权地位--通过精神分析学和符号学发展成为一个完全成熟的解构主义项目，在思想上征服了美国--加剧了对更清晰的分界和理论定义的需求。因此，"新唯物主义 "作为一种方法、一种概念框架和一种政治立场出现了，它拒绝语言范式，而是强调沉浸在社会权力关系中的身体的具体而复杂的物质性。

At that point, it became clear to me that the genealogical line that connected me to Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze also marked a distinctive tradition of thought on issues of embodiment and political subjectivity. The terminological differences between this branch and the deconstructive one also became sharper, as did the political priorities. Accordingly, “nomadic subjects” is neither about representation nor about recognition but rather about expression and actualization of practical alternatives. Gilles Deleuze—from his (smoky) seminar room at Vincennes— provided lucid and illuminating guidance to those involved in the project of redefining what exactly is the “matter” that neo-materialism is made of. Things get more conceptually rigorous from that moment on.
在这一点上，我清楚地认识到，将我与坎吉勒姆、福柯和德勒兹联系在一起的谱系也标志着一种关于体现和政治主体性问题的独特思想传统。这一分支与解构主义分支在术语上的差异也变得更加尖锐，政治重点也是如此。因此，"游牧主体 "既不是关于表征，也不是关于承认，而是关于表达和实现实际的选择。吉勒-德勒兹（Gilles Deleuze）--从他在万森纳（烟雾弥漫）的研讨室里--为那些参与重新定义新唯物主义的 "物质 "究竟是由什么构成的项目的人们提供了清晰而富有启发性的指导。从那时起，事情在概念上变得更加严谨了。

Feminism, of course, did more than its share. Feminist philosophy builds on the embodied and embedded brand of materialism that was pioneered in the last century by Simone de Beauvoir. It combines, in a complex and groundbreaking manner, phenomenological theory of embodiment with Marxist—and later on poststructuralist—re-elaborations of the complex intersection between bodies and power. This rich legacy has two long-lasting theoretical consequences. The first is that feminist philosophy goes even further than mainstream continental philosophy in rejecting dualistic partitions of minds from bodies or nature from culture. Whereas the chasm between the binary oppositions is bridged by Anglo-American gender theorists through dynamic schemes of social constructivism (Butler and
当然，女权主义也不甘示弱。女权主义哲学建立在西蒙娜-德-波伏娃（Simone de Beauvoir）在上世纪开创的体现和嵌入式唯物主义基础之上。它以一种复杂和开创性的方式，将关于具身的现象学理论与马克思主义--以及后来的后结构主义--对身体与权力之间复杂交集的重新阐释结合起来。这一丰富的遗产产生了两个长期的理论影响。首先，女性主义哲学比主流大陆哲学更进一步，摒弃了思想与身体或自然与文化的二元对立。英美性别理论家们通过社会建构主义的动态方案弥合了二元对立之间的鸿沟（巴特勒和

Scott eds. 1992), continental feminist perspectives move towards either theories of sexual difference or a monistic political ontology that makes the sex/gender distinction redundant.
斯科特编，1992 年），大陆女性主义观点要么转向性差异理论，要么转向一元论政治本体论，使性/性别区分变得多余。

The second consequence of this specific brand of materialism is that oppositional consciousness combines critique with creativity, in a “doubleedged vision” (Kelly 1979) that does not stop at critical deconstruction but moves on to the active production of alternatives. Thus, feminist philosophers have introduced a new brand of materialism, of the embodied and embedded kind. The cornerstone of this theoretical innovation is a specific brand of situated epistemology (Haraway 1988), which evolves from the practice of “the politics of location” (Rich 1985) and infuses standpoint feminist theory and the debates with postmodernist feminism (Harding 1991) throughout the 1990s.
这种特殊的唯物主义的第二个后果是，对立意识将批判与创造结合在一起，在一种 "双刃视角"（凯利，1979 年）中，这种视角并没有停留在批判性的解构上，而是转向积极地生产替代品。因此，女性主义哲学家引入了一种新的唯物主义，一种体现的、嵌入式的唯物主义。这一理论创新的基石是一种特定的情景认识论（哈拉维，1988 年），它从 "位置政治"（里奇，1985 年）的实践中发展而来，并在整个 20 世纪 90 年代注入了立场女性主义理论以及与后现代主义女性主义的争论（哈丁，1991 年）。

As a meta-methodological innovation, the embodied and embedded brand of feminist materialist philosophy of the subject introduces a break from both universalism and dualism. As for the former, universalist claims to a subject position that allegedly transcends spatio-temporal and geo-political specificities are criticised for being dis-embodied and dis-embedded, i.e., abstract. Universalism, best exemplified in the notion of “abstract masculinity” (Hartsock 1987) and triumphant whiteness (Ware 1992), is objectionable not only on epistemological, but also on ethical grounds. Situated perspectives lay the pre-conditions for ethical accountability for one’s own implications with the very structures one is analyzing and opposing politically. The key concept in feminist materialism is the sexualized nature and the radical immanence of power relations and their effects upon the world. In this Foucauldian perspective, power is not only negative or confining (potestas), but also affirmative (potentia) or productive of alternative subject positions and social relations.
作为元方法论上的创新，女性主义唯物主义主体哲学的体现和嵌入品牌打破了普遍主义和二元论。就前者而言，普遍主义主张的主体地位据称超越了时空和地缘政治的特殊性，但却被批评为非体现和非嵌入，即抽象。抽象的男性气质"（Hartsock，1987 年）和 "胜利的白人"（Ware，1992 年）概念中最典型的普遍主义，不仅在认识论上，而且在伦理上都是令人反感的。情境视角为一个人在政治上分析和反对的结构所产生的影响奠定了道德责任的先决条件。女性主义唯物主义的关键概念是权力关系及其对世界影响的性化本质和根本性内在性。在福柯的这一观点中，权力不仅是消极的或限制性的（potestas），而且也是肯定性的（potentia），或者说是另类主体地位和社会关系的生产力。

Feminist anti-humanism, also known as postmodern feminism, expanded on the basic critique of one-sided universalism, while pointing out the dangers implicit in a flat application of equal opportunities policies. Contrary to “standpoint theory” (Harding 1986), post-humanist feminist philosophers do not unquestionably rely on the notion of “difference,” as the dialectical motor of social change. They rather add more complexity to this debate by analyzing the ways in which “otherness” and “sameness” interact in an asymmetrical set of power relations. This is analogous to Deleuze’s theories of Otherness; his emphasis on processes, dynamic interaction and fluid boundaries is a materialist, high-tech brand of vitalism, which makes Deleuze’s thought highly relevant to the analysis of the late industrialist patriarchal culture we inhabit. Furthermore, Deleuze’s work is of high relevance for feminism: not only does he display a great empathy with issues of difference, sexuality and transformation, but he also invests the site of the feminine with positive force. Conveyed by figurations such as the non-Oedipal Alice: the little girl about to be dispossessed of her body by the Oedipal Law, or by the more affirmative figure of the philosopher’s fiancee Ariadne, the feminine face of philosophy is one of the sources of the transmutation of values from negative into affirmative. This metamorphosis allows Deleuze to overcome the boundaries that separate mere critique from active empowerment. Last but not least, Deleuze’s emphasis on the “becoming woman” of philosophy marks a new kind of masculine style of philosophy: it is a philosophical sensibility which has learned to undo the straitjacket of phallocentrism and to take a few risks. In Deleuze’s thought, the “other” is not the emblematic and invariably vampirized mark of alterity, as in classical philosophy. Nor is it a fetishized and necessarily othered “other,” as in deconstruction.
反人道主义的女权主义，也被称为后现代女权主义，在对片面的普遍主义进行基本批判的基础上进行了扩展，同时指出了在平等机会政策的平面应用中所隐含的危险。与 "立场理论"（哈丁，1986 年）相反，后人道主义女性主义哲学家并没有毫无疑问地依赖 "差异 "这一概念作为社会变革的辩证动力。相反，她们通过分析 "他者 "与 "同一 "在一系列不对称的权力关系中的互动方式，为这场辩论增添了更多的复杂性。这与德勒兹的 "他者 "理论相似；他强调过程、动态互动和流动边界，是一种唯物主义、高科技的生命论，这使得德勒兹的思想与分析我们所处的晚期工业主义父权制文化高度相关。此外，德勒兹的作品还与女性主义高度相关：他不仅对差异、性和转变等问题表现出极大的共鸣，还为女性的场所注入了积极的力量。通过非俄狄浦斯式的爱丽丝（即将被俄狄浦斯律法剥夺身体的小女孩）或哲学家的未婚妻阿里阿德涅这一更具肯定性的形象等形象，哲学的女性面貌是价值观从消极转化为肯定的源泉之一。这种蜕变使德勒兹突破了单纯批判与积极赋权之间的界限。最后但并非最不重要的一点是，德勒兹对哲学的 "女性化 "的强调标志着一种新的男性哲学风格：这是一种哲学感性，它学会了解开阴茎中心主义的束缚，学会了冒一些风险。 在德勒兹的思想中，"他者 "并不像古典哲学中的 "他者 "那样，是象征性的、一成不变的、被吸血鬼化了的 "改变性 "的标志。他者 "也不像解构主义中的 "他者 "那样，是被迷信化的、必然被他者化的 "他者"。
It is a moving horizon of exchanges and becoming, towards which the non-unitary subjects of postmodernity move, are by which they are moved in return.
后现代的非统一主体向它迈进，同时也被它所吸引。

This double genealogy makes my own relationship to materialism into a lifelong engagement with complexities and inner contradictions.
这种双重谱系使我自己与唯物主义的关系成为一种终生与复杂性和内在矛盾的接触。

Q2: In the same chapter in Deleuze and Feminist Theory the new materialism is also called “anti-maternalist” (Braidotti 2000, 172). Maternal feminism surely is, along with feminist standpoint theory, a feminist materialism. So, on the menu we find “the naturalistic paradigm” and its “definitive loss” (ibid., 158), feminist materialisms, “social constructivism” (ibid.), and, finally, “a more radical sense of materialism” (ibid., 161), that is, an “anti-essentialism” (ibid., 158), “a form of neo-materialism and a blend of vitalism that is attuned to the technological era” (ibid., 160). In Metamorphoses you propose a cartographical method for contemporary philosophical dialogue according to which “we think of powerrelations simultaneously as the most ‘external’, collective, social phenomenon and also as the most intimate or ‘internal’ one” (Braidotti 2002a, 6). Looking back at your chapter in Deleuze and Feminist Theory, how would you employ this method to draw a contemporary map of the new feminist materialist dialogue? Or, from a slightly different angle, your chapter from Patterns of Dissonance on the radical philosophies of sexual difference (a branch of feminist theory that does not necessarily overlap with the trademarked “French feminism” and which is very much a materialism) closes with the provocative question: “have they been heard?” (Braidotti 1991, 273). How would you answer your 1991 question nowadays, amidst the theorizations of new feminist materialisms?
问题 2：在《德勒兹与女性主义理论》的同一章节中，新唯物主义也被称为 "反母权主义"（Braidotti 2000, 172）。母性女性主义与女性主义立场理论一样，肯定是一种女性主义唯物主义。因此，在菜单上，我们可以找到 "自然主义范式 "及其 "彻底丧失"（同上，158）、女性主义唯物主义、"社会建构主义"（同上），以及最后的 "更激进意义上的唯物主义"（同上，161），即 "反本质主义"（同上，158）、"新唯物主义的一种形式以及与技术时代相适应的活力主义的混合"（同上，160）。在《变形记》中，您为当代哲学对话提出了一种制图方法，根据这种方法，"我们将权力关系同时视为最'外部'、最集体、最社会的现象，也视为最亲密或最'内部'的现象"（Braidotti 2002a, 6）。回顾您在《德勒兹与女性主义理论》一书中的章节，您将如何运用这一方法绘制新女性主义唯物主义对话的当代地图？或者，从一个稍有不同的角度来看，您在《失调模式》（Patterns of Dissonance）一书中关于激进的性差异哲学（女性主义理论的一个分支，不一定与 "法国女性主义 "商标重叠，但在很大程度上是一种唯物主义）的一章，以一个具有启发性的问题结尾："她们的声音被听到了吗？(Braidotti 1991, 273）。如今，在新的女性主义唯物主义理论中，您将如何回答 1991 年的问题？

RB: The issue of the relationship between the material and the maternal was crucial for my generation. Part of it was contextual: we were the first ones in fact to enjoy the privilege of having strong, feminist teachers and supervisors in our academic work. In my case, I had as teachers and role models women of the caliber of Genevieve Lloyd and Luce Irigaray, Michelle Perrot and Joan Scott—to mention just the major ones. Talk about the anxiety of influence! This sort of lineage made the issue of the oedipalization of the pedagogical relationship into a crucial and complicated matter. Another reason for it was of course theoretical: if you look back at the scholarship of the 1980s, you will find a plethora of texts and treatises on pedagogics and mother-daughter relationships. Psychoanalysis alone blew this issue out of all proportions, and with the privilege of hindsight you may say that the entire post-1968 generation has a big negative relation to their mothers and fathers. I guess all members of a revolutionary generation are marked by the violence of a break, an inevitable rupture from the previous generation.
RB: 对于我们这一代人来说，物质与母性之间的关系问题至关重要。部分原因在于当时的环境：事实上，我们是第一批有幸在学术工作中拥有强大的女权主义教师和导师的人。就我而言，我的老师和榜样是吉纳维芙-劳埃德（Genevieve Lloyd）、卢斯-伊里格瑞（Luce Irigaray）、米歇尔-佩罗（Michelle Perrot）和琼-斯科特（Joan Scott）--这只是其中主要的几位。这就是影响的焦虑！这种一脉相承的关系使得教学关系中的恋母情结成为一个关键而复杂的问题。另一个原因当然是理论上的：如果你回顾一下 20 世纪 80 年代的学术研究，你会发现大量关于教育学和母女关系的文章和论文。单是精神分析就把这个问题吹得天花乱坠，事后你可以说，1968 年后的整整一代人都与他们的母亲和父亲有很大的负面关系。我想，所有革命一代的成员都带有暴力的烙印，不可避免地与上一代断裂。

Personally, I fast grew allergic to the whole oedipal theme, also because I witnessed the many violent and sharp conflicts it engendered in the feminist community—the clash between Cixous and de Beauvoir being a legendary one. In some ways I was scared of the negative passions that the “maternal” mobilized in a highly politicized context. I consequently took shelter in the first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, aptly called Anti-Oedipus, and made sure to apply it to the question of how to develop an independent yet loyal system of thought in relation to the development of feminist philosophy. This choice coincided with my decision to bring feminism into the institutions, which I took as a process of democratic accountability. Central to it, of course, is the project of inter-generational justice.
就我个人而言，我很快就对整个恋母情结主题过敏了，这也是因为我目睹了它在女权主义团体中引发的许多激烈而尖锐的冲突--西绪和德-波伏娃之间的冲突就是一个传奇。在某种程度上，我害怕 "母性 "在高度政治化的背景下所激发的负面激情。因此，我选择了《资本主义与精神分裂症》（Anti-Oedipus）第一卷作为避难所，并将其应用于如何在女性主义哲学的发展过程中建立一个独立而忠诚的思想体系。这一选择与我将女性主义带入体制的决定不谋而合，我将其视为一个民主问责的过程。当然，其核心是代际正义项目。

All of my cartographies are as inclusive as I’m capable of making them and I’ve carefully avoided sectarianism, while taking a firm theoretical and political stand (Braidotti 2010). This standpoint was also for me a way of staying sane through the multiple “theory wars” and “culture wars” we witnessed through the 1990’s, as the right wing took over the agenda in the USA and the post-1989 global consensus tends to dismiss the key traditions of thought I consider as fundamental for my work: Marxist and poststructuralist theories of materialism.
我所绘制的所有地图都在我力所能及的范围内具有包容性，我谨慎地避免了宗派主义，同时采取了坚定的理论和政治立场（布莱多蒂，2010年）。对我来说，这种立场也是在 1990 年代我们目睹的多重 "理论战争 "和 "文化战争 "中保持理智的一种方式，当时美国右翼接管了议程，1989 年后的全球共识倾向于否定我认为对我的工作至关重要的关键思想传统：马克思主义和后结构主义的唯物主义理论。

Right now there is a need for a systematic meta-discursive approach to the interdisciplinary methods of feminist philosophy. This is among the top priorities for philosophy today (Alcoff 2000) as well as women’s, gender and feminist studies as an established discipline (Wiegman 2002). If it is the case that what was once subversive is now mainstream, it follows that the challenge for feminist philosophers today is how to hold their position, while striving to achieve more conceptual creativity (Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994).
目前，需要对女权主义哲学的跨学科方法进行系统的元辨证研究。这是当今哲学（Alcoff，2000 年）以及作为一门成熟学科的妇女、性别和女权研究（Wiegman，2002 年）的当务之急。如果曾经是颠覆性的东西如今已成为主流，那么当今女性主义哲学家面临的挑战就是如何坚守自己的立场，同时努力实现更多的概念创造性（德勒兹和瓜塔里 [1991] 1994）。

In a globally connected and technologically mediated world that is marked by rapid changes, structural inequalities and increased militarization, feminist scholarship has intensified theoretical and methodological efforts to come to grips with the complexities of the present, while resisting the moral and cognitive panic that marks so much of contemporary social theories of globalization (Fukuyama 2002, Habermas 2003). With the demise of postmodernism, which has gone down in history as a form of radical scepticism and moral and cognitive relativism, feminist philosophers tend to move beyond the linguistic mediation paradigm of deconstructive theory and to work instead towards the production of robust alternatives. Issues of embodiment and accountability, positionality and location have become both more relevant and more diverse. My main argument is that feminist philosophy is currently finding a new course between post-humanism on the one hand and post-anthropocentric theories on the other. The convergence between these two approaches, multiplied across the many inter-disciplinary lines that structure feminist theory, ends up radicalizing the very premises of feminist philosophy. It results especially in a reconsideration of the priority of sexuality and the relevance of the sex/ gender distinction.
在这个全球相连、以技术为媒介的世界中，变化日新月异，结构性不平等和军事化日益加剧，女性主义学术研究加强了理论和方法上的努力，以应对当前的复杂性，同时抵制当代全球化社会理论中的道德和认知恐慌（福山，2002 年；哈贝马斯，2003 年）。后现代主义作为一种激进的怀疑主义以及道德和认知相对主义而被载入史册，随着后现代主义的消亡，女权主义哲学家倾向于超越解构理论的语言中介范式，转而致力于创造强有力的替代方案。体现与责任、立场与位置等问题变得更加相关，也更加多样化。我的主要论点是，女性主义哲学目前正在后人文主义和后人类中心主义理论之间找到一条新的道路。这两种方法的交汇，加之女性主义理论所涉及的众多跨学科领域，最终激化了女性主义哲学的前提。这尤其导致了对性的优先地位和性/性别区分相关性的重新思考。

It is more difficult to answer the question of whether the radical philosophies of sexual difference, as a form of neo-materialism that doesn’t necessarily overlap with French feminism (a misnomer on many accounts) had actually been heard. The paradigmatic status of the sex/ gender distinction in American feminist theory and the global reach of this paradigm, for instance across the former Eastern Europe after 1989, has made it difficult for situated European perspectives to keep alive, let alone move forth.
性差异的激进哲学作为一种新唯物主义形式，与法国女权主义并不一定重叠（很多说法都是误称），是否真正听到了这种哲学的声音，这个问题更难回答。性/性别差异在美国女权主义理论中的范式地位以及这一范式的全球影响，例如 1989 年后在前东欧的影响，使得欧洲的观点很难继续存在，更不用说向前发展了。

Most notably, this sex/gender distinction has become the core of the so-called “Trans-Atlantic dis-connection.” If I were to attempt to translate this into the language of feminist theory, I would say that “the body” in U.S. feminism cannot be positively associated with sexuality in either the critical or the public discourse. Sexuality, which is the fundamental paradigm in the critical discourses of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, simply has no place to be in American political discourse: it got strangled. What chance, then, did “French feminism” have? The sex/gender dichotomy swung towards the pole of gender with a vengeance, disembodying it under the joint cover of liberal individual “rights” and social constructivist “change.” It was left to the gay and lesbian and queer campaigners to try to reverse this trend, rewriting sexuality into the feminist agenda. For instance, Teresa de Lauretis (1994) returns to issues of psychoanalytic desire in order to provide a foundational theory of lesbian identity. Judith Butler reverses the order of priorities in the sex/gender dichotomy in favor of the former and manages to combine Foucault with Wittig. By now, observers begin to speak of American post-structuralism as a movement of its own, with its own specific features and conceptual aims. The fact that most leading French poststructuralists take up regular teaching positions in the USA favors this second life of post-structuralism, which in the meantime dies away in Europe and disappears especially from the French intellectual scene. By the start of the third millennium, “French” theory belongs to the world in a diasporic, not a universalist mode. The Frenchness of post-structuralism is lost in translation indeed, just as it undergoes a conceptual mutation in the Trans-Atlantic transition.
最值得注意的是，这种性/性别的区分已经成为所谓的 "跨大西洋断裂 "的核心。如果要我尝试将其转化为女权主义理论的语言，我会说，美国女权主义中的 "身体 "在批判性或公共话语中都无法与性积极地联系在一起。作为精神分析和后结构主义批判话语基本范式的性，在美国政治话语中根本没有立足之地：它被扼杀了。那么，"法国女权主义 "还有什么机会呢？性/性别二分法以复仇的姿态向性别一极摇摆，在自由主义的个人 "权利 "和社会建构主义的 "变革 "的共同掩护下将其分解。男同性恋、女同性恋和同性恋运动者试图扭转这一趋势，将性纳入女权主义议程。例如，特雷莎-德-劳雷蒂斯（Teresa de Lauretis，1994 年）回到精神分析的欲望问题，为女同性恋的身份认同提供了基础理论。朱迪斯-巴特勒（Judith Butler）颠倒了性/性别二分法的优先顺序，转而支持前者，并设法将福柯与维蒂希结合起来。至此，观察家们开始将美国后结构主义视为一场自成体系的运动，有其自身的特点和概念目标。大多数法国著名的后结构主义者都在美国担任固定的教职，这一事实有利于后结构主义的第二次生命，与此同时，后结构主义在欧洲逐渐消亡，尤其是在法国知识界销声匿迹。在第三个千年伊始，"法国 "理论以一种散居的而非普遍主义的模式走向世界。 正如后结构主义在跨大西洋转型中经历了概念上的变异一样，后结构主义的法兰西性在翻译中也确实丢失了。

One practical action I took in order to make sure that other, more European approaches were heard is to set up EU-wide networks of women’s gender and feminist studies, of which ATHENA (the Advanced Thematic Network of Women’s Studies in Europe) is the best example. Theoretically, my function as ATHENA founding director resulted in friendly but firm criticism of American hegemony in feminist theory and an attempt to develop other perspectives, drawn from historical and situated European traditions. I think we’ve been heard, insofar as counter-memories and alternative genealogies can ever be heard. The sheer tone and structure of this interview with you—a younger generation of critical thinkers—gives me great reason to rejoice and feel a renewed hope.
为了确保其他更具欧洲特色的研究方法能够得到倾听，我采取了一项实际行动，那就是在欧盟范围内建立妇女性别和女权研究网络，其中最典型的例子就是 ATHENA（欧洲妇女研究高级专题网络）。从理论上讲，我作为 ATHENA 的创始主任，对美国女权主义理论霸权进行了友好而坚定的批评，并尝试从欧洲的历史和传统中发展其他观点。我认为，只要反记忆和另类谱系的声音能够被听到，我们就已经被听到了。与你们--年轻一代的批判思想家--的访谈的纯粹基调和结构，让我有极大的理由感到欢欣鼓舞，并重新燃起希望。

Q3: Your philosophy has always been a philosophy of difference. In the chapter “Sexual Difference as a Nomadic Political Project” from Nomadic Subjects (1994) you explain why, and follow Luce Irigaray doing so. First, you claim to attempt to shift difference-as-a-dialectics, which underpins Western, Eurocentric thought. Here, “in this history,” you claim, “difference” has been predicated on relations of domination and exclusion, to be “different-from” came to mean to be “less than,” to be worth less than” (Braidotti 1994, 147; original emphasis). Second, you try to break through the canon of Western feminism, which has dismissed sexual difference “in the name of a polemical form of “antiessentialism,” or of a utopian longing for a position “beyond gender,” (ibid., 149). Developing your own approach, you have consistently focused on “sexual difference as a project,” as a “nomadic political project” (ibid.). Doing so, you have relied on so-called “French feminism” and “French theory.”
问题 3：您的哲学一直是一种差异哲学。在《游牧主体》（Nomadic Subjects）（1994 年）的 "作为游牧政治项目的性差异 "一章中，您解释了原因，并效仿了卢斯-伊里格瑞（Luce Irigaray）的做法。首先，您声称要尝试转变作为西方、欧洲中心主义思想基础的 "差异即辩证法"。在这里，"在这段历史中，"你声称，"差异 "是以统治和排斥关系为前提的，"与众不同 "意味着 "不如"，意味着价值低于"（Braidotti 1994, 147；原文强调）。其次，您试图突破西方女权主义的传统，西方女权主义 "以论战形式的 "反本质主义 "或乌托邦式的对 "超越性别的 "立场的渴望为名"（同上，149），否定性差异。您在发展自己的研究方法时，始终将 "性差异作为一个项目"，作为一个 "游牧的政治项目"（同上）。在此过程中，您依赖于所谓的 "法国女性主义 "和 "法国理论"。

Having discussed “French feminism” and its place in contemporary academia in question 2, what is your take on French theory at large in contemporary academia? Apart from its canonical version, which has been created in an Anglo-U.S. context just like “French feminism,” do you see minor traditions in academia that are equally “French”? And if so, how do they look and how are they related to the new materialism?
问题 2 讨论了 "法国女权主义 "及其在当代学术界的地位，那么您如何看待当代学术界的整个法国理论？除了像 "法国女权主义 "一样在英美语境下产生的经典版本之外，您是否在学术界看到了同样 "法国 "的次要传统？如果有，它们的面貌如何，与新唯物主义有何关联？

RB: It is clear by now that we need to deterritorialize French theory in order to rescue it from the debacle it suffered in North America. This is a double challenge, considering how right-wing the European intellectual context has become in the last decade. A further factor that delays the development of situated European perspectives is the perennial hostility between French and German philosophical traditions. There are however three main points worth stressing: first, a tendency to move beyond the analytic versus Continental divide in philosophy, as indicated by John Mullarkey (2006) in his work on “post-continental” philosophy. German philosopher Dieter Thoma makes a similar case in the volume I edited for the History of Continental Philosophy (Braidotti ed. 2010). These are encouraging developments that allow us to activate new theoretical and methodological resources within the previously antagonistic traditions.
罗伯特-布里格斯：现在已经很清楚，我们需要将法国理论非本土化，以便将其从北美的失败中拯救出来。考虑到过去十年欧洲知识界的右翼化，这是一个双重挑战。此外，法国与德国哲学传统之间长期存在的敌意也是阻碍欧洲本土化视角发展的因素之一。不过，有三个要点值得强调：首先，正如约翰-穆拉基（John Mullarkey，2006 年）在其关于 "后大陆 "哲学的著作中所指出的那样，在哲学中出现了一种超越分析哲学与大陆哲学之分的趋势。德国哲学家迪特尔-托马（Dieter Thoma）在我主编的《大陆哲学史》（Braidotti ed. 2010）一书中也提出了类似的观点。这些都是令人鼓舞的发展，使我们能够在以前对立的传统中激活新的理论和方法论资源。

Second, the productive contribution of radical epistemologies to the reception of French philosophy also needs to be stressed. Nowadays, there can be no reading of Canguilhem without taking into account Haraway’s work; no Derrida without Butler or Spivak; no Foucault without Stuart Hall and no Deleuze without materialist feminists. This is a point of no return.
其次，还需要强调激进认识论对接受法国哲学的富有成效的贡献。如今，如果不考虑哈拉维的著作，就无法解读康吉伦；如果不考虑巴特勒或斯皮瓦克，就无法解读德里达；如果不考虑斯图亚特-霍尔，就无法解读福柯；如果不考虑唯物主义女权主义者，就无法解读德勒兹。这是一个不归点。

Third, to address more directly your question I think French philosophy is rich in minor traditions, which we would do well to revisit. They range from the less globally recognized, but nonetheless quintessentially French tradition of philosophy of science and epistemology to the emphasis on sexuality of the libertine tradition. My personal favorite is the enchanted materialism of Diderot and an established tradition that links rationalism directly to the imagination. They are a multiplicity of mountain streams that converge upon mainstream materialism.
第三，为了更直接地回答您的问题，我认为法国哲学有着丰富的次要传统，我们应该重新审视这些传统。这些传统包括科学哲学和认识论，也包括强调性的自由主义传统。我个人最喜欢狄德罗的迷幻唯物主义，以及将理性主义与想象力直接联系起来的既有传统。它们是汇聚于主流唯物主义的多重山涧溪流。

Q4: Do you agree that difference is quintessential to the new materialism? And if so, how would you define its take on difference?
问题 4：你是否同意差异是新唯物主义的精髓？如果是，您如何定义它对差异的看法？

RB: Absolutely—especially if one follows Deleuze on this point and posits monism as the fundamental ontology. The notion of the univocity of Being or single matter positions difference as a verb or process of becoming at the heart of that matter. There are only variations or modulations of space and time within a common block so it’s all about patterns of repetition and difference. Within such a system of thought, moreover, sexual difference plays a crucial role.
罗伯特-布里格斯：完全正确--尤其是如果我们在这一点上追随德勒兹，将一元论作为基本的本体论。存在 "或 "单一物质 "的 "单一性 "概念将 "差异 "定位为 "动词 "或 "成为过程 "的核心。在一个共同的整体中，只有空间和时间的变化或调制，因此一切都与重复和差异的模式有关。此外，在这种思想体系中，性差异扮演着至关重要的角色。

Sexual difference in particular poses the question of the conditions of possibility for thought as a self-originating system of representation of itself as the ultimate presence. Thus, sexual difference produces subjectivity in general. The conceptual tool by which Irigaray had already shown this peculiar logic is the notion of “the sensible transcendental.” By showing that what is erased in the process of erection of the transcendental subject are the maternal grounds of origin, Irigaray simultaneously demystifies the vertical transcendence of the subject and calls for an alternative metaphysics. Irigaray’s transcendental is sensible and grounded in the very particular fact that all human life is, for the time being, still “of woman born” (Rich 1976). There are resonances between the early Irigaray and Deleuze’s work.
性差异尤其提出了一个问题，即思想作为一种自发的表征系统，其自身作为终极存在的可能性条件。因此，性差异产生了一般的主体性。伊里格瑞展示这一特殊逻辑的概念工具是 "感性超越 "的概念。伊里格瑞指出，在超越性主体的建立过程中被抹去的是起源的母性基础，她同时揭开了主体纵向超越性的神秘面纱，并呼唤另一种形而上学。伊里格瑞的超验性是感性的，其基础是所有人类生命目前仍是 "女人所生"（里奇，1976 年）这一特殊事实。早期的伊里格瑞与德勒兹的作品之间存在共鸣。

As I have often argued, Deleuze’s emphasis on the productive and positive force of difference is troublesome for feminist theory in so far as it challenges the foundational value of sexual difference. For Irigaray, on the other hand, the metaphysical question of sexual difference is the horizon of feminist theory; for Grosz ([1993] 1994) it is even its precondition. For Butler (1993) difference is a problem to overcome, as a limit of the discourse of embodiment; for me however sexual difference is the situated corporeal location that one starts from—it is a negotiable, transversal, affective space. The advantage of a Deleuzian as well as Irigarayan approach is that the emphasis shifts from the metaphysics to the ethics of sexual difference. Deleuze’s brand of philosophical pragmatism questions whether sexual difference demands metaphysics at all. The distinctive traits of nomadic sexual difference theory is that difference is not taken as a problem to solve, or an obstacle to overcome, but rather as a fact and a factor of our situated, corporeal location. And it is not a prerogative only of humans, either. This has important methodological consequences.
正如我经常论证的那样，德勒兹强调差异的生产性和积极力量，这对女性主义理论来说是个麻烦，因为它挑战了性差异的基础价值。另一方面，对伊里格瑞来说，性差异的形而上学问题是女性主义理论的地平线；对格罗斯（[1993] 1994 年）来说，它甚至是女性主义理论的先决条件。对巴特勒（1993 年）来说，差异是一个需要克服的问题，是体现论述的一个局限；但对我来说，性差异是一个人的身体出发点--它是一个可协商的、横向的、情感的空间。德勒兹和伊里格拉扬方法的优势在于，重点从性差异的形而上学转向了伦理学。德勒兹的哲学实用主义品牌质疑性差异是否需要形而上学。游牧性差异理论的显著特点是，差异不是一个需要解决的问题，也不是一个需要克服的障碍，而是一个事实，是我们所处的肉体位置的一个因素。它也不仅仅是人类的特权。这就产生了重要的方法论后果。

Following Deleuze’s empiricism, Colebrook for instance wants to shift the grounds of the debate away from metaphysical foundations to a philosophy of immanence that stresses the need to create new concepts. This creative gesture is a way of responding to the given, to experience, and is thus linked to the notion of the event. The creation of concepts is itself experience or experimentation. There is a double implication here: firstly that philosophy need not be seen as the master discourse or the unavoidable horizon of thought: artistic and scientific practices have their role to play as well. Secondly, given that ethical questions do not require metaphysics, the feminist engagement with concepts need not be critical but can be inventive and creative. In other words, experimenting with thinking is what we all need to learn. That implies the de-territorialization of the very sexual difference we started off from.
例如，科尔布鲁克追随德勒兹的经验主义，希望将辩论的基础从形而上学的基础转移到强调需要创造新概念的内在性哲学上来。这种创造性的姿态是对既定事物和经验做出回应的一种方式，因此与事件的概念相关联。概念的创造本身就是经验或实验。这里有双重含义：首先，哲学不必被视为主话语或不可避免的思想视野：艺术和科学实践也有其作用。其次，鉴于伦理问题不需要形而上学，女性主义对概念的参与不必是批判性的，而可以是创造性的。换句话说，尝试思考是我们所有人都需要学习的。这意味着我们从性别差异开始的去地域化。

Q5: In your recent work you focus on “post-humanism” and “post-secularism.” In two articles in Theory, Culture and Society you elaborate on both terms. In fact, you immediately complexify the post-human by weaving a post-anthropocentrism through it, which is an intervention ascribed to feminist theory: “The feminist post-anthropocentric approach […] also challenges the androcentrism of the poststructuralists’ corporeal materialism” (Braidotti 2006, 198). In addition, you claim that for instance Donna Haraway’s post-anthropocentric post-humanism is not an anti-foundationalism; it is a “process ontology” instead (ibid., 199).
Q5: 在您最近的著作中，您重点讨论了 "后人文主义 "和 "后世俗主义"。在《理论、文化与社会》杂志的两篇文章中，您对这两个术语进行了阐述。事实上，您通过编织后人类中心主义，立即将后人类复杂化了，这是对女性主义理论的干预："女性主义的后人类中心主义方法[......]也挑战了后结构主义者的肉体物质主义的雄性中心主义"（Braidotti 2006, 198）。此外，您还声称唐娜-哈拉维（Donna Haraway）的后人类中心主义后人文主义不是反基础主义，而是一种 "过程本体论"（同上，199）。

Apart from the fact that you capitalize on Haraway’s Whiteheadian moment here (“Beings do not pre-exist their relatings” (Haraway 2003, 6)), you also ascribe a specific theory of time to feminist post-humanism, a theory that seems Bergsonian:
除了你在这里利用了哈拉维的怀特海时刻（"存在并不先于其关系而存在"（哈拉维，2003 年，6）），你还为女性主义后人道主义赋予了一种特定的时间理论，这种理论似乎是柏格森式的：

To be in process or transition does not place the thinking subject outside history or time […]. A location is an embedded and embodied memory: it is a set of counter-memories, which are activated by the resisting thinker against the grain of the dominant representations of subjectivity. A location is a materialist temporal and spatial site of co-production of the subject, and thus anything but an instance of relativism (Braidotti 2006, 199).
处于过程或过渡中并不意味着思维主体置身于历史或时间之外[......]。位置是一种嵌入和体现的记忆：它是一组反记忆，由反抗者激活，与主体性的主流表征背道而驰。地点是主体共同生产的唯物主义时空场所，因此不是相对主义的实例（Braidotti 2006, 199）。

Process ontology, along with neo-vitalism, also provides the key to your conceptualization of the post-secular, albeit that sticking to the psychoanalytic frame remains of importance to you (Braidotti 2008, 12-13). In your work, postsecularism is conceptualized as follows:
过程本体论以及新资本主义也为您的后世俗主义概念化提供了关键，尽管坚持精神分析框架对您来说仍然很重要（Braidotti 2008, 12-13）。在您的著作中，后世俗主义被概念化如下：

The post secular position on the affirmative force of oppositional consciousness inevitably raises the question of faith in possible futures, which is one of the aspects of […] residual spirituality […]. Faith in progress itself is a vote of confidence in the future. Ultimately, it is a belief in the perfectibility of Wo/Man, albeit it in a much more grounded, accountable mode that privileges partial perspectives, as Haraway (1988) put it. It is a post secular position in that it is an immanent, not transcendental theory, which posits generous bonds of cosmopolitanism, solidarity and community across locations and generations. It also expresses sizeable doses of residual spirituality in its yearning for social justice and sustainability (ibid., 18).
后世俗立场对反对意识的肯定力量不可避免地提出了对可能的未来的信心问题，这是[......]残余精神的一个方面[......]。对进步的信仰本身就是对未来的信心。归根结底，它是一种对 "和/人 "完美性的信念，尽管正如哈拉维（Haraway，1988 年）所说的那样，它采用的是一种更接地气、更负责任的模式，赋予了局部视角以特权。它是一种后世俗的立场，因为它是一种内在的而非超验的理论，假定了跨地域、跨时代的世界主义、团结和社区的慷慨纽带。在对社会正义和可持续发展的向往中，它也表达了相当大的残余灵性（同上，18）。

In your view, the post-secular is thus intrinsic to contemporary feminist theories of difference, perceived as structured by a politics of affirmation rather than negation or dialectics (ibid., 13). And once more, theory’s non-linear temporality, in its Whiteheadian as well as Bergsonian mode, appears to be key.
因此，在您看来，后世俗是当代女性主义差异理论的内在要素，是由肯定而非否定或辩证的政治所构建的（同上，13）。此外，理论的非线性时间性，无论是怀特海模式还是柏格森模式，似乎都是关键所在。

In your theorization of the post-secular, however, the strong anti-androcentric approach of feminist theory seems to disappear somewhat, albeit that process ontology and neo-vitalism are explicited. How is post-secular feminism an anti-androcentrism? How, for instance, should we conceptualize this faith in “the perfectibility of Wo/Man”?
然而，在您的后世俗理论中，尽管阐述了过程本体论和新资本主义，但女性主义理论中强烈的反大中心主义似乎有些消失。后世俗女性主义是如何反大中心主义的？例如，我们应该如何理解这种对 "和/人的完美性 "的信仰？

RB: My starting assumption is that the post-secular turn challenges European political theory in general and feminism in particular because it makes manifest the notion that agency, or political subjectivity, can actually be conveyed through and supported by religious piety and may even involve significant amounts of spirituality. This statement has an important corollary—namely, that political agency need not be critical in the negative sense of oppositional and thus may not be aimed solely or primarily at the production of counter-subjectivities. Subjectivity is rather a process ontology of auto-poiesis or self-styling, which involves complex and continuous negotiations with dominant norms and values and hence also multiple forms of accountability. This position is defended within feminism by a variety of different thinkers ranging from Harding and Narayan (2000) to Mahmood (2005).
RB: 我的出发点是，后世俗转向对欧洲政治理论，尤其是女性主义提出了挑战，因为它表明了这样一种观念，即政治能动性或政治主体性实际上可以通过宗教虔诚来传达并得到宗教虔诚的支持，甚至可能涉及大量的灵性。这种说法有一个重要的必然结果--即政治能动性不一定是消极意义上的对立批判，因此也不一定仅仅或主要以产生反主体性为目的。相反，主体性是一种自我表现或自我定型的过程本体论，它涉及与主流规范和价值观之间复杂而持续的谈判，因此也涉及多种形式的问责。从哈丁和纳拉扬（2000 年）到马哈茂德（2005 年），不同的思想家在女权主义中为这一立场辩护。

The corollary of this axiom is the belief that women’s emancipation is directly indexed upon sexual freedom, in keeping with the European liberal tradition of individual rights and self-autonomy. As Joan Scott (2007) recently argued, this historically specific model cannot be universalized and it is the basic fault of contemporary European politicians that they enforced this model and insist on its homogeneity in spite of rising evidence of its contingent and hence partial applicability. This is a crucial point, which again stresses the importance of sexuality as the major axis of subjectformation in European culture and in its philosophies of subjectivity. It is precisely because of the historical importance of sexuality that sexual difference is such a central axis in the formation of identity and of social relations.
这一公理的必然结果是，人们认为妇女解放直接取决于性自由，这与欧洲自由主义的个人权利和自治传统是一致的。正如琼-斯科特（Joan Scott）（2007 年）最近指出的那样，这种历史上特定的模式无法普遍化，而当代欧洲政治家的根本错误就在于，尽管有越来越多的证据表明这种模式具有偶然性和部分适用性，但他们却强制推行这种模式并坚持其同一性。这是至关重要的一点，它再次强调了性作为欧洲文化及其主体性哲学中主体形成的主轴的重要性。正是由于性的历史重要性，性差异才成为形成身份和社会关系的核心轴心。

Thus the post-secular predicament forces, if not a complete revision, at least a relativization of the dominant European paradigm that equates emancipation with sexual liberation. Moreover, the post-secular position
因此，后世俗的困境即使不能完全修正，至少也会迫使将解放等同于性解放的欧洲主流范式相对化。此外，后世俗立场
on the affirmative force of oppositional consciousness inevitably raises the question of the desire for and faith in possible futures, which is one of the aspects of the residual spirituality I mentioned above. The system of feminist civic values rests on a social constructivist notion of faith as the hope for the construction of alternative social horizons, new norms and values.
女权主义公民价值观体系的基础是社会建构主义的信仰概念，即希望构建另一种社会视野、新的规范和价值观。女权主义公民价值观体系的基础是社会建构主义的信仰概念，即希望建构另一种社会视野、新的规范和价值观。

Faith in progress itself is a vote of confidence in the future. Ultimately, it is a belief in the perfectibility of Wo/Man, albeit it in a much more grounded, accountable mode that privileges partial perspectives, as Haraway (1988) put it.
对进步的信念本身就是对未来的信心。归根结底，它是一种对 "和/人 "完美性的信念，尽管正如哈拉维（Haraway，1988 年）所说的那样，这种信念是一种更接地气、更负责任的模式，它赋予局部视角以特权。

Desire is never a given. Rather, like a long shadow projected from the past, it is a forward-moving horizon that lies ahead and towards which one moves. Between the “no longer” and the “not yet,” desire traces the possible patterns of becoming. These intersect with and mobilize sexuality, but only to deterritorialize the parameters of a gender system that today more than ever combines redemptive emancipatory benevolence with violent militarized coercion into the Western neo-imperial project. Against the platitudes of sex as conspicuous consumption and the arrogance of nationalist projects of enforced liberation of non-Westerners, critical thinkers today may want to re-think sexuality beyond genders, as the ontological drive to pure becoming. Desire sketches the conditions for intersubjective encounters between the no longer and the not yet, through the unavoidable accident of an insight, a flush of sudden acceleration that marks a point of non-return. Accepting the challenge of de-territorialized nomadic sexuality may rescue contemporary sexual politics from the paradoxical mix of commercialized banalities and perennial counter-identity claims on the one hand, and belligerent and racist forms of neo-colonial civilizationism on the other.
欲望从来都不是既定的。相反，它就像一个从过去投射过来的长长的影子，是一个向前移动的地平线，就在前方，人们朝着它前进。在 "不再 "与 "尚未 "之间，欲望追踪着可能的成为模式。这些模式与性交织在一起，并调动了性的力量，但只是为了将性别体系的参数去地域化，而今天的性别体系比以往任何时候都更多地将救赎性解放的仁慈与暴力军事化的胁迫结合在一起，成为西方新帝国主义的项目。今天，批判性思想家们可能希望重新思考超越性别的性问题，将其视为纯粹成为的本体论动力，而不是将性作为显性消费的陈词滥调，以及强迫非西方人解放的民族主义项目的傲慢态度。欲望勾勒了不再与尚未之间的主体间相遇的条件，通过不可避免的意外洞察，突然加速的冲动，标志着一个不归点。接受游牧性的去领土化挑战，可以将当代性政治从商业化的平庸和常年的反身份诉求，以及新殖民文明主义的好战和种族主义形式的矛盾混合体中解救出来。

Q6: As a final experiment, let us try to move feminism beyond ideas about the social and cultural embeddedness of embodied femininity by discussing the way in which you work with the notion of the nomad. In Difference and Repetition Deleuze ([1968] 1994, 36) already contrasted the nomad to nomos, and it seems that throughout your work you delve into this particular opposition more and more. In other words, it seems to be interested increasingly not so much in a feminism that is about a rethinking of the relation between the female and the male, or the relation between the female and the world, what is at stake in your feminism is thinking about “woman” in all of its morphogenetic and topological virtualities. From the “other materialism” which you already propose in the final chapter of your first book (Patterns of Dissonance) in 1991 to claims like “Language is a virus” (in Nomadic Subjects), you have already pushed feminism way beyond the idea that the female should be thought as “the Other” and even beyond Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-woman” which in some way comes close to a nomadology but still implies the social and cultural relationality which the nomad does not need. Could we conclude (with Arnold Toynbee) that the nomad is she who “does not move” but is merely interested in the experimenting and experiencing femininity in all its material realizations? Or better, has the concept of the nomad allowed you to set in motion a return to a radical Spinozism that studies not so much the social and cultural aspects of feminism, but simply poses the question what a woman can do?
问题6：作为最后的尝试，让我们通过讨论您如何处理游牧者这一概念，尝试让女性主义超越关于具身女性的社会和文化嵌入性的观念。在《差异与重复》中，德勒兹（[1968] 1994, 36）已经将游牧者与诺莫斯（nomos）进行了对比。换句话说，您似乎越来越关注的不是重新思考女性与男性关系或女性与世界关系的女性主义，您的女性主义的关键在于思考 "女人 "在其所有形态发生学和拓扑学中的虚拟性。从 1991 年您在第一本书（《不和谐模式》）最后一章中提出的 "另一种唯物主义"，到《游牧主体》中的 "语言是一种病毒 "等主张，您已经推动女性主义超越了女性应被视为 "他者 "的观点，甚至超越了德勒兹和瓜塔里的 "成为女人"，后者在某种程度上接近于游牧学，但仍然意味着游牧者不需要的社会和文化关系。我们是否可以得出这样的结论（与阿诺德-汤因比一样）：游牧者是 "不移动 "的人，她只是对尝试和体验女性的所有物质实现方式感兴趣？或者更好的是，游牧民族的概念是否让你开始回归一种激进的斯宾诺莎主义，这种斯宾诺莎主义研究的不是女性主义的社会和文化方面，而只是提出一个问题：女人能做什么？

RB: What a great question! I wish we could run a six-week seminar on it! The starting point for most feminist redefinitions of subjectivity is a new form of materialism that develops the notion of corporeal materiality by emphasizing the embodied and therefore sexually differentiated structure of the speaking subject. Consequently, rethinking the bodily roots of subjectivity is the starting point for the epistemological project of nomadism. The body or the embodiment of the subject is to be understood as neither a biological nor a sociological category, but rather as a point of overlap between the physical, the symbolic, and the sociological. I stress the issue of embodiment so as to make a plea for different ways of thinking about the body. The body refers to the materialist but also vitalist groundings of human subjectivity and to the specifically human capacity to be both grounded and to flow and thus to transcend the very variables—class, race, sex, gender, age, disability—which structure us. It rests on a post-identitarian view of what constitutes a subject.
RB：真是个好问题！我希望我们能就此举办一个为期六周的研讨会！大多数女权主义对主体性重新定义的出发点是一种新形式的唯物主义，它通过强调说话主体的身体性结构，从而发展了身体物质性的概念。因此，重新思考主体性的身体根源是游牧主义认识论项目的出发点。身体或主体的体现既不是生物学范畴，也不是社会学范畴，而是身体、符号和社会学之间的重叠点。我强调 "体现 "这一问题，是为了呼吁对 "身体 "进行不同的思考。身体指的是人类主体性的唯物主义基础，同时也是生命主义基础，以及人类特有的既立足又流动的能力，从而超越了构成我们的变量--阶级、种族、性别、年龄、残疾。它的基础是对主体构成的后认同主义观点。

A nomadic vision of the body defines it as multi-functional and complex, as a transformer of flows and energies, affects, desires and imaginings. From psychoanalysis I have learned to appreciate the advantages of the non-unitary structure of the subject and the joyful implication of the unconscious foundations of the subject. Complexity is the key term for understanding the multiple affective layers, the complex temporal variables and the internally contradictory time- and memory-lines that frame our embodied existence. In contrast with the oppositions created by dualistic modes of social constructivism, a nomadic body is a threshold of transformations. It is the complex interplay of the highly constructed social and symbolic forces. The body is a surface of intensities and an affective field in interaction with others. In other words, feminist emphasis on embodiment goes hand-inhand with a radical rejection of essentialism. In feminist theory one speaks as a woman, although the subject “woman” is not a monolithic essence defined once and for all, but rather the site of multiple, complex, and potentially contradictory sets of experiences, defined by overlapping variables, such as class, race, age, life-style, sexual preference and others. One speaks as a woman in order to empower women, to activate socio-symbolic changes in their condition; this is a radically anti-essentialist position.
游牧式的身体观将身体定义为多功能和复杂的，是流动和能量、情感、欲望和想象的转换器。我从精神分析中学到了主体非单一结构的优势，以及主体无意识基础的快乐含义。复杂性是理解多重情感层、复杂的时间变量以及内在矛盾的时间和记忆线的关键术语，这些因素构成了我们的具身存在。与社会建构主义二元论模式造成的对立不同，游牧身体是一个转变的门槛。它是高度建构的社会和符号力量的复杂相互作用。身体是强度的表面，是与他人互动的情感场。换句话说，女性主义对身体的强调与对本质主义的彻底否定是相辅相成的。在女性主义理论中，尽管 "女性 "这一主体并不是一劳永逸的单一本质，而是多重、复杂、潜在矛盾的经验集合，由阶级、种族、年龄、生活方式、性偏好等重叠变量定义。一个人以女性的身份发言，是为了增强女性的权能，激活社会符号对其状况的改变；这是一种彻底的反本质主义立场。

The nomad expresses my own figuration of a situated, postmodern, culturally differentiated understanding of the subject in general and of the feminist subject in particular. This subject can also be described as postmodern/postindustrial/postcolonial, depending on one’s location. In so far as axes of differentiation like class, race, ethnicity, gender, age and others intersect and interact with each other in the constitution of subjectivity, the notion of nomad refers to the simultaneous occurrence of many of these at once. Speaking as a feminist entails that priority is granted to issues of gender (or rather, of sexual difference) in connection with the recognition of differences among women. This figuration translates therefore my desire to explore and legitimate political agency, while taking as historical evidence the decline of metaphysically fixed, steady identities. One of the issues at stake here is how to reconcile partiality and discontinuity with the construction of new forms of inter-relatedness and collective political projects.
游牧民族 "表达了我对主体，尤其是对女性主义主体的一种情景化、后现代、文化差异化的理解。这种主体也可以被描述为后现代/后工业/后殖民，这取决于个人所处的位置。阶级、种族、民族、性别、年龄等分化轴心在主体性的构成中相互交叉、相互作用，游牧者的概念指的是同时出现许多这样的轴心。作为一名女权主义者，在承认女性之间的差异时，应优先考虑性别（或者说是性差异）问题。因此，这种具象化表达了我的愿望，即探索政治机构并使其合法化，同时将形而上学上固定、稳定的身份的衰落作为历史证据。这里的一个关键问题是，如何将偏袒和不连续性与构建新形式的相互关联性和集体政治项目相协调。

The political strategy doubles up as a methodology; transformative projects involve a radical repositioning on the part of the knowing subject, which is neither self-evident nor free from pain. No process of consciousness-raising ever is. In post-structuralist feminism, the “alternative science project” (Harding 1986) has also been implemented methodologically through the practice of dis-identification from familiar and hence comforting values and identities (De Lauretis 1986, Braidotti 1994).
政治战略同时也是一种方法论；变革项目涉及认识主体的彻底重新定位，这既不是不言而喻的，也不是没有痛苦的。任何提高意识的过程都不可能没有痛苦。在后结构主义女权主义中，"另类科学项目"（Harding，1986 年）也是通过与熟悉的、因而也是令人欣慰的价值观和身份相分离的实践，在方法论上得以实施的（De Lauretis，1986 年；Braidotti，1994 年）。

Dis-identification involves the loss of cherished habits of thought and representation, a move that can also produce fear and a sense of insecurity and nostalgia. Change is certainly a painful process, but this does not equate it with suffering, nor does it warrant the politically conservative position that chastises all change as dangerous. The point in stressing the difficulties and pain involved in the quest for transformative processes is rather to raise an awareness of both the complexities involved, the paradoxes that lie in store and to develop a nomadic “ethics of compassion” (Connolly 1999).
身份的分离涉及丧失珍视的思维和表述习惯，这一举动也会产生恐惧、不安全感和怀旧感。变革当然是一个痛苦的过程，但这并不等同于苦难，也不意味着政治上的保守立场就可以将所有变革都视为危险。强调寻求变革过程中的困难和痛苦，是为了让人们认识到其中的复杂性和悖论，并培养一种游牧民族的 "同情伦理"（Connolly，1999 年）。

Changes that affect one’s sense of identity are especially delicate. Given that identifications constitute an inner scaffolding that supports one’s sense of identity, shifting our imaginary identifications is not as simple as casting away a used garment. Psychoanalysis taught us that imaginary re-locations are complex, and as time-consuming as shedding an old skin. Moreover, changes of this qualitative kind happen more easily at the molecular or subjective level, and their translation into a public discourse and shared social experiences is a complex and risk-ridden affair. In a more positive vein, Spinozist feminist political thinkers like Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd (1999) argue that such socially embedded and historically grounded changes are the result of “collective imaginings”—a shared desire for certain transformations to be actualised as a collaborative effort. They are transversal assemblages aimed at the production of affirmative politics and ethical relations.
影响身份感的变化尤其微妙。鉴于认同构成了支撑一个人身份感的内在支架，改变我们的想象认同并不像扔掉一件旧衣服那么简单。精神分析告诉我们，想象中的重新定位是复杂的，就像脱掉旧皮一样耗时。此外，这种质的变化更容易发生在分子或主观层面，而将其转化为公共话语和共同的社会经验则是一件复杂而充满风险的事情。莫伊拉-加滕斯（Moira Gatens）和吉纳维芙-劳埃德（Genevieve Lloyd，1999 年）等斯宾诺莎主义女性主义政治思想家从更积极的角度认为，这种具有社会内涵和历史基础的变化是 "集体想象 "的结果--一种希望通过合作实现某些转变的共同愿望。它们是横向的组合，旨在产生积极的政治和伦理关系。

De-familiarization is a sobering process by which the knowing subject evolves from the normative vision of the self he or she had become accustomed to. The frame of reference becomes the open-ended, interrelational, multi-sexed, and trans-species flows of becoming by interaction with multiple others. A subject thus constituted explodes the boundaries of humanism at skin level.
去熟悉化是一个令人清醒的过程，在这个过程中，认识主体从他或她所习惯的规范性自我视角中演变出来。参照系变成了开放的、相互关联的、多性别的和跨物种的，通过与多个他人互动而成为的流动。这样构成的主体在皮肤层面打破了人文主义的界限。

However, as Irigaray teaches us, changing the boundaries of what a woman can do entails the shift of fundamental parameters. Ontologically, in terms of the spatio-temporal frame of becoming; symbolically, through liturgies of actualization and the formalization of adequate modes of expression; and socially, in practical forms of collaborative morality and transitional politics that may lead to a more radical form of democracy. As I argued earlier, the conditions for renewed political and ethical agency cannot be drawn from the immediate context or the current state of the terrain. They have to be generated affirmatively and creatively by efforts geared to creating possible futures, by mobilizing resources and visions that have been left untapped and by actualizing them in daily practices of interconnection with others.
然而，正如伊里格瑞教导我们的那样，要改变女性所能做的事情的界限，就必须改变基本参数。在本体论上，是指成为的时空框架；在象征意义上，是指通过实现的礼仪和适当表达方式的形式化；在社会意义上，是指合作道德和过渡政治的实际形式，这可能会导致更激进的民主形式。正如我在前面所论述的那样，政治和伦理机构更新的条件不能从眼前的环境或当前的状况中得出。这些条件必须通过努力创造可能的未来，通过调动尚未开发的资源和愿景，通过在与他人相互联系的日常实践中实现这些资源和愿景，以肯定和创造性的方式产生。

This project requires more visionary power or prophetic energy, qualities which are neither especially in fashion in academic circles, nor highly valued scientifically in these times of commercial globalization. Yet, the call for more vision is emerging from many quarters in critical theory. Feminists have a long and rich genealogy in terms of pleading for increased visionary insight. From the very early days, Joan Kelly (1979) typified feminist theory as a double-edged vision, with a strong critical and an equally strong creative function. Faith in the creative powers of the imagination is an integral part of feminists’ appraisal of lived embodied experience and the bodily roots of subjectivity, which would express the complex singularities that feminist women have become. Donna Haraway’s work (1997, 2003) provides the best example of this kind of respect for a dimension where creativity is unimaginable without some visionary fuel.
这个项目需要更多的远见卓识或先知先觉的能量，在这个商业全球化的时代，这些品质在学术界并不特别流行，在科学界也不受重视。然而，批判理论界的许多方面都在呼吁更多的远见卓识。女权主义者在恳求提高远见卓识方面有着悠久而丰富的历史。从早期开始，琼-凯利（Joan Kelly，1979 年）就将女性主义理论视为双刃剑，具有强烈的批判性和同样强烈的创造性。相信想象力的创造力是女权主义者对活生生的身体体验和主体性的身体根源的评价的一个组成部分，这将表达女权运动女性所具有的复杂的独特性。唐娜-哈拉维（Donna Haraway）的著作（1997 年，2003 年）提供了这种尊重的最佳范例。

Prophetic or visionary minds are thinkers of the future. The future as an active object of desire propels us forth and motivates us to be active in the here and now of a continuous present that calls for resistance. The yearning for sustainable futures can construct a liveable present. This is not a leap of faith, but an active transposition, a transformation at the in-depth level (Braidotti 2006). A prophetic or visionary dimension is necessary in order to secure an affirmative hold over the present, as the launching pad for sustainable becoming or qualitative transformations. The future is the virtual unfolding of the affirmative aspect of the present, which honours our obligations to the generations to come.
先知或有远见的头脑是未来的思想家。未来作为一个积极的愿望对象，推动着我们前进，激励着我们在此时此地积极行动起来，面对需要反抗的持续不断的现在。对可持续未来的向往可以构建一个宜居的现在。这不是信仰的飞跃，而是一种积极的转换，一种深层次的转变（Braidotti，2006 年）。为了确保对现在的肯定，作为可持续发展或质的转变的起点，预言或远见是必要的。未来是对现在的肯定的虚拟展开，它尊重我们对子孙后代的义务。

The pursuit of practices of hope, rooted in the ordinary micropractices of everyday life, is a simple strategy to hold, sustain and map out sustainable transformations. The motivation for the social construction of hope is grounded in a profound sense of responsibility and accountability. A fundamental gratuitousness and a profound sense of hope is part of it. Hope is a way of dreaming up possible futures, an anticipatory virtue that permeates our lives and activates them. It is a powerful motivating force grounded not only in projects that aim at reconstructing the social imaginary, but also in the political economy of desires, affects and creativity. Contemporary nomadic practices of subjectivity—both in pedagogy and other areas of thought—work towards a more affirmative approach to critical theory.
追求希望的实践植根于日常生活中的平凡小事，是保持、维持和规划可持续变革的简单策略。希望的社会建构的动力源于深刻的责任感和义务感。基本的无偿性和深刻的希望感也是其中的一部分。希望是憧憬可能未来的一种方式，是一种充满期待的美德，它渗透并激活我们的生活。它是一种强大的动力，不仅植根于旨在重建社会想象的项目，而且植根于欲望、情感和创造力的政治经济学。当代主体性的游牧实践--无论是在教育学还是在其他思想领域--都在努力使批判理论更具肯定性。

- Chapter 2
第二章

“Any materialist philosophy must take as its point of departure the existence of a material world that is independent of our minds” Interview with Manuel DeLanda
"任何唯物主义哲学都必须以独立于我们思想之外的物质世界的存在为出发点" 曼努埃尔-德兰达访谈录

Q1: In your short text “The Geology of Morals, A Neo-Materialist Interpretation” from 1996 you introduce the term “neo-materialism” rewriting the way in which Deleuze and Guattari, in their A Thousand Plateaus ([1980] 1987), use Hjelmslev’s linguistic model (which according to Deleuze and Guattari thus goes far beyond the reach of language) of form, content, substance and expression in order to conceptualize geological movements. In your reading of it, you make no use of Hjelmslev but instead favor other concepts like strata, deterritorialization and reterritorialization in order to map the morphogenetic changes of the real. There is no reason why neo-materialism should make use of particular concepts (like the ones mentioned) or even of particular authors like Hjelmslev. Yet what seems to be crucial for it would be to revitalize an interest in an affirmative reading of the dynamics among processes of materialization, as it offers us a thinking which starts with “bodily motions alone,” as Spinoza would put it ([1677] 2001, E2P49 Schol.) and how this allows us to rethink very different branches of academia such as geology, mathematics, cultural theory, (neo-classical) economics and sociology.
问1：在您1996年发表的短文《道德地质学，一种新唯物主义的解释》中，您提出了 "新唯物主义 "这一术语，改写了德勒兹和瓜塔里在《千高原》（[1980] 1987）中使用赫耶姆斯列夫的语言模型（德勒兹和瓜塔里认为这一模型远远超出了语言的范围）来概念化地质运动的方式。在你的解读中，你没有使用赫姆斯列夫，而是倾向于使用其他概念，如地层、去领土化（deterritorialization）和再领土化（reterritorialization），来描绘现实的形态发生变化。新唯物主义没有理由使用特定的概念（如上述概念），甚至没有理由使用特定的作者（如赫耶尔姆斯列夫）。然而，新唯物主义的关键在于重新唤起人们对唯物化过程动态的肯定性解读的兴趣，因为它为我们提供了一种思维方式，正如斯宾诺莎所说的那样，这种思维方式 "仅仅从身体运动开始"（[1677] 2001, E2P49 Schol.），并使我们能够重新思考地质学、数学、文化理论、（新古典主义）经济学和社会学等不同的学术分支。

In your book Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy from 2002 you give a beautiful definition of what ‘a history’ is, which made us rethink the way in which new materialism could be situated in academic thought. You write,
在您 2002 年出版的《密集科学与虚拟哲学》一书中，您为 "历史 "下了一个美丽的定义，这让我们重新思考了新唯物主义在学术思想中的定位方式。您写道

The well-defined nature of the possible histories is not to be approached by a mere mention of laws expressed as differential equations, but by an understanding of how such equations in fact individuate trajectories (DeLanda 2002, 36).
要了解可能历史的明确性质，不能仅仅提及以微分方程表示的规律，而要了解这些方程实际上是如何将轨迹个别化的（DeLanda 2002, 36）。

Can we conclude that the books you wrote and the way in which your new materialist arguments rewrite the various branches of academia, are all about the creation of such “individuated trajectories” that invent a neo-materialism? In other words, could we even say that your neo-materialism, though inspired by Deleuze and Braudel, cannot even be said to have these authors as its point of departure?
我们是否可以断定，您所写的书以及您的新唯物主义论点改写学术界各个分支的方式，都是为了创造这种 "个性化轨迹"，发明一种新唯物主义？换句话说，我们是否可以说，您的新唯物主义虽然受到德勒兹和布罗代尔的启发，但甚至不能说是以这两位作家为出发点？

Manuel DeLanda: Any materialist philosophy must take as its point of departure the existence of a material world that is independent of our minds. But then it confronts the problem of the origin of the enduring identity of the inhabitants of that world: if the mind is not what gives identity to mountains and rivers, plants and animals, then what does? An old answer is “essences,” the answer given by Aristotle. But if one rejects essentialism then there is no choice but to answer the question like this: all objective entities are products of a historical process, that is, their identity is synthesized or produced as part of cosmological, geological, biological, or social history. This need for a concept of “synthesis” or of “production” is what attracted Marx to Hegelian dialectics since it provided him with a model of synthesis: a conflict of opposites or the negation of the negation. Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, replace that model of synthesis with what they call a “double articulation”: first, the raw materials that will make up a new entity must be selected and pre-processed; second, they must be consolidated into a whole with properties of its own. A rock like limestone or sandstone, for example, is first articulated though a process of sedimentation (the slow gathering and sorting of the pebbles that are the component parts of the rock). Then it is articulated a second time as the accumulated sediment is glued together by a process of cementation. They use Hjemslev’s terms “content” and “expression” as the names for the two articulations, but this is not meant to suggest that the articulations are in any way linguistic in origin. On the contrary: the sounds, words, and grammatical patterns of a language are materials that accumulate or sediment historically, then they are consolidated by another process, like the standardization of a dialect by a Royal Academy and its official dictionaries, grammars, and rules of pronunciation.
曼努埃尔-德兰达任何唯物主义哲学都必须以存在一个独立于我们思想之外的物质世界为出发点。但是，唯物主义哲学随之面临的问题是，这个世界中的居民的持久特性从何而来：如果不是心灵赋予山川河流、植物和动物特性，那么是什么赋予了它们特性？一个古老的答案是 "本质"，也就是亚里士多德给出的答案。但是，如果我们拒绝本质论，那么就别无选择，只能这样回答这个问题：所有客观实体都是历史进程的产物，也就是说，它们的特性是作为宇宙史、地质史、生物史或社会史的一部分而合成或产生的。这种对 "综合 "或 "生产 "概念的需求正是黑格尔辩证法吸引马克思的原因，因为黑格尔辩证法为他提供了一种综合模式：对立面的冲突或否定之否定。而德勒兹和瓜塔里则用他们所谓的 "双重衔接 "取代了这种综合模式：首先，必须对构成新实体的原材料进行选择和预处理；其次，必须将它们整合成一个具有自身属性的整体。例如，石灰石或砂岩等岩石首先要经过沉积过程（岩石组成部分卵石的缓慢聚集和分类）才能形成。然后，当积累的沉积物通过胶结过程粘合在一起时，岩石又被第二次衔接起来。他们使用赫耶姆斯列夫的术语 "内容 "和 "表达 "作为这两次衔接的名称，但这并不意味着这两次衔接在任何方面都源于语言。 恰恰相反：一种语言的音、词和语法模式是历史积累或沉淀下来的材料，然后通过另一个过程加以巩固，比如皇家学院及其官方词典、语法和发音规则对方言的标准化。

The question of the “individuation of trajectories” is about mathematical models (which to me are the secret of the success of science) but you are correct that it goes beyond that. All entities synthesized historically are individual entities: individual plants and animals; individual species and ecosystems; individual mountains, planets, solar systems, et cetera. Here “individual” means simply “singular or unique,” that is, not a particular member of a general category, but a unique entity that may compose larger individual entities through a relation of part-to-whole, like individual pebbles composing a larger individual rock. A materialist ontology of individual entities is implicit in Deleuze & Guattari and Braudel, so we must give them credit for that, then move on and invent the rest.
轨迹的个体化 "问题与数学模型有关（在我看来，数学模型是科学成功的秘诀），但你说得没错，数学模型远不止于此。历史上合成的所有实体都是单个实体：单个的植物和动物；单个的物种和生态系统；单个的山脉、行星、太阳系等等。这里的 "个体 "仅指 "单个或独特的"，也就是说，不是一般类别中的特定成员，而是一个独特的实体，它可以通过部分对整体的关系组成更大的个体实体，就像单个鹅卵石组成更大的单个岩石一样。德勒兹和瓜塔里以及布劳戴尔都隐含着关于个体实体的唯物主义本体论，因此我们必须对他们给予肯定，然后再继续发明其他的东西。

Q2: Neo-materialism is in a way rewriting academia as a whole, which includes the disciplinary boundaries that organize it today. In your work you definitely practice this by reading a geology into sociology for instance. Yet it would be very interesting to make this more explicit. Thus, how would new materialism propose a rethinking of the disciplinary boundaries (without using labels such as interdisciplinarity, postdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity which eventually are all new disciplining exercises)?
Q2: 新唯物主义在某种程度上改写了整个学术界，包括今天组织学术界的学科界限。在您的作品中，您无疑在践行这一点，比如将地质学融入社会学。然而，如果能更明确地说明这一点，将会非常有趣。因此，新唯物主义将如何提出对学科界限的重新思考（在不使用诸如跨学科、后学科或跨学科等标签的情况下，这些标签最终都是新的学科划分练习）？

MD: Academic fields are also historical individuals with contingent boundaries, many of which are settled as part of turf wars. Why would anyone feel the need to respect those boundaries? We need to draw on the conceptual and empirical resources developed by all fields to enrich materialism and prevent it from becoming a priori. What label we use to designate this maneuver is entirely irrelevant.
医学博士：学术领域也是历史性的个体，有着偶然的边界，其中许多边界是作为地盘争夺战的一部分解决的。为什么会有人觉得有必要尊重这些界限呢？我们需要利用所有领域开发的概念和经验资源来丰富唯物主义，防止它成为先验论。我们用什么标签来标明这种做法完全无关紧要。

Q3: Despite your emphasis on individuated trajectories, you responded very positively to our request for an interview about a new materialism. You said that the time has come indeed for a renewed interest in materialist perspectives. In addition to its potential disciplining effects (“new materialism” becoming a theoretical yet anti-methodological school), we all know that materialism, in European thought, has a strong Marxist history. In several of your writings and interviews, however, you mentioned various problems with Marx’s thinking.
问题3：尽管您强调个性化的轨迹，但您还是非常积极地回应了我们关于新唯物主义的采访请求。您说，现在确实到了重新关注唯物主义观点的时候了。除了其潜在的学科效应（"新唯物主义 "成为一个反方法论的理论流派）之外，我们都知道，唯物主义在欧洲思想界有着深厚的马克思主义历史。然而，在您的一些著作和访谈中，您提到了马克思思想的各种问题。

You consider yourself to be left-wing, but you do not share many of the dogmas, institutional preferences and economic solutions offered by the Left, premised on Marxism. In terms of economics your interest seems to be much more in institutional or evolutionary economics (think of the writings of Donald now Deirdre McCloskey and Phil Mirowski) and the way in which they now reread Adam Smith (especially his Theory of Moral Sentiments from 1759). Nevertheless, what you do take from Marx is his interest in the oppressed, that is, his anti-Aristotelianism that allows us to conceptualize the self-organizing power of “matter” without the “meaning” that should overcode it.
您认为自己是左翼人士，但您并不认同左翼人士以马克思主义为前提提出的许多教条、制度偏好和经济解决方案。就经济学而言，您的兴趣似乎更多地在于制度经济学或进化经济学（想想唐纳德-麦克洛斯基（Donald now Deirdre McCloskey）和菲尔-米洛斯基（Phil Mirowski）的著作），以及他们现在重读亚当-斯密（尤其是他 1759 年的《道德情操论》）的方式。尽管如此，你从马克思那里学到的是他对被压迫者的兴趣，也就是他的反亚里士多德主义，它让我们能够将 "物质 "的自我组织力量概念化，而不需要 "意义 "的过度编码。

Combining your rejection of Marx and your appraisal of materialism, could we then label your new materialist thinking as a non-humanist and even non-anthropocentric materialism?
结合您对马克思的否定和对唯物主义的评价，我们是否可以将您的新唯物主义思想称为非人道主义甚至非人类中心主义的唯物主义？

MD: The political economy of Marx is entirely a priori. Although he was sincerely interested in historical data (and hence, in creating an a posteriori theory) the actual amount of information available to him was extremely limited. Today we have the opposite situation thanks to the work of Fernand Braudel and his school. In addition, the old institutional school of economics (perhaps best represented by the work of John Kenneth Galbraith) as well as the neo-institutionalist school, offer new models that go beyond classical economics. (The two authors you mention, though, are mostly useless, being meta-economists and non-materialist.) It is our duty as Leftists to cut the umbilical cord chaining us to Marx and reinvent political economy. Deleuze and Guattari failed miserably in this regard.
医学博士：马克思的政治经济学完全是先验的。尽管他对历史数据（从而创建一种后验理论）抱有真诚的兴趣，但他所能获得的实际信息量极为有限。今天，由于费尔南-布劳戴尔（Fernand Braudel）及其学派的工作，我们的情况恰恰相反。此外，旧制度经济学派（约翰-肯尼斯-加尔布雷思（John Kenneth Galbraith）的著作或许是其最佳代表）以及新制度主义学派都提供了超越古典经济学的新模型。(不过，你提到的两位作者大多一无是处，他们都是元经济学家和非唯物主义者）。作为左派，我们有责任切断将我们与马克思捆绑在一起的脐带，重塑政治经济学。德勒兹和瓜塔里在这方面失败得一塌糊涂。

Marx’s theory of value was indeed anthropocentric: only human labor was a source of value, not steam engines, coal, industrial organization, et cetera. So in that sense the answer is yes, we need to move beyond that and reconceptualize industrial production. In addition, Marx did not see trade or credit as sources of wealth, but Braudel presents indisputable historical evidence that they are.
马克思的价值理论的确是以人类为中心的：只有人类劳动才是价值的源泉，而不是蒸汽机、煤炭、工业组织等等。因此，从这个意义上说，答案是肯定的，我们需要超越这一点，重新认识工业生产。此外，马克思并不认为贸易或信贷是财富的来源，但布劳代尔提出了无可争议的历史证据，证明它们是财富的来源。

Q4: It would be interesting, in reply to Marxism, to see this stance formulated into a political program. Above all, the current ecological drama might be a nice starting point for a neo-materialist political program. But could it be led by an invisible hand?
Q4: 作为对马克思主义的回应，将这一立场表述为政治纲领将是非常有趣的。首先，当前的生态戏剧可能是新唯物主义政治纲领的一个很好的起点。但它是否可以由一只看不见的手来领导呢？

MD: Ecologists (not only activists but scientists) are well placed to help in this regard, because as they study food webs they must consider all sources of “value”: the sun, the photosynthetic process that transforms solar energy into chemical energy, the micro-organisms that decompose dead bodies and re-inject nutrients into the soil, et cetera. Combining ecology and economics is a good idea, so that a barrel of oil is not valued only in terms of its market price but as a non-renewable source of value due to the energy it contains. We may keep the idea of an “invisible hand” (that is, that prices self-organize as part of a dynamic between supply and demand) but only when dealing with large numbers of small firms without market power. When dealing with oligopolies there is no anonymous competition but rivalry and deliberate planning. Large corporations, as Galbraith argued long ago, are a “planning system” operating through a very visible hand. Braudel referred to oligopolies as an “anti-market” to stress this point.
医学博士：生态学家（不仅是活动家，还有科学家）在这方面可以提供很好的帮助，因为他们在研究食物网时必须考虑到所有的 "价值 "来源：太阳、将太阳能转化为化学能的光合作用过程、分解尸体并将养分重新注入土壤的微生物等等。将生态学与经济学相结合是一个好主意，这样一桶石油的价值就不仅仅体现在其市场价格上，而是因其所含能量而成为不可再生的价值来源。我们可以保留 "看不见的手"（即价格作为供需动态的一部分自我组织）的观点，但仅限于在处理大量没有市场支配力的小公司时。在寡头垄断情况下，不存在匿名竞争，而是竞争和蓄意计划。正如加尔布雷思早就指出的那样，大公司是一个通过有形之手运作的 "规划系统"。布劳戴尔将寡头垄断称为 "反市场"，以强调这一点。

Q5: In your work on “assemblage theory” (in A New Philosophy of Society from 2006) you once again show us that it is “the movement that in reality generates all these emergent wholes” that we should focus on when we want to “get a sense of the irreducible social complexity characterizing the contemporary world” (DeLanda 2006, 6). You argue strongly against the dualisms that have been transmitted to us in the history of philosophy (matter vs. meaning, micro vs. macro, inorganic vs. organic vs. social, realism vs. social constructivism, etcetera.) and argue in favor of a new ontology according to which “mechanisms are largely causal, but they do not necessarily involve linear causality” (ibid., 19; original emphasis). In an interesting book from 2007 called Built by Animals, Mike Hansell describes to us the following construction:
Q5: 在您关于 "组合理论 "的著作（2006 年出版的《社会新哲学》）中，您再次向我们表明，当我们想要 "了解作为当代世界特征的不可还原的社会复杂性"（DeLanda 2006, 6）时，我们应该关注的是 "在现实中产生所有这些新兴整体的运动"。您强烈反对哲学史上流传下来的二元论（物质与意义、微观与宏观、无机与有机、社会、现实主义与社会建构主义，等等），主张建立一种新的本体论，根据这种本体论，"机制在很大程度上是因果性的，但它们并不一定涉及线性因果关系"（同上，19；原文强调）。在 2007 年出版的一本名为《动物建造》（Built by Animals）的有趣书籍中，迈克-汉塞尔（Mike Hansell）向我们描述了如下结构：

It is a sphere composed of a few hundred stones cemented together, with a large circular hole at the bottom. The top of its dome bears seven or eight study spikes, each a cairn of stones, larger ones at the base, the smallest at the tip creating a sharp point. The most distinctive architectural detail, the one that gives the name to the species that builds it, is the collar to the circular aperture. It is a pleated coronet constructed from particles too small to be distinguishable from the cement that binds them. The diameter of this whole dwelling, for that is what it is, is about 150 thousandths of a millimeter (i.e. micrometres, written fim). Smaller than the full stop at the end of this sentence, it is the portable home of the Difflugia coronata, a species of amoeba (Hansell 2007, 58).
它是一个由几百块石头粘合而成的球体，底部有一个圆形大洞。穹顶顶端有七八个研究尖峰，每个尖峰都是由石头堆砌而成，较大的在底部，最小的在顶端，形成一个锋利的尖角。最与众不同的建筑细节，也是建造它的物种名称的由来，是圆形开孔的项圈。它是一个褶皱的冠状体，由太小的颗粒构成，无法从粘结它们的水泥中分辨出来。它的直径约为千分之一毫米（即微米，写作 fim）。它比句末的句号还小，是一种变形虫 Difflugia coronata 的便携式住所（汉塞尔，2007 年，58 页）。

The Difflugia coronata is not an animal. It is a single-cell creature that feeds and reproduces, but has no nervous system (thus no brain). Major academics interested in animal architecture, like the quoted Hansell, have difficulty explaining how such a simple creature is capable of creating such a complex form, their biggest problem being that the Difflugia coronata lacks a brain. For some reason they fail to see how their question already embodies several presumptions that make any answer impossible. They accept the Cartesian difference between the mind and the body. They accept the difference between the animal (subject) and its house (object).
冠突伪尾柱虫不是动物。它是一种单细胞生物，可以进食和繁殖，但没有神经系统（因此没有大脑）。对动物结构感兴趣的主要学者，如引述的汉塞尔，很难解释如此简单的生物如何能够创造出如此复杂的形态，他们最大的问题是冠突散囊菌没有大脑。出于某种原因，他们没有看到他们的问题已经包含了几个假设，这使得任何答案都是不可能的。他们接受笛卡尔关于心灵与肉体的区别。他们接受了动物（主体）和它的房子（客体）之间的区别。

New materialism, implicitly and explicitly, wards off these modernist oppositions, and might very well be considered capable of explaining how this simple creature could create such complex forms. Not only in your geological history of the organic world, but also in your assemblage theory you show us how organic and inorganic matter, in their entanglement, create the new. Do you think the Difflugia coronata created its house similarly to the way in which the human being created not only its cities but also the social group equally “[…] freeing them from the constraints and literally setting them into motion to conquer every available niche in the air, in water and on land” as you wrote in A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (2000, 26-7) ?
新唯物主义以暗示和明示的方式抵御了这些现代主义的对立，并且很可能被认为能够解释这种简单的生物如何创造出如此复杂的形式。不仅在您的有机世界地质史中，而且在您的组合理论中，您都向我们展示了有机物和无机物是如何在纠缠中创造新事物的。您是否认为，冠突散囊菌创造自己的房子，就像您在《千年非线性历史》（2000，26-7）中写道的那样，"[......]将它们从束缚中解放出来，让它们真正地开始行动，去征服空中、水中和陆地上的每一个可用空间"？

MD: It is absurd to think that complex self-organizing structures need a “brain” to generate them. The coupled system atmosphere-hydrosphere is continuously generating structures (thunderstorms, hurricanes, coherent wind currents) not only without a brain but without any organs whatsoever. The ancient chemistry of the prebiotic soup also generated such coherent structures (auto-catalytic loops) without which the genetic code could not have emerged. And bacteria in the first two billion years of the history of the biosphere discovered all major means to tap into energy sources (fermentation, photosynthesis, respiration). To think that a “brain” is needed goes beyond Cartesian dualism and fades into Creationism: matter is an inert receptacle for forms that come from the outside imposed by an exterior psychic agency: “Let there be light!”
医学博士：认为复杂的自组织结构需要 "大脑 "来生成是荒谬的。大气-水圈耦合系统不仅没有大脑，而且没有任何器官，就能不断产生结构（雷暴、飓风、连贯风流）。前生物汤的古老化学反应也产生了这种连贯的结构（自动催化循环），没有这种结构，遗传密码就不可能出现。在生物圈历史的前 20 亿年中，细菌发现了利用能源的所有主要手段（发酵、光合作用、呼吸作用）。认为需要一个 "大脑 "的想法超越了笛卡尔的二元论，而褪色为创世论：物质是一个惰性容器，容纳由外部精神机构强加的来自外部的形式："要有光！"

So yes, neo-materialism is based on the idea that matter has morphogenetic capacities of its own and does not need to be commanded into generating form. But we should not attempt to build such a philosophy by “rejecting dualisms” or following any other meta-recipe. The idea that we know already how all past discourses have been generated, that we have the secret of all past conceptual systems, and that we can therefore engage in meta-theorizing based on that knowledge is deeply mistaken. And this mistake is at the source of all the idealisms that have been generated by postmodernism.
因此，是的，新唯物主义是基于这样一种观点，即物质本身具有形态发生能力，不需要被命令生成形式。但是，我们不应试图通过 "摒弃二元论 "或遵循任何其他元模式来构建这样一种哲学。那种认为我们已经知道过去所有话语是如何生成的，我们掌握了过去所有概念体系的秘密，因此我们可以在此基础上进行元理论化的想法是大错特错的。而这个错误正是后现代主义产生的所有理想主义的根源。

Q6: Could you elaborate some more on this idea of not “rejecting dualisms,” since this comes very close to an important argument in our own reading of new materialism. For when we say that new materialism, implicitly and explicitly, wards off modernist oppositions and thus qualitatively shifts the acceptance of the Cartesian difference between the mind and the body, the subject and the object, et cetera, we are referring to Bergson ([1869] 2004, 297) who has argued that: “The difficulties of ordinary dualism come, not from the distinction of the two terms, but from the impossibility of seeing how the one is grafted upon the other.” Thus, we argue, the time has come to make a formal difference between this ordinary dualism as Bergson analyzes it, and the radical rewriting of modernist dualisms, as proposed for instance by Lyotard and Deleuze. The latter have set themselves to a rewriting exercise that involves a movement in thought that practices what Bergson termed “pushing dualism to an extreme,” rephrased by Deleuze’s statement that “difference is pushed to the limit.” Would you agree with us that this is actually a crucial element of new materialism’s affirmative stance?
问 6：您能否进一步阐述一下不 "拒绝二元论 "这一观点，因为这与我们自己解读新唯物主义时的一个重要论点非常接近。因为当我们说新唯物主义以隐含和明确的方式抵制现代主义的对立，从而从质上改变了对笛卡尔式的心与身、主体与客体等差异的接受时，我们指的是柏格森（[1869] 2004, 297），他认为："普通二元论的困难不是来自于二元论，而是来自于二元论："他认为："普通二元论的困难不是来自两个术语的区别，而是来自无法看到一个术语是如何嫁接到另一个术语之上的。因此，我们认为，现在是时候在柏格森分析的普通二元论与利奥塔和德勒兹等人提出的对现代主义二元论的激进重写之间做出形式上的区分了。德勒兹的说法是 "差异被推向极限"。您是否同意我们的看法，即这实际上是新唯物主义肯定立场的一个关键要素？

MD: I am not convinced that avoiding dualities is the key to a new way of thinking (particularly if one simply adds new ones: modernismpostmodernism, rhizome-tree, power-resistance). What matters is what categories are used dualistically. For example, in my book A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (DeLanda 2006) I criticize the use of the concepts “The Market” and “The State.” Not because they are a duality, but because both are reified generalities that do not really exist. Adding a third term, like “The People,” would not help. What we need is to replace the reified generalities with concrete assemblages: many bazaars, many regional trading areas, many national markets… each with a date of birth and (potentially) a date of death. The best way to deal with this problem is always to think statistically, dealing always with populations and with how variation is distributed in a population. Thus, the duality “male-female” can easily be eliminated if we take a large population and check how secondary sexual characteristics are distributed: all of them, except for the capacity to bear children, form two overlapping statistical distributions. The duality emerges when one ignores the zone of overlap and reifies the averages.
医学博士：我并不认为避免二元对立是新思维的关键（尤其是如果只是增加新的二元对立：现代主义-后现代主义、根瘤-树、权力-反抗）。重要的是哪些范畴被二元对立地使用。例如，在我的著作《新社会哲学》（A New Philosophy of Society：Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity》（德兰达，2006 年）一书中，我批评了 "市场 "和 "国家 "这两个概念的使用。这并不是因为它们是二元对立的，而是因为它们都是被重新整合的一般概念，并不真正存在。增加第三个术语，如 "人民"，也无济于事。我们需要的是用具体的集合体来取代被重新整合的一般概念：许多集市、许多地区贸易区、许多国家市场......每一个都有出生日期和（可能的）死亡日期。处理这一问题的最佳方法始终是进行统计思考，始终处理人口问题以及人口中的变异分布问题。因此，如果我们从一个大的群体出发，看看第二性征是如何分布的，就可以很容易地消除 "男-女 "二元性：除了生育能力之外，所有的第二性征都形成了两个重叠的统计分布。如果忽略重叠区，并将平均值重新量化，就会出现二元性。

Q7: Could we say that this stance exemplifies your ontological take on ‘topology’ as explained in Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, which involves a qualitative shifting of Euclidean geometry (2002, 24) through “view[ing] this genesis not as an abstract mathematical process but as a concrete physical process in which an undifferentiated intensive space (that is, a space defined by continuous intensive properties) progressively differentiates, eventually giving rise to extensive structures (discontinuous structures with definite metric properties)” (ibid., 25; original emphasis)?
问 7：我们是否可以说，这种立场体现了您在《密集科学与虚拟哲学》一书中对 "拓扑学 "的本体论观点，它涉及欧几里得几何的质的转变（2002, 24），"不是把这种起源看作一个抽象的数学过程，而是看作一个具体的物理过程，在这个过程中，一个未分化的密集空间（即由连续的密集属性定义的空间）逐渐分化，最终产生了广义结构（具有确定度量属性的非连续结构）"（同上，25；原文强调）？25；原文强调）？

MD: Topology enters neo-materialism as part of the rejection of Aristotle. We need to replace both his “genus” and his “species.” The latter is replaced by the concept of a species as a contingent historical individual, born through a process of speciation (reproductive isolation) and capable of dying through extinction. The former is replaced by the “topological animal,” that is, a body-plan common to entire phyla (such as that of vertebrates) that is a structured space of possible body designs. Such a space cannot be metric because each vertebrate species varies in length, area, volume, et cetera, so only topological properties like connectivity can be used to specify it.
医学博士：拓扑学作为否定亚里士多德的一部分进入了新唯物主义。我们需要取代他的 "属 "和 "种"。后者被 "种 "这一概念所取代。"种 "是一个偶然的历史个体，通过物种分化（生殖隔离）过程而诞生，并可能因灭绝而消亡。前者被 "拓扑动物 "所取代，即整个门类（如脊椎动物）共有的身体结构，它是可能的身体设计的结构空间。这种空间无法度量，因为每个脊椎动物物种的长度、面积、体积等都各不相同，所以只能用拓扑特性（如连通性）来说明它。

Q8: In After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux critiques idealists and what he calls “correlationists,” for their shared representationalism (something you also argue against) and also for continuing the anthropocentrism that saturates the history of Western thought. For although the human mind is no longer the point of departure for philosophy, correlationalism still needs it in order for the world to exist.
Q8: 在《终结之后》一书中，昆廷-迈拉苏批判了唯心主义者和他所谓的 "相关主义者"，批判他们共同的表象主义（这也是你所反对的），同时也批判他们延续了充斥西方思想史的人类中心主义。虽然人类思维不再是哲学的出发点，但关联主义仍然需要人类思维才能使世界存在。

Meillassoux ([2006] 2008, 37) ascribes a Kantianism to “the Leibnizian monad; Schelling’s nature, or the objective subject-object; Hegelian Mind; Schopenhauer’s Will; the Will (or Wills) to Power in Nietzsche; perception loaded with memory in Bergson; Deleuze’s Life, etc.”
梅拉苏（[2006] 2008, 37）将康德主义归结为 "莱布尼茨的一元论、谢林的自然或客观主客体、黑格尔的心智、叔本华的意志、尼采的权力意志、柏格森的记忆感知、德勒兹的生命等等"。

According to our reading of your work, you seem to aim at providing a non-anthropocentric mapping of the morphogenetic changes of the real. Does it follow from this summary of your project that you agree with Meillassoux?
根据我们对您作品的解读，您的目标似乎是为现实的形态变化提供一个非人类中心主义的映射。从您对自己项目的总结中，是否可以看出您同意迈拉苏的观点？

MD: To be honest, I never read Meillassoux. But I surely reject the idea that morphogenesis needs any “mind” to operate. I also reject the neo-
医学博士：老实说，我从未读过迈拉苏的著作。但我肯定反对形态发生需要任何 "心智 "来运作的观点。我也反对新

Kantian thesis of the linguisticality of experience. To assume that human experience is structured conceptually is to dehistoricize the human species: we spent hundreds of thousands of years as a social species, with a division of labor (hunters, gatherers) and sophisticated stone tool technology. Language is a relatively recent acquisition. Are we to assume that those ancient hunter gatherers lived in an amorphous world waiting for language to give it form? That’s Creationism again, you know: “And the word became flesh.”
康德关于经验语言性的理论。假定人类经验的结构是概念性的，就等于将人类非历史化：我们作为一个社会性物种已经度过了数十万年的岁月，拥有劳动分工（狩猎者、采集者）和先进的石器技术。语言是最近才获得的。难道我们要假定，那些远古的狩猎采集者生活在一个无定形的世界里，等待着语言赋予其形式？这又是创世论，你知道的："道成肉身"

So yes, to the extent that Meillassoux rejects all forms of idealism I surely agree with him. I would need to see what he offers beyond a critique in order to assess the actual degree of agreement. Critique is never enough. Marxism is not going to go away simply by making a critique of it, we need to offer a viable alternative.
因此，是的，就迈耶索反对一切形式的唯心主义而言，我当然同意他的观点。我需要看看他在批判之外还提出了什么，才能评估实际的一致程度。批判永远是不够的。马克思主义不会仅仅因为批判它而消失，我们需要提供一个可行的替代方案。

Q9: If so, an alliance can also be struck between your work and the work of Alain Badiou, who is Meillassoux’s teacher and also claiming a new materialism. This time it comes to the fore when we take into account your shared interest in mathematics, and, more in particular, topology, diagram or model. For a new materialism to be valuable for scholarly and activist projects such as feminism and post-colonialism, however, a theory of the subject seems to be necessary. In new feminist materialism, for instance, alliances are sought with process ontologies, which make the non-anthropocentric stance not non-foundationalist (cf. the work of Rosi Braidotti). A question then would be whether you see this necessity for a new theory of the subject, and how this (dis-)connects with the work of Meillassoux and Badiou?
问 9：如果是这样的话，您的作品与阿兰-巴迪欧的作品之间也可以形成一种联盟，巴迪欧是迈拉苏的老师，也主张新唯物主义。这一次，当我们考虑到你们对数学，尤其是拓扑学、图解或模型的共同兴趣时，这一点就凸显出来了。然而，要使新唯物主义对女权主义和后殖民主义等学术和活动项目具有价值，似乎有必要建立一种主体理论。例如，新女性主义唯物主义寻求与过程本体论结盟，这使得非人类中心主义立场并非非基础主义（参见罗西-布赖多蒂的著作）。那么，一个问题是，您是否认为有必要建立一种新的主体理论，以及这与迈亚苏和巴迪欧的工作有何（不）联系？

MD: Badiou left me with a bad feeling after reading his book on Deleuze which is incredibly incompetent. He uses the word “the One” on just about every page when Deleuze never used it (other than when making remarks about the scholastic notion of the “univocity of being”). He is also a fanatic about set theory, whereas I tend towards the differential calculus as my mathematical base. (The idea that the latter was reduced to the former is yet another mistake we inherited from the nineteenth century).
医学博士：巴迪欧在读了他那本关于德勒兹的书之后，给我留下了不好的感觉。他几乎每一页都使用 "一 "这个词，而德勒兹从未使用过这个词（除了在谈到 "存在的单一性 "这一学术概念时）。他也是集合论的狂热爱好者，而我则倾向于将微分学作为我的数学基础。(把后者简化为前者的想法是我们从十九世纪继承下来的又一个错误）。

I agree that a theory of the subject is absolutely necessary but it must be based on Hume, not on Kant: subjective experience not as organized conceptually by categories but as literally composed of intensities (of color, sound, aroma, flavor, texture) that are given structure by habitual action.
我同意主体理论是绝对必要的，但它必须以休谟而非康德为基础：主观经验不是由概念范畴组织起来的，而是由习惯性行为赋予结构的强度（颜色、声音、香气、味道、质地）字面构成的。

Recent developments in artificial intelligence will help with this: while the old symbolic school is deeply Kantian, the new connectionist school (based on neural nets that are not programmed but trained) points to a way out. Current neural net designs are at the level of insect intelligence but they already suggest how an insect protosubjectivity can emerge from a dynamic of perceived intensities. We need to extend this to the subjectivity of mammals and birds, and work our way up to human subjectivity.
人工智能的最新发展将对此有所帮助：旧的符号学派具有浓厚的康德色彩，而新的联结主义学派（基于非编程而是训练的神经网络）则指出了一条出路。目前的神经网络设计只达到了昆虫智能的水平，但它们已经提出了昆虫的原主体性是如何从感知强度的动态中产生的。我们需要将其扩展到哺乳动物和鸟类的主观能动性，进而发展到人类的主观能动性。

The political implication of this can be phrased as follows: rejecting the linguisticality of experience (according to which every culture lives in its own world) leads to a conception of a shared human experience in which the variation comes not from differences in signification (which is a linguistic notion), but of significance (which is a pragmatic one). Different cultures do attribute different importance, relevance, or significance to different things because their practices (not their minds) are different. When it comes to gender, the paradox is this: idealism was created by males who were in an academic environment in which their material practices were reduced to a minimum, and who had wives who did all the material work. And yet the moment feminism became academic it became deeply idealist. Hence I welcome any return to materialism by feminists, even if based on entirely different ideas.
这其中的政治含义可以表述如下：摒弃经验的语言性（根据这种语言性，每种文化都生活在自己的世界里），就会产生一种关于人类共同经验的概念，在这种概念中，差异不是来自符号的不同（这是一种语言学概念），而是来自意义的不同（这是一种实用主义概念）。不同的文化确实赋予不同的事物不同的重要性、相关性或意义，因为他们的实践（而非思想）不同。说到性别问题，悖论就在于：理想主义是由男性创造的，他们身处学术环境，物质生活被压缩到最低限度，他们的妻子承担了所有的物质工作。然而，当女权主义变得学术化的那一刻，它就变得深具理想主义色彩了。因此，我欢迎女权主义者回归物质主义，哪怕是基于完全不同的理念。

- Chapter 3
第三章

“Matter feels, converses, suffers, desires, yearns and remembers” Interview with Karen Barad
"物质的感觉、对话、痛苦、渴望、向往和记忆"，凯伦-巴拉德访谈录

Q1: “New materialism” as a term was coined by Manuel DeLanda and Rosi Braidotti in the second half of the 1990’s^1. New materialism shows how the mind is always already material (the mind is an idea of the body), how matter is necessarily something of the mind (the mind has the body as its object), and how nature and culture are always already “naturecultures” (Donna Haraway’s term). New materialism opposes the transcendental and humanist (dualist) traditions that are haunting cultural theory, standing on the brink of both the modern and the post-postmodern era. The transcendental and humanist traditions, which are manifold yet consistently predicated on dualist structures, continue to stir debates that are being opened up by new materialists (think of the feminist polemic concerning the failed materialism in the work of Judith Butler, and of the Saussurian/Lacanian linguistic heritage in media and cultural studies). What can be labelled “new materialism” shifts these dualist structures by allowing for the conceptualization of the travelling of the fluxes of nature and culture, matter and mind, and opening up active theory formation.
问题 1："新唯物主义 "一词是由曼努埃尔-德兰达和罗西-布赖多蒂在 20 世纪 90 年代后半期提出的 1 。新唯物主义揭示了心灵如何总是已经是物质的（心灵是身体的观念），物质如何必然是心灵的东西（心灵以身体为对象），以及自然和文化如何总是已经是 "自然文化"（唐娜-哈拉维的术语）。新唯物主义反对困扰文化理论的超验主义和人文主义（二元论）传统，站在现代和后后现代的边缘。超验主义和人文主义传统是多方面的，但始终以二元论结构为前提，它们继续引发着新唯物主义者正在展开的辩论（想想朱迪斯-巴特勒作品中关于失败的唯物主义的女权主义论战，以及媒体和文化研究中的索绪尔/拉卡语言学遗产）。可以被称为 "新唯物主义 "的东西改变了这些二元论结构，允许将自然与文化、物质与心灵的流动旅行概念化，并开启了积极的理论形成。

In your emphasis on quantum physics, you seem to be proposing a very similar route. The idea behind “agential realism,” in print since 1996 following the Bohrian approach to epistemology that you have published about since the mid-1980s, seems to ward off the dualisms that have haunted the humanities and the sciences as well. Particularly in the case of measurement, this agential realism allows you to re-read Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics and to critique the fact that so many theorists refuse to come to terms with the material-discursive and performative nature of intra-actions.
在您对量子物理学的强调中，您似乎提出了一条非常相似的路线。您自上世纪八十年代中期就开始发表关于认识论的博里安方法，自 1996 年以来，"行动现实主义 "的思想就已付梓，它似乎可以抵御困扰人文科学和科学的二元论。特别是在测量问题上，这种行动现实主义让您得以重读玻尔的量子力学哲学，并对许多理论家拒绝承认内部行动的物质-辨证和表演性质这一事实提出批评。

Is this immanent enfolding of matter and meaning, which you refer to as “agential realism,” and which we name a “new materialism,” the quintessence of your critique of both the sciences and the humanities?
这种物质与意义的内在结合，您称之为 "行动现实主义"，而我们称之为 "新唯物主义"，这是否就是您对科学和人文科学批判的精髓？

Karen Barad: The core of your question I have to say is spot on, but since you state what I am doing in terms of critique I wanted to start by saying something about critique. I am not interested in critique. In my opinion, critique is over-rated, over-emphasized, and over-utilized, to the detriment of feminism. As Bruno Latour signals in an article entitled “Why has critique run out of steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern” (2004), critique is a tool that keeps getting used out of habit perhaps, but it is no longer the tool needed for the kinds of situations we now face. Critique has been the tool of choice for so long, and our students find themselves so well-trained in critique that they can spit out a critique with the push of a button. Critique is too easy, especially when a commitment to reading with care no longer seems to be a fundamental element of critique. So as I explain to my students, reading and writing are ethical practices, and critique misses the mark. Now, I understand that there is a different valence to the notion of critique in Europe than there is in the United States; nonetheless, I think this point is important. Critique is all too often not a deconstructive practice, that is, a practice of reading for the constitutive exclusions of those ideas we can not do without, but a destructive practice meant to dismiss, to turn aside, to put someone or something down— another scholar, another feminist, a discipline, an approach, et cetera. So this is a practice of negativity that I think is about subtraction, distancing and othering. Latour suggests that we might turn to Alan Turing’s notion of the critical instead of critique (Turing 1950), where going critical refers to the notion of critical mass—that is, when a single neutron enters a critical sample of nuclear material which produces a branching chain reaction that explodes with ideas. As a physicist I find this metaphor chilling and ominous.
卡伦-巴拉德：我不得不说，你的问题的核心是一针见血的，但既然你指出了我在评论方面所做的工作，我想先谈谈评论。我对评论不感兴趣。在我看来，批判被过度评价、过度强调和过度利用，这对女权主义是有害的。正如布鲁诺-拉图尔（Bruno Latour）在一篇题为《为什么批判已经力不从心？从 "事实问题 "到 "关注问题"》（2004 年）一文中指出，批判也许是一种出于习惯而不断使用的工具，但它已不再是我们现在所面临的情况所需要的工具。长期以来，批判一直是我们的首选工具，我们的学生发现自己在批判方面训练有素，按一下按钮就能吐出批判。批判太容易了，尤其是当用心阅读似乎不再是批判的基本要素时。因此，正如我向学生解释的那样，阅读和写作都是道德实践，而批评则失之偏颇。现在，我明白在欧洲，批判的概念与美国有不同的含义；尽管如此，我认为这一点很重要。批判往往不是一种解构性的实践，也就是说，不是一种对那些我们不能没有的思想的构成性排斥进行解读的实践，而是一种破坏性的实践，意在否定、搁置、贬低某人或某事--另一位学者、另一位女权主义者、一门学科、一种方法，等等。因此，我认为这是一种关于减法、疏远和他者化的否定性实践。 拉图尔建议，我们可以借鉴阿兰-图灵的 "临界 "而非 "批判 "的概念（图灵，1950 年）。"临界 "指的是临界质量的概念，也就是说，当一个中子进入核材料的临界样本时，就会产生分支链式反应，爆发出各种想法。作为一名物理学家，我觉得这个隐喻令人不寒而栗、不祥。
Instead, building on a suggestion of Donna Haraway, what I propose is the practice of diffraction, of reading diffractively for patterns of differences that make a difference. And I mean that not as an additive notion opposed to subtraction, as I will explain in a little bit. Rather, I mean that in the sense of it being suggestive, creative and visionary.
相反，根据唐娜-哈拉维（Donna Haraway）的建议，我提出的是衍射实践，衍射性地阅读差异模式，从而产生差异。我的意思并不是指与减法相对的加法概念，稍后我会解释。相反，我的意思是它具有暗示性、创造性和前瞻性。

In chapter 2 of Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Barad 2007) I discussed in detail what I call a diffractive methodology, a method of diffractively reading insights through one another, building new insights, and attentively and carefully reading for differences that matter in their fine details, together with the recognition that there intrinsic to this analysis is an ethics that is not predicated on externality but rather entanglement. Diffractive readings bring inventive provocations; they are good to think with. They are respectful, detailed, ethical engagements. I want to come back to the crux of your question now that I have said something about critique. I do not mean to pick on that, but I think it is important to say something about the notion of critique and to move it to thinking instead about these kinds of provocations and other kinds of engagements that we might practice.
在《半路遇见宇宙》（Meeting the Universe Halfway：量子物理学与物质和意义的纠缠》（巴拉德，2007 年）第二章中，我详细论述了我所说的衍射方法论，这是一种通过相互衍射来解读见解、建立新见解、专注而仔细地阅读细节中重要的差异的方法，同时认识到这种分析的内在是一种不以外部性为前提，而是以纠缠为前提的伦理学。衍射式阅读带来了创造性的启发；它们有利于思考。它们是尊重的、细致的、伦理的参与。既然我说到了批判，我想回到你问题的核心。我并不是想挑刺，但我认为有必要谈谈批判的概念，并将其转为思考我们可能实践的这类挑衅和其他类型的参与。

So, coming back to the crux of your question, the entanglement of matter and meaning calls into question this set of dualisms that places nature on one side and culture on the other. And which separates off matters of fact from matters of concern (Bruno Latour) and matters of care (Maria Puig de la Bellacasa), and shifts them off to be dealt with by what we aptly call here in the States “separate academic divisions,” whereby the division of labor is such that the natural sciences are assigned matters of fact and the humanities matters of concern, for example. It is difficult to see the diffraction patterns—the patterns of difference that make a difference— when the cordoning off of concerns into separate domains elides the resonances and dissonances that make up diffraction patterns that make the entanglements visible.
因此，回到你的问题的核心，物质与意义的纠缠让人质疑这套将自然置于一边、将文化置于另一边的二元论。它将事实问题与关注问题（布鲁诺-拉图尔）和关怀问题（玛丽亚-普伊格-德拉贝拉卡萨）分开，并将它们转移到我们在美国称之为 "独立学术分部 "的地方去处理，例如，根据这种分工，自然科学负责事实问题，而人文科学负责关注问题。如果将关注的问题划分为不同的领域，就会忽略构成衍射模式的共振和不共振，从而使纠葛变得清晰可见，那么我们就很难看到衍射模式--即产生差异的模式。

I would like to offer two examples to think with in engaging your question. I recently gave a keynote at a conference at the Stevens Institute of Technology,2 which is in New Jersey. They are starting a very innovative revamping of their Humanities program. They are interested in taking insights from science studies, and running them back into the Humanities. This is the way they talk about it. What they propose is the reverse of how some would think of the potential impact of science studies: not to use the Humanities to think about the Sciences but to use the Sciences to rethink the Humanities. This is their project and it was a very interesting conference. But there was something about the way in which it was being framed overall that I wanted to see if I could get into conversation with them about. First of all, there was the notion that what is needed is a synthesis; a synthesis or a joining of the Humanities and the Sciences as if they were always already separate rather than always already entangled. So that there would be Science with matters of fact, and nature, and so on, on one side, and Humanities, meaning, values, and culture, on the other, and somehow that there would be a joining of the two. So, we talked about the ways in which there are entanglements that already exist between the Humanities and the Sciences; they have not grown up separately from one another. I was just pointing out to them some of the limitations of thinking analogically as in looking for mirror images between the Sciences on the one hand and the Humanities on the other. And I was telling them about this wonderful story that Sharon Traweek tells about when she was doing fieldwork on the high energy physics community at the Stanford Linear Accelerator (SLAC). She is standing in a hall at SLAC, and notices a physicist staring at pictures of fractal images on the wall. She gazes upon the images and asks him: “Can you tell me what is so beautiful about those images?” The physicist turns to her with this puzzled look on his face and says: “I am not really sure why you asked the question. It’s self-evident!
在回答你的问题时，我想提供两个例子供你思考。最近，我在新泽西州史蒂文斯理工学院（ 2 ）的一次会议上做了主题发言。该学院位于新泽西州，正在对其人文课程进行创新性改革。他们希望从科学研究中汲取灵感，并将其运用到人文学科中。他们是这么说的。他们的建议与某些人对科学研究潜在影响的看法正好相反：不是用人文科学来思考科学，而是用科学来重新思考人文科学。这是他们的项目，也是一次非常有趣的会议。但我想看看能否与他们就会议的总体框架进行交流。首先，有一种观点认为，我们需要的是一种综合；一种人文学科与科学之间的综合或结合，就好像它们本来就是分开的，而不是纠缠在一起的。这样，一边是关于事实、自然等问题的科学，另一边是关于意义、价值和文化的人文，两者将以某种方式结合在一起。因此，我们谈到了人文学科和科学之间已经存在的纠葛；它们并不是各自独立发展起来的。我只是向他们指出了一些类比思维的局限性，即在科学与人文之间寻找镜像。我向他们讲述了莎伦-特拉维克（Sharon Traweek）讲述的一个精彩故事：她在斯坦福直线加速器（SLAC）的高能物理社区进行实地考察。 她站在 SLAC 的一个大厅里，注意到一位物理学家正盯着墙上的分形图像发呆。她凝视着这些图片并问他"你能告诉我这些图片美在哪里吗？"物理学家转过身来，一脸疑惑地对她说："我真的不知道你为什么要问这个问题。这是不言而喻的！
Everywhere you look it is the same.” And of course feminists are not trained to look or take pleasure in everything being the same, but to think about differences.
你看哪里都一样"。当然，女权主义者所接受的训练并不是去看待或享受一切相同的事物，而是去思考差异。

Of course the mirror image of that is that Science mirrors Culture, so we have a kind of scientific realism versus social constructivism, which are of course both about mirroring. Instead, what I propose is the notion of diffraction, drawing on the work of my colleague and friend Donna Haraway. As Donna says, “diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike reflections, diffractions do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less distorted form, thereby giving rise to industries of [story-making about origins and truths]. Rather, diffraction can be a metaphor for another kind of critical consciousness.” What I was pointing out is the difference in the shift from geometrical optics, from questions of mirroring and sameness, reflexivity, where to see your image in the mirror there necessarily has to be a distance between you and the mirror. So there is a separation of subject and object, and objectivity is about mirror images of the world. And instead, the shift towards diffraction, towards differences that matter, is really a matter of what physicists call physical optics as compared to geometrical optics. Geometrical optics does not pay any attention to the nature of light.
当然，其镜像是科学反映文化，因此我们有一种科学现实主义与社会建构主义的对立，当然两者都是关于镜像的。相反，我借鉴我的同事和朋友唐娜-哈拉维（Donna Haraway）的研究成果，提出了衍射的概念。正如唐娜所说，"衍射模式记录了互动、干扰、强化、差异的历史。衍射是关于异质的历史，而不是关于原物。与反射不同，衍射不会以或多或少扭曲的形式将相同的东西置换到其他地方，从而产生[关于起源和真理的故事]产业。相反，衍射可以隐喻另一种批判意识"。我指出的是与几何光学、镜像和同一性问题、反射性问题不同的是，要在镜子中看到自己的影像，你和镜子之间必须有一定的距离。因此，主体和客体是分离的，客观性是关于世界的镜像。相反，向衍射的转变，向重要差异的转变，实际上是物理学家所说的物理光学与几何光学相比的问题。几何光学并不关注光的本质。

Actually, it is an approximation that gets used to study the optics of different lenses, or mirrors. And you just treat light as if it were a ray (an abstract notion). In other words, it is completely agnostic about whether light is a particle or a wave or anything else. It is just an approximation scheme for studying various apparatuses. By contrast, diffraction allows you to study both the nature of the apparatus and also the object. That is, both the nature of light and also the nature of the apparatus itself. I talk a lot about this in chapter 2 of Meeting. But what I wanted to bring out is the fact that we learn so much more about diffraction using quantum physics.
实际上，这是一种近似值，用于研究不同透镜或镜子的光学原理。而你只是把光当作光线（一个抽象概念）来对待。换句话说，它与光是粒子还是波或其他任何东西完全无关。它只是研究各种仪器的近似方案。相比之下，衍射既可以研究仪器的性质，也可以研究物体的性质。也就是说，既可以研究光的性质，也可以研究仪器本身的性质。我在《相遇》的第 2 章中对此谈了很多。但我想指出的是，我们通过量子物理学对衍射有了更多的了解。

There is a difference between understanding diffraction as a classical physics phenomenon and understanding it quantum-mechanically. I have taken this wonderful metaphor that Donna has given us and I have run with it by adding important non-classical insights from quantum physics. Diffraction, understood using quantum physics, is not just a matter of interference, but of entanglement, an ethico-onto-epistemological matter. This difference is very important. It underlines the fact that knowing is a direct material engagement, a cutting together-apart, where cuts do violence but also open up and rework the agential conditions of possibility. There is not this knowing from a distance. Instead of there being a separation of subject and object, there is an entanglement of subject and object, which is called the “phenomenon.” Objectivity, instead of being about offering an undistorted mirror image of the world, is about accountability to marks on bodies, and responsibility to the entanglements of which we are a part. That is the kind of shift that we get, if we move diffraction into the realm of quantum physics. All of this is to say that we come up with a different way of thinking about what insights the Sciences, the Humanities, the Arts, the Social Sciences, and let’s not forget insights derived outside of academia, can bring to one another by diffractively reading them through one another for their various entanglements, and by being attentive to what gets excluded as well as what comes to matter. So that we wind up with a very different way of engaging the relationship between the Sciences and the Humanities, which I think is the original question that you asked me.
将衍射理解为经典物理现象与从量子力学角度理解衍射是不同的。我采用了唐娜给我们的这个美妙的比喻，并在其中加入了量子物理学的重要非经典见解。用量子物理学来理解衍射，它不仅仅是一个干涉的问题，而是一个纠缠的问题，一个伦理-认识论的问题。这种差异非常重要。它强调了这样一个事实，即认识是一种直接的物质接触，是一种 "合 "与 "分 "的切割。这种认识不是远距离的。主体与客体不是分离的，而是纠缠在一起的，这就是所谓的 "现象"。客观性不再是提供一个不扭曲的世界镜像，而是对身体上的印记负责，对我们作为其中一部分的纠葛负责。如果我们将衍射技术引入量子物理学领域，就会产生这样的转变。综上所述，我们可以换一种思维方式来思考科学、人文学科、艺术、社会科学以及学术界以外的见解，通过衍射法解读它们之间的各种纠葛，关注被排除在外的东西以及变得重要的东西，从而为彼此带来哪些启示。因此，我们最终会以一种非常不同的方式来处理科学与人文之间的关系，我认为这正是你最初向我提出的问题。

And then, just really briefly my second example and I promise you I will not go on this long about every question, but just to set up some things in the beginning… I taught a lecture course this quarter called “Feminism in Science,” which had Science students in the class as well as students from the Humanities, the Social Sciences, and the Arts, and we were talking about the notion of scientific literacy and how scientific literacy has grown up to be the sole responsibility of the Sciences. But what is scientific literacy? We spent millions of dollars on it in the United States and we are not really sure what it means at all, as a matter of fact. And after spending millions of dollars by whatever measure is provided for scientific literacy, we still have the same percentages of scientific literacy as before. According to these measures, scientific literacy is between three and six percent. And that is actually the same number of scientists and engineers that we have. That tells you something about the way in which scientific literacy is being understood, and how it is being measured, and how it is being thought about, and who needs to take responsibility for it, and so on. And so we talked about the fact that a different kind of literacy is actually required for doing science. That consideration of the ethical, social and legal implications of various new sciences and technologies after the fact is not robust enough. For example, we considered the new field of bioethics in which ethics is taken to be solely a matter of considering the imagined consequences of scientific projects that are already given. But the notion of consequences is based on the wrong temporality: asking after potential consequences is too little, too late, because ethics of course, is being done right at the lab bench.
然后，我只是简单地举第二个例子，我向你们保证，我不会对每个问题都讲这么长，但只是在开头设定一些事情......本季度我讲授了一门名为 "科学中的女性主义 "的讲座课程，班上有理科学生，也有来自人文学科、社会科学和艺术的学生，我们在讨论科学素养的概念，以及科学素养是如何发展成为理科的唯一责任。但什么是科学素养？在美国，我们为此花费了数百万美元，但事实上，我们根本不清楚科学素养的含义。在花费了数百万美元之后，不管科学素养的衡量标准是什么，我们的科学素养百分比仍然和以前一样。根据这些衡量标准，科学素养在 3%到 6%之间。而这实际上与我们拥有的科学家和工程师人数相同。这说明了人们是如何理解科学素养的，如何衡量科学素养，如何看待科学素养，以及谁需要为此承担责任等等。因此，我们谈到了这样一个事实，即做科学实际上需要一种不同的素养。对各种新科学和新技术的伦理、社会和法律影响的事后考虑不够有力。例如，我们讨论了生物伦理学这一新领域，在这一领域中，伦理学被认为仅仅是一个考虑已经给出的科学项目的想象后果的问题。 但是，"后果 "的概念是建立在错误的时间性基础上的：追问潜在的后果太少、太晚了，因为伦理学当然是在实验室工作台上完成的。
And so, as for what it takes to be scientifically literate, the question is what does it take in order to identify the various apparatuses of bodily production that are at stake here. And so in order to identify those we need a much broader sense of literacy and we need all kinds of people around the lab bench, so that scientific literacy should no longer be seen as being solely the responsibility of the Sciences. I think that is one of the ways in which we get ourselves in a lot of trouble in terms of education.
因此，至于怎样才能具备科学素养，问题在于怎样才能识别出这里所涉及的各种身体生产装置。因此，为了识别这些装置，我们需要一种更广泛的素养，我们需要实验室工作台周围的各种人，因此科学素养不应再被视为仅仅是科学界的责任。我认为这是我们在教育方面陷入困境的原因之一。

Q2: Could you explain to us a bit more what, how, or who the agent in agential realism “is”?
问题 2：您能否再向我们解释一下，代理现实主义中的代理人 "是 "什么、怎么 "是 "或 "是谁"？

KB: First, I want to say that I try to stay away from using the term “agent,” or even “actant,” because these terms work against the relational ontology I am proposing. Also the notion that there are agents who have agency, or who grant agency, say, to non-humans (the granting of agency is an ironic notion, no?), pulls us back into the same old humanist orbits over and over again. And it is not easy to resist the gravitational force of humanism, especially when it comes to the question of “agency.” But agency for me is not something that someone or something has to varying degrees, since I am trying to displace the very notion of independently existing individuals. This is not, however, to deny agency in its importance, but on the contrary, to rework the notion of agency in ways that are appropriate to relational ontologies. Agency is not held, it is not a property of persons or things; rather, agency is an enactment, a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring entanglements. So agency is not about choice in any liberal humanist sense; rather, it is about the possibilities and accountability entailed in reconfiguring material-discursive apparatuses of bodily production, including the boundary articulations and exclusions that are marked by those practices. One of the items that you asked about is the how of agency, and in a sense, the how is precisely in the specificity of the particular practices, so I cannot give a general answer to that, but perhaps I can say something helpful about the space of possibilities for agency.
KB：首先，我想说的是，我尽量不使用 "代理人 "或甚至 "行为者 "这个词，因为这些词与我提出的关系本体论相悖。另外，有代理人拥有代理权，或赋予代理权，比如说赋予非人类代理权（赋予代理权是一个具有讽刺意味的概念，不是吗？要抵制人文主义的引力并非易事，尤其是在 "代理权 "问题上。但对我来说，"能动性 "并不是某人或某物在不同程度上拥有的东西，因为我试图取代独立存在的个体这一概念。然而，这并不是要否认代理的重要性，恰恰相反，我是要以适合关系本体论的方式来重构代理的概念。代理权不是被持有的，它不是人或物的属性；相反，代理权是一种制定，是重新配置纠葛的可能性问题。因此，代理权与自由人文主义意义上的选择无关；相反，代理权涉及的是重新配置身体生产的物质-意识形态工具所带来的可能性和责任，包括这些实践所标示的边界衔接和排斥。你问到的一个问题是 "如何代理"，从某种意义上说，"如何代理 "恰恰存在于特定实践的特殊性之中，因此我无法给出一个笼统的答案，但或许我可以就代理的可能性空间说一些有用的话。

Agency, on an agential realist account, does not require a clash of apparatuses, (as Butler once suggested) such as the contradictory norms of femininity, so that we are never successful in completely embodying femininity, because there are contradictory requirements. Agential realism does not require that kind of clash of apparatuses, because intra-actions to begin with are never determining, even when apparatuses are reinforcing. Intra-actions entail exclusions, and exclusions foreclose determinism. However, once determinism is foreclosed this does not leave us with the option of free will. I think we tend to think about causality and questions of agency in terms of either determinism on the one hand, or free will on the other. Cause and effect are supposed to follow one upon the other like billiard balls, and so we got into the habit of saying that we do not really mean this in a causal sense. And I think to some degree, causality has become a dirty word, as realism is/was. And so I am trying to get people to talk about causality again, because I think that it is very, very important. If we have a group of people where we find that there is a lot of cancer in a certain community, I want to know something about the nature of that community and about causal relationships, because if I am at Love Canal in the United States, a populated area where a bunch of toxins were dumped and the people were getting cancers, then I might want to evacuate people. On the other hand, if I am at the Mayo Clinic, where they are treating cancer patients and there are a lot of people with cancer, it is not the thing to do. I really want us to specify more carefully the different kinds of causalities, and how to think causality again. And that is partly what I mean by the notion of “intra-action” as proposing a new way of thinking causality.
从行动现实主义的角度来看，代理并不要求工具的冲突（巴特勒曾提出过），比如女性气质规范的相互矛盾，这样我们就永远无法成功地完全体现女性气质，因为存在着相互矛盾的要求。行动现实主义并不要求这种机制的冲突，因为内部行动从一开始就不是决定性的，即使机制是强化的。内部行动意味着排除，而排除就排除了决定论。然而，一旦决定论被排除，我们就没有了自由意志的选择。我认为，我们倾向于从决定论或自由意志的角度来思考因果关系和代理问题。因果关系本应像台球一样一前一后，因此我们习惯于说，我们并不是真正意义上的因果关系。我认为，在某种程度上，因果关系已经成了一个脏词，就像现实主义一样。因此，我试图让人们再次谈论因果关系，因为我认为它非常非常重要。如果我们发现某个社区有很多人罹患癌症，我想知道这个社区的性质和因果关系，因为如果我在美国的爱运河，一个倾倒了大量毒素的人口密集区，人们患上了癌症，那么我可能会想疏散人群。另一方面，如果我在梅奥诊所，那里正在治疗癌症病人，而那里有很多癌症患者，那就不应该这样做。我真的希望我们能更仔细地明确不同种类的因果关系，以及如何重新思考因果关系。 这就是我所说的 "内部行动 "概念的部分含义，它提出了一种新的因果关系思维方式。
It is not just a kind of neologism, which gets us to shift from interaction, where we start with separate entities and they interact, to intra-action, where there are interactions through which subject and object emerge, but actually as a new understanding of causality itself.
它不仅仅是一种新名词，让我们从 "相互作用"（我们从独立的实体开始，它们相互作用）转向 "内部作用"（主体和客体通过相互作用而产生），而且实际上是对因果关系本身的一种新的理解。

First of all, agency is about response-ability, about the possibilities of mutual response, which is not to deny, but to attend to power imbalances. Agency is about possibilities for worldly re-configurings. So agency is not something possessed by humans, or non-humans for that matter. It is an enactment. And it enlists, if you will, “non-humans” as well as “humans.” At the same time, I want to be clear that what I am not talking about here is democratically distributing agency across an assemblage of humans and non-humans. Even though there are no agents per se, the notion of agency I am suggesting does not go against the crucial point of power imbalances. On the contrary. The specificity of intra-actions speaks to the particularities of the power imbalances of the complexity of a field of forces. I know that some people are very nervous about not having agency localized in the human subject, but I think that is the first step—recognizing that there is not this kind of localization or particular characterization of the human subject is the first step in taking account of power imbalances, not an undoing of it.
首先，代理权关乎回应能力，关乎相互回应的可能性，这不是否认，而是关注权力的不平衡。代理权是关于世界重新配置的可能性。因此，代理权不是人类或非人类所拥有的东西。它是一种制定。如果你愿意，它既包括 "人类"，也包括 "非人类"。同时，我想说明的是，我在这里所说的并不是在人类和非人类的集合体中民主地分配代理权。即使没有代理人本身，我提出的代理权概念也并不违背权力失衡这一关键点。恰恰相反。内部行动的特殊性说明了力量场复杂性中力量失衡的特殊性。我知道有些人对人类主体中不存在代理权的局部性感到非常紧张，但我认为这是第一步--承认人类主体不存在这种局部性或特殊性是考虑权力失衡的第一步，而不是消除权力失衡的第一步。

As a brief example, there is an article I just came across on the Internet by Chris Wilbert called “Profit, Plague and Poultry: The Intra-active Worlds of Highly Pathogenic Avian Flu” (Wilbert 2006), on the bio-geopolitics of potential flu pandemics. Chris’s analysis of the avian flu (H5N1) as a naturalcultural phenomenon highlights the importance of taking account of the agential entanglements of intra-acting human and nonhuman practices. Chris points out that while world health organizations and governments are placing migratory birds and small farm chicken producers under surveillance, the empirical data does not support these causal linkages. Rather, the disease follows the geographical diffraction patterns of large-scale factory farmed production of poultry. The latter gives rise to unprecedented densities of birds, making first-class lodgings for thriving and mutating zoonoses. Industrially produced meats, international veterinary practices, biosecurity practices, international trade agreements, transport networks, increased density of human populations, and more are among the various agential apparatuses at work. Causality is not interactional, but rather intra-actional. Making policy based on additive approaches to multiple causes, misses key factors in avoiding epidemics such as providing inexpensive forms of safe food for the poorest populations and the elimination of industrial forms of the mass killing of animals. So in addition to nicely illustrating the importance of paying attention to “human” and “non-human” forms of agency, as it were, there is a way in which Chris acknowledges what gets left out of practices of accounting when agency is attributed to human or non-human entities and left at that. What gets left out, you see, is a whole array of very complex material practices that contribute to a kind of epidemic that is not attributable either to the organisms themselves or to the kinds of things that people do. I do not know Chris.
举个简单的例子，我刚刚在互联网上看到克里斯-威尔伯特（Chris Wilbert）写的一篇文章，名为《利润、瘟疫与家禽》（Profit, Plague and Poultry：The Intra-active Worlds of Highly Pathogenic Avian Flu"（Wilbert，2006 年），论述了潜在流感大流行的生物地缘政治。克里斯将禽流感（H5N1）作为一种自然-文化现象进行分析，突出强调了考虑人类和非人类内部活动纠葛的重要性。克里斯指出，虽然世界卫生组织和各国政府都在对候鸟和小型养鸡场生产者进行监控，但经验数据并不支持这些因果联系。恰恰相反，这种疾病遵循大规模工厂化家禽生产的地理衍射模式。后者产生了前所未有的禽类密度，为蓬勃发展和不断变异的人畜共患病提供了一流的栖息地。工业化生产的肉类、国际兽医实践、生物安全实践、国际贸易协议、运输网络、人口密度的增加等等，都是在发挥作用的各种代理机构。因果关系不是相互作用的，而是内部作用的。根据多重原因的叠加方法制定政策，会忽略避免流行病的关键因素，如为最贫困人口提供廉价的安全食品，以及消除大规模杀戮动物的工业形式。因此，除了很好地说明了关注 "人类 "和 "非人类 "代理形式的重要性之外，克里斯还以一种方式承认了当代理被归因于人类或非人类实体时，会计实践中被遗漏的东西。 你看，被遗漏的是一系列非常复杂的物质实践，它们促成了一种流行病，而这种流行病既不能归因于生物本身，也不能归因于人们所做的事情。我不知道克里斯
I bring it to your attention, because I think that he gives us an interesting case to think with.
我提请你们注意，因为我认为他给了我们一个有趣的思考案例。

Another example that may be helpful here is an example that Haraway (2008) talks about. It is an example that is raised by Barbara Smuts, who is an American bioanthropologist who went to Tanzania to investigate baboons in the wild for her doctoral research. She is told as a scientific investigator of non-human primates to keep her distance, so that her presence would not influence the behavior of the research subjects that she was studying. Distance is the condition of objectivity. Smuts talks about the fact that this advice was a complete disaster for her research, that she found herself unable to do any observations since the baboons were constantly attentive to what she was doing. She finally realized that this was because Smuts was behaving so strangely to them, they just could not get over her. She was being a bad social subject in their circles. The only way to carry on and to do research objectively was to be responsible; that is, that objectivity, a theme that feminist science studies has been emphasizing all along, is the fact that objectivity is a matter of responsibility and not a matter of distancing at all. What ultimately did work was that she learned to be completely responsive to the non-human primates, and in that way she became a good baboon citizen. They could understand, at least intelligibly to the non-human primates, and as a result they left her alone and went about their business, making it possible for her to conduct her research.
哈拉维（Haraway，2008 年）提到的另一个例子可能对我们有所帮助。这是美国生物人类学家芭芭拉-斯穆特（Barbara Smuts）提出的一个例子，她前往坦桑尼亚调查野生狒狒，进行博士研究。作为非人灵长类动物的科学调查员，她被告知要保持距离，这样她的存在就不会影响她所研究的研究对象的行为。距离是客观性的条件。斯穆特谈到，这个建议对她的研究来说简直是一场灾难，她发现自己无法进行任何观察，因为狒狒一直在注意她在做什么。她最终意识到，这是因为斯穆特的行为对狒狒来说太奇怪了，狒狒们根本无法接受她。在它们的圈子里，她是一个糟糕的社交对象。要想继续客观地开展研究，唯一的办法就是负责任；也就是说，女性主义科学研究一直强调的客观性主题，就是客观性是一个责任问题，而根本不是疏远的问题。最终起作用的是，她学会了对非人类灵长类动物做出完全响应，这样她就成了狒狒的好公民。它们能够理解，至少能够理解非人灵长类动物，因此，它们不再打扰她，继续做自己的事情，使她能够开展研究。

Q3: In Meeting the Universe Halfway and in several journal articles, you follow Haraway in proposing “diffraction,” the relational nature of difference, as a methodology for treating theories and texts not as preexisting entities, but as intra-action, as forces from which other texts come into existence. On the other hand, you focus strongly on the work of Niels Bohr throughout your work. Your rewriting of the philosophy that is active in all of his texts seems to be neither dutiful nor undutiful to his ideas. And yet your work can be read as one of the strongest commentaries on the work of Bohr now available to academics. Perhaps the first one that succeeds in reading him into the Humanities. Next to Bohr, of course, you read many other scientists and scholars like Einstein, Schrodinger, but also Merleau-Ponty, Haraway of course, Deleuze, and Latour. Especially as concerns the philosophers and those scholars traditionally not read within the Sciences, you seem to read them very affirmatively, albeit in passing.
问题3：在《半途与宇宙相遇》和几篇期刊文章中，你追随哈拉维提出了 "衍射"，即差异的关系性，以此作为一种方法论，将理论和文本视为内部作用，而非预先存在的实体，作为其他文本产生的力量。另一方面，您在整部作品中强烈关注尼尔斯-玻尔的研究。你对活跃在他所有文本中的哲学的重写，似乎既没有对他的思想尽责，也没有对他的思想不尽责。然而，您的著作可以被解读为目前学术界对玻尔著作最有力的评论之一。或许，这也是第一部成功将玻尔纳入人文学科的著作。当然，除了玻尔之外，您还阅读了许多其他科学家和学者，如爱因斯坦、薛定谔，以及梅洛-庞蒂、哈拉维、德勒兹和拉图尔。特别是对于那些传统上不在科学领域阅读的哲学家和学者，您似乎非常肯定地阅读了他们，尽管是顺带阅读。

How would you evaluate this conceptualization of the way in which you treat theories, taking into account your proposal for a diffractive methodology? In other words, is there a sense in which your work is not a meditation that agrees or disagrees with the work of Bohr, but one that is intra-active with it, creating both the work of Bohr and agential realism? And what are the generational implications of diffraction more generally? Feminists are usually wary of thought as governed by oedipality; feminists such as Rosi Braidotti have argued for a methodology that does not repeat the all-too-common Oedipal relation with Masters, affirming their status by negating the work, and this comes very close to your critique of critique actually. Does diffraction allow for a relation between texts and scholars that is neither undutiful (affirming the Master by negating the work) nor dutiful (placing the “new” work in the Master’s house)?
考虑到您提出的衍射方法论，您如何评价您对待理论的这种概念化方式？换句话说，从某种意义上说，您的研究是否不是一种同意或不同意玻尔研究的沉思，而是一种与玻尔研究互动的沉思，既创造了玻尔的研究，又创造了激动现实主义？更广泛地说，衍射的世代意义是什么？女权主义者通常对受恋母情结支配的思想保持警惕；罗西-布赖多蒂（Rosi Braidotti）等女权主义者主张采用一种方法论，不重复与大师之间司空见惯的恋母情结，通过否定作品来肯定他们的地位。衍射法是否允许文本与学者之间的关系既不是不尽责（通过否定作品来肯定大师），也不是尽责（将 "新 "作品放在大师的房子里）？

KB: Given what I already said about diffractive readings, I think it is clear that your question really beautifully states my relationship with the materials that I engaged with in doing diffractive readings. In the spirit of diffractive readings, I just want to say that I am really very grateful and indebted to you for your careful reading of my work. Thank you for that. I wholeheartedly agree with what you have said there in terms of the fact that I am neither looking to Bohr’s work as scripture nor to somehow be the “undutiful daughter” to Bohr. But to read various insights through one another and to produce something new, new patterns of thinking-being, while at the same time being very attentive to what it is that Bohr is trying to say to us, and I think that you have done that with my work so I wanted to thank you for that.
KB：鉴于我已经说过关于衍射阅读的内容，我认为你的问题非常清楚地说明了我与衍射阅读所涉及的材料之间的关系。本着衍射阅读的精神，我只想说，我真的非常感激和感谢你对我作品的仔细阅读。谢谢您。我完全同意你的观点，即我既不是把玻尔的著作奉为圣经，也不是要做玻尔的 "不孝女"。我认为你在我的工作中做到了这一点，所以我想为此向你表示感谢。

Q4: Although “gender” is the term that seems to be the unquestionable foundation of the field of gender studies, its conceptual legacy has been specified as Anglo-American and linguistic. Feminist scholars working with gender usually set up an argument against a biological determinism or biological essentialism, and ascribe a fixed sexual ontology to major traditions in (scholarly) thought as well as to Continental feminist philosophy (e.g. the work of Luce Irigaray). Felix Guattari once summarized his take on these issues in an interview, stating:
问题 4：尽管 "性别 "一词似乎是性别研究领域毋庸置疑的基础，但它的概念遗产却被明确 定义为英美的和语言的。研究性别问题的女性主义学者通常会提出反对生物决定论或生物本质论的论点，并将固定的性本体论归因于（学术）思想的主要传统以及大陆女性主义哲学（如卢斯-伊里加雷的著作）。费利克斯-瓜塔里曾在一次访谈中总结了他对这些问题的看法，他说：

If Gilles Deleuze and I have adopted the position of practically not speaking of sexuality, and instead speaking of desire, it’s because we consider that the problems of life and creation are never reducible to physiological functions, reproductive functions, to some particular dimension of the body. They always involve elements that are either beyond the individual in the social or political field, or else before the individual level (Guattari and Rolnik [1982] 2008, 411).
如果说吉尔-德勒兹和我采取的立场是实际上不谈论性，而是谈论欲望，那是因为我们认为生命和创造的问题永远不能还原为生理功能、生殖功能、身体的某个特定维度。它们总是涉及超越个人的社会或政治领域的因素，或者是在个人层面之前的因素（Guattari and Rolnik [1982] 2008, 411）。

This non-representationalist take on “sexual difference” seems to come close to your reading of this concept. Your proposal for an onto-epistemology shows us how matter (among others bodily matter) and meaning are always already immanently enfolded and transitional. Yet instead of taking a term from psychoanalysis (like desire), you bring in physics (Bohr’s conceptual apparatus). How then is quantum physics helping you in articulating your feminism?
这种对 "性差异 "的非表象主义解读似乎与你对这一概念的解读相近。你提出的 "内在认识论"（on-to-epistemology）向我们展示了物质（包括身体物质）和意义是如何始终内在地包覆和过渡的。然而，你并没有从精神分析中选取一个术语（比如欲望），而是引入了物理学（玻尔的概念装置）。那么，量子物理学是如何帮助你阐明你的女性主义的呢？

KB: A decade ago I would often get the following question: “Since your work is not about women or gender, what does it have to do with feminism?” My answer, of course, was: “Everything.” Happily, the question you have asked is light years beyond the kind of thinking that motivates that question. And I am assuming then that the level of conversation has shifted since that time, and that I can jump right in. Eros, desire, life forces run through everything, not only specific body parts or specific kind of engagements among body parts. Matter itself is not a substrate or a medium for the flow of desire. Materiality itself is always already a desiring dynamism, a reiterative reconfiguring, energized and energizing, enlivened and enlivening. I have been particularly interested in how matter comes to matter. How matter makes itself felt. This is a feminist project whether or not there are any women or people or any other macroscopic beings in sight. Along with other new materialist feminists—Vicki Kirby is notable in this regard—feeling, desiring and experiencing are not singular characteristics or capacities of human consciousness. Matter feels, converses, suffers, desires, yearns and remembers. You could also see Noela Davis’ paper on new materialism on this topic (Davis 2009). I tried to make this point more vivid in chapter 7 of my book, which has received a lot of interest and attention, but less specifically feminist engagement. And I think there is a lot of important food for thought in this chapter, at least in my mind. So I want to go over this, because it is a chapter that gets deeply into the physics of things, and as a result many humanities and social sciences scholars assume it is irrelevant to what they are thinking about. I always teach physics in my feminist classes, in part precisely because it calls into question the exceptionally narrow framing of scientific concerns and scientific literacy in the way that I was just talking about.
KB：十年前，我经常会被问到以下问题："既然你的作品不是关于女性或性别的 那它和女权主义有什么关系？"我的回答当然是"一切"令人欣慰的是，你所提出的问题远远超出了引发这个问题的思维方式。那我就假设，从那时起，对话的层次已经发生了变化，我可以直接插话了。爱神、欲望、生命力贯穿万物，而不仅仅是特定的身体部位或身体部位之间特定的接触。物质本身并不是欲望流动的基质或媒介。物质本身就已经是一种欲望的动力，是一种反复的重构，被激发又被激发，被激活又被激活。我一直对物质如何走向物质特别感兴趣。物质如何让人感受到自身。无论是否有女性、人类或其他宏观存在，这都是一个女权主义项目。与其他新唯物主义女权主义者一样--维基-科比（Vicki Kirby）在这方面也很突出--感受、渴望和体验并不是人类意识的单一特征或能力。物质会感受、对话、痛苦、欲望、渴望和记忆。您也可以参阅诺拉-戴维斯（Noela Davis）关于新唯物主义的论文（戴维斯，2009 年）。我试图在我的书的第 7 章中更生动地阐述这一点，这一章受到了很多人的兴趣和关注，但较少有专门的女性主义参与。我认为，至少在我看来，这一章有很多值得思考的重要内容。所以我想再讲一遍，因为这一章深入探讨了物理问题，结果很多人文和社会科学学者认为这与他们正在思考的问题无关。 我总是在我的女性主义课堂上讲授物理，部分原因正是因为它以我刚才谈到的方式，对科学关注和科学素养的异常狭隘的框架提出了质疑。
Who is responsible for engaging with science? I’d like to walk you through some of what’s going on in that chapter, because I think it holds some really important ways for rethinking some key feminist issues about matter and space and time and so on.
谁有责任参与科学？我想带大家了解一下这一章的内容，因为我认为这一章为重新思考关于物质、空间和时间等一些关键的女性主义问题提供了一些非常重要的方法。

I will give you a super-fast lesson of what you need to know about quantum physics and then come to what is in Chapter 7 to show you some of the results and what I think the implications are in terms of thinking about questions of social justice, which I think are key here. So here is my crash course on quantum physics.
我将以超快的速度给大家上一堂量子物理学速成课，然后再讲第 7 章的内容，向大家展示一些结果，以及我认为这些结果对思考社会公正问题的影响，我认为社会公正是这里的关键。这就是我的量子物理学速成班。

According to classical physics, there are only two kinds of entities in the world; there are particles and there are waves. Particles are very different from waves. Particles are localized entities that occupy a particular place in space and in time, and you cannot have two particles in the same place at the same time. On the other hand, there are waves, and waves are not entities at all. Waves are disturbances in fields. If you think about ocean waves, you see that waves often overlap with one another. They can occupy the same place at the same time; that is part of what they are famous for doing. So on the one hand, we have something localized, and, on the other, we have something very non-localized. Very distinct kinds of entities, ontologically speaking. In physics, there is a very simple machine that can be used to find out whether it is a particle or a wave, and it is called a two-slit apparatus. When you take a bunch of balls and shoot them randomly at two slits, what you find is that most of the particles wind up directly across from the two slits. You get something called a “scatter pattern.” You can think about the fact that if I am wildly throwing tennis balls in this room at the doorway, most of them are going to wind up right across from the doorway and a few of them will scatter to the sides. In contrast to that, think of a wave machine, making a disturbance in the water. And when the disturbance hits this kind of “breakwater” with two holes in it, what happens is that the disturbance bulges out on both sides and you get these kinds of concentric, overlapping circles that get forced through, just like when I drop two rocks in a pond simultaneously, I get an overlapping of concentric circles. That is a diffraction pattern and what you see is that there is a reinforcing of waves. When two waves meet, crest to crest, they make a higher wave. But sometimes you get a crest meeting a trough, and they cancel out.
根据经典物理学，世界上只有两种实体：粒子和波。粒子与波截然不同。粒子是在空间和时间中占据特定位置的局部实体，不可能同时有两个粒子出现在同一个地方。另一方面，还有波，波根本不是实体。波是场中的扰动。如果你想想海浪，就会发现波浪经常相互重叠。它们可以同时占据同一个地方；这就是它们闻名遐迩的部分原因。因此，一方面，我们有局部的东西，另一方面，我们也有非常非局部的东西。从本体论上讲，这是两种截然不同的实体。在物理学中，有一种非常简单的机器，可以用来找出是粒子还是波，它被称为双缝仪器。当你把一堆球随机地射向两个狭缝时，你会发现大多数粒子都会落在两个狭缝的正对面。这就是所谓的 "散射模式"。你可以想一想，如果我在这个房间里对着门口疯狂地扔网球，那么大部分网球都会落在门口的正对面，少数会散落到两边。与此相反，想想波浪机，它在水中制造扰动。当扰动撞击到这种有两个洞的 "防波堤 "时，扰动就会向两边凸起，你就会看到这些同心的、重叠的圆圈被挤过去，就像我同时向池塘里投下两块石头，就会看到同心圆的重叠。 这就是衍射图案，你看到的是波浪的加强。当两个波峰相遇时，波峰与波峰之间会产生更高的波。但有时波峰与波谷相遇，它们会相互抵消。
That makes for a very different kind of pattern.
这就形成了一种截然不同的模式。

Now, what happens if we test electrons with a two-slit apparatus? You might think, since we used to think of electrons as little tiny particles, that they would give me a particle pattern. But the result that we actually get is that electrons exhibit a diffraction or wave pattern. But as we saw, diffraction patterns are created by overlapping waves. But how can electrons overlap? They are particles. They cannot overlap with one another. You might think that the electrons are overlapping, but you can test that by sending one electron through at a time. If you send just one electron through at a time, you built up this diffraction pattern. It seems like we cannot explain this diffraction pattern; it seems like a mystery how this particle seems to be acting like a wave. Einstein in particular was very upset about this and suggested that we do an experiment where we actually watch the electron go through the slits. I want to talk about this which-slit detector experiment, because this is what I am building up to. In this experiment, what I have done is replace the top slit with a slit on a spring. And if the particle goes through the top slit, it imparts some of its momentum to the top slit and it moves a little bit, then I will know “Oh, it went through the top slit.” So, this is a way to measure which slit the electron is going through on its way to the screen. And Einstein said if we do this experiment we will catch the electron in the act of being both a particle, by going through one slit or the other, and a wave by showing this interference pattern and then it will show that quantum mechanics is self-contradictory and that we will have to find some other way of thinking about it. And Bohr said: “No, not so fast.” If you do this experiment, you have now revised the apparatus. And what we observe in any experiment is a phenomenon or entanglement or the inseparability of the apparatus and the observed object.
现在，如果我们用双缝仪器测试电子，会发生什么呢？你可能会想，既然我们过去一直把电子看成是微小的粒子，那么它们就会呈现出粒子图案。但实际上，我们得到的结果是电子呈现出衍射或波纹图案。但正如我们看到的，衍射图样是由重叠的波产生的。但电子怎么会重叠呢？它们是粒子。它们不可能相互重叠。你可能会认为电子是重叠的，但你可以通过一次只发送一个电子来测试这一点。如果每次只发送一个电子通过，就会形成这种衍射图样。我们似乎无法解释这种衍射图样；这个粒子怎么会像波一样，这似乎是一个谜。爱因斯坦对此非常不满，他建议我们做一个实验，实际观察电子穿过狭缝的过程。我想说说这个狭缝探测器实验，因为这就是我正在做的实验。在这个实验中，我所做的是用弹簧上的狭缝代替顶缝。如果粒子穿过顶部狭缝 它的一些动量传给了顶部狭缝 然后它移动了一下 我就知道 "哦 它穿过了顶部狭缝"所以，这是一种测量电子 在到达屏幕的途中经过哪个狭缝的方法爱因斯坦说，如果我们做这个实验 我们就能捕捉到电子的行为 既是粒子，通过一个狭缝或另一个狭缝 又是波，显示出这种干涉模式玻尔说："不，没那么快"如果你做了这个实验，你就修改了仪器。我们在任何实验中观察到的都是一种现象或纠缠，或仪器与观察对象的不可分割性。
Bohr said that if Einstein were to make the adjustment to the two-slit apparatus he suggested, he is going to get a particle pattern, not a diffraction pattern. Now, one should lose sleep over this. Because what this is saying is that the ontology of the electron is changing depending upon how I measure it. Let me just finish the quantum physics lesson really quickly. Bohr has an explanation for this, which is to say, again, that the properties that we measure are not attributable to independent objects. Independent objects are abstract notions. This is the wrong objective referent. The actual objective referent is the phenomenon— the intra-action of what we call the electron and the apparatus. And so the fact that its ontology changes when we change the apparatus is not a surprise, because we are investigating an entirely different phenomenon.
玻尔说，如果爱因斯坦按照他的建议对双缝仪器进行调整，他将得到粒子图案，而不是衍射图案。现在，人们应该为此而失眠。因为这意味着，电子的本体论会随着我测量它的方式而改变。让我来快速上完量子物理课。玻尔对此有一个解释，那就是，我们测量的属性并不能归因于独立的对象。独立对象是抽象概念。这是错误的客观参照物。实际的客观参照物是现象--我们所说的电子和仪器的内部作用。因此，当我们改变仪器时，它的本体也会发生变化，这并不奇怪，因为我们研究的是一种完全不同的现象。

I will now move into what is in Chapter 7 because I think, again, that there are important feminist “lessons” here. And of course when I say “feminist lessons,” that is a distorting shorthand I need to qualify. Because, of course, what I am presenting with agential realism already has feminist lessons built in to it, and that is part of the beauty of Chapter 7. At least for me it is the incredible satisfaction of taking insights from feminist theory, on the one hand, and insights from physics, on the other, and reading them through one another in building agential realism. And from there going back and seeing if agential realism can solve certain kinds of fundamental problems in quantum physics. And the fact that it is robust enough to do that, and that feminist theory has important things to say to physics is amazing, absolutely amazing, and key to the point I want to make as well. And in fact, when I was able to actually show that you could do science with agential realism and bring these important interests, the question came to me of whether or not I should publish this result in a physics journal or leave it for the book, so that physicists would have to go to a feminist book in order to find out some of the physics. I chose the latter, but in retrospect I think it was a mistake, because it took a very long time for the book to come out (more than three years) and because it seems that some physicists are engaging with my ideas without acknowledging it. Practices of publishing are always political.
现在我将进入第 7 章的内容，因为我再次认为，这里有重要的女权主义 "教训"。当然，当我说 "女性主义的教训 "时，我需要对这一歪曲的简称加以限定。因为，当然，我提出的代理现实主义已经包含了女权主义的教训，而这正是第 7 章的魅力所在。至少对我来说，能从女性主义理论和物理学中各取所需，并在建立敏捷现实主义的过程中相互渗透，我感到非常满足。然后再回过头来看，如果代理现实主义能解决量子物理学中的某些基本问题，那将是多么令人难以置信的满足。而事实是，它足够强大，能够做到这一点，而且女性主义理论对物理学有重要的启示，这令人惊叹，绝对令人惊叹，这也是我想说的关键。事实上，当我能够真正证明，你可以用激进现实主义来做科学，并带来这些重要的利益时，我想到的问题是，我是否应该在物理学期刊上发表这一成果，还是把它留在书中，这样物理学家就不得不去看一本女性主义的书，以了解一些物理知识。我选择了后者，但现在回想起来，我认为这是一个错误，因为这本书花了很长的时间（三年多）才出版，而且似乎有些物理学家对我的观点并不认可。出版实践总是政治性的。

Coming back to the issue at hand, Bohr and Heisenberg were totally at odds. Not only Bohr and Einstein, but also Bohr and Heisenberg. Heisenberg thought that the reason why it changes from a wave pattern to a particle pattern when you change the apparatus is because you are disturbing the particle. And this places a limit on what we can know, because each measurement disturbs what you are measuring. And he called that the “(Heisenberg) Uncertainty Principle,” which I have found is more familiar to European audiences than American audiences. But Bohr argues with Heisenberg and says that he makes a fundamental error in proposing uncertainty, and what is at issue is not uncertainty at all, but rather indeterminacy. That is, when we make a measurement, what happens is that it is not a matter of disturbing something and our knowledge is uncertain as a result, but rather there are not inherent properties and there are not inherent boundaries of things that we want to call entities before the measurement intra-action. That is, Bohr is saying that things are indeterminate; there are no things before the measurement, and that the very act of measurement produces determinate boundaries and properties of things. So, his is an ontological principle rather than an epistemological one. In other words, for Bohr particles do not have a position independently of my measuring something called position.
回到手头的问题，玻尔和海森堡完全不和。不仅是玻尔和爱因斯坦，玻尔和海森堡也是如此。海森堡认为，当你改变仪器时，之所以会从波型变为粒子型，是因为你干扰了粒子。这就限制了我们的认知，因为每次测量都会干扰你正在测量的东西。他称之为"（海森堡）不确定性原理"，我发现欧洲观众比美国观众更熟悉这个原理。但玻尔与海森堡争论说，他在提出不确定性时犯了一个根本性错误，问题根本不在于不确定性，而在于不确定性。也就是说，当我们进行测量时，发生的事情并不是扰乱了什么，我们的知识因此而不确定，而是在测量内部行动之前，我们想要称之为实体的事物并不存在固有属性和固有边界。也就是说，玻尔说的是，事物是不确定的；在测量之前没有事物，而测量行为本身会产生事物的确定边界和属性。因此，他的原则是本体论原则，而不是认识论原则。换句话说，对于玻尔来说，粒子并不具有独立于我测量的叫做位置的东西的位置。

Now, it seems that there is no scientific way to discern who is right, because what we are talking about is showing an empirical result about what happens before you do any measurement. So it seems like there is no way to ever resolve that. But actually we can. This is amazing! We can do experimental metaphysics now, which of course is just an indicator of the fact that there has never been a sharp boundary between physics, on the one hand, and metaphysics or philosophy, on the other. So there is an amazing and really astonishing experiment that physicists have only been able to do in the past decade or so since previously it was not technologically possible. And these famous Gedanken- or thought experiments of Bohr and Heisenberg could now be done for the first time, actually be performed in a laboratory. They never thought about them actually being done; they were not meant to be experiments that got actualized. They were meant to be experiments to think with, just tools to think with. But now it is technologically possible to actually do this experiment—to show what happens when I measure which-slit. Was Einstein right and do I catch the electron being both a particle and a wave showing that quantum theory is self-contradictory? Or is Bohr right that once I actually go ahead and measure which-slit, now I get a particle pattern and the interference pattern is gone? But even more beautifully than that, what the physicists have done in this case is to design an experiment where Heisenberg’s explanation of disturbing something that already exists, cannot be part of the explanation. So Heisenberg is designed out of this experiment. If it happens, it is happening for some reason other than a disturbance.
现在，似乎没有科学的方法来辨别谁是对的，因为我们所说的是在你进行任何测量之前，显示出一个关于发生了什么的经验性结果。因此，似乎没有办法解决这个问题。但实际上，我们可以。这太神奇了！我们现在可以做实验形而上学了，当然，这也恰恰说明了一个事实，那就是物理学与形而上学或哲学之间从来就没有过明显的界限。因此，物理学家在过去的十几年里才得以完成一项令人惊叹的实验，因为以前在技术上是不可能实现的。玻尔和海森堡的这些有名的思想实验，现在第一次可以在实验室里完成。他们从未想过这些实验会真正实现；这些实验并不是为了实现而实现的。它们只是用来思考的实验，只是用来思考的工具。但现在，从技术上讲，我们有可能真正完成这个实验--展示当我测量哪个狭缝时会发生什么。爱因斯坦是对的，我是否抓住了电子既是粒子又是波的事实，说明量子理论是自相矛盾的？或者玻尔是对的，一旦我真的去测量哪条缝，现在我得到的是粒子模式，干涉模式消失了？但比这更美妙的是，物理学家在这种情况下所做的是设计一个实验，让海森堡关于干扰已经存在的东西的解释不能成为解释的一部分。因此，海森堡被设计出了这个实验。如果它发生了，那一定是出于某种干扰之外的原因。

What is happening is that there is a beam of atoms coming along; in fact, they are rubidium atoms, and before the rubidium atoms reach the double slit, what happens is that there is a laser beam which gives the rubidium atoms some energy. And what happens when the atom gets energy, the electron that is in the inner orbital of rubidium gets kicked up to a high energy level from the energy it got from the laser beam. Now it is in, what is called, an “excited state.” See, there is already talk of desire in physics! And then it goes across and it goes to these cavities, these micromaser cavities. That is the which-slit detector. You do not have to know anything about micromaser cavities at all except this: when the rubidium atom in an excited state goes into one micromaser cavity or the other, the electron necessarily
在铷原子到达双缝之前，激光束会给铷原子提供一些能量。当原子获得能量时，铷原子内轨道上的电子就会被激光束中的能量提升到一个高能级。现在它处于所谓的 "激发态"看，物理学中已经有了 "欲望 "的说法然后它穿过这些空腔，这些微激光器空腔。这就是狭缝探测器你根本不需要了解微激光腔，只需要知道：当处于激发态的铷原子进入一个微激光腔或另一个微激光腔时，电子必须
drops back down to its ground state and in doing so it emits a photon and it leaves this trace photon in either the upper cavity or the lower cavity and then goes on its way through the two slits. So the rubidium atom goes on its way through the two slits and it hits the screen. And that is our experiment. Now, the reason why Heisenberg is not a part of this, is because you can show that by getting the rubidium atom into an excited state and having it come back down, it does nothing to affect the atom’s forward momentum. It is not disturbed. Here physicists have very cleverly made a which-slit detector that does not disturb the rubidium atoms’ forward momentum. So it is going to leave a telltale trace in detector one or detector two of which slit it went through without disturbing it. Now if you do this without the which-slit detector, just send rubidium atoms through double slits, you get a diffraction pattern. But if you put the laser there and the micromaser cavities and find out which slit it goes through, then it shifts to a scatter pattern or a particle pattern. But that second one definitely is a scatter pattern (rather than the alternating intensity pattern of waves). I just told you that there is no disturbance going on here so that is amazing already. It is amazing that you can now show that Bohr is right and not Einstein.
在此过程中，铷原子会发射出一个光子，这个光子会留在上腔或下腔，然后继续穿过两个狭缝。因此，铷原子穿过两个狭缝，然后撞击屏幕。这就是我们的实验。现在，海森堡之所以不参与这个实验，是因为你可以证明，让铷原子进入激发态，再让它返回下来，并不会影响原子的前向动量。它没有受到干扰。在这里，物理学家们非常巧妙地制造了一个狭缝探测器，它不会干扰铷原子的前向动量。因此，它会在一号探测器或二号探测器上留下蛛丝马迹，表明它通过了哪个狭缝，而不会受到干扰。如果不使用哪个狭缝探测器，只是让铷原子通过双狭缝，就会得到衍射图样。但如果你把激光和微激光腔放在那里，并找出它通过的狭缝，那么它就会转变为散射图案或粒子图案。但第二个肯定是散射图案（而不是波的强度交替图案）。我刚刚告诉过你，这里没有发生任何干扰，这已经很了不起了。你现在能证明玻尔而不是爱因斯坦是对的，这已经很了不起了。

But now here is where we as feminists really need to pay attention, because now something really amazing is coming forward in this, which is that since I have not made a disturbance in actually measuring which slit the atom goes through, you might ask the question if, after it goes through and leaves a telltale trace (a photon) in one slit or the other, what happens if I erase that information? Will I get the diffraction pattern again? It would be very hard, if there was a disturbance, to completely “un-disturb” it just so. But there is no disturbance here, remember? So we can ask the question, if I erase the which-slit information, can I actually get the diffraction pattern? The eraser part here is that I am going to erase the which-slit information and here is how I do it. I have these two different cavities and I take the wall out between the two of them, the two micromaser cavities, and I put a photo-absorbing plate right in between them. Remember that the rubidium atoms are left in there and they have gone through and they hit the screen. But they leave a photon, a quantum of light, in either cavity one or in cavity two. If I put a photon absorbing plate in between, then if the photon gets absorbed, I have erased the information of which side it came from. So that is how I am going to erase the information. And what I am going to do is I am going to put a set of shutters (like the shutters you have for blinds on the windows, and you can make it either shut so that the windows completely shut out the light or you can open them so the light comes through). So if we put shutters there, if the shutters are closed, I have the situation I had before where I know the which-slit information. But if I open the shutters, I give it the possibility of being erased.
但现在，作为女权主义者，我们真的需要注意了，因为现在有一件非常令人惊奇的事情出现了，那就是，既然我在实际测量原子通过哪个狭缝时没有造成干扰，那么你可能会问这样一个问题：如果原子通过并在一个狭缝或另一个狭缝中留下了明显的痕迹（光子），那么如果我抹去这些信息，会发生什么呢？我还能再得到衍射图样吗？如果存在干扰，要完全 "消除 "干扰是非常困难的。但这里没有干扰，还记得吗？因此，我们可以问这样一个问题：如果我抹去了哪个狭缝的信息，我真的能得到衍射图样吗？这里的 "擦除 "部分是指我要擦除哪个狭缝的信息，我是这样做的。我有两个不同的空腔，我把两个空腔（两个微激光器空腔）之间的壁拿掉，然后在它们之间放一块光吸收板。记住，铷原子被留在里面，它们穿过并撞击屏幕。但它们会在一号空腔或二号空腔中留下一个光子，一个光量子。如果我在中间放一块光子吸收板，那么如果光子被吸收，我就抹去了它来自哪一边的信息。这就是我要消除信息的方法。而我要做的，就是放上一组百叶窗（就像你在窗户上装百叶窗一样，你可以把它关上，让窗户完全隔绝光线，也可以把它打开，让光线透进来）。因此，如果我们在那里安装百叶窗，如果百叶窗是关闭的，我就会出现之前的情况，即我知道哪条缝的信息。但如果我打开百叶窗，它就有可能被抹去。

And what happens here actually is that, if I do this experiment now and open the shutters, I can show that I actually get a diffraction pattern! Now this gets even stranger. So I have these rubidium atoms, they are heading toward the two-slit detector. They leave a telltale photon in one place or the other. They go through the two slits and I am going to let them already hit, completely hit the screen. Now afterwards I am going to decide whether or not to open the shutters and erase the information about which slit it goes through. That is called “delayed choice” mode. And if I trace the ones whose which-slit information is erased, I get a diffraction pattern. In other words, after the rubidium atom has already hit, I am able to determine whether or not it had behaved like a particle or a wave. In other words, whether or not it had gone through a single slit at a time, like a particle will, or gone through both slits at the same time like a wave will. In other words, after it has already hit the screen and gone through the apparatus, I am able to determine its ontology, afterwards.
实际上，如果我现在做这个实验并打开百叶窗，就能看到衍射图样！这就更奇怪了。这些铷原子正飞向双缝探测器它们在一个地方或另一个地方留下了光子的痕迹它们穿过两个狭缝，我让它们完全撞击屏幕。之后，我将决定是否打开快门，抹去光子通过哪个狭缝的信息。这就是所谓的 "延迟选择 "模式。如果我追踪那些狭缝信息被抹去的照片，就会得到衍射图样。换句话说，在铷原子撞击之后，我就能确定它的行为是粒子还是波。换句话说，它是像粒子一样一次通过一个狭缝，还是像波一样同时通过两个狭缝。换句话说，在它撞上屏幕并穿过仪器之后，我才能够确定它的本体。

So the point here is: how do physicists interpret this? The way physicists interpret this is by saying that we have the ability to change the past. Because I am changing how it went through the slit after it has already gone through the slits. So there is a talk about erasing what already was, restoring the diffraction pattern, and basically moving the clock backwards or changing how the particle went through after it has already gone through: the ability to change the past. Now I want to suggest, though, that that is a very convenient kind of nostalgic fantasy. I cannot blame physicists for engaging in this. I think this is a very seductive fantasy. Perhaps at one time or another all of us wish that we could change the past and the marks left on bodies, and change the ways in which we materialized the world, especially when we are not being careful, that we would like to undo what has been done, that we would like to go back and do it differently. But is this really what this experiment is telling us about what is possible?
因此，问题的关键在于：物理学家如何解释这一点？物理学家的解释是：我们有能力改变过去。因为我是在它已经穿过狭缝之后，改变它穿过狭缝的方式。因此，有一种说法是抹去已经存在的东西，恢复衍射图样，基本上是将时钟向后移动，或者在粒子已经穿过之后改变它穿过的方式：改变过去的能力。不过，现在我想说的是，这是一种非常方便的怀旧幻想。我不能责怪物理学家这样做。我认为这是一种非常诱人的幻想。也许我们每个人都曾希望能够改变过去，改变在身体上留下的痕迹，改变我们物化世界的方式，尤其是在我们不小心的时候，我们希望能够撤销已经做过的事情，我们希望能够回到过去，以不同的方式去做。但这真的是这个实验告诉我们的可能吗？

It turns out that if we look at this experiment more carefully—it is all explained in Chapter 7—the original diffraction pattern is not being restored whatsoever and there is no complete erasure going on here at all. What is happening here is that the experiment is not about engaging a past that already was. See, we assume that time is a given externality, just a parameter that marches forward, and that the past already happened and the present, that moment “now” just slipped away into the past, and that the future is yet to come. But if we examine this carefully, again using the insights from feminist theory, from post-structuralist theory, and things that Cultural Studies has been telling us, and so on, and bring them into the physics here, what we can see is that what is going on actually is the making of temporality. There are questions of temporality that are coming to the fore here. What we are seeing here is that time is not given, it is not universally given, but rather that time is articulated and re-synchronized through various material practices. In other words, just like position, momentum, wave and particle, time itself only makes sense in the context of particular phenomena. So what is going on here is that physicists are actually making time in marking time, and that there is a certain way in which what we take to be the “past” and what we take to be the “present” and the “future” are entangled with one another. What we have learned from this experiment is that what exists are intra-active entanglements. That is the only reason we get a diffraction pattern again, by the way.
事实证明，如果我们更仔细地观察这个实验--第 7 章中会有详细解释--原始衍射图样并没有被还原，这里根本没有发生完全抹去的情况。这里发生的事情是，这个实验并不是在处理已经存在的过去。看，我们假设时间是一个既定的外在性，只是一个向前推进的参数，过去已经发生，而现在，"现在 "这个时刻刚刚滑向过去，未来尚未到来。但是，如果我们仔细研究这个问题，再次利用女性主义理论、后结构主义理论以及文化研究告诉我们的东西等等，并把它们带入物理学中，我们就会发现，实际上正在发生的是时间性的形成。时间性问题在这里凸显出来。我们在这里看到的是，时间并不是给定的，也不是普遍给定的，而是通过各种物质实践来衔接和重新同步的。换句话说，就像位置、动量、波和粒子一样，时间本身只有在特定现象的背景下才有意义。因此，这里发生的事情是，物理学家实际上是在标记时间的过程中创造时间，我们所认为的 "过去 "与我们所认为的 "现在 "和 "未来 "以某种方式相互纠缠在一起。我们从这个实验中学到的是，存在的是内部活动的纠缠。顺便说一句，这也是我们再次获得衍射图样的唯一原因。

And importantly, the original diffraction pattern doesn’t return, a new one is created, one in which the diffraction (that is, entanglement effects) is a bit challenging to trace. So, the issue is not one of erasure and return. What is at issue is an entanglement, intra-activity. The “past” was never simply there to begin with, and the “future” is not what will unfold, but “past” and “future” are iteratively reconfigured and enfolded through the world’s ongoing intra-activity. There is no inherently determinate relationship between past, present, and future. In rethinking causality as intra-activity and not as this kind of billiard-ball causality—cause followed by an effect—the fantasy of erasure is not possible, but possibilities for reparation exist. That “changing the past” in the sense of undoing certain discrete moments in time is an illusion. The past, like the future though, is not closed. But “erasure” is not what is at issue. In an important sense, the “past” is open to change. It can be redeemed, productively reconfigured in an iterative unfolding of spacetimematter. But its sedimenting effects, its trace, can not be erased. The memory of its materializing effects is written into the world. So changing the past is never without costs, or responsibility. A recent Ph.D. student of mine, Astrid Schrader (whose work is really remarkable, well worth looking out for) has an amazing paper in Social Studies of Science entitled “Responding to Pfiesteria piscicida (the Fish Killer): Phantomatic Ontologies, Indeterminacy, and Responsibility in Toxic Microbiology” (2010), showing how previously incompatible experiments on a tiny aquatic organism with large environmental policy stakes can be reconciled by tracing how time is differently made/synchronized through different laboratory practices. She argues that memory is not a matter of the past, but recreates the past each time it is invoked.
重要的是，原来的衍射图样并不会返回，而是会产生一个新的衍射图样，其中的衍射（即纠缠效应）在追踪上具有一定的挑战性。因此，问题不在于抹除和返回。问题在于一种纠缠，一种内部活动。过去 "从来都不是一开始就存在的，"未来 "也不是将要展开的，而是 "过去 "和 "未来 "在世界持续的内部活动中反复重构和包围的。过去、现在和未来之间并不存在固有的确定关系。将因果关系重新视为内部活动，而非台球式的因果关系--先有因，后有果--就不可能存在抹杀的幻想，但却存在补偿的可能性。改变过去 "是一种幻想，是指消除时间中某些不连续的时刻。过去和未来一样，并不是封闭的。但 "抹去 "并不是问题的关键。在一个重要的意义上，"过去 "是可以改变的。它可以被救赎，在时空物质的迭代展开中被有效地重新组合。但是，它的沉积效应、它的痕迹是无法抹去的。其物化效应的记忆已写入世界。因此，改变过去从来都不是没有代价和责任的。一位新近获得博士学位的科学家 我的学生 Astrid Schrader（她的作品非常出色，值得关注）在《科学的社会研究》（Social Studies of Science）上发表了一篇题为 "对鱼类杀手 Pfiesteria piscicida（鱼类杀手）的回应 "的惊人论文：该论文展示了如何通过追踪时间是如何通过不同的实验室实践以不同的方式制造/同步的，来调和之前对一种具有重大环境政策利害关系的微小水生生物进行的互不兼容的实验。她认为，记忆不是过去的问题，而是每次被调用时都会重新创造过去。

What I am trying to make clear is—all of this is an answer to your question, believe it or not—a sample of what I have learned from engaging with quantum physics that helps me further my understanding of feminist issues and practices. My passion for my work is utterly and completely grounded, and hopefully always with its feet attached to the ground, in questions of justice and ethics. This is what totally drives me. So I think there is a way in which the physics here actually helps me to bring an important materialist sense to Derridean notions of justice-to-come. That is not justice which we presume we know what it is in advance and which is forever fixed. So just to end this short answer with a couple of quotes from Derrida:
我想说明的是--信不信由你--这些都是对你问题的回答，是我从量子物理学中学到的知识的一个样本，这些知识有助于我进一步理解女权主义问题和实践。我对工作的热情是完全彻底地立足于正义和伦理问题，并希望始终脚踏实地。这就是我的全部动力。因此，我认为物理学在某种程度上可以帮助我为德里达的 "即将到来的正义 "概念带来重要的唯物主义意义。这并不是我们预先假定的、永远固定不变的正义。最后，我想引用德里达的几句话来结束这个简短的回答：

[The concern is] not with horizons of modified—past or future—presents, but with a “past” that has never been present, and which never will be, whose future to come will never be a production or a reproduction in the form of presence (Derrida [1968] 1982, 21; original emphasis).
[关注的]不是经过修改的过去或未来的 "现在"，而是从未存在过、也永远不会存在的 "过去"，它的未来永远不会以存在的形式产生或再现（德里达[1968]，1982 年，21；原文强调）。

And furthermore that:
此外

No justice […] seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead […]. Without this non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present […] without this responsibility and this respect for justice concerning those who are not there, of those who are no longer or who are not yet present and living, what sense would there be to ask the question “where?” “where tomorrow?” “whither?” (Derrida [1993] 2006, xviii; original emphasis).
如果没有某种责任的原则，在所有活生生的当下之外，在与活生生的当下相分离的事物之内，在那些尚未出生或已经死去的人的鬼魂面前，任何正义[......]似乎都是不可能或不可想象的[......]。如果没有这种与活生生的当下本身的非同时性[......]，如果没有这种对那些不在那里的人，对那些不再存在或尚未存在和活着的人的责任和对正义的尊重，那么问 "在哪里 "这个问题还有什么意义呢？"明天在哪里？""向何处去？(德里达[1993] 2006，xviii；原文强调）。

So this is an example of what I learned from my diffractive engagements with physics: what responsibility entails in our active engagement of sedimenting out the world in certain kinds of ways and not others. Being attentive to ways in which we are re-doing, with each intra-action materially re-doing the material configurings of spacetimemattering. The past and the present and the future are always being reworked. And so that says that the phenomena are diffracted and temporally and spatially distributed across multiple times and spaces, and that our responsibility to questions of social justice have to be thought about in terms of a different kind of causality. It seems very important to me to be bringing physics to feminism as well as feminism to physics. (To understand my response as something learned from physics and applied to feminism is to have misunderstood something fundamental about what I am trying to say.)
因此，这就是我从物理学的衍射参与中学到的一个例子：在我们以某种方式而非其他方式积极参与沉积世界的过程中，责任意味着什么。关注我们重新创造的方式，每一次内部行动都是对时空散射的物质配置的重新创造。过去、现在和未来总是在被重塑。因此，这些现象在时间上和空间上都是衍射的，分布在多个时间和空间，我们对社会公正问题的责任必须从另一种因果关系的角度来思考。在我看来，将物理学带入女性主义以及将女性主义带入物理学都是非常重要的。(如果把我的回答理解为从物理学中学到的东西并应用于女性主义，那就是误解了我想要表达的一些基本内容）。

Q5: A lot of scholars within the Humanities have great difficulties with posthumanist theories especially because they seem to lack an ethics, and you already talked about ethics. Especially when you bring in physics, this critique will no doubt be even stronger. At several moments in your work, however, one gets the impression that the ethics implicit in your approach is of great importance to you, as you already mentioned. Obviously when one wants to be part of feminist debates, it is impossible not to articulate onto-epistemology as an ethico-onto-epistemology. In your “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter” (Barad 2003) your emphasis on the material-discursive seems to critique the idea of the “medium.” This idea seems to claim that there are cases in which meaning can be non-material, idealistically traveling through space while not being affected by matter, actually remaining ultimately
Q5: 很多人文学科的学者对后人文主义理论有很大的异议，特别是因为这些理论似乎缺乏伦理学，而你已经谈到了伦理学。特别是当您把物理学也带进来时，这种批评无疑会更加强烈。不过，在您的作品中，有好几次给人的印象是，您的方法中隐含的伦理对您来说非常重要，这一点您已经提到过。很明显，当一个人想要参与女性主义辩论时，就不可能不把伦理本体论作为本体论来阐述。在您的《后人文主义的表演性：Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter"（巴拉德，2003 年）一文中，您对 "物质-传播 "的强调似乎是对 "媒介 "这一概念的批判。这种观点似乎声称，在某些情况下，意义可以是非物质的，可以理想地穿越空间，同时不受物质的影响，实际上最终仍然是 "媒介"。

“the same,” or unaltered. Your texts show that this idea of the medium is in conflict with the argument that matter and meaning are necessarily entangled.
"相同 "或未改变。您的文章表明，这种媒介观念与 "物质和意义必然纠缠在一起 "的论点相冲突。

Our question then would be how to understand this relational ontology that rejects the metaphysics of what used to be called “relata,” of words and things. How is an ethics at work in how matter comes to matter?
那么，我们的问题就是如何理解这种关系本体论，它摒弃了过去被称为 "关系 "的形而上学，摒弃了词语和事物。在物质如何产生物质的过程中，伦理学是如何发挥作用的？

KB: I think that you can already probably see from what I have been saying that I believe that questions of ethics and of justice are always already threaded through the very fabric of the world. They are not an additional concern that gets added on or placed in our field of vision now and again by particular kinds of concern. Being is threaded through with mattering. Epistemology, ontology, and ethics are inseparable. Matters of fact, matters of concern, and matters of care are shot through with one another. Or to put it in yet another way: matter and meaning cannot be severed. In my agential realist account, matter is a dynamic expression/articulation of the world in its intra-active becoming. All bodies, including but not limited to human bodies, come to matter through the world’s iterative intra-activity, its performativity. Boundaries, properties, and meanings are differentially enacted through the intra-activity of mattering. Differentiating is not about radical exteriorities (we saw that in the experiments I just talked about) but rather what I call agential separability. That is, differentiating is not about Othering, separating, but on the contrary, about making connections and commitments. So the very nature of materiality itself is an entanglement. Hence, what is on the other side of the agential cut is never separate from us. Agential separability is not individuation. Ethics is therefore not about right responses to a radically exteriorized other, but about responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming, of which we are a part. Ethics is about mattering, about taking account of the entangled materializations of which we are part, including new configurations, new subjectivities, new possibilities. Even the smallest cuts matter. Responsibility, then, is a matter of the ability to respond.
KB：我想你已经可以从我所说的话中看出，我认为伦理和正义问题始终贯穿于世界的结构之中。它们并不是一种额外的关注，而是通过特定的关注时不时地被添加或置于我们的视野之中。存在与物质贯穿始终。认识论、本体论和伦理学密不可分。事实问题、关注问题和关怀问题彼此贯穿。或者换一种说法：物质与意义不可分割。在我的行动现实主义论述中，物质是世界在其内在活动中的动态表达/艺术化。所有的身体，包括但不限于人类的身体，都是通过世界迭代的内在活动，即世界的表演性而成为物质的。边界、属性和意义都是通过 "物质化 "的内部活动以不同方式表现出来的。差异化不是激进的外部性（我们在刚才的实验中看到了这一点），而是我所说的行动分离性。也就是说，差异化不是他者化、分离，而是相反，是建立联系和承诺。因此，物质性的本质本身就是一种纠缠。因此，在行动切割的另一端的东西永远不会与我们分离。行动上的可分离性并不是个体化。因此，伦理学不是关于对彻底外在化的他者的正确回应，而是关于对成为的生动关系的责任与担当，我们是其中的一部分。伦理是关于 "重要性"，是关于考虑到我们作为其中一部分的纠缠不清的物质化，包括新的构型、新的主体性、新的可能性。即使是最小的切口也很重要。 因此，责任是一个反应能力的问题。
Listening for the response of the other and an obligation to be responsive to the other, who is not entirely separate from what we call the self. This way of thinking ontology, epistemology, and ethics together makes for a world that is always already an ethical matter.
倾听他人的回应，并有义务对他人做出回应，因为他人并不完全独立于我们所谓的自我。这种将本体论、认识论和伦理学结合在一起的思维方式，使得世界始终已经是一个伦理问题。

Q6: Finally, if you then propose a materialist ethics through physics, similar to the way people like Badiou (2007) and Meillassoux ([2006] 2008) re-absolutize the scope of mathematics, you indeed stir up post-Kantian academia. This has to have consequences for how you value various disciplines. Not falling into the traps of disciplinarity, multi-disciplinarity, inter-disciplinarity, or post-disciplinarity, how would you then qualify your manifesto for academic research?
问 6：最后，如果你通过物理学提出一种唯物主义伦理学，就像巴迪欧（2007 年）和梅拉苏（[2006] 2008 年）等人重新确定数学的范围那样，你确实会激起后康德学术界的骚动。这必然会对如何评价各学科产生影响。在不陷入学科性、多学科性、跨学科性或后学科性陷阱的情况下，您将如何为您的学术研究宣言定性？

KB: Well, manifesto is a thing that my friend and colleague Donna
KB：嗯，宣言是我的朋友兼同事 Donna

Haraway can get into, but I cannot claim that term. [Laughs.] Of course, she means it ironically. Agential realism is not a manifesto, it does not take for granted that all is or will or can be made manifest. On the contrary, it is a call, a plea, a provocation, a cry, a passionate yearning for an appreciation of, attention to the tissue of ethicality that runs through the world. Ethics and justice are at the core of my concerns or rather, it runs through “my” very being, all being. Again, for me, ethics is not a concern we add to the questions of matter, but rather is the very nature of what it means to matter.
哈拉维可以进入， 但我不能声称这个词。 [笑] 当然，她的意思是讽刺。[当然，她的意思是讽刺。行动现实主义不是宣言，它并不理所当然地认为一切都在、将要或能够被彰显。恰恰相反，它是一种呼唤，一种恳求，一种挑衅，一种呐喊，一种对欣赏、关注贯穿世界的伦理组织的热情渴望。伦理和正义是我关注的核心，或者说，它贯穿于 "我 "的存在本身，贯穿于所有的存在。同样，对我来说，伦理不是我们对物质问题的附加关注，而是 "物质 "的本质。

Notes
说明

1. This text is the result of an intra-active event (“Meeting Utrecht Halfway”) that took place on June 6, 2009 at the 7th European Feminist Research Conference, hosted by the Graduate Gender Programme of Utrecht University. The authors would like to thank the Center for Adaptive Optics at the University of California, Santa Cruz and the Infrastructurele Dienst Centrumgebied at Utrecht University for providing the video conferencing facilities, Heleen Klomp for transcribing the event, and the audience in Utrecht (esp. Magdalena Gorska, Sami Torssonen, and Alice Breemen) and Santa Cruz (esp. Karen’s partner Fern Feldman and her canine companion Bina who were willing to sit through a transcontinental interview well before the sun came up on the west coast of the U.S.) for attending.
1.本文是 2009 年 6 月 6 日由乌得勒支大学性别问题研究生项目主办的第七届欧洲女权主义研究会议上的一次内部活动（"中途相聚乌得勒支"）的成果。作者衷心感谢加州大学圣克鲁兹分校自适应光学中心和乌得勒支大学 Infrastructurele Dienst Centrumgebied 提供的视频会议设施、Heleen Klomp 提供的活动记录，以及乌得勒支的听众（特别是 Magdalena Gorska、Magdalena Gorska、Magdalena Gorska、Magdalena Gorska、Magdalena Gorska、Magdalena Gorska、Magdalena Gorska）。还有乌得勒支的听众（特别是 Magdalena Gorska、Sami Torssonen 和 Alice Breemen）和圣克鲁斯的听众（特别是 Karen 的搭档 Fern Feldman 和她的宠物狗 Bina，在美国西海岸太阳还没升起的时候，他们就愿意坐在那里接受跨洲采访）。

2. Science, Technology, and the Humanities: A New Synthesis, April 24-25, 2009.
2.科学、技术与人文：新的综合，2009 年 4 月 24-25 日。

Chapter 4
第 4 章

“There is contingent being independent of us, and this contingent being has no reason to be of a subjective nature”
"存在着独立于我们之外的偶然存在，而这种偶然存在没有理由具有主观性"

Interview with Quentin Meillassoux
采访昆廷-迈拉苏

Q1: Your debut book After Finitude ([2006] 2008) is considered by many to be one of the fiercest attacks on the history of modern thought, critiquing its humanism, its immanent metaphysics, its anti-materialism.1 You rigorously develop what you refer to as speculative materialism by means of rewriting this history, or as you refer to it, by rewriting correlationalism. This term is conceptualized throughout the book and has certainly triggered many scholars—sometimes referred to as the speculative realists (see Bryant et al, eds. 2011)—to develop a new philosophy of science and a new view on how move away from Kant.
Q1：您的处女作《终结之后》（[2006] 2008 年）被许多人认为是对现代思想史最猛烈的抨击之一，批判了现代思想史的人文主义、内在形而上学和反唯物主义。 1 您通过重写这段历史，或者说通过重写关联主义，严格地发展了您所说的推测唯物主义。这个术语的概念贯穿全书，它无疑引发了许多学者--有时被称为投机现实主义者（见布莱恩特等编，2011 年）--发展出一种新的科学哲学，以及一种关于如何摆脱康德的新观点。

Correlationism, which you refer to as “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 5) is severely critiqued by others who use this term. For you, however, the correlationist standpoint deserves great respect, which you do not just critique, but rather “radicalize from within: as an ‘inside job,’” as Harman (2011a, 25) puts it.
您所说的 "关联主义 "是指 "我们永远只能接触到思维与存在之间的关联，而永远不能接触到脱离另一关联的任何一个术语"（Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 5），使用这一术语的其他人对关联主义进行了严厉的批判。然而，对您而言，关联主义的观点值得尊重，您不仅对其进行了批判，而且正如哈曼（2011a, 25）所说，"从内部将其激进化：作为一项'内部工作'"。

In this book, which is mapping what we refer to as a new materialism, we felt no need to include or exclude particular scholars, and thus we also see no reason to count you in (or out). What we do notice is that we outline a similar trajectory to your own, albeit that these trajectories are developed in very different ways. Can you give us a rough sketch of the path you have been taking, giving much attention to this most complex idea of “correlationism”?
在这本描绘我们所说的新唯物主义的书中，我们认为没有必要纳入或排除特定的学者，因此我们也认为没有理由把您算在内（或排除在外）。我们注意到的是，我们勾勒出了与您相似的轨迹，尽管这些轨迹的发展方式截然不同。您能否向我们粗略地介绍一下您一直以来对 "关联主义 "这一最复杂的思想给予极大关注的路径？

Quentin Meillassoux: In my book I frontally oppose two positions: a) “strong correlationism” which, in my opinion, is the most rigorous form of anti-absolutism, and therefore of contemporary anti-metaphysics, and b) a metaphysics I call “subjective,” which, conversely, is nowadays the most widespread philosophy of the absolute, one which consists in posing this or that feature of the subject as essentially necessary—that is, its status as part of a correlate.
昆廷-迈拉苏：在我的书中，我正面反对两种立场：a）"强相关主义"，在我看来，它是反绝对主义的最严格形式，因此也是当代反形而上学的最严格形式；b）我称之为 "主观 "的形而上学，反过来说，它是当今最普遍的绝对哲学，它把主体的这个或那个特征说成是本质上必然的，也就是说，它是相关物的一部分。

Let us specify this distinction. In chapter 1 of After Finitude, I define correlationism in general as an anti-absolutist thesis: one uses the correlate “subject-object” (broadly defined) as an instrument of refutation of all metaphysics to enforce that we would have access to a modality of the in-itself. Instead, for correlationism, we cannot access any form of the in-itself, because we are irremediably confined in our relation-to-the-world, without any means to verify whether the reality that is given to us corresponds to reality taken in itself, independently of our subjective link to it. For me, there are two main forms of correlationism: weak and strong (see chapter 2, p. 42 for the announcement of this difference and p. 48 ff. for its explanation). Weak correlationism is identified with Kant’s transcendental philosophy: it is “weak” in that it still grants too much to the speculative pretension (e.g. absolutory) of thought. Indeed, Kant claims that we know something exists in itself, and that it is thinkable (non-contradictory). “Strong” correlationism does not even admit that we can know that there is an “in-itself” and that it can be thought: for this we are radically confined in our thought, without the possibility of knowing the in-itself, not even its taking place and logicity.
让我们具体说明这一区别。在《有限性之后》第一章中，我将关联主义定义为一个反自由主义的论题：人们使用 "主-客"（广义）关联作为驳斥所有形而上学的工具，以强制我们获得本体的模态。相反，在关联主义看来，我们无法获得任何形式的本体，因为我们被无可奈何地限制在我们与世界的关系中，没有任何方法来验证我们所获得的现实是否与现实本身相符，与我们的主观联系无关。在我看来，关联主义有两种主要形式：弱关联主义和强关联主义（见第 2 章第 42 页关于这一区别的说明，以及第 48 页及其后的解释）。弱关联主义与康德的超验哲学是一致的：它的 "弱 "在于它仍然过多地赋予了思想的推测性自命不凡（如绝对性）。事实上，康德声称我们知道某种事物本身是存在的，而且它是可思辨的（非矛盾的）。"强 "关联主义甚至不承认我们可以知道有一个 "本体"，而且它可以被思维：为此，我们的思维被彻底禁锢，不可能知道本体，甚至不可能知道它的发生和逻辑性。

I then define correlationism’s most rigorous contemporary opponent: the subjectivist metaphysician. The one who believes, unlike the strong correlationist (let’s call him simply “the correlationist” from now on), that we can actually access an absolute: that of the correlate. Instead of saying, like the correlationist, that we can not access the in-itself because we are confined to the correlate, the subjectivist metaphysician (let’s call him the “subjectivist” alone) asserts that the in-itself is the correlate itself.
然后，我定义了相关论在当代最严格的对手：主观主义形而上学家。与强相关论者不同（从现在起，我们姑且称他为 "相关论者"），主观主义形而上学者认为，我们实际上可以接触到一个绝对的东西：相关物的绝对性。主观主义形而上学者（我们姑且称他为 "主观主义者"）不像相关论者那样说，我们无法进入本体，因为我们被局限在相关物中，而是断言，本体就是相关物本身。

Thus the “subjectivist’s” thesis, according to its various instances, absolutizes various features of subjectivity. We have seen this from Hegel’s speculative idealism, which absolutizes Reason, to the various actual variations of vitalism (along the dominant Nietzsche/Deleuze axis) that absolutize will, perception, affect, et cetera. For me, Deleuze is a metaphysical subjectivist who has absolutized a set of features of subjectivity, hypostatized as Life (or “a Life”), and has posed them as radically independent of our human and individual relationship to the world.
因此，"主观主义者 "的论点，根据其不同的实例，将主观性的各种特征绝对化。我们已经看到了这一点，从将理性绝对化的黑格尔的推测唯心主义，到将意志、知觉、情感等绝对化的生命论的各种实际变体（沿着尼采/德勒兹的主导轴心）。在我看来，德勒兹是一个形而上学的主观主义者，他将主观性的一系列特征绝对化，伪装成 "生命"（或 "一种生命"），并将这些特征摆在与我们人类和个人与世界的关系完全无关的位置上。

This distinction between strong correlationism and subjectivist metaphysics constitutes the very core of the book. Chapter 3, in fact, lays the foundation of my enterprise. Chapter 3 is entirely based on the clash between correlationism and subjectivism, and it is that confrontation that allows me to establish the absolute necessity of facticity—a point of view from which you must read all my subsequent positions.
强相关主义与主观主义形而上学之间的这种区别构成了本书的核心。事实上，第 3 章奠定了我的事业的基础。第 3 章完全建立在关联主义与主观主义的冲突之上，正是这一冲突让我确立了事实性的绝对必要性--你必须从这一观点出发来阅读我之后的所有立场。

Q2: In your view Deleuze, who has made important contributions to what we refer to as “new materialism,” is not materialist because the absolute primacy of the unseparated (“nothing can be unless it is some form of relation to the world”) in his metaphysics does not allow for the Epicurean atom “which has neither intelligence, nor will, nor life” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 37) to be possible.
问 2：德勒兹对我们所说的 "新唯物主义 "做出了重要贡献，但在你看来，他并不是唯物主义者，因为在他的形而上学中，不分离的绝对首要性（"除非是与世界的某种形式的关系，否则任何东西都不可能存在"）不允许伊壁鸠鲁式的原子 "既没有智慧，也没有意志，更没有生命"（迈拉苏[2006] 2008, 37）成为可能。

Though it should be added that the Deleuze (with and without Guattari) is important to your thinking and still demands more thinking (Meillassoux 2010). You emphasize that science and mathematics have posed questions to philosophy (questions concerning the ancestral) that demand a speculative materialism freed from the primacy of the unseparated. Yet how can you simultaneously claim to break with a transcendental statement such as: what is asubjective cannot be—and yet marry a similar approach to that of Kant concerning science or mathematics?
尽管应该补充的是，德勒兹（有瓜塔里和没有瓜塔里）对您的思考非常重要，而且仍然需要更多的思考（Meillassoux，2010 年）。您强调科学和数学向哲学提出了问题（关于祖先的问题），这些问题要求一种摆脱了未分离的首要地位的推测唯物主义。然而，您又是如何同时宣称要打破诸如 "作为主观的东西不可能是主观的 "这样的超验陈述，并在科学或数学方面采用与康德类似的方法呢？

QM: Let’s be precise again. The statement: “what is asubjective cannot be” is the only “common point” of both anti-metaphysical correlationism and subjectivist metaphysics. But we must understand in what way and to what extent. For the correlationist, it means that I can never think the object by doing the economy of my subjective point of view. For the correlationist, the statement therefore means: the a-subjective is unthinkable for us (“it cannot be” means: “it cannot be thinkable”). For the subjectivist the statement conversely means that the a-subjective is absolutely impossible: “it cannot be” = “it cannot be in itself.” Metaphysics of Life or of Spirit, transcendental philosophy, or strong correlationism: all converge in the denunciation of “naive realism” proper to an Epicurean type of materialism asserting that some non-subjective exists (atoms and void) and that we can know it. I really break with this anti-realist consensus, notably with any form of transcendental, and yet without going back to Epicureanism, which in its genre still remained a metaphysics (not subjective but realist) because it supported the real need for atoms and void.
QM：让我们再准确一点。这句话"作为主观的东西不可能是 "是反形而上学的关联主义和主观主义形而上学的唯一 "共同点"。但我们必须明白是以何种方式和在何种程度上。对于相关论者来说，这意味着我永远不能通过我的主观观点的经济性来思考客体。因此，对关联论者来说，这句话的意思是：主观的东西对我们来说是不可思考的（"它不可能是 "的意思是："它不可能是可思考的"）。反之，对于主观论者来说，这句话的意思是：a-主观是绝对不可能的："它不可能是"="它本身不可能是"。生命形而上学或精神形而上学、超验哲学或强关联主义：所有这些都汇聚在对 "天真的现实主义 "的谴责中，这种 "天真的现实主义 "是伊壁鸠鲁式的唯物主义所特有的，它断言某种非主观的存在（原子和虚空），而且我们可以认识它。我确实打破了这种反现实主义的共识，特别是任何形式的超验，但并没有回到伊壁鸠鲁主义，它在其流派中仍然是一种形而上学（不是主观的，而是现实主义的），因为它支持对原子和虚空的真正需要。

But this certainly does not prevent me from maintaining the demand for an elucidation of science’s conditions of thinkability. Such a demand, in fact, has nothing transcendental in itself: it is proper to any philosophy which seeks to know what it is speaking of when using the term “science.” My thesis is that we still do not understand what this word means, since we failed to resolve the aporia of the arche-fossil: that the mathematized sciences of nature are only thinkable under the conditions of granting an absolute scope to its statements, an absolute scope that all anti-metaphysical philosophies of the era have challenged. Subjectivist metaphysics could rightly assert that they have maintained the absolute scope of thought and that they therefore do not fall under the problem of arche-fossil: however, I show that these metaphysics are effectively refuted by strong correlationism, and that consequently they are also ultimately unable to resolve this aporia.
但这当然不妨碍我坚持要求阐明科学的可思性条件。事实上，这种要求本身并不具有超越性：它是任何哲学的应有之义，因为任何哲学在使用 "科学 "一词时，都试图知道自己在说什么。我的论点是，我们仍然不理解这个词的含义，因为我们未能解决原初化石的poria：数学化的自然科学只有在赋予其陈述以绝对范围的条件下才是可思辨的，而这个绝对范围是这个时代所有反形而上学哲学所挑战的。主观主义形而上学可以理直气壮地断言，它们坚持了思维的绝对范围，因此它们不属于原初化石问题的范畴：然而，我表明，这些形而上学被强关联主义有效地驳倒了，因此它们最终也无法解决这个空洞。

Q3: Perhaps we should talk about why we should rewrite the history of thought. Many authors interested in developing a materialist or realist philosophy today are keen on rejecting humanism because of its (implicit) representationalist or linguisticist theorizations, claiming that in this emphasis on the copy or on language a lethal reductivism has entered thought (in philosophy and the humanities more generally, but in the sciences just as well). You, on the other hand, intend to break open correlationist thinking in order to reach out for the Absolute again. Many will agree with you that the Absolute has been excluded from thinking more and more since the coming of modernity (since the rise of Kant-inspired correlationism, to use your terms). In fact, whereas Nietzsche famously claimed at the end of the 19th century (in Also Sprach Zarathustra ([1883-1885] 1967)) that critical thinking had killed God, you claim the exact opposite: because of correlationism the Absolute has become unthinkable. Critiquing Kant through Descartes and Hume especially when it comes down to causality, you intend to push correlationism to the extreme, revealing what you refer to as the Principle of Facticity: a radically different conceptualization of nature (nature as contingent) and its relation to thinking. Radicalizing (weak) correlationism shows us that, as you put it “every world is without reason, and is thereby capable of actually becoming otherwise without reason” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 53; original emphasis).
问题 3：也许我们应该谈谈为什么要重写思想史。今天，许多有志于发展唯物主义或现实主义哲学的作者都热衷于拒绝人文主义，因为它（隐含的）表象主义或语言主义理论，声称在这种对摹本或语言的强调中，一种致命的还原论已经进入了思想（在哲学和人文学科中更为普遍，但在科学中也是如此）。而您则打算打破关联主义思维，重新探寻绝对。许多人会同意你的观点，即自从现代性到来以来（用你的话说，自从康德启发的关联主义兴起以来），绝对性越来越被排除在思维之外。事实上，尼采在 19 世纪末（在《查拉图斯特拉如是说》（[1883-1885] 1967 年）中）曾有过批判性思维扼杀了上帝的著名论断，而您的论断却恰恰相反：由于关联主义，绝对性变得不可思考。您通过笛卡尔和休谟对康德进行了批判，尤其是在因果关系方面，您打算将关联主义推向极端，揭示您所说的事实性原则：一种完全不同的自然概念化（自然是偶然的）及其与思维的关系。激进的（弱）关联主义向我们表明，正如您所说的，"每个世界都是没有理由的，因而也能够在没有理由的情况下成为另外一个世界"（梅拉苏[2006] 2008, 53；原文强调）。

QM: Let me explain this point again in a few words. The subjectivist asserts that the correlationist discovered, in spite of him, the true absolute: not a reality outside of the correlate, but the correlate as such. Indeed, the correlationist has demonstrated that we could not claim to think of a reality independent of the correlation without immediately contradicting ourselves: to think the in-itself is to think it, thus making it a correlate of our subjective activity of thought instead of making it an absolute independent of us. But this, according to the subjectivist, demonstrates that this absolute is nothing other than the correlation itself. Because, by the correlationist’s own confession, I cannot conceive the correlate’s disappearance or being-other without immediately reconducting it in its own structures, which means that in reality I cannot think the correlation otherwise than as necessary. This conclusion contradicts the correlationist’s anti-absolutist thesis. However the subjectivist nevertheless extracts it from the argument of the correlationist, thus turning correlationism against itself: the correlate, instrument of de-absolutization of realist metaphysics, is turned back into an anti-realist absolute. But the strong correlationist has not yet spoken his last word: in Chapter 3, I show that in his most contemporary forms (Heidegger or Wittgenstein) he manages to refute the subjective response by opposing the irreducible facticity to the absolutization of the correlation. I shall let you re-read how I describe this answer: the conclusion I draw upon is that strong correlationism cannot be refuted by the absolutization of the correlation as believed by the subjectivist, but rather by the absolutization of facticity (wherein resides the meaning of the principle of factuality).
QM：让我用几句话再解释一下这一点。主观论者断言，尽管相关论者发现了真正的绝对：不是相关物之外的现实，而是相关物本身。事实上，关联论者已经证明，我们不可能在不立即自相矛盾的情况下声称思考一个独立于关联之外的实在：思考本体就是思考它，从而使它成为我们主观思维活动的关联物，而不是使它成为独立于我们的绝对物。但主观论者认为，这就证明了这种绝对性不过是相关性本身而已。因为，根据关联论者自己的供述，我无法想象关联物的消失或成为他者，而不立即在其自身的结构中对其进行再引导，这意味着在现实中，我除了把关联物视为必然之外，不可能对其进行其他思考。这一结论与关联论者的反自由主义论题相矛盾。然而，主观论者还是从相关论者的论证中抽取了这一结论，从而使相关论自相矛盾：作为现实主义形而上学去绝对化工具的相关物，又重新变成了反现实主义的绝对物。但是，强相关论者还没有说出他的最后一句话：在第 3 章中，我将说明，在其最当代的形式中（海德格尔或维特根斯坦），他通过将不可还原的事实性与相关性的绝对化对立起来，成功地驳斥了主观反应。 我想让你重读一下我是如何描述这个答案的：我得出的结论是，强相关主义并不能像主观主义者所相信的那样，被相关性绝对化所驳倒，而是被事实性绝对化所驳倒（事实性原则的意义就在于此）。

Q4: Though you mention several times that speculative materialism is in search of a diachronic approach, your use of concepts does point us to a time (and place) long gone (the arche-fossil for instance). Also when you state that “[…] there is a deeper level of temporality, with which what came before the relation-to-the-world is itself but a modality of that relation-to-the-world” (ibid., 123), this depth, which comes back several times in the final chapter, should be searched for “before” thought. This reminds us once again of a Heideggerian approach which intends to take us “back” to the things themselves. Now as we’ve seen before, you are in fact quite critical of Heidegger (not only in your answer above but also for instance on ibid., 41-2, where you accuse him (together with Wittgenstein) of setting up a strong correlationism that dominated twentieth century philosophy). Though you quote mainly his later work, your critique of Heidegger focuses primarily on questions of being that were more central to his earlier work. In his Die Frage nach Technik (1954) and also in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (1960) we can easily read a materialism that comes close to yours as he too questions relationality and is in search of a more complete and deeper meaning of things (and times) that can be found only before this relationality came into being.
问 4：虽然您多次提到推测唯物主义是在寻找一种非同步的方法，但您对概念的使用确实把我们指向了一个久远的时间（和地点）（例如原生化石）。此外，当您指出"[......]存在着更深层次的时间性，在与世界的关系之前的东西本身不过是与世界的关系的一种模式"（同上，123）时，在最后一章中多次提到的这种深度应该在思想 "之前 "去寻找。这让我们再次想起海德格尔的方法，即让我们 "回到 "事物本身。正如我们之前所看到的，你对海德格尔的批评其实是相当严厉的（不仅是在你上面的回答中，而且例如在同上，41-2，你指责他（与维特根斯坦一起）建立了一种主导二十世纪哲学的强烈的关联主义）。虽然您主要引用了海德格尔的晚期著作，但您对海德格尔的批评主要集中在存在问题上，而这些问题在他早期的著作中更为核心。在他的《对技术的质疑》（Die Frage nach Technik，1954 年）和《艺术的起源》（Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes，1960 年）中，我们很容易读到一种与您的观点相近的唯物主义，因为他也质疑关系性，并在寻找事物（和时代）更完整、更深刻的意义，而这种意义只有在关系性产生之前才能找到。

Speculatively taking away the idealist and sometimes humanist dimension of Heidegger’s thinking, could we say that the phenomenological notion of going back to the things themselves, and also their interest in rewriting, as Lyotard ([1988] 1991) would put it, ancient Greek thinking (think as well of your last chapter entitled “Ptolemy’s Revenge”) is also your interest? Or would you at least share his idea not so much of rewriting a pre-human, but rather a pre-modern or classical philosophy?
撇开海德格尔思想中的唯心主义和有时的人文主义维度，我们是否可以说，回到事物本身的现象学概念，以及他们重写古希腊思想的兴趣，正如利奥塔（[1988] 1991）所说的那样（想想您最后一章的标题 "托勒密的复仇"），也是您的兴趣所在？或者说，你是否至少赞同他的观点，即与其说是重写前人类哲学，不如说是重写前现代或古典哲学？

QM: In relation to Heidegger, I take care to show that he has in fact never escaped correlationism, neither in his later nor in his earlier period. That is why I quote his Identity and Difference (chapter 1, p. 41-2), which brings back Ereignis—a central notion from after the “turn” in Heidegger’s work—to a clearly correlational structure. The “return to things themselves,” which was the slogan of Husserl’s phenomenology before that of the early Heidegger, in no way corresponds to my idea of philosophy: as it only consists, by this call, in returning to the things as correlates of consciousness, Dasein, phenomenon, being, or Being. If the given were the thing in itself, then the thing would intrinsically be something given-to, but according to me, this is not the case. There is therefore no return to “things in themselves,” but rather to the in-itself seen as indifferent to what is given to us, because indifferent to our opening-the-world.
QM: 关于海德格尔，我想说明的是，无论是在他的晚期还是早期，他实际上都没有摆脱关联主义。这就是为什么我引用了他的《同一性与差异性》（第一章，第 41-2 页），其中将 "Ereignis"--海德格尔作品中 "转向 "之后的核心概念--带回了一个明显的相关性结构。在早期海德格尔之前，胡塞尔现象学的口号是 "回到事物本身"，但这一口号与我对哲学的理解完全不符，因为它只是回到作为意识、Dasein、现象、存在或存在者的关联物的事物本身。如果 "被给予 "本身就是 "事物"，那么 "事物 "本质上就是 "被给予 "的东西，但在我看来，情况并非如此。因此，我们并没有回到 "事物本身"，而是回到被视为对被给予之物无动于衷的本体，因为它对我们的 "打开-世界 "无动于衷。

I am not involved in a return to or a rewriting of the Greeks—such an enterprise offers no determinate meaning to my approach.
我没有参与回归或重写希腊人的活动--这样的活动对我的方法没有确定的意义。

Q5: Michel Foucault was the first to announce the End of Man or the second Copernican turn in The Order of Things ([1966] 1970). His new way of writing history might not have excluded the human mind, but certainly it at least claims not to start with it. His idea of discourse for instance did not start with language, but with material forms (for instance the prison-form) which came along with expressive forms like delinquency (which is not a signifier, but part of a set of statements reciprocally presupposing the material form of the prison). To push this a bit further, it seems not too difficult to rephrase this argument without the human mind playing even a minor role in it. Think for instance of how sedimentary processes work, where pebbles are picked up by water streams (expressed through them) and are sorted in uniform layers creating the new entity of the sedimentary rock (new substances), a non-linear and ongoing process also in movement because of tectonic movements, weather conditions and much more (complicated) processes of change that in the end create movements very similar to how Foucault saw them taking place in respect to nineteenth century processes of delinquency.
问题 5：米歇尔-福柯是第一个在《事物的秩序》（[1966] 1970 年）中宣布 "人的终结 "或 "第二次哥白尼转向 "的人。他书写历史的新方式也许并不排斥人类思维，但至少可以肯定的是，他声称不以人类思维为出发点。例如，他的话语观念并不是从语言开始的，而是从物质形式（例如监狱形式）开始的，而物质形式又与表现形式如犯罪（它不是一个符号，而是一系列陈述的一部分，这些陈述互为监狱物质形式的前提）相伴而生。再进一步说，要重新表述这一论点，而人类思维在其中不扮演哪怕是次要的角色，似乎也并不困难。举例来说，想想沉积过程是如何运作的：鹅卵石被水流带走（通过水流表达），并被分拣成均匀的层，形成沉积岩的新实体（新物质），这是一个非线性的、持续的过程，由于地壳运动、天气条件以及更多（复杂的）变化过程，这个过程也在不断运动，最终形成的运动与福柯所看到的十九世纪犯罪过程非常相似。

In what way then is your approach different from Foucault’s? Or, where is the arche-fossil different and less dependent upon the human mind than the pebbles in the example above?
那么，你的方法与福柯的方法有何不同？或者说，与上述例子中的鹅卵石相比，原型化石在哪些地方与人类思维不同，更不依赖于人类思维？

QM: Concerning Foucault I will simply answer as follows. His investigation focuses on past dispositives of knowledge-power, and eventually on dispositives that are contemporary to him. He can bring us nothing in regards to the disqualification of strong correlationism, because the disqualification is situated at a level that his research does not address, but rather presupposes. Indeed, I examine how correlationism, from its point of departure in the Cogito, has come to dominate all of modern thought, including the most resolutely anti-Cartesian: the “great confinement” was not that of the fools in the asylum, but that of the philosophers in the Correlate—and this also applies to Foucault. Indeed, Foucault does not say anything that would embarrass a correlationist, as all his comments can easily be considered as a discourse-correlated-to-the-point-of-view-of-our-time, and rigorously dependent on it. This is a typical thesis of some correlationist relativism: we are trapped in our time, not in Hegelian terms, but rather in a Heideggerian fashion—that is to say in the modality of knowledge-power that always already dominates us. His thesis on the “disappearance of man” is about man understood as an object of “human sciences,” not about the correlate as I conceive it.
QM：关于福柯，我简单回答如下。他的研究重点是过去的知识-权力支配，最终是与他同时代的支配。关于强相关主义的不合格，他什么也不能给我们带来，因为不合格是在他的研究没有涉及，而是预设的层面上。事实上，我研究了关联主义是如何从《科吉多》中的出发点开始支配所有现代思想的，包括最坚决反笛卡尔的思想："伟大的禁锢 "不是精神病院中愚人的禁锢，而是关联主义中哲学家的禁锢--这也适用于福柯。事实上，福柯没有说过任何会让相关论者尴尬的话，因为他的所有评论都可以被轻松地视为与我们的时代观点相关的话语，并严格地依赖于它。这是某些相关论相对主义的典型论点：我们被困在我们的时间中，不是以黑格尔的方式，而是以海德格尔的方式--也就是说，被困在知识-权力的模式中，而知识-权力总是已经支配了我们。他关于 "人的消失 "的论述是关于被理解为 "人文科学 "对象的人，而不是我所理解的相关性。

I am not at all hostile to Foucault’s thesis, even though in my view he thinks within a historicist ontology that remains unthought in its deep nature—even in his magnificent course entitled “Society Must be Defended” (Foucault 2003).
我一点也不敌视福柯的论述，尽管在我看来，他是在一种历史主义本体论的框架内进行思考的，而这种本体论的深层本质仍未得到思考--即使在他那门题为《社会必须得到捍卫》（福柯，2003 年）的宏伟课程中也是如此。

Q6: The central question of your book was: How is thought able to think what there can be when there is no thought? (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 36) A lot of scholars in the humanities, though sympathetic to your re-reading of Kant and Hume, might not see the urgency of this question. Feminism for instance might be interested in thinking beyond the male-female dichotomy and contemporary feminist theory would also definitely not start its analysis from the human (female) mind, but the urgency of thinking a place without thought would probably be considered the pointless question par excellence, as you already phrased it (ibid., 121). How would you suggest convincing them?
问题6：您这本书的中心问题是：在没有思想的情况下，思想如何能够思考可能存在的东西？在没有思想的情况下，思想如何能够思考可能存在的东西？(梅拉苏[2006] 2008, 36）很多人文学科的学者，虽然同情您对康德和休谟的重读，但可能看不到这个问题的紧迫性。例如，女性主义可能对超越男女二元对立的思考感兴趣，当代女性主义理论也肯定不会从人类（女性）的思想出发进行分析，但正如您已经表述过的那样（同上，121），思考一个没有思想的地方的紧迫性可能会被认为是一个毫无意义的问题。您建议如何说服他们？

QM: That the question of what there is when there is no thought is considered by many—and not only by feminists—as devoid of meaning or interest is indeed likely. As you recall, I specifically say: the problem is to understand how the most urgent question has come to be regarded as the most idle one. The question is not about convincing anyone to think otherwise, because it is a very strong feature of our era that we cannot fight in a few sentences.
QM：许多人--不仅是女权主义者--认为 "没有思想时有什么 "这个问题没有意义或没有兴趣，这确实很有可能。你还记得吧，我特别提到：问题是要了解最紧迫的问题是如何被视为最无用的问题的。这个问题并不是要说服谁不这么想，因为这是我们这个时代的一个非常强烈的特征，我们不可能三言两语就与之斗争。

If I had to say something to shake actual certainties, I would formulate it in a provocative fashion, but basically this is what I think: I assert that anyone who refuses to deal with this question simply does not know what he is saying when he utters the words “science,” “mathematics,” “absolute,” “metaphysics,” “non-metaphysics,” and other words of equal significance. What I say in my book and in the lines above suffice to explain what allows me to say that.
如果我必须说些什么来动摇实际的确定性，我会以一种挑衅性的方式来表述，但基本上这就是我的想法：我断言，任何拒绝处理这个问题的人，当他说出 "科学"、"数学"、"绝对"、"形而上学"、"非形而上学 "以及其他同样重要的词语时，他根本不知道自己在说什么。我在我的书中和上面几行中所说的话足以解释我为什么能这样说。

That is why the question of sexual difference cannot be foreign to this interrogation. For instance, Lacan’s entire work is crossed by the question of the scientificity or non-scientificity of psychoanalysis, and finds one of its points of culmination in the notion of the “matheme.” Well, I argue for any Lacanian discourse—which is admittedly related to the question of the difference between “man/woman” or “male/female”—to be unable to grasp the meaning of its most crucial concepts until it will not have treated as its necessary prerequisite the question of the non-correlational in science. The same also applies to any feminist theory that incorporates in its discourse one of the terms quoted above.
正因为如此，性差异问题在这一讨论中不可能是陌生的。例如，拉康的整部著作都贯穿着精神分析的科学性或非科学性问题，并在 "matheme "这一概念中达到了顶峰。我认为，任何拉康式的论述--诚然与 "男人/女人 "或 "男性/女性 "之间的差异问题有关--如果不把科学中的非相关性问题作为必要前提，就无法把握其最关键概念的意义。同样的道理也适用于将上述术语之一纳入其论述的任何女性主义理论。

Q7: You shift strong correlationism by revolutionizing Kant and Hume, thus by demonstrating how a radical anti-anthropocentrism fulfills the Copernican revolution. Central to this radical anti-anthropocentrism by which you reabsolutize thought is mathematics (ibid., 101, 103, 113, 126): “what is mathematizable cannot be reduced to a correlate of thought” (ibid., 117). This entails a definite move away from thinking science philosophically, because this is what has obfuscated “science’s non-correlational mode of knowing, in other words, its eminently speculative character” (ibid., 119; original emphasis). What you state is that of the statement “thought can think that event X can actually have occurred prior to all thought, and indifferently to it,” “no variety of correlationism […] can admit that that statement’s literal meaning is also its deepest meaning” (ibid., 122; original emphasis). In line with the argument it makes sense to link this eternal truth that we find in mathematics to a “realism” (albeit speculative), but how could we call it a materialism? Is the morphogenetic dynamics of mathematics equal to matter?
问 7：您通过对康德和休谟的革命，从而证明了激进的反人类中心主义是如何实现哥白尼革命的，从而改变了强相关主义。数学是这种激进的反人类中心主义的核心，通过数学，您将思想重新归属于数学（同上，101、103、113、126）："可数学化的东西不能归结为思想的关联物"（同上，117）。这就必然会远离从哲学的角度来思考科学，因为正是这一点掩盖了 "科学的非相关性认识模式，换句话说，科学的推测性特征"（同上，119；原文强调）。你所说的是，对于 "思想可以认为事件 X 实际上可能发生在所有思想之前，而且与思想无关 "这句话，"没有任何一种相关论[......]可以承认这句话的字面意义也是其最深刻的意义"（同上，122；原文着重号）。根据这一论点，将我们在数学中发现的这一永恒真理与 "现实主义"（尽管是推测性的）联系起来是有道理的，但我们怎么能称其为唯物主义呢？数学的形态发生动力学等同于物质吗？

QM: I intend to demonstrate-note here that this is still not done in After Finitude—that what is mathematizable is absolutizable. You ask me if this is a materialist thesis rather than a merely “realist” one. It is difficult to discuss the relevance of my thesis if we omit the whole discussion of the problem of the arche-fossil found in Chapter 1. I will nevertheless answer as follows: for me, materialism holds in two key statements: 1. Being is separate and independent of thought (understood in the broad sense of subjectivity), 2. Thought can think Being. Thesis number 1 is opposed to any anthropomorphism which seeks to extend subjective attributes to Being: materialism is not a form of animism, spiritualism, vitalism, etcetera. It asserts that non-thinking actually precedes, or at least may in right precede thought, and exists outside of it, following the example of Epicurean atoms, devoid of any subjectivity, and independent of our relationship to the world. Thesis number 2 affirms that materialism is rationalism (again broadly defined as there are different definitions of reason) in that it is always an enterprise that, through skepticism, opposes an activity of knowledge and criticism to religious appeal, to mystery, or to the limitation of our knowledge.
QM：我打算证明--在此请注意，《有限性之后》仍未做到这一点--可数学化的东西就是可绝对化的。你问我这是否是唯物主义的论断，而不仅仅是 "现实主义 "的论断。如果我们省略第一章中关于原初化石问题的全部讨论，就很难讨论我的论题的相关性。不过，我的回答如下：对我来说，唯物主义有两个关键论点：1.存在 "是独立于 "思维"（广义的主观性）的；2. "思维 "可以 "思考""存在"。论点一反对任何试图将主观属性扩展到存在的拟人主义：唯物主义不是万物有灵论、灵性论、生命论等等的一种形式。它断言，非思维实际上先于思维，或者至少可以正确地先于思维，并且存在于思维之外，就像伊壁鸠鲁的原子一样，没有任何主观性，独立于我们与世界的关系之外。论点二确认唯物主义是理性主义（同样是广义的，因为对理性有不同的定义），因为它总是通过怀疑主义，将知识和批判活动与宗教诉求、神秘或我们知识的局限性对立起来。

Skepticism and faith converge in the thesis of our finitude, making us available to any belief: conversely, materialism grants the human being the capacity to think by his own means the truth of both his environment and condition. Under the enemy of reason, he always knows how to detect the priest. He also knows that no one has more desire to be right—without allowing one to argue against him—than the opponent of reason.
怀疑论和信仰在我们的有限性这一论点上趋于一致，使我们可以接受任何信仰：反之，唯物主义赋予人类以自己的方式思考其环境和条件的真相的能力。在理性的敌人面前，他总是知道如何发现牧师。他还知道，没有人比理性的敌人更渴望自己是正确的--不允许别人反驳他。

I follow these two theses because I argue and demonstrate—strictly through argumentation—that there is contingent being independent of us, and furthermore, that this contingent being has no reason to be of a subjective nature. I also try to found a scientific rationalism based on the use of mathematics to describe non-human and inorganic reality. This is not to “Pythagorize,” or to assert that Being is inherently mathematical: it is rather to explain how it is that a formal language manages to capture, from contingent-Being, properties that a vernacular language fails at restituting. My thesis on mathematics is a thesis on the scope of formal languages, not a thesis on Being. I do not posit it by whim or “scientist” tropism, but because I showed with the problem of arche-fossil that there one had no choice: if the sciences have meaning, then mathematics has an absolute scope. Yet sciences have meaning, and hence sciences rest via their mathematized formulations on a reality that is radically independent of our humanity. This contrasts with the ‘qualitative’ judgments of ordinary perception, which can safely be thought for their part as correlated to the sensible relation we have with the world, and as having no existence outside of this relation. The absolute scope of mathematics must therefore be established, and our only way to do this is, I think, is to pass through the derivative scope of the principle of factuality. This is the problem left out in After Finitude: a problem that simultaneously traces the program of a consequent speculative materialism.
我之所以遵循这两个论点，是因为我通过严格的论证来论证和证明，存在着独立于我们之外的偶然存在，而且，这种偶然存在没有理由具有主观性。我还试图在用数学描述非人类和无机现实的基础上，建立一种科学理性主义。这并不是要 "毕达哥拉斯化"，也不是要断言 "存在 "本质上是数学的：而是要解释形式语言是如何从 "偶然存在 "中捕捉到白话语言无法重构的属性的。我关于数学的论述是关于形式语言范围的论述，而不是关于 "存在 "的论述。我提出这个论题并非心血来潮，也不是 "科学家 "的哗众取宠，而是因为我在原型化石问题上表明，我们别无选择：如果科学有意义，那么数学就有绝对的范围。然而，科学是有意义的，因此，科学通过其数学化的表述建立在一个与我们的人性根本无关的现实之上。这与普通知觉的 "定性 "判断形成了鲜明对比，普通知觉的 "定性 "判断可以被认为是与我们与世界之间的感性关系相关联的，在这种关系之外并不存在。因此，必须确立数学的绝对范围，而我们要做到这一点，我认为唯一的途径就是通过事实性原则的派生范围。这就是《终结之后》所遗漏的问题：一个同时追溯到随之而来的投机唯物主义纲领的问题。

Q8: In your conceptualization of potentiality vs. virtuality you note that potentiality comes with a determined world, conforming to the laws of nature. Superchaos, on the other hand, comes with virtuality. How is thinking the virtual linked to speculation, and what role is there for matter (and nature)? We ask the latter sub-question, because we noticed that whereas on page 11 you speak of matter, life, thought and justice, on page 14 you only speak of the latter three. We introduced the concept of nature in reference to your apparent affinity with Spinoza’s physics (not with his metaphysics).
问 8：在您关于潜在性与虚拟性的概念中，您指出潜在性伴随着一个确定的世界，符合自然规律。而 "超混沌 "则具有虚拟性。虚拟思维如何与推测相联系，物质（和自然）的作用是什么？我们之所以提出后一个问题，是因为我们注意到，在第 11 页，您谈到了物质、生命、思想和正义，而在第 14 页，您只谈到了后三者。我们之所以引入 "自然 "这一概念，是因为您显然与斯宾诺莎的物理学（而非其形而上学）颇有渊源。

Finally, then, the vectorial subject to be developed in speculative materialism does not emancipate but rather anticipates the unforeseen, though in keeping with the law of non-contradiction. Doing away with idealism, it would be most interesting to see how this emancipation “does not yet exist,” especially in relation to how it then affirms or critiques the great French feminists like Cixous and even de Beauvoir, when they emphasize not so much a final emancipation but rather the willingness to write or think femininity.
最后，在推测唯物主义中发展起来的矢量主体并不是解放，而是预见未预见的事物，尽管它符合不矛盾律。摒弃理想主义，最有趣的是看看这种解放是如何 "尚不存在 "的，尤其是它如何肯定或批判法国伟大的女权主义者，如西克斯甚至波伏娃，她们强调的与其说是最终解放，不如说是书写或思考女性的意愿。

QM: For me, matter is not identifiable with “nature.” Nature is a world order determined by specific constants, and that determines within itself this set of possibles that I call “potentialities.” In return, matter is a primordial ontological order: it is the fact that there must be something and not nothing—contingent beings as such. One can imagine an infinity and more of material worlds governed by different laws: they would be different “natures,” although equally material. Matter’s second characteristic is negative: it designates contingent non-living and non-thinking beings. In our world, life and thought are constituted on a background of inorganic matter to which they return. One could perhaps imagine a nature entirely alive or spiritual in which case “matter” would be pushed out—but it would remain an essential and eternal possibility of Superchaos because every nature can be destroyed by it, but not the contingent being in a state of pure-material.
质量管理：对我来说，物质与 "自然 "不可同日而语。自然是一种由特定常数决定的世界秩序，它本身决定了一系列可能性，我称之为 "潜能"。反过来，物质是一种原始的本体论秩序：它是必须有而不是无的事实--这种存在是有条件的。我们可以想象无穷无尽的物质世界，它们受不同规律的支配：虽然同样是物质的，但 "性质 "却各不相同。物质的第二个特征是消极的：它指的是偶然的非生命和非思维的存在。在我们的世界里，生命和思想是在无机物的背景上构成的，它们又回到了无机物的背景上。也许我们可以想象一种完全有生命或有灵性的自然，在这种情况下，"物质 "将被挤出，但它仍然是 "超混沌 "的一种基本和永恒的可能性，因为每一种自然都可能被它摧毁，但处于纯物质状态的偶然存在却不会。

Concerning the theory of the materialist subject, I am indeed interested in challenging the identification of action with its pure present deployment, while simultaneously repeating the criticism of the former revolutionary model of future emancipation. However, I think that the present is intimately constituted by the “projection” of the subject to this not-yet-present. Here I am not saying anything original: Heidegger as well as Sartre has insisted on this constitutive dimension of the future in the constitution of the subjective present. However, I add a very different dimension to this projection: a dimension which is not only devoid of religious transcendence, but also inaccessible to the subject’s action—an articulation that I believe effective of radical egalitarian justice (of the living and of the dead) and the eternal return as proof of return (a resurrection intensely deceptive). What interests me is the feedback effect of this expectation on the present of action and on the concrete transformation of the subject.
关于唯物主义主体理论，我确实有兴趣挑战将行动与其纯粹的当下部署相提并论的做法，同时重复对以前的未来解放革命模式的批判。然而，我认为，当下是由主体对这一尚未到来的当下的 "投射 "所密切构成的。在这里，我并没有说什么独创性的话：海德格尔和萨特都坚持未来在主观当下构成中的这一构成维度。然而，我为这一投射添加了一个截然不同的维度：这一维度不仅没有宗教的超越性，而且主体的行动也无法触及--我认为这是对激进的平等主义正义（生者与死者的正义）和作为回归证明的永恒回归（极具欺骗性的复活）的有效阐述。我感兴趣的是这种期待对当下行动和主体具体转变的反馈作用。

Notes
说明

1. Translation (from the French) by Marie-Pier Boucher.
1.Marie-Pier Boucher 翻译（法文）。

II
II

Cartographies
制图

Introduction
简介

A “New Tradition” in Thought
思想中的 "新传统

Chapter 5 (“The Transversality of New Materialism”) focuses on three ways in which new materialism can be called “transversal.” So far we have seen that new materialism is a cultural theory that does not privilege matter over meaning or culture over nature. It explores a monist perspective, devoid of the dualisms that have dominated the humanities (and sciences) until today, by giving special attention to matter, which has been so neglected by dualist thought. Cartesian dualism, after all, has favored mind. As concerns feminist literary theory in the deconstructive paradigm, for instance, it has been noted that:
第 5 章（"新唯物主义的横向性"）重点论述了新唯物主义被称为 "横向性 "的三种方式。到目前为止，我们已经看到，新唯物主义是一种文化理论，它并不把物质凌驾于意义之上，也不把文化凌驾于自然之上。它探索了一种一元论视角，摒弃了迄今为止一直主宰着人文学科（和科学）的二元论，特别关注被二元论思想所忽视的物质。毕竟，笛卡尔的二元论偏爱的是心灵。例如，关于解构主义范式中的女性主义文学理论，有人指出：

Men have aligned the opposition male/female with rational/ emotional, serious/frivolous, or reflective/spontaneous, [whereas] feminist criticism […] works to prove itself more rational, serious, and reflective than male readings that omit and distort (Culler [1982] 2008, 58).
男性将男性/女性的对立与理性/感性、严肃/肤浅、反思/即兴对立起来，[而]女性主义批评[......]则努力证明自己比那些忽略和歪曲的男性解读更加理性、严肃和反思（Culler [1982] 2008, 58）。

It is this kind of scholarship, according to Jonathan Culler, but also according to DeLanda (as seen in the interview above) that attempts to provoke a shift in thought, but which continues the dominant scholarly mode of thinking. And whereas this act of reclaiming thought has been important for feminism, it has not spurred a revolution in thought (as we will explain in Chapters 5 and 7). New materialism wants to set such a revolution in motion, and for this reason it has a renewed interest in philosophical monism or in the philosophy of immanence. New materialism, as a transversally new intellectual orientation, works through the transcendental and humanist (dualist) traditions that haunt cultural theory, and finds itself transversally on the brink of both the modern and the postpostmodern eras. The transcendental and humanist traditions, despite being manifold, are consistently predicated on dualist structures. New materialists open up the paradoxes inherent in those traditions by creating concepts that traverse the fluxes of matter and mind, body and soul, nature and culture, and opens up active theory formation. The three transversalities discussed in Chapter 5 concern disciplinarity, paradigms, and the spatiotemporality of theory—that is, the cartographical methodology introduced in the interview with Braidotti.
乔纳森-库勒（Jonathan Culler）以及迪兰达（DeLanda）认为（如上述访谈所示），正是这种学术研究试图引发思想的转变，但却延续了占主导地位的学术思维模式。尽管这种重拾思想的行为对女性主义非常重要，但它并没有引发思想革命（正如我们将在第 5 章和第 7 章中解释的那样）。新唯物主义希望掀起这样一场革命，因此它对哲学一元论或自在哲学重新产生了兴趣。新唯物主义作为一种横向的新思想取向，穿越了困扰文化理论的超验主义和人文主义（二元论）传统，发现自己横向处于现代和后现代时代的边缘。超验主义和人文主义传统尽管多种多样，但始终以二元论结构为前提。新唯物主义者通过创造穿越物质与心灵、身体与灵魂、自然与文化的概念，打开了这些传统中固有的悖论，开启了积极的理论形成。第五章讨论的三个横向性涉及学科性、范式和理论的时空性，也就是在对布赖多蒂的访谈中介绍的制图方法。

Chapter 6 (“Pushing Dualism to an Extreme”) discusses the way in which new materialism constitutes a philosophy of difference or immanence by working through or “traversing” the dualisms that form the backbone of modernist thought. This chapter dives immediately into the epistemological or even methodological dimension of new materialism itself as displayed by the interviewees in Part One. Continuing the transversal ideas of Lyotard, Deleuze, and Bruno Latour about the temporality of theory formation, new materialists have set themselves to a rewriting of all possible and impossible forms of emancipation. This rewriting exercise involves a movement in thought that, in the words of Henri Bergson ([1896] 2004, 236), can be termed “push[ing] dualism to an extreme.” By this movement, Deleuze ([1968] 1994, 45) has stated that “difference is pushed to the limit,” that is to say, “difference” is “shown differing” (ibid., 68; emphasis in original). The chapter addresses the new materialist ways in which modernity’s dualisms (structured by a negative relation between terms) are traversed, and how a new conceptualization of difference (structured by an affirmative relation) comes to be constituted along the way. This conceptualization of difference leaves behind all prioritizations (implicitly) involved in modern dualist thinking, since a difference structured by affirmation does not work with predetermined relations (e.g. between mind and body) nor does it involve a counter-hierarchy between terms. The chapter makes explicit the methodology of the current-day rise of non-dualist thought, both in terms of its non-classificatory mode of (Deleuzian) thinking, and in terms of the theory of the time of thought thus effectuated (Lyotard’s notion of “rewriting modernity” is not a postmodernism).
第 6 章（"将二元论推向极致"）讨论了新唯物主义是如何通过 "穿越 "构成现代主义思想主干的二元论来构成差异哲学或内在哲学的。正如第一部分中的受访者所展示的那样，本章立即切入了新唯物主义本身的认识论甚至方法论维度。新唯物主义者延续了利奥塔、德勒兹和布鲁诺-拉图尔关于理论形成的时间性的横向思想，致力于重写所有可能和不可能的解放形式。用亨利-柏格森（Henri Bergson）（[1896] 2004, 236）的话来说，这一重写活动涉及到一场思想运动，可以称之为 "将二元论推向极端"。通过这一运动，德勒兹（[1968] 1994, 45）指出，"差异被推向了极限"，也就是说，"差异 "被 "显示为不同"（同上，68；着重号为原文所加）。本章探讨了现代性二元论（以术语之间的否定关系为结构）被穿越的新唯物主义方式，以及如何在此过程中形成一种新的差异概念化（以肯定关系为结构）。这种差异概念化摒弃了现代二元论思维中（隐含地）涉及的所有先验性，因为以肯定关系为结构的差异并不与预先确定的关系（如身心之间的关系）有关，也不涉及术语之间的反等级制度。 本章明确提出了当今非二元论思想兴起的方法论，既包括其非分类的（德勒兹式的）思维模式，也包括由此产生的思想时间理论（利奥塔的 "重写现代性 "概念并非后现代主义）。
We conclude by demonstrating how this new materialism traverses the sexual dualisms that structure modernist feminist thinking, anticipating the next chapter that includes a re-reading of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex ([1949] 2010), mainly through the work of Elizabeth Grosz. This short demonstration forms the bridge to Chapter 7.
最后，我们将展示这种新唯物主义是如何穿越构成现代主义女权主义思想的性二元论的，并预示下一章将主要通过伊丽莎白-格罗斯的作品重新解读西蒙娜-德-波伏娃的《第二性》（[1949] 2010）。这一简短的论证构成了通往第七章的桥梁。

The seventh chapter (“Sexual Differing”) envisions a new way of mapping the relations between the sexes by moving beyond sex, sexual difference, and gender. Instead of the epistemological groundwork for a new conceptualization of difference, this chapter is interested in new materialism’s ontology of difference itself. In the dominant reception of the work of de Beauvoir, finding its apotheosis in the work of Butler, feminists overthrow sex and sexual difference in favor of gender. What we propose in a new materialist spirit is that gender, with which a revolution in thought was intended, did not produce the desired effect. Theorists of gender position themselves in dualistic opposition to theorists of sexual difference, and end up re-affirming sexual difference in its narrowest definition (the biological essentialism of sex). All forms of identity politics, as shown in the interviews summarized by the Culler citation above, involve dualism, and need to be opened up and set in motion. Counter-intuitively, a true revolution in thought does not consist of the dualistic overthrow of a seemingly outdated framework. Similar to Deleuze’s rejection of Otherness that runs through a great deal of the new materialist work, we show how a revolution in thought entails the affirmation of the thinking process—that is, a practical philosophy. This chapter in line with the preceding chapter, proposes the setting up of a new materialist theory of sexual difference as a practical philosophy in which concept and creation are considered as intertwined.
第七章（"性差异"）设想了一种超越性、性差异和性别的描绘两性关系的新方法。本章关注的不是差异新概念的认识论基础，而是新唯物主义的差异本体论本身。在对德-波伏娃作品的主流接受中，女权主义者推翻了性和性别差异，转而支持性别。我们以新唯物主义的精神提出的是，性别这一思想革命的初衷并没有产生预期的效果。性别理论家将自己定位为与性差异理论家对立的二元论者，最终重新肯定了最狭义的性差异（性的生物本质论）。正如库勒在上文引用的访谈中所总结的那样，所有形式的身份政治都涉及二元论，都需要开放和启动。与直觉相反，真正的思想革命并不在于推翻一个看似过时的二元论框架。与德勒兹在大量新唯物主义著作中对 "他者性"（Otherness）的摒弃类似，我们要说明的是，思想革命如何需要对思维过程--即实践哲学--的肯定。本章与前一章一脉相承，提出建立新唯物主义性差异理论，将其视为概念与创造相互交织的实践哲学。
Rereading de Beauvoir affirmatively, a sexual differing can be made apparent that has an eye for the material (“sex”) and the discursive (“gender”) in their mutual entanglement, thus shifting identity politics and biological essentialism in favor of a performative ontology, as well as the dominant conceptualization of a “revolution in thought.” In the practical philosophical process, then, the present comes about as creating the past and the future: de Beauvoir (the past) is being re-read (the present), while working towards the future of feminist thought. Through our so-called case study on sex, gender, and sexual difference, we show how the new materialism is a practical philosophy that makes way for thinking metamorphoses regarding—along with sex—“race,” class, and the other so-called axes of social difference.
以肯定的态度重读波伏娃，可以发现一种性差异，它关注物质（"性"）和话语（"性别"）的相互纠缠，从而改变身份政治和生物本质论，转而支持表演本体论，以及 "思想革命 "的主流概念。因此，在实践哲学的过程中，现在创造了过去和未来：德-波伏娃（过去）被重新解读（现在），同时为女性主义思想的未来而努力。通过我们所谓的关于性、性别和性差异的案例研究，我们展示了新唯物主义如何成为一种实践哲学，为关于性、"种族"、阶级和其他所谓的社会差异轴心的思维蜕变开辟道路。

Finally, in the eighth chapter (“The End of (Wo)Man”), we engage most directly with new materialism’s new metaphysics by discussing its posthumanism or a-humanism. We start from the work of Foucault, on whose work all interviewees took a position. When Foucault in The Order of Things ([1966/1970] 1994) announced that man was only a recent invention, he added a permanent question mark to the humanist and modernist traditions that had dominated European thought for over two centuries. In his recently published accompanying dissertation Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology (2008, submitted in 1961) he gives us an even more thorough perspective on how anthropocentrism has shaped our (dualist) thinking, and how it has actually distorted our strategies of studying the real. His views can definitely be considered the opening statements of new materialism, especially because Foucault in his later work has shown in so many ways how bodies (think of prisons, for instance) and the words within which they are enveloped (think of “delinquency”) act only in entanglement with one another, and that the human being acts within the actualization and realization of these discursive forces. Recently, Meillassoux’s After Finitude ([2006] 2008) proposed another re-reading of Kant that suggests that Foucault has not pushed things far enough (as Meillassoux explained in his interview).
最后，在第八章（"（人）的终结"）中，我们通过讨论新唯物主义的后人文主义或非人文主义，最直接地接触到了新唯物主义的新形而上学。我们从福柯的著作入手，所有受访者都对福柯的著作采取了立场。当福柯在《事物的秩序》（[1966/1970] 1994 年）中宣布人只是最近的发明时，他给两个多世纪以来主导欧洲思想的人文主义和现代主义传统打上了一个永久的问号。在他最近出版的随附论文《康德人类学导论》（2008 年，1961 年提交）中，他为我们提供了一个更加透彻的视角，让我们了解人类中心主义如何塑造了我们的（二元论）思维，以及它实际上如何扭曲了我们研究现实的策略。他的观点无疑可被视为新唯物主义的开篇之作，尤其是因为福柯在其晚年的著作中以多种方式展示了身体（比如监狱）和包裹着身体的话语（比如 "犯罪"）是如何相互纠缠在一起的，以及人是如何在这些话语力量的现实化和实现中行动的。最近，梅拉苏的《有限性之后》（[2006] 2008 年）提出了对康德的另一种重读，认为福柯还没有把事情推得足够远（正如梅拉苏在访谈中解释的那样）。

Not even referring to Foucault in his book, Meillassoux’s interests in ancestrality proposes us to think the real without it first being represented in the human mind, which, according to Meillassoux, is still the common practice in what is called post-critical theory (which probably includes Foucault). Meillassoux, continuing themes found in the early writings of Alain Badiou, together with other speculative thinkers such as Ray Brassier and Graham Harman, thus intends to fulfill Kant’s Copernican revolution of the mind by proposing a radical anti-anthropocentrism, which refuses to see truth only in how it can possibly appear to the human mind. Instead, he proposes an understanding of truth (or nature) through mathematics. We will show how Meillassoux’s speculative materialism differs from the positions of other prominent contemporary materialists such as Barad and
梅亚苏在书中甚至没有提到福柯，他对祖先性的兴趣建议我们思考现实，而不首先在人类头脑中表现出来，梅亚苏认为，这仍然是所谓的后批判理论（可能包括福柯）的普遍做法。梅亚苏延续了阿兰-巴迪欧（Alain Badiou）早期著作中的主题，与雷-布拉西耶（Ray Brassier）和格雷厄姆-哈曼（Graham Harman）等其他投机思想家一起，通过提出一种激进的反人类中心主义，拒绝仅从真理在人类头脑中可能呈现的方式来看待真理，从而意图实现康德的哥白尼式思想革命。相反，他提出通过数学来理解真理（或自然）。我们将展示梅亚苏的推测唯物主义与其他当代著名唯物主义者的立场有何不同，如巴拉德和

DeLanda. These authors, though also inspired by the natural sciences, emphasize that phenomena reveal themselves from their relations. However, we will also demonstrate how a coherence can be created between these new materialists that, after having worked through humanism and the different differences it gave rise to, asks how much (wo)man we need at all. Without intending to come to a fixed conclusion, we can see that the different developments in new materialist thinking leave us with many questions in both the sciences and the humanities on the role of the human being in the morphogenesis of the real. This book, together with the new materialist scholars it interviews and discusses, wishes to provide a methodological opening for these ontological questions.
德兰达这些作者虽然也受到自然科学的启发，但他们强调现象是从它们之间的关系中显现出来的。然而，我们也将展示如何在这些新唯物主义者之间建立一种一致性，即在研究了人文主义及其引发的不同分歧之后，提出我们到底需要多少（人）的问题。我们无意得出一个固定的结论，但我们可以看到，新唯物主义思想的不同发展在科学和人文领域都给我们留下了许多关于人在现实的形态发生中的作用的问题。本书及其采访和讨论的新唯物主义学者希望为这些本体论问题提供一个方法论的开端。

The “new” in new materialism is not a term that accepts or continues a classificatory historiography of (academic) thinking that necessarily comes with a hierarchy or any kind of a priori logic. New materialism affirms that such hierachized specialization creates “minds in a groove” whereas “there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of human life” (Whitehead [1925] 1997, 197). New materialism does not intend to add yet another specialized epistemology to the tree of academic knowledge production (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 5). As such, it is thus not necessarily opposed to the crude or Historical/Marxist materialist tradition. It is not necessarily different from any other materialist, pragmatic or monist tradition either, since it carefully “works through” all these traditions in order to avoid, along with the trap of antagonism, the trap of anachronism (Lyotard [1988] 1991, 26-7) or of “a retrograde movement” (Bergson [1934] 2007, 11). New materialism says “yes, and” to all of these intellectual traditions, traversing them all, creating strings of thought that, in turn, create a remarkably powerful and fresh “rhythm” in academia today (Simondon [1958] 1980).
新唯物主义中的 "新 "并不是一个接受或延续（学术）思维分类史学的术语，这种分类史学必然带有等级制度或任何先验逻辑。新唯物主义认为，这种等级化的专业化造成了 "沟槽中的思想"，而 "没有任何抽象的沟槽足以理解人类生活"（怀特海 [1925] 1997, 197）。新唯物主义无意在学术知识生产之树上添加另一种专门的认识论（德勒兹和瓜塔里[1980] 1987, 5）。因此，新唯物主义并不一定与粗糙的或历史/马克思主义唯物主义传统相对立。它也未必有别于任何其他唯物主义、实用主义或一元论传统，因为它小心翼翼地 "穿越 "所有这些传统，以避免对立的陷阱，同时也避免不合时宜的陷阱（利奥塔[1988] 1991, 26-7）或 "倒退运动 "的陷阱（柏格森[1934] 2007, 11）。新唯物主义对所有这些思想传统都说 "是的，而且"，穿越它们，创造出一连串的思想，反过来又在当今学术界创造出一种非常有力和新鲜的 "节奏"（西蒙顿[1958]，1980 年）。

New materialism’s metaphysics follows from an interdisciplinary development in thought, whose backbone is a strong interest in Continental philosophy. Yet it seems to have no difficulty in opening up these thoughts to Anglo-American thought, and actually makes their intermingling productive. Yet this is nothing “new.” There are many examples in which Continental and Anglo-American thought have been moving in similar directions, as scholars were consciously or unconsciously inspired by a radical thought they felt to be present beneath what was known. After all, just like Alfred North Whitehead’s plea for “wandering” through and beyond grooves (Whitehead [1925] 1997, 207), Lyotard’s “working through” is “a working attached to a thought of what is constitutively hidden from us in the event and in the meaning of the event” (Lyotard [1988] 1991, 26). Or in the words of Bergson, “As though the thing and the idea of the thing, its reality and its possibility, were not created at one stroke when a truly new form, invented by art or nature is concerned!” (Bergson [1934] 2007, 11). Good ideas are never bothered by space or time. From Bergson to Whitehead and Lyotard, from Louis Hjelmslev to Benedict Spinoza, from Foucault to British Cultural Studies, and from quantum physics to contemporary feminist theory—time and again, new thoughts travel easily and have always already announced themselves when the conditions are right (De Boever et al. 2009).
新唯物主义的形而上学源于跨学科的思想发展，其支柱是对大陆哲学的浓厚兴趣。然而，新唯物主义在向英美思想开放这些思想方面似乎并不困难，而且实际上使它们的交融富有成效。然而，这并不是什么 "新鲜事"。有许多例子表明，大陆思想和英美思想一直朝着相似的方向发展，因为学者们自觉或不自觉地受到了他们认为存在于已知事物之下的激进思想的启发。毕竟，正如阿尔弗雷德-诺斯-怀特海（Alfred North Whitehead）呼吁 "徘徊 "于沟槽之中和沟槽之外（怀特海[1925] 1997, 207），利奥塔（Lyotard）的 "通过工作 "是 "一种附着于对事件和事件意义中对我们构成性地隐藏着的东西的思考的工作"（利奥塔[1988] 1991, 26）。或者用柏格森的话说，"就好像当艺术或自然发明一种真正的新形式时，事物和事物的观念、事物的现实性和可能性不是一蹴而就的！"（柏格森[1934]，1991 年，第 26 页）。(柏格森 [1934] 2007, 11）。好的思想从不受空间或时间的困扰。从柏格森到怀特海和利奥塔，从路易斯-赫姆斯列夫到本尼迪克特-斯宾诺莎，从福柯到英国文化研究，从量子物理学到当代女性主义理论，新思想总是能轻而易举地传播开来，而且总是在条件成熟时就已经宣布自己的存在（De Boever 等人，2009 年）。

One could even claim that the break between Continental and Anglo-American thought, or the divide between the sciences and the humanities as C.P. Snow ([1959] 1965) expressed it in his famous 1950 essay “The Two Cultures,” were not so much states that were noticed, but were actually prompted by philosophers of science themselves. Snow’s taxonomy created and eventually overcoded this radical distinction he claimed to have merely observed (cf. Kirby 2008a). Such major Historiographies, to speak again with Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, are not so much critiqued by new materialism. Instead, they are being read in their relations to the minor historiographies which often result in the appearance of alternative new trajectories. It is in this sense that the “materialism” of new materialism is also not exclusive. It is not embraced in opposition to transcendental thinking, but instead re-reads metaphysics as a whole from a “natureculture” perspective, as science studies would call it (Latour [1991] 1993, Haraway 2003). The new materialist practice of reading as re-reading, together with the readings proposed by new materialist scholars, perform its new metaphysics.
我们甚至可以说，大陆思想与英美思想之间的断裂，或斯诺（C.P. Snow，[1959] 1965 年）在其 1950 年的著名论文《两种文化》中所表述的科学与人文之间的鸿沟，与其说是被注意到的状态，不如说实际上是由科学哲学家自己促成的。斯诺的分类法创造并最终过度编码了他声称只是观察到的这一根本区别（参见 Kirby 2008a）。吉尔-德勒兹（Gilles Deleuze）和费利克斯-瓜塔里（Felix Guattari）再次指出，新唯物主义并没有对这些重要的历史学进行批判。相反，它们是在与次要史学的关系中被解读的，而次要史学往往导致出现另类的新轨迹。正是在这个意义上，新唯物主义的 "唯物主义 "也不具有排他性。新唯物主义并不是与超验思维相对立的，而是从 "自然文化 "的角度重新解读形而上学，正如科学研究中所说的那样（拉图尔 [1991] 1993，哈拉维 2003）。作为重读的新唯物主义阅读实践，连同新唯物主义学者提出的阅读建议，共同演绎了新的形而上学。

New materialism wants to do justice to the “material-semiotic,” or “material-discursive” character of all events, as Donna Haraway (1988, 595) and Karen Barad (2003, 810) would call it. It is interested in actualizing a metaphysics that fully affirms the active role played by matter in “receiving” a form (cf. Simondon 2009, 4). Working through Cartesian or modernist dualisms, new materialism has set itself to practice the Spinozist dictum that the mind is always already an idea of the body, while the body is the object of the mind (Spinoza [1677] 2001, E2P21, Schol.). In terms of artworks, for instance, a new materialist perspective would be interested in finding out how the form of content (the material condition of the artwork) and the form of expression (the sensations as they come about) are being produced in one another, how series of statements are actualized, and how pleats of matter are realized in the real (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 89; cf. Bolt and Barrett eds. forthcoming). In this way, new materialism is different from most post-Kantian studies of art, since in these studies, the material and discursive dimensions are treated separately. After a short description of the materials used following a “crude materialism,” the contemporary scholar influenced by the so-called “linguistic turn” proceeds to deconstruct its messages. New materialism allows for the study of the two dimensions in their entanglement: the experience of a piece of art is made up of matter and meaning. The material dimension creates and gives form to the discursive, and vice versa. Similar to what happens with the artwork, new materialism sets itself to rewriting events that are usually only of interest to natural scientists. Here it becomes apparent that a new materialist take on “nature” will be shown to be transposable to the study of “culture” and vice versa, notwithstanding the fact that these transpositions are not unilinear.
正如唐娜-哈拉维（Donna Haraway）（1988, 595）和卡伦-巴拉德（Karen Barad）（2003, 810）所言，新唯物主义希望公正地对待所有事件的 "物质--交际 "或 "物质--游离 "特性。它致力于实现一种形而上学，充分肯定物质在 "接受 "形式时所发挥的积极作用（参见 Simondon 2009, 4）。通过笛卡尔或现代主义的二元论，新唯物主义开始实践斯宾诺莎的论断，即心灵总是已经是身体的观念，而身体则是心灵的对象（斯宾诺莎 [1677] 2001, E2P21, Schol.）。以艺术作品为例，新唯物主义视角感兴趣的是找出内容的形式（艺术作品的物质条件）和表达的形式（产生的感觉）是如何相互产生的，一系列陈述是如何实现的，物质的褶皱是如何在现实中实现的（德勒兹和瓜塔里[1980] 1987, 89；参见 Bolt 和 Barrett 编，即将出版）。因此，新唯物主义不同于大多数后康德艺术研究，因为在这些研究中，物质层面和话语层面是分开处理的。受所谓 "语言学转向 "影响的当代学者在对 "粗陋的唯物主义 "所使用的材料进行简短描述后，便开始解构其信息。新唯物主义允许在两个维度的纠缠中进行研究：艺术作品的体验是由物质和意义构成的。物质维度创造并赋予话语形式，反之亦然。与艺术作品的情况类似，新唯物主义致力于重写通常只有自然科学家才感兴趣的事件。 在这里，新唯物主义对 "自然 "的研究显然可以转用于对 "文化 "的研究，反之亦然。
After all, “transposition” is at work in music as well as genetics (Braidotti 2006, 5).
毕竟，"转位 "在音乐和遗传学中都起作用（Braidotti 2006, 5）。

Thinking in such a way reveals to us a “[…] new form of materialist philosophy in which raw matter-energy through a variety of self-organizing processes and an intense power of morphogenesis, generates all the structures that surround us” (DeLanda 1996, n.p.). Studying these metamorphoses as they happen through the formation of content and expression, that is, through the entanglement of materiality and meaning in the widest sense of the word, new materialist thinking allows us to write such a metamorphosis not by excluding parts of it beforehand, but by at least being open to the process in its full manifestation. We need this new materialism because, whether it concerns earthquakes, art, social revolutions, or simply thinking, the material and the discursive are only taken apart in the authoritative gesture of the scholar or by the common-sensical thinker; while in the event, in life itself, the two seeming layers are by all means indiscernible. New materialism wants to move away from the authoritative scholarly attitude and from everyday utilitarian common sense, and wants to engross itself in what is “ontologically prior” (Massumi 2002, 66).
以这种方式进行思考向我们揭示了一种"[......]新形式的唯物主义哲学，在这种哲学中，原始物质能量通过各种自组织过程和强烈的形态发生力，产生了我们周围的所有结构"（DeLanda，1996 年，未注明页码）。新唯物主义思想通过内容和表达的形成，即通过物质性和意义在最广泛意义上的纠缠来研究这些蜕变，使我们能够书写这样的蜕变，而不是事先排除其中的部分内容，而是至少对这一过程的全部表现持开放态度。我们需要这种新唯物主义，因为无论是关于地震、艺术、社会革命，还是单纯的思维，物质和话语都只是在学者的权威姿态或普通感性的思想家那里才被拆分开来；而在事件中，在生活本身中，这两个看似不同的层面无论如何都是无法分辨的。新唯物主义希望摆脱学者的权威态度和日常的功利常识，希望将自己投入到 "本体论上的先验"（Massumi 2002, 66）之中。

As an important but poorly defined force in contemporary academia, new materialism stands in need of conceptualization, and this second part of the book provides it. We bring together important scholars and texts that have contributed to the new materialism, and by showing the coherence in their (implicit) dialogue, by demonstrating their joint movements, we allow for a natureculture metaphysics of the ontologically prior to be actualized. But we do not map this new tradition from a distance. In this book, we add to new materialism as much as we perform a new engagement with canonical and minor academic literatures. In keeping with new materialism’s interdisciplinarity, our mapping shows us how new materialist accounts are similar to certain (empirical) tendencies in accounting for nature on the one hand and cognitive accounts of culture and nature on the other.
新唯物主义是当代学术界一股重要但定义不清的力量，它需要概念化，本书的第二部分提供了概念化。我们汇集了对新唯物主义做出贡献的重要学者和文本，通过展示他们（隐含的）对话中的一致性，通过展示他们的联合行动，我们让本体论先验的自然文化形而上学得以实现。但我们并不是从远处来描绘这一新的传统。在本书中，我们对新唯物主义进行了补充，同时也对经典和次要学术文献进行了新的探讨。为了与新唯物主义的跨学科性保持一致，我们的映射向我们展示了新唯物主义的论述是如何与某些（经验）倾向相似的，一方面是对自然的论述，另一方面是对文化与自然的认知论述。

Chapter 5
第 5 章

The Transversality of New Materialism
新唯物主义的横向性

Manuel DeLanda and Rosi Braidotti—independently of one another—first started using “neo-materialism” or “new materialism” in the second half of the 1990s, for a cultural theory that does not privilege the side of culture, but focuses on what Donna Haraway (2003) would call “naturecultures” or what Bruno Latour simply referred to as “collectives” ([1991] 1993). The term proposes a cultural theory that radically rethinks the dualisms so central to our (post-)modern thinking and always starts its analysis from how these oppositions (between nature and culture, matter and mind, the human and the inhuman) are produced in action itself. It thus has a profound interest in the morphology of change and gives special attention to matter (materiality, processes of materialization) as it has been so much neglected by dualist thought. In the same breath we then always already start with the mater, as Braidotti (2002b, 170) already emphasized elsewhere. This explains why, along with the interest in science seen in particular with DeLanda and Latour, the emancipation of mat(t)er is also by nature a feminist project.1
曼努埃尔-德兰达（Manuel DeLanda）和罗西-布赖多蒂（Rosi Braidotti）在 20 世纪 90 年代后半期开始使用 "新唯物主义 "或 "新唯物主义 "来指代一种文化理论，这种理论并不偏重文化的一面，而是侧重于唐娜-哈拉维（Donna Haraway，2003 年）所称的 "自然文化"（naturecultures）或布鲁诺-拉图尔（Bruno Latour）所称的 "集体"（[1991] 1993 年）。该术语所提出的文化理论从根本上反思了我们（后）现代思维中的二元对立，并始终从这些对立（自然与文化、物质与精神、人类与非人类之间的对立）如何在行动中产生这一角度出发进行分析。因此，它对变化的形态学有着浓厚的兴趣，并特别关注物质（物质性、物质化过程），因为二元论思想对它的忽视是如此之深。正如布莱多蒂（2002b, 170）在其他地方强调的那样，我们总是以物质为出发点。这就解释了为什么除了对科学的兴趣，尤其是对德兰达和拉图尔的兴趣之外，解放母体本质上也是一个女性主义项目。 1

For those familiar with the materialism of Walter Benjamin, “new materialism” is ironic for several reasons. Analyzing modernity, Benjamin ([1982] 2002, 22) rejects the modern fetish of newness and the illusions it presumes. Particularly because he considers “[n]ewness […] a quality independent of the use value of the commodity,” staging a materialism that is “new” would make no sense at all. But of course there is no reason why we should confine ourselves to such a linear modernist idea of History. Especially if, in following Latour ([1991] 1993, 82), we claim that “[h]istory is no longer simply the history of people, it becomes the history of natural things as well,” Benjamin’s critique can be put aside. The newness we are interested in is not so much a better or improved version of “old” (historical, Marxist-inspired) materialism. DeLanda for instance has made it very clear that he rewrites this Marxism and its (humanist) take on the material (though Benjamin in particular offers us many ways out of these traps). Therefore DeLanda also wrote his famous A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (1997) in which he puts such an “other” history, as proposed by Latour, to work (see also Harman 2008).
对于那些熟悉瓦尔特-本雅明（Walter Benjamin）唯物主义的人来说，"新唯物主义 "具有讽刺意味，原因有几个。在分析现代性时，本雅明（[1982] 2002, 22）摒弃了现代人对 "新 "的迷信及其假定的幻想。特别是因为他认为 "新[......]是一种独立于商品使用价值之外的品质"，因此上演一场 "新 "的唯物主义根本毫无意义。当然，我们没有理由将自己局限于这样一种线性的现代主义历史观。尤其是，如果我们追随拉图尔（[1991] 1993, 82），声称 "历史不再仅仅是人的历史，它也成为自然事物的历史"，那么本雅明的批评就可以被搁置一旁。我们感兴趣的新事物并不是 "旧"（历史的、马克思主义启发的）唯物主义的更好或改进版本。例如，迪兰达就明确表示，他改写了这种马克思主义及其（人文主义）对物质的看法（尽管本雅明尤其为我们提供了许多摆脱这些陷阱的方法）。因此，德兰达还撰写了著名的《非线性历史千年》（1997 年），其中他将拉图尔提出的 "另一种 "历史付诸实施（另见哈曼，2008 年）。

In this book it is not so much a history that is presented to the reader, but rather, following Braidotti, a mapping of how the materialism that is referred to as a new materialism is at work in the humanities and in the sciences at this very moment. Of course that does not mean that we exclude historicity, time, or memory; texts are read insofar as they are considered important and valuable for the non-dualist, materialist current in contemporary thought, and not judged according to when they were conceived. Thus, it is no problem to state that we see this new materialism we are interested in at work in Spinoza’s Ethics. Benedict Spinoza, already in 1677, claims that the mind is the idea of the body, making the body necessarily the object of the mind. The mind and the body are the same thing, as he stresses repeatedly. This is a most interesting contribution to a new materialist thinking. Similarly, the present book develops an interest in the new materialist thoughts to be found in the work of the authors mentioned so far, but also in that of Simone de Beauvoir, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead and Brian Massumi, among others.
本书向读者展示的与其说是一部历史，不如说是继布赖多蒂之后，对被称为新唯物主义的唯物主义如何在此时此刻在人文科学领域发挥作用的描绘。当然，这并不意味着我们要排除历史性、时间性或记忆性；文本的阅读取决于它们被认为对当代思想中的非二元论唯物主义思潮的重要性和价值，而不是根据它们的构思时间来判断。因此，我们可以说，在斯宾诺莎的《伦理学》中，我们看到了我们感兴趣的这种新唯物主义正在发挥作用。本尼迪克特-斯宾诺莎（Benedict Spinoza）早在 1677 年就声称，心灵是身体的理念，因此身体必然是心灵的对象。正如他反复强调的那样，心灵和身体是一回事。这是对新唯物主义思想最有趣的贡献。同样，本书对新唯物主义思想的兴趣不仅体现在上述作者的作品中，还体现在西蒙娜-德-波伏娃、亨利-柏格森、阿尔弗雷德-诺斯-怀特海和布赖恩-马苏米等人的作品中。

There is a good reason why a book on new materialism is written now. In recent years new materialism has proven to be capable of opposing the transcendental and humanist traditions that are haunting cultural theory, standing on the brink of the post-postmodern era. Of course dualist traditions are stubborn and have buried themselves deep in the minds of (common-sense) scholars today. These traditions continue to stir debates, which are being opened up by new materialists (think of the feminist polemic about the failed materialism in the work of Judith Butler (Kirby
现在写一本关于新唯物主义的书是有道理的。近年来，新唯物主义已被证明有能力反对困扰文化理论的超验主义和人文主义传统，屹立于后后现代时代的边缘。当然，二元论传统是顽固的，在当今（常识性）学者的头脑中埋藏得很深。这些传统继续引发着争论，而新唯物主义者正在开启这场争论（想想朱迪斯-巴特勒（Judith Butler）著作中关于失败的唯物主义的女权主义论战（Kirby

2006), and of the Saussurian/ Lacanian linguistic heritage in media and cultural studies (Dolphijn 2010), which as Karen Barad (2007) has shown, have prevented the theorization of “agential matter” from being effectuated). But at the start of the 21st century, this new materialist ambition does seem to offer a more than equal alternative for scholars working in the humanities and beyond. Perhaps for the first time in its history, this “minor tradition” in thinking (as Gilles Deleuze would label it) is getting the attention it needs, freeing itself from the Platonist, Christian, and Modernist rule under which it suffered for so long.
正如凯伦-巴拉德（Karen Barad）（2007 年）所指出的那样，这阻碍了 "能动物质 "理论化的实现）。但是，在 21 st 世纪之初，这种新唯物主义的雄心似乎为从事人文学科及其他领域工作的学者提供了一种更为平等的选择。或许在其历史上，这一思想中的 "次要传统"（正如吉尔-德勒兹（Gilles Deleuze）所标榜的那样）第一次得到了它所需要的关注，摆脱了它长期以来所遭受的柏拉图主义、基督教和现代主义的统治。

In the work of both Braidotti and DeLanda it has been through a rethinking of several French philosophers closely connected to May ‘68 (including Michel Foucault, Luce Irigaray, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) that their thinking came about. And it was the work of Deleuze (and Guattari) that was actually most important to them. Especially in his early work, Deleuze tried to show that the materialist philosophy he proposed was not new but fell into the rich though minor tradition already mentioned. By writing on philosophers like Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bergson, but also on writers like Marcel Proust and Franz Kafka, Deleuze intended to rewrite the history of thinking by giving attention to those materialist authors it had rejected or marginalized for such a long time. At the start of his career, Deleuze puts the emphasis on re-reading radical minds like Spinoza, thus showing how they actually offer philosophy a new way of thinking—namely, a philosophy of the body. And it is by traversing these different philosophies of the body that Deleuze’s other work (sometimes with Guattari) really starts exploring materialist/monist thought to the fullest, creating the fertile ground upon which new materialist scholars like Braidotti and DeLanda take root today.
在布赖多蒂和迪兰达的作品中，他们的思想是通过对与 "5.68 "事件密切相关的几位法国哲学家（包括米歇尔-福柯、卢斯-伊里格瑞、吉尔斯-德勒兹和费利克斯-瓜塔里）的重新思考而产生的。而实际上，对他们来说最重要的是德勒兹（和瓜塔里）的作品。尤其是在早期作品中，德勒兹试图表明，他所提出的唯物主义哲学并不是新的，而是属于上文提到的丰富但次要的传统。通过对斯宾诺莎、尼采和柏格森等哲学家，以及马塞尔-普鲁斯特和弗朗茨-卡夫卡等作家的写作，德勒兹试图通过关注那些长期以来被拒之门外或边缘化的唯物主义作家来重写思想史。德勒兹在其职业生涯之初，就把重点放在重新解读斯宾诺莎这样的激进思想上，从而表明他们实际上是如何为哲学提供一种新的思维方式的--即身体哲学。德勒兹的其他作品（有时与瓜塔里合作）正是通过穿越这些不同的身体哲学，才真正开始了对唯物主义/一元论思想的全面探索，为今天像布赖多蒂和迪兰达这样的新唯物主义学者扎根于此创造了肥沃的土壤。

Most faithful to the work of Deleuze (and Guattari), DeLanda’s early version of new materialism proffered the claim that the concept “abstract machine” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987) captures processes without form of substance that can be found in concrete assemblages of biology, sociology, and geology alike, in a manner that enables cultural theory at large to move away from linguistic representationalism towards “the realm of engineering diagrams” which are “shared by very different physical assemblages. Thus there would be an “abstract motor” with different
德兰达最忠实于德勒兹（和瓜塔里）的作品，他早期版本的新唯物主义主张 "抽象机器"（德勒兹和瓜塔里[1980]，1987 年）这一概念捕捉到了生物学、社会学和地质学等具体组合中的无形过程，这种方式使整个文化理论从语言表征主义转向 "工程图领域"，而 "工程图领域 "是 "非常不同的物理组合所共有的"。因此，"抽象电机 "与不同的
physical instantiations in technological objects and natural atmospheric processes” (DeLanda 1996, n.p.). This new materialism engenders immanent thought and, as a consequence, it breaks through not only the mind-matter and culture-nature divides of transcendental humanist thought, but also thinking causal structures and teleology (i.e. a determinism):
技术物品和自然大气过程中的物理实例"（DeLanda，1996 年，注释页）。这种新唯物主义产生了内在思想，因此，它不仅突破了超验人文主义思想中的心-物和文化-自然界限，还突破了思维因果结构和目的论（即决定论）：

This conception of very specific abstract machines […] indeed points towards a new form of materialist philosophy in which raw matter-energy through a variety of self-organizing processes and an intense power of morphogenesis, generates all the structures that surround us. Furthermore, the structures generated cease to be the primary reality, and matter-energy flows now acquire this special status (ibid.).
这种非常具体的抽象机器的概念[......]确实指向一种新形式的唯物主义哲学，在这种哲学中，原始物质能量通过各种自组织过程和强大的形态发生力，产生了我们周围的所有结构。此外，生成的结构不再是主要的现实，而物质-能量流现在获得了这种特殊的地位（同上）。

The way in which matter seems to gain primacy in DeLanda’s new materialism points instead at a “generative matter,” which is a concept that does not capture matter-as-opposed-to-signification, but captures mattering as simultaneously material and representational (cf. Cheah 1999, Barad 2007).
在迪兰达的新唯物主义中，"物质 "似乎获得了首要地位，但这一方式却指向了 "生成物质"，这一概念并没有捕捉到与 "符号 "相对立的物质，而是将 "物质 "同时捕捉为 "物质 "和 "表征"（参见 Cheah 1999，Barad 2007）。

Braidotti introduced new materialism or “a more radical sense of materialism” by framing it as “[r]ethinking the embodied structure of human subjectivity after Foucault” (Braidotti 2000, 158). Coming from a very rich materialist tradition in Australian feminism, Braidotti’s “after Foucault” should not so much be read as a reference to a move beyond Foucault, given that she and DeLanda (as well as other new materialists) can be said to affirm, one way or another, the much-noted prediction of Foucault ([1970] 1998, 343) that “perhaps, one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian.” Compared to DeLanda, Braidotti’s new materialism is equally immanent and non-linear, and “embodied subjectivity” is conceptualized accordingly:
Braidotti 将新唯物主义或 "更激进意义上的唯物主义 "定义为 "在福柯之后思考人类主体性的体现结构"（Braidotti 2000, 158）。Braidotti来自澳大利亚女性主义中非常丰富的唯物主义传统，她和DeLanda（以及其他新唯物主义者）可以说以这样或那样的方式肯定了福柯（[1970] 1998, 343）备受关注的预言，即 "也许有一天，这个世纪将被称为德勒兹世纪"，因此，Braidotti的 "福柯之后 "不应被解读为超越福柯。与德兰达相比，布赖多蒂的新唯物主义同样具有内在性和非线性，"体现的主体性 "也相应地被概念化：

A piece of meat activated by electric waves of desire, a text written by the unfolding of genetic encoding. Neither a sacralized inner sanctum, nor a pure socially shaped entity, the enfleshed Deleuzian subject is rather an “in-between”: it is a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous unfolding outwards of affects. A mobile entity, an enfleshed sort of memory that repeats and is capable of lasting through sets of discontinuous variations, while remaining faithful to itself. The Deleuzian body is ultimately an embodied memory (Braidotti 2000, 159).
欲望的电波激活了一块肉，基因编码的展开书写了一段文字。既非神圣化的内心圣殿，也非纯粹的社会形态实体，德勒兹式的 "充血主体 "是一种 "介于两者之间 "的存在：它是外部影响的折叠，同时也是情感的向外展开。它是一个流动的实体，是一种被充实的记忆，它不断重复，能够通过一系列不连续的变化而持续，同时又忠实于自身。德勒兹的身体归根结底是一种具身记忆（Braidotti 2000, 159）。

Apart from the immanence of the new materialism qualitatively shifting the many instantiations of cultural theory that exemplify the transcendental, there is a strong emphasis on the intra-action^2 of the technological and the natural, or as Braidotti has called it, on “the ‘posthuman’ predicament” which entails “much more than the definitive loss of the naturalistic paradigm” (ibid., 158). Bringing “nature” into cultural theory does not make new materialists susceptible to adopting the ontology of the so-called positivist natural sciences. One of the pillars of the new materialism is the claim that modern natural science and postmodern cultural theory are both humanisms (cf. Colebrook 2004). In Braidotti’s work the shared humanist subject of biological determinism and social constructivism is exchanged for a post-humanist subject, which entails for starters a qualitative shift away from the two poles of present-day epistemology: positivism and postmodernism (cf. Haraway 1988).
除了新唯物主义的 "内在性"（immanence）从质上改变了文化理论中许多体现超越性的实例之外，新唯物主义还特别强调技术与自然的内在 2 ，或如布赖多蒂所言，强调"'后人类'的困境"，它所带来的 "远不止是自然主义范式的彻底丧失"（同上，158）。将 "自然 "引入文化理论并不会使新唯物主义者容易接受所谓实证主义自然科学的本体论。新唯物主义的支柱之一是主张现代自然科学和后现代文化理论都是人文主义（参见 Colebrook 2004）。在 Braidotti 的著作中，生物决定论和社会建构论中共同的人文主义主体被置换为后人文主义主体，这首先意味着从质变上脱离了当今认识论的两极：实证主义和后现代主义（参见 Haraway，1988 年）。

In their subsequent work, DeLanda and Braidotti continued constituting new materialism by posing dual oppositions as their main target. Reworking and eventually breaking through dualism appears to be the key to new materialism. Dualism comes to the fore as the structuring principle of the transcendental and humanist traditions that they want to shift in their work. Prioritizing mind over matter or culture over nature is a transcendentalizing gesture following humanist and dialecticist thought. It posits postmodernism as overcoming the flaws of positivism, and social constructivism as overcoming biological determinism. As such, the gesture is predicated upon sequential negation, and has a progress narrative structure. The reliance upon dialecticism has been uncovered as an effect of what Lynn Hankinson Nelson (1993, 127-8) termed “unreal dichotomies” or “non-exhaustive oppositions.” Nelson has made clear that one pole of a dichotomy or binary opposition is always already implied in the other as its negation, which makes dichotomies unreal and oppositions non-exhaustive. In the words of Michel Serres:
在随后的工作中，德兰达和布赖多蒂继续将二元对立作为主要目标，从而构成了新唯物主义。重塑并最终突破二元对立似乎是新唯物主义的关键所在。二元论作为超验主义和人文主义传统的结构性原则而凸显出来，他们希望在其作品中加以转变。将精神置于物质之上，或将文化置于自然之上，是遵循人文主义和辩证法思想的超越姿态。它假定后现代主义克服了实证主义的缺陷，社会建构主义克服了生物决定论。因此，这种姿态以连续的否定为前提，具有进步的叙事结构。人们发现，对辩证法的依赖是林恩-汉金森-纳尔逊（Lynn Hankinson Nelson，1993，127-8）所说的 "不真实的二分法 "或 "非穷尽对立 "的结果。尼尔森明确指出，二分法或二元对立中的一极总是已经隐含在另一极中，作为其否定，这使得二分法不真实，对立也不详尽。用米歇尔-塞雷斯的话说：

An idea opposed to another idea is always the same idea, albeit affected by the negative sign. The more you oppose one another, the more you remain in the same framework of thought (Serres with Latour 1995, 81).
与另一种思想相对立的思想始终是同一种思想，只是受到了否定符号的影响。越是相互对立，就越是保持在同一思想框架内（Serres 和 Latour 1995, 81）。

The intimate relation between two so-called opposites makes it clear that the transcendental and humanist tendencies, which are fought by new materialist theorists are fundamentally reductive. After all, negation implies a relation, which is precisely what is undone by the dependence of transcendental humanist thought on dualism.
两个所谓对立面之间的密切关系清楚地表明，新唯物主义理论家所反对的超越论和人文主义倾向从根本上说是一种还原。毕竟，否定意味着一种关系，而这恰恰是超验人文主义思想依赖二元论而无法实现的。

Attempting to break through reductive dualist thought in A New Philosophy of Society, DeLanda (2006, 45-6; original emphasis) makes the following statement:
德兰达（2006 年，45-6；着重号原文如此）在《新社会哲学》一书中试图突破还原二元论思想，他作了如下论述：

[…] general categories do not refer to anything in the real world and […] to believe they do (i.e. to reify them) leads directly to essentialism. Social constructivism is supposed to be an antidote to this, in the sense that by showing that general categories are mere stereotypes it blocks the move towards their reification. But by coupling the idea that perception is intrinsically linguistic with the ontological assumption that only the contents of experience really exist, this position leads directly to a form of social essentialism.
[......]一般范畴并不指向现实世界中的任何事物，[......]相信它们指向现实世界中的任何事物（即把它们重新整合）会直接导致本质主义。社会建构主义本应是这一问题的解毒剂，因为它通过证明一般范畴仅仅是刻板印象，阻止了将其重新定型的行为。但是，通过将感知本质上是语言的这一观点与只有经验内容才真正存在这一本体论假设相结合，这一立场直接导致了某种形式的社会本质主义。

Linguisticality (which is not denied, but given its proper place, that is, a more modest one) forms the nexus of DeLanda’s non-dualist argument about new materialism. Anti-representationalism (an immanent gesture) is employed so as to break through the assumed binary opposition between realist essentialism and social constructivism. Due to the fact that causally linear, predetermined and constrained reasoning has been left behind (or at least is included in an open, constrained yet undecidable^3 notion of causality that fills up all of its dimensions), it cannot be argued that new materialism entails a simple move beyond social constructivism in a progressive way. According to DeLanda, new materialism is neither realist nor social constructivist. It is precisely the commonalities of realism and social constructivism that are being recognized, though shifted.
语言性（并没有被否定，而是被赋予了适当的位置，即一个更为适度的位置）构成了德兰达关于新唯物主义的非二元论论证的核心。反表象主义（一种内在的姿态）的运用是为了突破现实主义本质论与社会建构主义之间假定的二元对立。由于因果线性、预定和受限的推理已被抛在脑后（或至少被纳入一个开放的、受限的但却无法确定的 3 因果性概念中，它充满了所有的维度），因此不能说新唯物主义需要以渐进的方式简单地超越社会建构主义。迪兰达认为，新唯物主义既不是现实主义，也不是社会建构主义。尽管发生了转变，但人们认识到的恰恰是现实主义和社会建构主义的共性。

Braidotti (2006, 130; cf. Rossini 2006) theorizes similar moves in Transpositions, yet with a clear focus on feminist politics:
Braidotti (2006, 130; cf. Rossini 2006)在《转述》中提出了类似的理论，但明显侧重于女性主义政治：

In the political economy of phallologocentrism and of anthropocentric humanism, which predicates the sovereignty of Sameness in a falsely universalistic mode, my sex fell on the side of ‘Otherness,’ understood as pejorative difference, or as being-worth-less-than. The becoming-animal/ becomingworld speaks to my feminist self, partly because my gender, historically speaking, never quite made it into full humanity, so my allegiance to that category is at best negotiable and never to be taken for granted.
在以阴茎为中心的政治经济学和以人类为中心的人文主义中，我的性别属于 "他者"，被理解为贬义的差异，或被理解为没有价值。成为动物/成为世界 "与我的女性主义自我不谋而合，部分原因是我的性别在历史上从未完全成为完整的人类，因此我对这一类别的忠诚充其量只是可协商的，绝不是理所当然的。

This is neither an essentialist statement, nor one of semiotic constructivism. It is rather the materialist acknowledgement of a historical location: a starting position of asymmetrical power differentials. This location is not only geopolitical, but also genealogical and time-bound.
这既不是本质主义的说法，也不是符号建构主义的说法。相反，它是对历史位置的唯物主义承认：不对称权力差异的起始位置。这个位置不仅是地缘政治性的，也是谱系性和时间性的。

Braidotti’s claim is anti-representationalist in two ways. First of all, she cuts across a biological (or Platonic) essentialism and “semiotic constructivism” (here, a relativism) in a manner that mirrors DeLanda. Secondly, a feminist politics is conceptualized, which does not embrace the dualist move of creating counter-identities (a modernist feminist project) nor does it attempt to move beyond dualism by producing a plethora of counter-identities according to a pluralizing gesture (a postmodernist feminist project, and again a relativism). Feminists “rather go further and push towards qualitatively stronger de-territorializations” (ibid., 134), that is, towards becoming-animal/becoming-world, which entails a breakthrough of the naturalizing tendencies of both sexist humanism and the denaturalizing tendencies of modern and postmodern feminisms.
布赖多蒂的主张在两个方面是反表象主义的。首先，她跨越了生物（或柏拉图）本质论和 "符号建构主义"（这里指相对主义），其方式与德兰达如出一辙。其次，女性主义政治被概念化了，它既不接受创造反身份的二元论举措（现代主义女性主义项目），也不试图超越二元论，按照多元化姿态制造大量反身份（后现代主义女性主义项目，同样也是相对主义）。女权主义者 "更进一步，推动质的更强的去地域化"（同上，134），即成为动物/成为世界，这就需要突破性别主义人文主义的自然化倾向和现代及后现代女权主义的非自然化倾向。

What we find in the work of DeLanda and Braidotti is a series of moves that complexify cultural theory in the light of the habit of dualism. We claim that the immanent philosophies of DeLanda and Braidotti (though by no means exclusively), in their early as well as their recent incarnations, exemplify the constitution and enactment of new materialist cultural theory.
在德兰达和布赖多蒂的著作中，我们发现了一系列根据二元论的习惯将文化理论复杂化的举措。我们认为，迪兰达和布赖多蒂的内在哲学（但绝不是唯一的内在哲学），无论是其早期的哲学还是其近期的哲学，都是新唯物主义文化理论的构成和发展的典范。

This chapter engages with the constitution of new materialism, as an object of study and a shared ambition with the scholars whose work we study. Following the interviews in Part One of this book, and building on a comprehensive review of enactments or instantiations of new materialism in recent cultural theory, this chapter proposes that the immanent gesture of new materialism is transversal rather than dualist as it intersects academic (neo-)disciplines (for instance feminist theory, science and technology studies, and media and cultural studies), paradigms (for instance the Saussurian/Lacanian linguisticism that is still prevalent in cultural theory today, or the dualistic take on the natural sciences and the humanities), and the linear spatiotemporalities conventionally assigned to epistemic trends (for instance “new” materialism versus Marxist historical materialism as practiced by Benjamin for instance^4 ). Our proposition is that new materialism is itself a distinctive trend, both in feminist theory and in cultural theory more broadly, and a device or tool for opening up theory formation. This is to say that new materialism not only allows for addressing the conventional epistemic tendency to what can be summarized as classification or territorialization (when a new trend appears on the academic stage, it is usually interpreted as a “class” that can be added to an existing classification of epistemologies), but also—and at the same time—for de-territorializing the academic territories, tribes, and temporalities traditionally considered central to scholarship. After all, the classificatory strategy perfectly exemplifies transcendentalism and the two characteristics of dualism (sequential negation and a narrative of progress). Braidotti has summarized the need for this double move as a “qualitative leap” towards “creating conditions for the implementation of transversality” (ibid., 123). In this chapter, we intend to affirm the transversality of new materialism. That is to say, we study and propose a new materialism that cuts across or intersects dual oppositions in an immanent way. Felix Guattari ([1964] 1984), coining this term as early as 1964, insists on the “micropolitical” nature of transversality, introducing it as a means to search for the new—not by critiquing the old, but by radically questioning (or smoothening out) all the barriers that supported its logic. “Transversality is the transference become vehicular” as Gary Genosko (1996, 15) then concludes. The strength of new materialism is precisely this nomadic traversing of the
本章探讨了新唯物主义的构成，将其作为一个研究对象，并将其作为我们所研究的学者的共同抱负。继本书第一部分的访谈之后，在对新唯物主义在近期文化理论中的表现或实例进行全面回顾的基础上，本章提出，新唯物主义的内在姿态是横向的，而非二元的，因为它交叉了学术（新）学科（如女性主义理论、科技研究、媒体与文化研究）、范式（如索绪尔/拉古语言学）和文化研究、新）学科（如女性主义理论、科技研究、媒体与文化研究）、范式（如当今仍在文化理论中盛行的索绪尔/拉卡语言学，或自然科学与人文科学的二元论），以及传统上赋予认识论趋势的线性时空（如 "新 "唯物主义与本雅明等人奉行的马克思主义历史唯物主义的对比 4 ）。我们的主张是，新唯物主义本身就是女性主义理论和更广义的文化理论中的一种独特趋势，是开启理论形成的一种手段或工具。这就是说，新唯物主义不仅可以解决传统认识论的分类或地域化倾向（当一种新趋势出现在学术舞台上时，它通常被解释为一种 "类别"，可以被添加到现有的认识论分类中），而且同时还可以将传统上被视为学术核心的学术地域、部落和时间性去地域化。毕竟，分类策略完美地体现了超验主义和二元论的两个特征（顺序否定和进步叙事）。 布赖多蒂将这种双重举措的必要性概括为 "质的飞跃"，即 "为实现横向性创造条件"（同上，123）。在本章中，我们打算肯定新唯物主义的横向性。也就是说，我们研究并提出了一种新唯物主义，它以一种内在的方式跨越或交叉二元对立。费利克斯-瓜塔里（Felix Guattari，[1964] 1984 年）早在 1964 年就创造了这一术语，他坚持横向性的 "微政治 "性质，将其作为一种寻找新事物的手段--不是通过批判旧事物，而是通过从根本上质疑（或抹平）支撑其逻辑的所有障碍。正如加里-杰诺斯科（1996，15）所总结的那样，"横向性是将转移变为车辆"。新唯物主义的力量恰恰在于这种游牧式的穿越
territories of science and the humanities, performing the agential or noninnocent nature of all matter^5 that seems to have escaped both modernist (positivist) and postmodernist humanist epistemologies.
科学与人文的领地，表现了所有物质的能动性或非无辜性 5 ，这似乎逃不过现代主义（实证主义）和后现代主义人文主义认识论的眼睛。

New Materialism Generated: Depending on Disciplines
新唯物主义的产生：取决于学科

Although we want to show here that a first instantiation of transversality enacted by new materialist cultural theorists cuts across scholarly disciplines, there is a whole range of scholars working on new materialism from their respective disciplinary locations. In these specific disciplinary takes on new materialism, the potentialities of the new materialism get lost in unnecessarily narrow understandings. Introducing new materialism into a discipline entails a transcendental gesture according to which the new materialism and the discipline in question (e.g. sociology) are positioned as pre-existing or generated rather than generative, and consequently as interacting rather than intra-acting. In other words, due to the presumed schism or dualism, the transversality of new materialism is being undone rather than affirmed or put to work. To transversalize can only be done when always already “invoking a new frame of analysis,” as Jonathan Gil Harris (2003, 281) puts it. A new materialism that emerges from a discipline is an immanent gesture that we will discuss in the next section.
尽管我们想在此说明，新唯物主义文化理论家所提出的跨越性的第一个实例是跨越学术学科的，但有一大批学者从各自的学科位置出发研究新唯物主义。在这些特定学科对新唯物主义的理解中，新唯物主义的潜力被不必要的狭隘理解所迷失。将新唯物主义引入一门学科需要一种超越的姿态，根据这种姿态，新唯物主义和相关学科（如社会学）被定位为预先存在或生成的，而不是生成的，因此是相互作用的，而不是内部作用的。换句话说，由于假定的分裂或二元论，新唯物主义的横向性正在被取消，而不是被肯定或付诸实施。正如乔纳森-吉尔-哈里斯（Jonathan Gil Harris）（2003, 281）所说，只有在已经 "援引新的分析框架 "的情况下，才能实现横向化。从一门学科中产生的新唯物主义是一种内在姿态，我们将在下一节中讨论。

Momin Rahman and Anne Witz (2003, 245) in “What Really Matters? The Elusive Quality of the Material in Feminist Thought,” for instance, focus exclusively on sociologically induced feminisms, and argue that “there needs to be a recognition of both the limits of a constructionism grounded in materialism and the potential of a constructionism that deploys materiality as a more porous and flexible concept.” Rahman and Witz recognize the shift engendered by a new materialism (conceptualizing “materiality”), and claim that the conceptualization of the material employed in the early days of feminist sociology was more complex than simply economical. This cartography is in line with what we want to present here. Although new materialism has set in motion a qualitative shift in cultural theory at large, this shift is transversal, not dualist. Striking alliances between the old and the new, Rahman and Witz claim that early feminists broadened the definition of the economically determinist material to include social relations and the domestic sphere, and worked on the material as including everyday and institutional practices as well (ibid., 250). As a consequence, they read Butler’s claim about “the distinction between the material and the cultural [being] no longer a stable or viable one” (ibid., 249) as an outrage, precisely because of the fact that 1970s and 1980s feminist sociology did not necessarily work along the lines of such a distinction. In the work of Butler, they imply, a second-wave feminist materialism functions as a straw person.6 Rahman and Witz find that good-old feminist sociological work worked along the lines of an expanded conceptualization of the material.
Momin Rahman 和 Anne Witz（2003，245）在《什么才是真正重要的？The Elusive Quality of the Material in Feminist Thought "一文中，只关注由社会学诱发的女性主义，并认为 "既要认识到以唯物主义为基础的建构主义的局限性，也要认识到将物质性作为一个更松散、更灵活的概念加以利用的建构主义的潜力"。拉赫曼和维茨承认新唯物主义（将 "物质性 "概念化）所带来的转变，并声称女性主义社会学早期所采用的物质性概念化比单纯的经济性更为复杂。这一制图与我们在此要介绍的内容是一致的。尽管新唯物主义在整个文化理论中启动了质的转变，但这种转变是横向的，而非二元的。拉赫曼和维茨在新旧理论之间建立了联盟，他们认为早期的女权主义者扩大了经济决定论物质的定义，将社会关系和家庭领域也包括在内，并将日常和制度性实践也纳入了物质的范畴（同上，250）。因此，她们将巴特勒关于 "物质与文化之间的区别不再是一个稳定或可行的区别"（同上，249）的说法解读为一种愤怒，这正是因为 20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代的女权主义社会学并不一定是按照这样的区别来工作的。她们暗示，在巴特勒的著作中，第二波女性主义唯物主义充当了稻草人的角色。 6 拉赫曼和维茨发现，古老的女性主义社会学工作是按照扩大物质概念化的思路开展的。

Simultaneously, however, they claim that the good-old feminist sociological work simply added new (relativist, they say) theoretical frameworks to the existing economically determinist materialism. They question whether, in such a context, “the distinctive materiality of materialism has any residual conceptual integrity” (ibid., 252). In other words, they stumble upon the problems of additive/quantitative epistemic approaches, especially, we would say, when the two quantified approaches are non-exhaustive oppositions. We claim that adding a so-called feminist postmodern epistemology with relativist inclinations to a modern epistemology, feminist or not, materialist or not, does not necessarily result in a qualitative shifting of either the modern or the feminist postmodern. This is why the questioning of conceptual integrity is justified in the case of the cartography of Rahman and Witz, but not in the context of new (feminist) materialism per se. The conceptualization of “materiality” that the sociologists Rahman and Witz engage with does not necessarily shift the term towards something that differs from the economical simply because of the fact that early feminist sociologists seem to have added a bodily materiality to the economical.
然而，与此同时，她们声称，古老的女性主义社会学著作只是为现有的经济决定论唯物主义添加了新的（她们说是相对主义的）理论框架。她们质疑，在这样的背景下，"唯物主义独特的物质性是否具有任何残存的概念完整性"（同上，252）。换句话说，他们遇到了加法/定量认识论方法的问题，尤其是当这两种定量方法是非穷尽性的对立时。我们认为，在现代认识论中加入具有相对主义倾向的所谓女性主义后现代认识论，无论是否是女性主义的，是否是唯物主义的，都不一定会导致现代认识论或女性主义后现代认识论的质的转变。这就是为什么对概念完整性的质疑在拉赫曼和维茨的制图学中是合理的，但在新的（女性主义）唯物主义本身的语境中却不是。社会学家拉赫曼和维茨对 "物质性 "的概念化并不一定仅仅因为早期的女性主义社会学家似乎在经济学中加入了身体的物质性，就将这一术语转向不同于经济学的东西。

The materialism brought to the fore by Rahman and Witz—if compared with economical (neo-classical) materialism, the constructionist approach remains constant, as DeLanda also stressed in the interview in Part One—should in fact be labeled “new” in the teleological sense of the term, whereas we have argued that it is among other things teleology (as shared by realist/totalizing/modern and social constructivist/relativist/ postmodern epistemologies) that is broken down in new materialism. Rahman and Witz themselves yearn for a breakdown of linear continuity as well, while remaining in a dualistic mode (pre-distinguishing the social and the physical), which we would interpret as an artifact of their territorial approach to new theory formation:
拉赫曼和维茨提出的唯物主义--如果与经济（新古典主义）唯物主义相比，建构主义方法保持不变，正如德兰达在第一部分的访谈中也强调的那样--实际上应该被贴上目的论意义上的 "新 "标签，而我们认为新唯物主义打破的正是目的论（现实主义/总体化/现代和社会建构主义/相对论/后现代认识论所共有的）。拉赫曼和维茨本身也渴望打破线性连续性，但他们仍停留在二元论模式（预先区分社会和物理），我们将其解释为他们对新理论形成的地域性方法的产物：

The social constructionism being worked at here is not one that is limited by physical matter, but rather one that is able to incorporate body matters as an indivisible part of lived, gendered experience and action. […] it seems to us that there is an attempt to consider the social effectivity of the physical—materiality as embodiment, experienced and rendered meaningful within gendered and sexualized frameworks of meaning and action (ibid., 256; original emphasis).
这里所说的社会建构主义不是一种受限于身体物质的社会建构主义，而是一种能够将身 体问题作为生活、性别经验和行动不可分割的一部分的社会建构主义。[......]在我们看来，我们试图考虑的是身体物质作为体现的社会效果，它在性别化和性 化的意义和行动框架中被体验和赋予意义（同上，256；原文强调）。

Rahman and Witz thus affirm dualisms throughout their article—the dualism between new materialism and sociology being the starting point, and the one between physicality and sociality being the end result. It seems as if they have wanted to rescue (good-old) feminist sociology in light of a materialism that is new in the teleological sense of the term.7 Analyzing their article, we have shown that such an approach does not allow for the qualitative shifting of concepts that is to be found in the work of, among others, Braidotti and DeLanda. The materiality celebrated remains reduced to being the polar opposite of a sociality—that is, the material here has to be made socially effective, rather than seeing the social and the material as co-constitutive forces through, for instance, the “abstract machine.” We read this absence as an artifact of the authors buying into disciplinary territoriality. Bringing new materialism (here assumed to be a pre-existing body of work) into contact with a scholarly discipline (equally assumed to be pre-existing) has distortive effects. The presupposition that a new materialism is generated contradicts new materialism’s own anti-representationalism. New materialism, then, takes scholarship into absolute deterritorialization, and is not an epistemic class that has a clear referent. New materialism is something to be put to work.8
因此，拉赫曼和维茨在整篇文章中都肯定了二元论--新唯物主义与社会学之间的二元论是出发点，而实体性与社会性之间的二元论则是最终结果。他们似乎想根据目的论意义上的新唯物主义来拯救（古老的）女性主义社会学。 7 通过分析她们的文章，我们发现这种方法无法实现概念的质变，而这种质变可以在布赖多蒂和迪兰达等人的著作中找到。被颂扬的物质性仍然被归结为社会性的对立面--也就是说，这里的物质必须具有社会效力，而不是通过 "抽象机器 "等将社会和物质视为共同构成的力量。我们将这种缺失解读为作者对学科地域性的认同。将新唯物主义（在此假定为已有著作）与学术学科（同样假定为已有学科）相联系会产生扭曲的效果。新唯物主义产生的预设与新唯物主义本身的反代表性相矛盾。因此，新唯物主义将学术绝对去地域化，而不是一个有明确所指的认识论范畴。新唯物主义是需要付诸实践的。 8

Cultural theory being less disciplined than (feminist) sociology, the beginnings of a transversal understanding of new materialism can be found in Susan Sheridan’s “Words and Things: Some Feminist Debates on Culture and Materialism.” Sheridan (2002, 23), while not using the term new materialism herself, argues that the impact of post-structuralism on feminist cultural theory has resulted in the displacement of “the primacy of social and economic relations in analyses of women’s situation,” and in the implementation of taking into consideration the primacy of “issues of sexuality, subjectivity and textuality.” Sheridan claims that this seeming shift rests on a misinterpretation of post-structuralist theory, in which words and things got separated (all of a sudden “words” gained primacy) whereas post-structuralism, if read unpolemically, and together with recent work on matter, “demonstrates how inseparable are the symbolic and the material in examining the discursive construction of ‘objects’ of knowledge, and the material effects of that discursive power” (ibid., 25). In other words, post-structuralism and new materialism in Sheridan’s understanding should not be read as dual opposites, and together they should not be seen as theoretical moves beyond a feminist sociological materialism. This cartography is qualitatively different from the one presented by Rahman and Witz, and it finds confirmation in the work of French post-structuralist feminists such as Helene Cixous ([1975] 1976, 879, 884), one of whose main concerns, after all, was representationalism.
与（女权主义）社会学相比，文化理论的学科性较弱，但苏珊-谢里丹（Susan Sheridan）的《文字与事物》（Words and Things：关于文化与唯物主义的一些女权主义辩论"。谢里丹（2002，23）虽然没有使用新唯物主义一词，但她认为，后结构主义对女性主义文化理论的影响导致了 "社会和经济关系在分析女性处境时的首要地位 "被取代，并开始考虑 "性、主体性和文本性问题 "的首要地位。谢里丹认为，这种看似转变的基础是对后结构主义理论的误读，在这种误读中，文字和事物被分离开来（突然间 "文字 "获得了首要地位），而后结构主义，如果不加争论地解读，再加上最近关于物质的研究，"在研究知识'对象'的话语建构以及话语权力的物质影响时，证明了符号和物质是多么密不可分"（同上，25）。换言之，在谢里丹的理解中，后结构主义和新唯物主义不应被解读为二者的对立面，也不应被视为超越女性主义社会学唯物主义的理论举措。这种图式与拉赫曼和维茨提出的图式有着质的不同，它在法国后结构主义女性主义者（如海伦-西克苏斯（Helene Cixous）（[1975] 1976, 879, 884））的著作中得到了证实，毕竟，她们的主要关注点之一就是表象主义。

Sheridan, like Braidotti, positions herself amongst post-structuralist feminists who have argued that cultural constructivist feminism “is not materialist enough” (ibid., 27), and who have attacked “reductive (essentialist) representations of the nature/culture binary divide itself” (ibid., 28). Here, a post-structuralist feminist cultural theory seems to be dualistically opposed to a “cultural constructivism.” Post-structuralist feminists are said to have critiqued cultural constructivism for working with a “de-materialised body,” whereas another critique is that they have been working with “understandings of ‘discourse’” that are “limited” when language is taken to be performative (ibid.). At the same time, poststructuralist feminist cultural theory is said to have attacked the reductive essentialism of both feminist sociology (focusing on the material) and cultural constructivism (focusing on the cultural). Traversing the non-exhaustive opposites of feminist sociology and cultural constructivism, and analyzing the reductivism effected on the basis of a reliance on either matter or discourse demonstrates transversality. In other words, Sheridan argues that the current rise in new materialist analyses in cultural theory shows that both language-oriented cultural constructivisms and sociologically induced feminisms are to be critiqued, since neither has fully employed the agential qualities of matter. Sheridan’s reading of what she calls a “new stage” (ibid.; cf. Hekman 2010, 7 on a “new settlement”) in feminist theory generates a focus not only on biological matter or on a cultural theory incorporating insights from the natural sciences, but also on the matter of the political economy, thus qualitatively shifting a concept of matter as purely physical and opposed to the social or linguistic.
与 Braidotti 一样，Sheridan 也将自己定位为后结构主义女性主义者，她们认为文化建构主义女性主义 "不够唯物主义"（同上，27），并抨击 "自然/文化二元划分本身的还原性（本质主义）表述"（同上，28）。在这里，后结构主义女性主义文化理论似乎与 "文化建构主义 "二元对立。据说，后结构主义女性主义者批评文化建构主义的工作方式是 "去物质化的身体"，而另一种批评则认为，她们的工作方式是 "对'话语'的理解"，当语言被视为表演时，这种理解就 "受到了限制"（同上）。与此同时，后结构主义女性主义文化理论抨击了女性主义社会学（关注物质）和文化建构主义（关注文化）的还原本质主义。穿越女性主义社会学和文化建构主义的非穷尽性对立面，分析基于对物质或话语的依赖而产生的还原论，体现了横向性。换言之，谢里丹认为，当前文化理论中新唯物主义分析的兴起表明，语言导向的文化建构主义和社会学诱导的女性主义都应受到批判，因为两者都没有充分运用物质的能动性。谢里丹对她所称的 "新阶段"（同上；参见《新时代》第 3 卷第 2 期）进行了解读。 Hekman 2010, 7 on a "new settlement"）在女性主义理论中，不仅关注生物物质或包含自然科学见解的文化理论，还关注政治经济问题，从而从质上改变了纯粹物理的物质概念，使其与社会或语言概念相对立。

The new stage’s disciplinary transversality comes to be fully delineated by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman (2008, 9-10; cf. Squier and Littlefield 2004) as a new materialism (here called “material feminism”) that is to be found in the disciplines of “science studies, environmental feminisms, corporeal feminisms, queer theory, disability studies, theories of race and ethnicity, environmental justice, (post-)Marxist feminism, globalization studies, and cultural studies,” and which as an epistemic trend is involved in “integrating them into what amounts to a new paradigm for feminist thought. […] this paradigm is currently emerging and […] is a necessary and exhilarating move for contemporary feminism.” In The Material of Knowledge: Feminist Disclosures, Hekman (2010) goes so far as to demonstrate that new materialism is to be found in all scholarly disciplines, cutting across the trans-Atlantic disconnection between analytic and continental philosophy, and putting feminist theory at the forefront. For us, too, the new materialism allows for a move away from disciplines towards the meta-disciplinary, in feminist theory and in cultural theory more broadly, which is a claim that alludes to the importance of studying and engaging with the effect that this move might have on the paradigms of contemporary cultural theory. In what ways does new materialism traverse paradigms?
Stacy Alaimo 和 Susan Hekman（2008, 9-10; cf. Squier and Littlefield 2004）将新阶段的学科横向性完全描述为一种新唯物主义（此处称为 "唯物女权主义"），这种唯物主义存在于 "科学研究、环境女权主义、肉体女权主义、同性恋理论 "等学科中。科学研究、环境女性主义、肉体女性主义、同性恋理论、残疾研究、种族和民族理论、环境正义、（后）马克思主义女性主义、全球化研究和文化研究 "等学科中都可以找到新唯物主义（此处称为 "唯物女性主义"），作为一种认识论趋势，新唯物主义 "将这些学科整合为一种新的女性主义思想范式"。[......]这一范式目前正在形成，[......]是当代女权主义的必要之举，令人振奋。在《知识的材料》一书中：在《知识的材料：女性主义的披露》一书中，赫克曼（2010 年）甚至表明，新唯物主义可以在所有学术学科中找到，它跨越了分析哲学与大陆哲学之间的跨大西洋断裂，将女性主义理论置于最前沿。对我们来说，新唯物主义也使女性主义理论和更广义的文化理论从学科走向元学科，这暗指了研究和参与这一举措可能对当代文化理论范式产生的影响的重要性。新唯物主义是如何跨越范式的？

Generating New Materialism: Playing with Paradigms
创造新唯物主义：玩转范式

Demonstrating the workings of new materialism, that is, generating a new materialism rather than relying upon a new materialism already pre-generated, Braidotti (2000, 160) argues that what is to be found in postmodern cultural theory (i.e. the body of social/semiotic constructivist cultural theory considered state-of-the-art once theory formation is positioned on a global classificatory map) is a “denial of the materiality of the bodily self” in paradoxical conjunction with the fast circulation of an excessive number of theoretical discourses about, and cultural representations of, the human body. In other words, cultural theory in the postmodern era has been unable to account fully for materiality, whereas it found itself surrounded by an excessive representation (thus objectification) of (bodily and non-bodily, organic and inorganic, always already feminized) matter in popular culture as well as cultural theory. Braidotti takes postmodernist constructivism’s specific form of anti-essentialism, which affirms representationalism, to be responsible for this curious situation. Postmodernist constructivism is discovered to be a paradigm in which the space for materialism is, in Alistair Welchman’s words (2005, 390), “restricted,” and postmodern cultural theorists are simply included in the huge category of “critics who use an impoverished conception of matter inherited from non-materialist systems of thought” (ibid., 388). Postmodern cultural theory, otherwise seen as constituting and having been constituted by the Crisis of Reason, seems to have continued to work within the legacy of modernism’s foundationalism. The modernist system of thought relying on Reason (and concepts like Logos, Mind, Representation) has not been fully broken down, and this is why transcendental and humanist tendencies continue to haunt present-day cultural theory.
Braidotti (2000, 160)展示了新唯物主义的运作方式，即生成一种新唯物主义，而不是依赖一种已经预先生成的新唯物主义。Braidotti（2000, 160）认为，在后现代文化理论（即一旦理论形成被定位在全球分类地图上，被视为最先进的社会/半社会建构主义文化理论体系）中可以发现的是 "对身体自我物质性的否定"，与此同时，关于人体的过多理论话语和文化表征也在快速流传。换句话说，后现代的文化理论无法完全解释物质性，而它却发现自己被流行文化和文化理论中（身体的和非身体的、有机的和无机的、总是已经女性化的）物质的过度表征（从而客体化）所包围。Braidotti 认为，后现代主义建构主义反本质主义的特殊形式，即肯定表象主义，是造成这种奇怪局面的原因。用阿利斯泰尔-韦尔奇曼（Alistair Welchman）的话说（2005, 390），后现代建构主义是一种 "限制了唯物主义空间 "的范式，后现代文化理论家只是被归入了 "使用从非唯物主义思想体系继承下来的贫乏的物质概念的批评家 "这一庞大的类别（同上，388）。后现代文化理论在其他方面被视为构成了理性危机，并且已经被理性危机所构成，但它似乎仍在现代主义基础主义的遗产范围内继续工作。 依赖理性（以及逻各斯、心智、表象等概念）的现代主义思想体系尚未被完全打破，这也是超越主义和人文主义倾向继续困扰当今文化理论的原因。
We have already explained that a postmodernism dualistically opposing modernism cannot entail anything but a continuation of the Same (cf. Alaimo and Hekman 2008, 2-3, Hekman 2010, 48). How does new materialism succeed in qualitatively shifting the paradigm that had supposedly already left the academic stage after May ‘68? And how does it introduce a conception of matter that is not impoverished?
我们已经解释过，与现代主义二元对立的后现代主义只能是 "同一 "的延续（参见 Alaimo and Hekman 2008, 2-3, Hekman 2010, 48）。新唯物主义如何成功地从质量上改变了本应在 "5.68 "之后就已退出学术舞台的范式？它又是如何引入一种并不贫乏的物质概念的？

As already stated, Braidotti’s new materialism, which she also terms a “bodily” or “carnal” materialism (2006, 182) begins with “the enfleshed Deleuzean subject,” which is “a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous unfolding outwards of affects.” The exterior and the interior, the subject(ive) and the object(ive), the individual, the social, and the symbolic are conceptualized as co-constitutive instead of pre-determined levels or layers. The genealogy of this Deleuzean subject is created in Continental thought; it includes “Descartes’ nightmare, Spinoza’s hope,
如前所述，布赖多蒂的新唯物主义，她也称之为 "身体的 "或 "肉体的 "唯物主义（2006, 182），始于 "德勒兹式的主体"，即 "外部影响的折叠和情感的同时向外展开"。外部和内部、主体和客体、个人、社会和象征被概念化为共同构成，而非预先确定的层次或层级。德勒兹这一主体的谱系是在大陆思想中创建的，其中包括 "笛卡尔的噩梦、斯宾诺莎的希望"、

Nietzsche’s complaint, Freud’s obsession, Lacan’s favorite fantasy, Marx’s omission” (Braidotti 2000, 159). This cartography shows that new materialism has something to say about Reason/the modernist paradigm as well as the Crisis of Reason/the postmodernist paradigm. In other words, it is a qualified cartography, which opens up for a qualitative shifting of a dual opposition. This shifting is done by rethinking matter. Affirming a radical sense of materialism, or simply radical immanence, instead of starting from Reason (whether adjectified, thus postmodernized, or not), Braidotti does not define matter as solid and stable, as self-identical. A radically immanent conceptualization of matter necessarily affirms its ongoing “metamorphosis” (Braidotti 2002a), or in the words of DeLanda (1996, 2002), its ongoing “morphogenesis” as it shows an interest in intensive material processes and the actual forms they can produce.
尼采的抱怨，弗洛伊德的痴迷，拉康最喜欢的幻想，马克思的遗漏"（Braidotti 2000, 159）。这种制图表明，新唯物主义对理性/现代主义范式以及理性危机/后现代主义范式都有一定的论述。换句话说，这是一种有条件的制图，它为二元对立的质变开辟了道路。这种转变是通过重新思考物质实现的。布莱多蒂肯定激进的物质主义，或者干脆说是激进的内在性，而不是从理性（无论是否经过形容词化，是否因此被后现代化）出发，布莱多蒂没有把物质定义为坚固稳定、自成一体的东西。对物质进行彻底的内在概念化必然会肯定其持续的 "蜕变"（布莱多蒂，2002a），或者用迪兰达（DeLanda，1996, 2002）的话说，其持续的 "形态发生"，因为它显示了对密集物质过程及其所能产生的实际形式的兴趣。

According to a philosophy of radical immanence informed by a Bergsonian concept of time (duree instead of linearity and progress), matter is not thought of as Matter, the photonegative of Reason or Logos or Mind or Representation, but rather by a focus on “duration [inserted] into matter” (Grosz 2005, 111). It is a focus, indeed, on metamorphosis or morphogenesis:
根据柏格森的时间概念（duree，而不是线性和进步），激进的内在性哲学并不把物质视为理性或逻各斯或心智或表象的光负，而是把重点放在"[插入]物质的持续时间 "上（格罗斯，2005 年，111 页）。事实上，这是一种对变形或形态发生的关注：

What endures, what is fundamentally immersed in time is not what remains unchanging or the same over time, a Platonic essence, but what diverges and transforms itself with the passage of time (ibid., 110).
永恒的、从根本上沉浸在时间中的，不是随着时间的推移而保持不变或相同的东西，不是柏拉图式的本质，而是随着时间的流逝而发生变化和转变的东西（同上，110）。

This boils down to matter immanently escaping every possible representation in the modernist, scientistic meaning as well as in the postmodernist, social or semiotic constructivist sense of the term according to which representation is not the scientistic “mirror of nature” but rather the equally representationalist “mirror of culture” (Barad 2007). This is to say that whereas a modernist scientific materialism allows for one, True representation of matter, and a postmodernist cultural constructivism allows for a plethora of equally true representations, it is the shared representationalism that is questioned and shifted by new materialism. Matter is a transformative force in itself, which, in its ongoing change, will not allow any representation to take root. This is also how Miguel de Beistegui (2004, 110) reads Deleuze with Heidegger, elusively concluding that: “Behind or, better said perhaps, beneath every object, every representation, every physical of metaphysical ideality lies a phenomenon, which is the flesh and blood of the world, the life that continues to live in and through being as it is represented in itself. This is being as it is lived.”9
根据后现代主义的社会或符号建构主义，表征不是科学主义的 "自然之镜"，而是同样表征主义的 "文化之镜"（巴拉德，2007 年）。这就是说，现代主义的科学唯物主义只允许一种真实的物质表征，而后现代主义的文化建构主义则允许大量同样真实的表征，新唯物主义质疑和改变的是共同的表征主义。物质本身就是一种变革的力量，在其不断变化的过程中，任何表象都无法扎根。Miguel de Beistegui (2004, 110) 也是这样解读德勒兹与海德格尔的，其结论令人费解："在每一个对象、每一个表象、每一个形而上学意识形态的实体的背后，或者更确切地说，在每一个对象、每一个表象、每一个形而上学意识形态的实体的背后，都隐藏着一个现象，它是世界的血肉，是继续活在存在之中并通过存在而存在的生命，因为存在本身就是表象。这就是被生活的存在"。 9

In “What is the Matter of Feminist Criticism?” Mariam Fraser affirms Braidotti’s new materialism, by working on the academic whom Claire Colebrook (2004, 293) has called the epitome of contemporary (feminist) postmodern cultural theory: Judith Butler. Representationalism or linguisticality is key to the work of Butler.10 Fraser (2002, 613) claims that in this work, language ends up addressing only the exterior. As a corollary, the interior appears as fundamentally ungraspable as any grasping is done through language. How do Barad and Vicki Kirby, whom Fraser positions alongside Braidotti for the generation of new materialism, qualitatively shift the relation between matter/materiality and language, between the exterior and the interior of the body? The key point is the abandonment of assumptions about linguisticality, and about who does the speaking/ writing. For Barad (1998, 105 in ibid., 618; original emphasis), “what is being described by our theories is not nature itself, but our participation within nature.” She theorizes the intra-action of the observer, the observed, and observing instruments, all of which are “agential.” In line with this, Kirby starts from the literacy of matter, re-reading Derrida and Saussure in order to show that a close reading of their work also uncovers their emphasis on materiality-in-change. In the work of Kirby, matter appears as something that is not only spoken about or spoken with, but rather as itself simply speaking. Nature and culture, word and flesh are “all emergent within a force field of differentiations that has no exteriority in any final sense” (Kirby 1997, 126-7 in Fraser 2002, 619; original emphasis). Both cases of transversality, signified by the “within,” entail leaving behind the primacy of either language/culture or matter/nature. In other words, a false dualism comes to be traversed. New materialism, that is, cuts across postmodernist and modernist paradigms as it shows that both epistemologies start from a distinctive pole of what Colebrook (2004, 56) has called “the representation/ materiality dichotomy.” Questioning this dichotomy involved the following:
在 "女性主义批评是怎么回事？一文中，玛丽亚姆-弗雷泽通过研究被克莱尔-科尔布鲁克（Claire Colebrook）（2004, 293）称为当代（女性主义）后现代文化理论缩影的学者，肯定了布雷多蒂的新唯物主义：朱迪斯-巴特勒。表象主义或语言性是巴特勒工作的关键。 10 Fraser (2002, 613) 指出，在巴特勒的著作中，语言最终只涉及外部。由此推论，内部似乎根本无法把握，因为任何把握都是通过语言完成的。弗雷泽将巴拉德和维基-柯比与布雷多蒂并列为新唯物主义的代表人物，他们是如何从质变上改变物质/物质性与语言之间的关系、身体的外部与内部之间的关系的呢？关键在于放弃了关于语言性的假设，以及关于谁在说话/写作的假设。巴拉德（1998，105，同上，618；原文强调）认为，"我们的理论所描述的不是自然本身，而是我们在自然中的参与"。她将观察者、被观察者和观察工具的内部行动理论化，所有这些都是 "行动的"。据此，柯比从物质的素养出发，重读德里达和索绪尔，以表明细读他们的作品也会发现他们对变化中的物质性的强调。在科比的作品中，物质不仅是一种被谈论或被使用的东西，它本身也是一种会说话的东西。自然与文化、文字与肉体 "都是在一个没有任何最终意义上的外部性的分化力场中出现的"（Kirby 1997, 126-7 in Fraser 2002, 619；原文强调）。 这两种以 "内在 "为标志的横向性都意味着抛弃语言/文化或物质/自然的首要地位。换句话说，一种虚假的二元论将被跨越。新唯物主义跨越了后现代主义和现代主义范式，因为它表明这两种认识论都是从科尔布鲁克（Colebrook）（2004, 56）所称的 "表象/物质性二分法 "的独特一极出发的。"对这种二分法的质疑涉及以下方面：

When feminists criticized or rejected the notion of women as mired in material embodiment, they did so because matter was deemed to be devoid of dynamism. When, subsequently, that phobia regarding matter was questioned, it was precisely because the border between mind and matter was deemed to be the effect of a prior linguistic or social production. And when ‘linguisticism,’ in turn, was challenged, this was because language had been erroneously taken to be a fixed, determining, and inhuman grid imposed upon life, rather than a living force (Colebrook 2008, 64).
当女权主义者批判或拒绝将女性束缚于物质体现的观念时，她们这样做是因为物质被认为缺乏活力。随后，当对物质的恐惧受到质疑时，恰恰是因为心灵与物质之间的边界被认为是先前的语言或社会生产的结果。反过来，当 "语言主义 "受到质疑时，这是因为语言被错误地认为是强加在生活之上的固定的、决定性的和非人性的网格，而不是一种活生生的力量（Colebrook 2008, 64）。

Bodies are texts that unfold according to genetic encoding, Braidotti says, which implies traversing the material and the representational.
身体是根据基因编码展开的文本，Braidotti 说，这意味着要穿越物质和表象。

Key to the new materialist paradigm, then, is an emphasis on the “material-discursive” or “material-semiotic” that we know from the paradigm-shifting work of Haraway (1988, 595; original emphasis):
因此，新唯物主义范式的关键在于强调 "物质-辨证 "或 "物质-交际"，这一点我们从哈拉维（Haraway，1988 年，595 页；原文强调）的范式转换著作中就已知晓：

[…] bodies as objects of knowledge are material-semiotic generative nodes. Their boundaries materialize in social interaction. Boundaries are drawn by mapping practices;
[......]作为知识客体的身体是物质--交际的生成节点。它们的边界在社会互动中具体化。边界是通过绘图实践划定的；

‘objects’ do not pre-exist as such. Objects are boundary projects. But boundaries shift from within; boundaries are very tricky.
物体 "本身并不存在。物体是边界项目。但边界会从内部发生变化；边界是非常棘手的。

What boundaries provisionally contain remains generative, productive of meanings and bodies. Siting (sighting) boundaries is a risky practice.
边界暂时包含的内容仍然具有生成性，能够产生意义和身体。确定（观察）边界是一种冒险的做法。

Such a claim is transversal when it comes to the broad (modernist and postmodernist) paradigms of cultural theory. The focus on the materialization of bodies and other so-called objects of investigation demonstrates how “duration” has in fact gotten “inserted into matter” (how DeLanda, for instance, got to focus on “matter-energy flows”), and how the “the representation/materiality dichotomy” has indeed been broken down (how Braidotti, for example, came to conceptualize the body as “a piece of meat activated by electric waves of desire, a text written by the unfolding of genetic encoding”) in new materialist cultural theory. Working with “material-semiotic agents,” as Haraway calls them, allows for a complexification of the way in which matter used to be defined. An object is no longer passive matter that has to be re-presented; meaningmaking takes place on a two-way track.11 Here it is also demonstrated how new materialism does not discard signification (cf. Ahmed 2008, 34) but rather directs it to its proper place and qualitatively shifts the linguistic turn accordingly (i.e. non-dualistically).
当涉及到广义的（现代主义和后现代主义）文化理论范式时，这种主张是横向的。对身体和其他所谓研究对象的物质化的关注表明，在新唯物主义文化理论中，"持续时间 "实际上是如何被 "插入物质之中 "的（例如，德兰达是如何开始关注 "物质-能量流 "的），以及 "表象/物质性二分法 "实际上是如何被打破的（例如，布赖多蒂是如何将身体概念化为 "由欲望的电波激活的一块肉，由基因编码的展开书写的文本"）。与哈拉维所说的 "物质--半透明媒介 "一起工作，可以使过去定义物质的方式变得更加复杂。对象不再是必须被重新呈现的被动物质；意义的生成是双向的。 11 这里也证明了新唯物主义并没有抛弃符号（参见 Ahmed 2008, 34），而是将其引向适当的位置，并相应地（即非二元论地）对语言转向进行了质的转变。

In the passage cited above as well as in her later work, Haraway focuses upon the ways in which bodies and systems of scholarly signification/ representation materialize alongside each other. Harawayian instantiations of new materialism affirm what Barad (2007) has called an onto-epistemology, or even an ethico-onto-epistemology, according to which being and knowing (and the good) become indistinguishable. Inspired by Haraway and Barad, we lastly wish to discuss the cartographical methodology that generates and is generated by the disciplinary and paradigmatic transversalities of new materialism.
在上文引述的这段话中以及在她后来的作品中，哈拉维关注的是身体与学术符号/表征系统相互具体化的方式。哈拉维的新唯物主义实例肯定了巴拉德（2007）所说的 "本体认识论"（onto-epistemology），甚至是 "伦理本体认识论"（ethico-onto-epistemology），根据这种认识论，存在与认识（以及善）变得不可区分。在哈拉维和巴拉德的启发下，我们最后想讨论一下新唯物主义的学科和范式横向性所产生和被产生的制图方法论。

Cartography Rather Than Classification
制图而非分类

New materialism is a cultural theory for the twenty-first century that attempts to show how postmodern cultural theory, even while claiming otherwise, has made use of a conceptualization of “post-” that is dualistic. Postmodern cultural theory re-confirmed modern cultural theory, thus allowing transcendental and humanist traditions to haunt cultural theory after the Crisis of Reason. New materialist cultural theory shifts (post-) modern cultural theory, and provides an immanent answer to transcendental humanism. It is a cultural theory that is non-foundationalist yet nonrelativist. In conformity with the interviewees in Part One of this book, we have shown that there is much to be gained from an argument such as the latter; after all, postmodernisms and modernisms are manifold, on the one hand, and epistemologically very similar on the other. It is for this reason that new materialism continues to rewrite the history of philosophy. As already stated, the minor tradition Deleuze proposed is now widely read and commented upon, but increasingly, great minds of the past are being given the attention that their work needs. For there is no need to limit this tradition to a series of personae or even to what the History of Philosophy has labeled a particular “type” of thinking. Scholars at work within modernism such as Bergson, Whitehead, William James and Edmund
新唯物主义是二十一世纪的一种文化理论，它试图说明后现代文化理论是如何利用二元对立的 "后 "的概念化的，即使它宣称不是这样。后现代文化理论重新确认了现代文化理论，从而让超验主义和人文主义传统在理性危机之后困扰着文化理论。新唯物主义文化理论转变了（后）现代文化理论，为超验人文主义提供了一个内在的答案。这是一种非基础主义、非相对论的文化理论。与本书第一部分的受访者一样，我们已经表明，后现代主义和现代主义这样的论点大有可为；毕竟，后现代主义和现代主义一方面是多方面的，另一方面在认识论上又非常相似。正因如此，新唯物主义继续改写着哲学史。如前所述，德勒兹提出的小传统现在已被广泛阅读和评论，但越来越多的过去的伟大思想家的作品也得到了应有的关注。因为我们没有必要将这一传统局限于一系列人物，甚至局限于《哲学史》所标注的某一特定 "类型 "的思想。在现代主义中工作的学者，如柏格森、怀特海、威廉-詹姆斯和埃德蒙-奥康纳等人，他们的研究成果都得到了应有的重视。

Husserl, all of whom had been pushed aside or reinterpreted by dualist thinking, are in need of serious materialist re-readings, which are in fact being carried out by an increasing number of scholars today. There is not even any reason to exclude Hegel from this list. For when he stated that “Action divides [spirit] into substance and consciousness of the substance” (Hegel [1807] 1977, paragraph 444), this not only comes very close to Spinoza’s solution to the mind-body problem with which this chapter began, it also allows us to rethink Marx’s (Hegel-inspired) materialism as a (non-dualist) neo-materialism. The richness of all these philosophies had by and large been suffering from dualism-dominated modernism and postmodernism. The way in which new materialism was generated in the previous paragraph alluded to the fact that duration not only came to be inserted into matter (ontology), but also and simultaneously into theory formation (epistemology). In other words, theory formation also entails the materialization of boundaries. Starting theory formation from movement alludes to cartography rather than classification, which is the third instantiation of transversality that we intend to highlight in this chapter.
他们都需要认真的唯物主义重读，而事实上，当今越来越多的学者正在这样做。我们甚至没有理由将黑格尔排除在外。因为当他指出 "行动把[精神]分为物质和物质的意识"（黑格尔[1807]1977 年，第 444 段）时，这不仅非常接近于本章开头提到的斯宾诺莎对心身问题的解决方案，而且还让我们能够把马克思（受黑格尔启发）的唯物主义重新视为（非二元论的）新唯物主义。所有这些哲学的丰富内涵大体上都受到了二元论主导的现代主义和后现代主义的影响。上一段中新唯物主义的产生方式暗指这样一个事实，即持续时间不仅被纳入物质（本体论），而且同时被纳入理论形成（认识论）。换言之，理论形成也包含边界的物质化。从运动出发的理论形成暗指制图学而非分类学，这是我们在本章中要强调的横向性的第三个实例。

In the introduction we claimed that new materialism not only enacts a thinking about theory formation that is other than classificatory (new materialism sets in motion a non-dualistic epistemic practice), but also that it enables us to understand the way in which theory formation used to be thought (following a territorialization pattern). We claimed that classification exemplifies the territorial and is fully dualistic, and throughout this chapter we have made clear how seemingly opposite epistemic tendencies or classes are in fact non-exhaustive oppositions. New materialism criticizes not only the use of “a discipline” or “a paradigm” as pre-determined, but is also critical, along the lines of the dismantling of binary oppositions that it enacts of the pre-determination of classifications of theoretical trends. Classifying epistemic tendencies that are supposedly prevalent in cultural theory implies working along territorial lines, which is a transcendentalizing gesture along with invoking sequential negation and a narrative of progress (i.e., it is dualist). This does not allow for the (un)folding of cultural theory—the matter-energy flows of theory formation, the non-linear coding practices, the cutting across matter and signification—to be captured. New materialism de-territorializes the ways in which cultural theory has been classified, and this process we call cartographical. We referred above to Colebrook, who questioned a conceptualization of “language” as “a fixed, determining, and inhuman grid imposed upon life.” She defined new materialism as allowing us to see not only matter, but also language as a “living force.” Questioning fixity thus opens up the possibility of thinking about theory formation in a non-linear, cartographical way.
我们在导言中声称，新唯物主义不仅提出了一种非分类性的理论形成思维（新唯物主义启动了一种非二元论的认识论实践），而且还使我们能够理解过去理论形成的思维方式（遵循一种地域化模式）。我们声称，分类体现了地域性，是完全二元论的，而在本章中，我们一直在阐明看似相反的认识论倾向或阶级实际上是如何非穷尽性地对立的。新唯物主义不仅批判使用 "学科 "或 "范式 "作为预设，而且按照其二元对立解构的思路，批判对理论趋势分类的预设。对所谓文化理论中普遍存在的认识论倾向进行分类，意味着按照地域划分工作，这是一种超验化的姿态，同时还援引了顺序否定和进步叙事（即二元论）。这就无法捕捉到文化理论的（非）折叠性--理论形成过程中的物质-能量流动、非线性编码实践、跨越物质和符号的切割。新唯物主义将文化理论的分类方式去地域化，我们称这一过程为制图。我们在上文提到了科尔布鲁克，她对将 "语言 "概念化为 "强加在生活之上的固定的、决定性的和非人性的网格 "提出了质疑。她将新唯物主义定义为不仅让我们看到物质，也让我们看到语言是一种 "有生命的力量"。因此，对固定性的质疑开启了以非线性、制图的方式思考理论形成的可能性。

Barad’s “Re(con)figuring Space, Time, and Matter” is useful for explaining the move away from the classificatory towards the cartographical. Earlier we mentioned Barad’s neologism “intra-action,” which allowed us to demonstrate that terms such as mind and matter, or sociology and new materialism, do not exist independently before they begin to inter-act. Barad (2001, 98) explains the machinery of intra-action as follows:
巴拉德的 "重新（构建）空间、时间和物质 "一文有助于解释从分类学转向制图学的过程。前面我们提到了巴拉德的新词 "内作用"，它让我们能够证明，诸如心灵与物质、社会学与新唯物主义等术语，在开始相互作用之前并不是独立存在的。巴拉德（2001，98）对 "内部作用 "机制解释如下：

[…] structures are to be understood as material-discursive phenomena that are iteratively (re)produced through ongoing material-discursive intra-actions. This machine is not a
[......]结构应被理解为物质-辨识现象，通过持续不断的物质-辨识内部互动而迭代（再）产生。这台机器不是

Euclidean device, nor is it merely a static instrument with a non-Euclidean geometry. It is a topological animal which mutates through a dynamics of intra-activity. Questions of connectivity, boundary formation, and exclusion (topological concerns) must supplement and inform concerns about positionality and location (too often figured in geometrical terms).
它既不是欧几里得装置，也不仅仅是具有非欧几里得几何形状的静态工具。它是一种拓扑动物，通过内部活动的动态变化而发生变化。关于连通性、边界形成和排斥的问题（拓扑学方面的问题）必须补充和充实关于位置性和位置的问题（通常以几何术语表示）。

Affirming onto-epistemology, Barad talks about mapping practices that draw boundaries, and she claims that the same objects/boundaries materialize in non-exhaustively opposite mapping practices (Euclidean space versus stasis in non-Euclidean space). The mapping practice, generating intra-action and generated through it, shifts both options and works along the following lines:
巴拉德肯定了 "到认识论"（ onto-epistemology ），谈到了划定边界的制图实践，她声称，同样的对象/边界在并非完全相反的制图实践中具体化（欧几里得空间与非欧几里得空间的静止）。制图实践产生内部行动，并通过内部行动产生制图实践，它改变了这两种选择，并按照以下思路开展工作：

What we need are genealogies of the material-discursive apparatuses of production which take account of the intraactive topological dynamics that reconfigure the spacetime manifold. In particular, it is important that they include an analysis of the connectivity of phenomena at different scales. […] The topological dynamics of space, time, and matter are an agential matter and as such require an ethics of knowing and being: Intra-actions have the potential to do more than participate in the constitution of the geometries of power, they open up possibilities for changes in its topology, and as such interventions in the manifold possibilities made available reconfigure both that will be possible. The space of possibilities does not represent a fixed event horizon within which the social location of knowers can be mapped, nor a homogenous fixed uniform container of choices. Rather the dynamics of the spacetime manifold is produced by agential interventions made possible in its very re(con)figuration (ibid., 103-4).
我们需要的是考虑到重构时空流形的内部拓扑动态的物质-辨识生产装置谱系。尤其重要的是，这些谱系应包括对不同尺度现象的关联性的分析。[......]空间、时间和物质的拓扑动态是一个行动问题，因此需要一种认识和存在的伦理学：内部行动不仅有可能参与权力几何结构的构成，它们还为拓扑结构的变化提供了可能性，因此，对所提供的多种可能性的干预将重新配置这两种可能性。可能性空间并不代表一个固定的事件视界，在这个事件视界中可以映射出认识者的社会位置，也不代表一个同质的、固定的、统一的选择容器。相反，时空流形的动态是由行动干预产生的，而行动干预又使时空流形的重新（构成）成为可能（同上，103-4）。

These genealogies, or “cartographies” in our vocabulary, are non-dualist approaches to theory formation that allow for absolute deterritorializing. Not primarily interested in representation, signification, and disciplinarity, new materialism is fascinated by affect, force, and movement as it travels in all directions. It searches not for the objectivity of things in themselves but for an objectivity of actualization and realization. It searches for how matter comes into agential realism, how matter is materialized in it. It is interested in speeds and slownesses, in how the event unfolds according to the inbetween, according to intra-action. New materialism argues that we know nothing of the (social) body until we know what it can do. It agrees with studying the multiplicity of modes that travel natureculture as the perpetual flow it has always already been.
这些谱系，或我们术语中的 "图谱"，是理论形成的非二元论方法，允许绝对的去地域化。新唯物主义主要关注的不是表象、符号和学科性，而是影响、力量和运动。它寻找的不是事物本身的客观性，而是现实化和实现的客观性。它探寻的是物质如何进入行动现实主义，物质如何在行动现实主义中具体化。新唯物主义关注速度与速度之间的关系，关注事件如何根据中间状态、根据内部行动而展开。新唯物主义认为，在我们知道（社会）身体能做什么之前，我们对它一无所知。新唯物主义赞同研究自然-文化作为永恒之流的多重模式。

In the next chapter we will take up the question of non-dualism, and we will discuss in a detailed manner how new materialism pushes dualism into non-dualism, thus allowing for a non-reductive take on matter and language.
下一章我们将讨论非二元论的问题，我们将详细讨论新唯物主义如何将二元论推向非二元论，从而对物质和语言采取非还原的态度。

Notes
说明

1. This mapping of new materialism overlaps considerably with the one produced by Myra J. Hird (2004, 2006), albeit that we (much like Barad in the interview earlier in this book) do not argue that new materialism has gotten off the ground in the natural sciences, and that there are varieties of feminist applications of new materialism. We will demonstrate in this book how new materialism traverses both the sciences and the humanities necessarily, and how it is immediately a feminism.
1.这一新唯物主义图谱与迈拉-J-赫尔德（Myra J. Hird）（2004，2006）的图谱有很大的重叠，尽管我们（与本书前文访谈中的巴拉德一样）并不认为新唯物主义在自然科学领域已经起步，而且新唯物主义在女性主义领域的应用也是多种多样的。我们将在本书中展示新唯物主义是如何同时跨越科学与人文学科的，以及它是如何立即成为一种女性主义的。

2. For this term see Barad 2007.
2.该术语见 Barad 2007。

3. We take this formulation from Grosz 2005.
3.这一表述来自 Grosz 2005。

4. For an interesting take on Benjamin’s take on historical materialism, see Tiedemann 2005, 157-63.
4.关于本雅明对历史唯物主义的有趣看法，见 Tiedemann 2005, 157-63。

5. See Dolphijn 2004, 24.
5.见 Dolphijn 2004, 24。

6. See van der Tuin 2009 for a conceptualization of “second-” and “third-wave feminist epistemologies.”
6.关于 "第二 "和 "第三波女权主义认识论 "的概念，见 van der Tuin 2009。

7. See van der Tuin 2008 and Davis 2009 for a critique of a biologically tainted argument about new materialism (namely Ahmed 2008). A comparison between Sara Ahmed’s work and Rahman and Witz will show that, whether sociologically or biologically biased, a disciplinary take on the new materialism is always already a reduction. New materialism proposes to study the biological and the sociological as intra-acting, thus as relating, rather than as two independent relata that might interact.
7.参见 van der Tuin 2008 和 Davis 2009 对新唯物主义中带有生物学色彩的论点的批判（即 Ahmed 2008）。将萨拉-艾哈迈德的著作与拉赫曼和维茨的著作进行比较，就会发现，无论是偏重社会学还是偏重生物学，对新唯物主义的学科性理解都已经是一种还原。新唯物主义建议将生物学和社会学作为内部行为进行研究，因此是相互关联的，而不是作为两个可能相互作用的独立关系。

8. Despite the most original and radical thoughts by which DeLanda has inspired so many scholars and scientists all over the world, a returning critique on his work has to be that the scholarly areas of his interest never even seem to connect to one another. Whether it concerns his revolutionary take on geology, biology, sociology, architecture, mathematics or historiography (which only seem to be some of the fields of which he has proven himself to be an expert), the disciplinary boundaries, contrary to the way Deleuze and a lot of other scholars working with Deleuze today deal with this, stay firmly in tact.
8.尽管迪兰达以其最具独创性的激进思想启发了全世界众多的学者和科学家，但对他的作品的一个反面批评是，他所关注的学术领域似乎从未相互连接过。无论是他对地质学、生物学、社会学、建筑学、数学还是历史学（这些似乎只是他已证明自己是专家的部分领域）的革命性看法，学科界限都与德勒兹和当今许多与德勒兹合作的其他学者的处理方式截然相反。

9. It is necessary, for an affirmative reading of Heidegger, that we do not consider his conceptualization of “being” as opposed to a (for instance Whiteheadian) becoming, as Shaviro (2009, ix) proposes. This is very possible if we commit ourselves to a different reading of the former’s texts. For when, in conceptualizing “being,” Heidegger ([1980] 1994, 66) states: “Hegel brings the absolute restlessness of absol-vence into this quiet ‘is’ of the general proposition,” he affirms that “being” equals this “true immediacy” which allows us to understand being as equal to metamorphosis or morphogenetic change. Beistegui’s “phenomenon” provides further proof for new materialism’s (as yet underresearched) relation with (new) phenomenology.
9.为了对海德格尔进行肯定性的解读，我们有必要不把他的 "存在 "概念化视为与（例如怀特海式的）"成为 "相对立，正如沙维罗（2009，ix）所提议的那样。如果我们致力于对前者的文本进行不同的解读，这是很有可能的。因为当海德格尔（[1980] 1994, 66）在概念化 "存在 "时指出黑格尔将 "绝对性"（absolute-vence）的 "绝对躁动"（absolute restlessness）带入了一般命题的 "是"（is）之中，他确认 "存在 "等同于这种 "真正的直接性"（true immediacy），这种直接性使我们能够将 "存在 "理解为等同于变形或形态变化。贝斯特吉的 "现象 "进一步证明了新唯物主义与（新）现象学之间的关系（尚未得到充分研究）。

10. Although it is undeniable that Butler features as the epitome of linguisticism in new materialist theory formation, new materialist theorists also try to read her affirmatively. Kirby’s Judith Butler: Live Theory from 2006 is an excellent example hereof, since one reads the attempt to push Butler beyond linguisticism, and thereby towards new materialism, between the lines on every page. Kirby (2006, 162, n. 2; original emphasis) states that “[…] contributions to the question of matter are compatible with Butler’s political project, even through they radically extend its terms.” Butler herself often feeds the dualism between new feminist materialism and linguis-ticist feminist theory. In her recent work Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? for instance, Butler (2009, 30) distances herself explicitly from Spinozist currents that are so influential, above all, in contemporary Australian feminist (materialist) theory (cf. Kirby 2006, 150 ff). Also when she (Butler) claims that the body reveals itself to us in and according to language (she uses the term “the interstices of language” ([1987] 1999, 193) it makes it easy to conclude that indeed this is a linguisticism at work.
10.不可否认，巴特勒是新唯物主义理论形成过程中语言主义的缩影，但新唯物主义理论家也试图对她进行肯定性解读。科比（Kirby）的《朱迪斯-巴特勒》（Judith Butler：2006年出版的《朱迪斯-巴特勒：活的理论》就是一个极好的例子，因为我们在每一页的字里行间都能读到将巴特勒推向语言主义之外，进而推向新唯物主义的尝试。柯比（Kirby）（2006, 162, n. 2；原文强调）指出："[......]对物质问题的贡献与巴特勒的政治计划是一致的，即使它们从根本上扩展了巴特勒的政治计划。巴特勒本人也经常助长新女性主义唯物主义与语言主义女性主义理论之间的二元论。例如，巴特勒（2009, 30）在其近期著作《战争框架：生命何时可悲？ 中明确表示与斯宾诺莎主义思潮保持距离，而斯宾诺莎主义思潮在当代澳大利亚女性主义（唯物主义）理论中影响深远（参见 Kirby 2006, 150 ff）。此外，当她（巴特勒）声称身体在语言中并根据语言向我们展示自身时（她使用了 "语言间隙 "一词（[1987] 1999, 193）），我们很容易得出结论，这的确是一种语言主义在起作用。

11. Instantiations are to be found in the work of among others Gallagher (2005) and Massumi (2002).
11.Gallagher (2005) 和 Massumi (2002) 等人的著作中都有实例。

Chapter 6
第 6 章

Pushing Dualism to an Extreme
将二元论推向极致

This chapter engages with the way in which several significant contemporary (Continental) philosophers establish a philosophy of difference in the form of a “new materialism.” It builds on work on new materialism’s specific philosophical impetus as well as carefully unpacking the methodology through which it is actualized. Though we will demonstrate that this double move concerning ontology on the one hand and methodology on the other is inherent in the new materialism, most contemporary commentaries focus on ontology only by positing the new philosophical stance. In other words, the materialism of new materialism is reflected upon, whereas a clear perspective on how new materialism is new remains underdeveloped. This chapter addresses this discrepancy by demonstrating how the new materialism produces a revolution in thought by traversing modernity’s dualisms (structured by a negative relation between terms), and by constituting a new conceptualization of difference (structured by an affirmative relation) along the way. This conceptualization of difference entails an ontological philosophical practice predicated on leaving behind all prioritizations (implicitly) involved in modern dualistic thinking, since a difference structured by affirmation does not work with predetermined relations (e.g. between mind and body) nor does it involve a counterhierarchy between terms (which would make the new materialism into a postmodern philosophical exercise).
本章探讨了几位重要的当代（大陆）哲学家以 "新唯物主义 "的形式建立差异哲学的方式。本章以新唯物主义的具体哲学动力为基础，并仔细解读了实现新唯物主义的方法论。尽管我们将证明这种关于本体论和方法论的双重举措是新唯物主义所固有的，但大多数当代评论只是通过提出新的哲学立场来关注本体论。换言之，新唯物主义的唯物主义得到了反思，而关于新唯物主义如何是新的这一清晰视角却仍未得到充分发展。本章通过论证新唯物主义如何穿越现代性的二元论（由术语之间的否定关系构成），并在此过程中构成新的差异概念化（由肯定关系构成），从而产生思想革命，来解决这一差异问题。这种差异概念化需要一种本体论哲学实践，其前提是抛开现代二元论思维中（隐含的）所有先验性，因为以肯定为结构的差异并不与预设关系（如身心之间的关系）相关，也不涉及术语之间的反等级制度（这会使新唯物主义成为一种后现代哲学实践）。

The “new” of new materialism (that is, the way in which its non-dualist philosophy is related to dualist philosophical stances) comes close to Jean-Francois Lyotard’s plea for a “rewriting” of “modernity.” In chapter 2 of his The Inhuman ([1988] 1991) Lyotard, who is famous for his thoughts on “post-modernism,” critiques this concept in particular because of its implicit notion of time. Postmodernism is modernism in the sense that the issues raised by modernism are also on the agenda of postmodernism, which is rather an after-modernism. Issues, as Lyotard continually stresses, that predominantly include the emancipation of humanity as a whole. Yet by appropriating the term post-modernism, his project automatically claims itself to be a linear consequence of modernism and (at the same time) refuses to think the here and now (or at least, it can only think the here and now as a consequence of a period in cultural history long gone). In rereading Aristotle’s Physics (Book IV), however, Lyotard agrees with the idea that what has already taken place (proteron) and what is about to take place (husteron) cannot be considered apart from the now. Both history and the future unfold from the now. Our age then should not be considered an age that follows from modernity, but rather an age that sets itself to a continuous rewriting of several of the (emancipatory) features that have been raised by modernity, thus actively creating a past (while projecting a future).
新唯物主义的 "新"（即它的非二元论哲学与二元论哲学立场的关联方式）与让-弗朗索瓦-利奥塔（Jean-Francois Lyotard）关于 "重写""现代性 "的呼吁相近。以 "后现代主义 "思想著称的利奥塔在其《非人类》（[1988] 1991 年）第二章中特别批评了这一概念，因为它隐含着时间概念。后现代主义就是现代主义，因为现代主义提出的问题也在后现代主义的议程上，而后现代主义是一种后现代主义。正如利奥塔不断强调的那样，这些问题主要包括全人类的解放。然而，通过挪用 "后现代主义 "一词，他的项目自动宣称自己是现代主义的线性结果，（同时）拒绝思考此时此地的问题（或者至少，它只能把此时此地看作是早已逝去的文化历史时期的结果）。然而，在重读亚里士多德的《物理学》（第四卷）时，利奥塔同意这样的观点，即已经发生的事情（proteron）和即将发生的事情（husteron）不能脱离现在来考虑。历史和未来都是从现在开始的。因此，我们的时代不应被视为现代性之后的时代，而应被视为一个不断改写现代性所带来的若干（解放）特征的时代，从而积极地创造过去（同时预测未来）。

That is why Lyotard ([1988] 1991, 24) suggests rephrasing his project as “rewriting modernity.”
正因如此，利奥塔（[1988] 1991, 24）建议将他的项目改写为 "重写现代性"。

The idea of rewriting modernity might also be considered a good description of what Gilles Deleuze (Lyotard’s close colleague at the University of Vincennes) proposed. Deleuze (e.g. [1966] 1991) too seems to accept the Aristotelian notion of time, which, in his books, is mainly at work in how Henri Bergson rewrote Aristotle (using the concepts of actuality and virtuality). Deleuze himself (like his interpreters) always claimed that he intended to rewrite the history of philosophy as a whole, or at least, his goal—especially in the early part of his career—was to question the History of Philosophy (with capital letters) as a whole, as its dominant lines of thought overcoded many ideas that he considered to be of the greatest value. Yet without prejudice to his timeless contributions to thought, there are good reasons to consider the work of Deleuze not so much a rewriting of the entire History of Philosophy, but rather as a rewriting of modernity.
重写现代性的观点也可以被认为是对吉尔-德勒兹（利奥塔在万森纳大学的亲密同事）所提出的观点的很好描述。德勒兹（例如 [1966] 1991）似乎也接受亚里士多德的时间概念，在他的著作中，这一概念主要体现在亨利-柏格森（Henri Bergson）如何重写亚里士多德（使用实存性和虚拟性概念）。德勒兹本人（就像他的诠释者一样）一直声称，他打算重写整个哲学史，或者至少，他的目标--尤其是在他职业生涯的早期--是质疑整个《哲学史》（大写字母），因为其主导思想脉络掩盖了许多他认为最有价值的思想。然而，在不损害他对思想的永恒贡献的前提下，我们有充分的理由认为德勒兹的著作与其说是对整个《哲学史》的重写，不如说是对现代性的重写。

For although authors like Lucretius, Duns Scotus, and the Stoics play an important role in his thinking, they have never been at the centre of a particular study, nor has Deleuze made much effort to shed new light on their ideas. He did, however, give philosophy and many other parts of academia important rewritings of philosophers such as Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche and Bergson, and writers like Proust and Kafka. These were authors who, in very different ways, all lived their lives in the so-called modern era. Renaming Deleuze’s project as “rewriting modernity” seems all the more agreeable, because its key feature, being the emancipation of humanity in its most radical form, seems precisely what Deleuze’s philosophy is all about. Gilles Deleuze’s (and Felix Guattari’s) rewriting of modernity was about the rewriting of a “minor tradition” in thought, as it was named (e.g. Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987), which is mainly based on the four “modernist” thinkers mentioned above. By rewriting their modernity, and not in the least place modernist ways of thinking emancipation, Deleuze did not create a post-modernism that continued (in any way) the traits that had given form to the modern era. Rather, in line with how Lyotard conceptualized it, Deleuze’s goal was to set this whole tradition in movement. We will show later that Deleuze’s take on the Other, for instance, cannot be captured by the post-modern countering of the One.
因为，尽管卢克莱修、邓斯-司各脱和斯多葛派等作家在他的思想中扮演着重要角色，但他们从未成为特定研究的中心，德勒兹也从未努力对他们的思想进行新的阐释。不过，他确实对斯宾诺莎、莱布尼兹、尼采和柏格森等哲学家，以及普鲁斯特和卡夫卡等作家进行了哲学和学术界许多其他方面的重要改写。这些作家以截然不同的方式都生活在所谓的现代。将德勒兹的计划重新命名为 "重写现代性 "似乎更令人赞同，因为其主要特征--以最激进的形式解放人性--似乎正是德勒兹哲学的目的所在。吉尔-德勒兹（和费利克斯-瓜塔里）对现代性的重写，是对以上述四位 "现代主义 "思想家为主体的 "小传统 "思想的重写（如德勒兹和瓜塔里 [1980] 1987）。德勒兹重写了他们的现代性，而且丝毫没有将现代主义的思维方式置于解放的地位，因此他所创造的后现代主义并没有（以任何方式）延续现代主义的特征。相反，根据利奥塔的概念，德勒兹的目标是让整个传统运动起来。我们稍后会指出，德勒兹对 "他者 "的看法，并不是后现代对 "一 "的反驳所能概括的。

In Lyotard’s wake, the perpetual rewriting of modernity is something also taken very seriously by those inspired by new materialist thought today, as already seen in the interviews in Part One of this book and subsequently noted at the end of the previous chapter. The work of this rapidly growing group of contemporary scholars rewrites modernism, or bits of modernism, opening this (philosophical) tradition up to the arts and the sciences, actualizing and realizing it in the here and now. Some authors, like Braidotti and DeLanda, are very much interested in re-reading Deleuze and his minor tradition, though it should be mentioned that both of them are also using other fertile (modern) grounds. Braidotti has always shown an interest in psychoanalysis (Freudian psychoanalysis in particular). DeLanda, on the other hand, though always viewed as a committed Deleuzian, makes at least as much use of the work of Fernand Braudel, Mario Bunge, and Max Weber. Others, like Karen Barad and Quentin Meillassoux, have come to this path through still other routes. Barad (2007), emerging from the field of theoretical physics, is mostly inspired by the work of Niels Bohr. Quentin Meillassoux ([2006] 2008) sets himself to rewriting the dominant stream in the modernist project as a whole (which he labels “correlationalist”), which brings him back most of all to an affirmative re-reading of David Hume.
在利奥塔之后，当今受新唯物主义思想启发的人们也非常认真地对待对现代性的永久重写，这一点在本书第一部分的访谈中已经有所体现，随后在上一章的末尾也有所提及。这群迅速壮大的当代学者的作品重写了现代主义或现代主义的片段，将这个（哲学）传统向艺术和科学开放，在此时此地将其现实化和实现。有些作者，如布赖多蒂和迪兰达，对重读德勒兹及其次要传统非常感兴趣，但值得一提的是，他们两人也在利用其他肥沃的（现代）土壤。Braidotti 一直对精神分析（尤其是弗洛伊德的精神分析）感兴趣。另一方面，迪兰达虽然一直被视为坚定的德勒兹主义者，但至少同样利用了费尔南-布劳德尔、马里奥-邦格和马克斯-韦伯的著作。还有一些人，如卡伦-巴拉德（Karen Barad）和昆汀-梅拉苏（Quentin Meillassoux），则是通过其他途径走上这条道路的。巴拉德（2007 年）来自理论物理学领域，其灵感主要来自尼尔斯-玻尔的著作。昆廷-梅拉苏（[2006] 2008 年）则致力于重写整个现代主义项目中的主流（他称之为 "关联主义"），这使他回到了对大卫-休谟的肯定性重读。

All of these authors are in touch with a material spirit whose imperceptible forces they perform in their writing in diverse ways. Yet their common interest in doing this affirmatively, in and through a re-reading of modernity, demands more refinement. For instance, in Nomadic Subjects Braidotti (1994, 171), in a Lyotardian vein and in reference to Deleuze’s minor tradition, states that we ought to “work through” the notion of woman: “Like the gradual peeling off of old skins, the achievement of change has to be earned by careful working through; it is the metabolic consumption of the old that can engender the new.” Expanding their interest in “naturecultures” (as Donna Haraway [2003] puts it) or in “collectives” (which is a concept of Bruno Latour ([1991] 1993)), the way in which they rewrite modernity’s processes is by rewriting the dualisms that are so central to modern thought. Latour for instance has stated that he is “trying the tricky move of unveiling the modern Constitution without resorting to the modern type of debunking” due to the fact that his project is to affirm “that the [modern] Constitution, if it is to be effective, has to be aware of what it allows” (Latour [1991] 1993, 43). This kind of argumentation can be summarized, in the words of Bergson ([1896] 2004, 236), as a movement of “push[ing] dualism to an extreme.” In this chapter we discuss the way in which a new materialism comes to be constituted precisely by this movement, which Deleuze ([1956/2002] 2004, 32) in discussing Bergson has typified as methodological (it touches upon ways of arguing, ways of doing philosophy) as well as ontological (it is interested in a material spirit, that is, in what Brian Massumi [2002, 66] calls “ontologically prior”). It is the type of movement Deleuze himself has adopted as his own methodology, especially in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, the diptych written together with Guattari.
所有这些作家都与物质精神有着千丝万缕的联系，他们以不同的方式在自己的作品中表现出物质精神难以察觉的力量。然而，他们共同的兴趣是在重新解读现代性的过程中并通过重新解读现代性来肯定地做到这一点，这就需要更多的改进。例如，在《游牧主体》（Nomadic Subjects Braidotti, 1994, 171）一书中，Braidotti 以利奥塔式的视角，参照德勒兹的次要传统，指出我们应该 "通过 "女性的概念："就像逐渐剥掉旧皮一样，变革的成就必须通过精心的工作才能获得；正是对旧事物的新陈代谢消耗才能产生新事物"。扩大他们对 "自然文化"（如唐娜-哈拉维[2003]所说）或 "集体"（布鲁诺-拉图尔（[1991] 1993 年）的概念）的兴趣，他们重写现代性进程的方式是重写现代思想中至关重要的二元论。例如，拉图尔曾说过，他 "正在尝试揭开现代宪法的神秘面纱，而不诉诸现代式的揭穿"，因为他的计划是要确认"[现代]宪法若要有效，就必须意识到它允许什么"（Latour [1991] 1993, 43）。用柏格森（[1896] 2004, 236）的话来说，这种论证可以概括为 "将二元论推向极端 "的运动。德勒兹（Deleuze）（[1956/2002] 2004, 32）在讨论柏格森时将其归类为方法论（它涉及论证方式、哲学实践方式）和本体论（它对物质精神感兴趣，即布赖恩-马苏米（Brian Massumi）[2002, 66]所说的 "本体论先验"）。 德勒兹本人也将这种运动作为自己的方法论，尤其是在与瓜塔里共同创作的双联作品《资本主义与精神分裂症》中。
In their Anti-Oedipus ([1972] 1983), they already claimed to perform what they called a “schizoanalysis” (a materialist philosophical practice interested in conceptualizing sexuality beyond the male/female dualism and even beyond human sexuality), and in breaking through the Oedipal plot that overcodes the ways in which we think (through psychoanalysis), and oftentimes individually and collectively experience, desire. Far from respecting Cartesian dualisms, this style of thinking is much more interested in rethinking Spinoza’s monist solution by means of these oppositions and what they can do, as Eugene Holland argues (1999, 111-2). But it was in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 20) that they came closest to capturing their project in words, when they state as follows: “We invoke one dualism only to challenge another. We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges all models.” Hence, the methodology and ontology proposed in rewriting modernity in no way “follows from” modernity. By pushing dualism to an extreme, “difference is pushed to the limit” (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 45). Consequently, by radically rewriting the dualisms of modernity, new materialism precisely becomes a philosophy of difference that opens up for a “new” ontology, or rather, a “new” ontogenesis.
在他们的《反俄狄浦斯》（[1972] 1983）中，他们已经声称要进行所谓的 "精神分裂"（一种唯物主义哲学实践，旨在超越男女二元论，甚至超越人类性欲，将性概念化），并突破俄狄浦斯情节，这种情节笼罩着我们思考（通过精神分析）的方式，以及很多时候个人和集体体验欲望的方式。正如尤金-霍兰（Eugene Holland）所言（1999, 111-2），这种思维方式远非尊重笛卡尔的二元论，而是更有兴趣通过这些对立面及其所能起到的作用来重新思考斯宾诺莎的一元论解决方案。但正是在《千高原》（德勒兹和瓜塔里 [1980] 1987, 20）一书中，他们最接近于用语言表达他们的计划，他们是这样说的："我们只援引一种二元论："我们引用一种二元论只是为了挑战另一种二元论。我们采用一种二元对立的模式，只是为了达到一种挑战所有模式的过程"。因此，重写现代性所提出的方法论和本体论绝不 "源于 "现代性。通过将二元论推向极端，"差异被推向极限"（德勒兹 [1968] 1994, 45）。因此，通过彻底改写现代性的二元论，新唯物主义恰恰成为一种差异哲学，为 "新 "本体论，或者说，为 "新 "本体生成开辟了道路。

In the previous chapter we suggested that new materialism is a transversal cultural theory that qualitatively shifts the dualist gesture of prioritizing mind over matter, soul over body, and culture over nature that can be found in modernist as well as post-modernist cultural theories. We thus “invoke[d] the same testimony” (Bergson [1896] 2004, 236) against two seemingly opposite cultural theories. Despite the fact that such prioritization appears commonsensical even today in prominent parts of the sciences and the humanities, its reliance on dualism is by no means beyond question. The outcomes of the prioritization exercises are generally presented as True in its most totalizing meaning, whereas minor traditions throughout the centuries have opposed them in convincing ways. In other words: a new materialism is constituted by demonstrating how the canonized relations between the aforementioned terms are in fact the outcomes of “power/knowledge” according to which Truth is an instantiation of a politics or regime, as Michel Foucault (1980) would have it. In this chapter we will take our previous arguments a step further by focusing on the methodological and ontological issues surrounding the present-day rise of non-dualist thought. We will begin by considering what a radical rewriting of modernity in the case of new materialism entails. How do scholars such as Braidotti, DeLanda, Barad, and Meillassoux produce their work?
在上一章中，我们提出，新唯物主义是一种横向的文化理论，它从质上改变了现代主义和后现代主义文化理论中的二元论姿态，即思想优先于物质、灵魂优先于肉体、文化优先于自然。因此，我们 "援引了相同的证词"（柏格森 [1896] 2004, 236）来反对两种看似相反的文化理论。尽管这种优先排序即使在今天的科学和人文学科的重要领域也显得合乎常理，但它对二元论的依赖却绝非毫无疑问。排定优先顺序的结果一般都被说成是最全面意义上的 "真"，而几个世纪以来的次要传统则以令人信服的方式反对它们。换句话说：新唯物主义的构成方式是证明上述术语之间的规范化关系实际上是 "权力/知识 "的结果，根据 "权力/知识"，正如米歇尔-福柯（Michel Foucault，1980 年）所说，"真理 "是政治或制度的具体化。在本章中，我们将进一步探讨前述论点，重点关注当今非二元论思想兴起的方法论和本体论问题。首先，我们将考虑新唯物主义对现代性的彻底改写意味着什么。布赖多蒂、德兰达、巴拉德和梅拉苏等学者是如何完成他们的工作的？

New Materialism’s Radical Rewriting of Modernity
新唯物主义对现代性的激进重写

Let us agree on the point that a cultural theory can only be truly distinctive and original if its establishment does not claim to be the next step in a discussion that is structured according to the dominant lines of sequential negation and the narrative of progress; that is, if its installment does not follow the classificatory lines that started dominating thought within modernism as it has branched off into so many different parts of life. Similarly, opposing this narrative is also not an option. Lyotard has already taught us that his increasing concern with the idea of postmodernism also had to do with the prefix “post-,” and the way this opposed yet (re)created the narratives of modernity. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, it was Michel Serres who put the latter into a general theory, when he stated: “An idea opposed to another idea is always the same idea, albeit affected by the negative sign. The more you oppose one another, the more you remain in the same framework of thought” (Serres with Latour 1995, 81).
让我们同意这样的观点：一种文化理论只有在其建立过程中不宣称自己是按照顺序否定和进步叙事的主导路线所组织的讨论的下一步，也就是说，如果它的安装不遵循现代主义内部开始主导思想的分类路线，因为现代主义已经分支到生活的许多不同部分，那么它才能真正具有独特性和原创性。同样，反对这种叙事也不是一种选择。利奥塔已经告诉我们，他对后现代主义思想的日益关注也与 "后 "这个前缀有关，以及这种反对又（重新）创造现代性叙事的方式。上一章已经提到，是米歇尔-塞雷斯（Michel Serres）将 "后 "纳入了一般理论：他说："与另一种观念相对立的观念始终是同一种观念，只是受到了否定符号的影响。越是相互对立，越是保持在同一思想框架内"（Serres with Latour 1995, 81）。

Therefore, not just the idea of postmodernism but actually all thought that starts either with classification or with the repudiation of it, does not radically rewrite, cannot set forth a revolution in thought. Elizabeth Grosz (2005, 165), who follows Luce Irigaray’s investment in thinking through (feminist) revolutions in thought, states most clearly that it is only in a radical rewriting that revolutions in thought can come into being. After all, such movement
因此，不只是后现代主义思想，实际上所有从分类或否定分类开始的思想，如果没有彻底的重写，就不可能提出思想革命。伊丽莎白-格罗斯（Elizabeth Grosz）（2005, 165）追随卢斯-伊里格拉伊（Luce Irigaray）通过（女权主义）思想革命进行思考的投资，她最明确地指出，只有在激进的重写中才能产生思想革命。毕竟，这种运动
is not a revolution on any known model, for it cannot be the overthrow of all previous thought, the radical disconnection from the concepts and language of the past: a revolution in thought can only use the language and the concepts that presently exist or have already existed, and can only produce itself against the background and history of the present.
它不是任何已知模式下的革命，因为它不可能推翻以往所有的思想，不可能从根本上脱离过去的概念和语言：思想革命只能使用当前存在或已经存在的语言和概念，只能在当前的背景和历史中产生自己。

Earlier, Grosz (2000) had already explained that the seemingly constraining model, or framework of thought, or concept allows in fact for the indeterminacy of a revolution in thought.1 Wishing to anticipate future thoughts and practices by negating the past, one positions oneself in a relation to past thoughts and practices that is solely constraining. In such a situation, the past undergoes nothing but re-confirmation in the present, albeit that progress is assumed to be made. This, we want to argue, is the structuring principle of classificatory modes of thinking, which are consequently prevented from a radical rewriting of thought, from being truly revolutionary.
早些时候，格罗斯（2000）已经解释过，看似约束性的模式、思想框架或概念，实际上允许思想革命的不确定性。 1 一个人希望通过否定过去来预见未来的思想和实践，他将自己置于一种与过去的思想和实践的关系之中，而这种关系仅仅是约束性的。在这种情况下，过去只能在现在得到重新确认，尽管假定已经取得了进展。我们要论证的是，这就是分类思维模式的结构性原则，这种思维模式因此而无法对思想进行彻底的改写，无法实现真正的革命。

Our goal in this chapter should thus be to find out in what way the revolutionary constitution of new materialist cultural theory rewrites modernity as a present according to which a past and future unfold. In order to get there we shall first demonstrate by what means the new materialist breakdown of dualism, of the structuring principle of modernist cultural theories, stirs a revolution in thought. New materialist cultural theorists do not involve themselves with ongoing repetitive discussions in the modernist humanities (cf. Serres with Latour 1995, 86). New materialism helps us analyze and (therefore) shift the structuring principles of these discussions by showing how classificatory negation involves a specific relationality, which is reductive. Later we will demonstrate how new materialist cultural theories are not relational in a negative, reductive manner, but rather are structured along the lines of an affirmative intensity, which in the end turns into a nondualism, a monist philosophy of difference, or more precisely, immanence. Invoking one dualism in order to challenge another allows new materialism to rewrite modernity as an emancipation.
因此，我们在本章中的目标应该是找出新唯物主义文化理论的革命性构成是以何种方式将现代性改写为过去和未来据以展开的现在的。为了达到这一目的，我们首先要证明新唯物主义对二元论的瓦解，即对现代主义文化理论结构原则的瓦解，是通过何种方式引发思想革命的。新唯物主义文化理论家并不参与现代主义人文学科正在进行的重复性讨论（参见 Serres 和 Latour 1995, 86）。新唯物主义帮助我们分析并（因此）改变了这些讨论的结构性原则，向我们展示了分类的否定如何涉及一种特定的关系性，而这种关系性是还原性的。稍后，我们将说明新唯物主义文化理论如何不是以一种否定的、还原的方式来处理关系，而是以一种肯定的强度来构建的，这种肯定的强度最终变成了一种非二元论，一种关于差异的一元论哲学，或者更准确地说，是关于内在性的哲学。用一种二元论来挑战另一种二元论，使新唯物主义得以将现代性改写为一种解放。

Dualism: A Negation is a Relation Structured by Negativity
二元论：否定是一种由否定性构成的关系

Bergson ([1869] 2004, 297) argued that “[t]he difficulties of ordinary dualism come, not from the distinction of the two terms, but from the impossibility of seeing how the one is grafted upon the other.” Bergson’s “ordinary dualism” indicates the structuring principle of Serres’ repetitive discussions, and Grosz’s (failed) overthrow of previous thought. Even in our time cultural theory is structured predominantly according to this ordinary dualism. It continues—implicitly or explicitly—the modernist framework of thought, accepting and thinking along the dominant lines of dualist distinctions of mind and matter, soul and body, and culture and nature. But although Bergson demonstrated that ordinary dualism is inherently problematic, the act of making distinctions between terms is not. The treatment the distinguished terms receive is what makes dominant cultural theory, then as now, questionable. Bergson implies that as long as we are clear about the fact that one term of a dichotomy is “grafted upon” the other, we will not fall into the trap of setting up a discussion that leads us away from serious thought. This also applies to how contemporary thought, often through denial, is grafted upon modernist cultural theory—such as through Barad’s term “representationalism,” as will be discussed below.
柏格森（[1869] 2004, 297）认为，"普通二元论的困难不是来自这两个术语的区别，而是来自不可能看到一个术语是如何嫁接到另一个术语之上的"。柏格森的 "普通二元论 "指出了塞雷斯反复讨论的结构原则，以及格罗斯对以往思想的推翻（失败）。即使在我们这个时代，文化理论也主要是根据这种普通的二元论来构建的。它或明或暗地延续着现代主义的思想框架，接受并沿着心与物、灵魂与肉体、文化与自然的二元区分的主流思路进行思考。不过，尽管柏格森证明了普通的二元论本质上是有问题的，但对术语进行区分的行为却没有问题。区别术语的处理方式使主流文化理论在当时和现在都受到了质疑。柏格森的意思是，只要我们清楚二分法中的一个术语是 "嫁接 "在另一个术语之上的，我们就不会落入陷阱，陷入导致我们远离严肃思考的讨论。这也适用于当代思想如何（通常是通过否认）嫁接到现代主义文化理论之上--比如巴拉德的 "再现主义 "一词，下文将对此进行讨论。

Let us provide an example that proves our point. Consider a big name in contemporary sociology and philosophy: Jean Baudrillard. Baudrillard was no doubt part of a very talented generation of French scholars that also included Lyotard and Deleuze. But in contrast with the latter two, Baudrillard was from the outset very much accepted in mainstream cultural theory. He is the prototype of those post-modernist thinkers from whom Lyotard implicitly wanted to distance himself, insofar as Baudrillard wholeheartedly accepts the modernist dualisms and continues their arguments. There is no other way to think, for instance, of Baudrillard’s theory of simulacra (e.g. Baudrillard [1981] 1995, [1995] 1996) as anything other than a continuation of modernity, as a general acceptance of its theories, and a refusal actually to rewrite the dualisms involved. Discussing for example the imaginary of Disneyland, he concluded that “[i]t is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology) but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle”(Baudrillard [1981] 1995, 12-3), he refuses to make any analysis whatsoever of the duality of real vs. representational. Accepting the difference (even while twisting it around) is by no means the way in which new materialism is always already questioning these principles and rewriting them from the start.
让我们举一个例子来证明我们的观点。请看当代社会学和哲学界的一位大名鼎鼎的人物：让-鲍德里亚（Jean Baudrillard）：让-鲍德里亚。毫无疑问，鲍德里亚是才华横溢的一代法国学者中的一员，这一代学者还包括利奥塔（Lyotard）和德勒兹（Deleuze）。但与后两者相比，鲍德里亚从一开始就被主流文化理论所接受。波德里亚全心全意地接受了现代主义的二元论，并延续了它们的论点，因此，他是那些后现代主义思想家的原型，而利奥塔则暗中想与波德里亚保持距离。举例来说，鲍德里亚的 "拟像 "理论（如鲍德里亚 [1981] 1995，[1995] 1996）是现代性的延续，是对现代性理论的普遍接受，是对二元对立的拒绝，除此之外别无他法。例如，在讨论迪斯尼乐园的想象时，他得出结论："这不再是一个虚假再现现实（意识形态）的问题，而是一个掩盖现实不再真实这一事实，从而拯救现实原则的问题"（鲍德里亚 [1981] 1995, 12-3），他拒绝对现实与再现的二元性进行任何分析。接受这种差异（即使是扭曲这种差异）绝不是新唯物主义从一开始就一直在质疑这些原则并改写它们的方式。

Thus the time has come to draw a formal difference between this ordinary dualism, as Bergson analyzes it, and the radical writing of modernist dualisms as proposed by Lyotard and Deleuze, but also by scholars such as Latour. The difference lies not in the fact that this latter group suggests a dualism that begins with the act of relating whereas ordinary dualism denies this relational nature. Rather, both groups start from this relating (insofar as it exists outside of its terms). Yet ordinary dualism is undergirded by a negative relationality, and it is this particular type of relationality that is not subscribed to by Lyotard, Deleuze, or Latour (or even Bergson, for that matter). Let us continue therefore by focusing more specifically upon the set-up of argumentations about the deficiency of ordinary dualism. We have to return once more to Bergson, whose work provides insight into the ways in which the concrete cases of ordinary dualism that structure cultural theory (the humanities) as well as scientism and common sense can be overcome. Yet his work also shows how nondualist philosophy is always “onto-epistemological” (Barad’s term)—that is, how philosophy involves the way in which “concept and creation are related to each other” (Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994, 11). This refers back to Deleuze’s remark about the work of Bergson as both methodological and ontological: Bergson not only provides insight into ordinary dualism as the structuring principle of non-revolutionary thought, but also he re-writes modernism so as to provide a non-dualist ontology structured by the “unity of the thing and the concept” (Deleuze [1956/2002] 2004, 33).
因此，现在是时候在柏格森所分析的这种普通二元论与利奥塔和德勒兹以及拉图尔等学者所提出的现代主义二元论的激进写作之间划清形式上的区别了。二者的区别并不在于后一派提出的二元论始于关系行为，而普通二元论否认这种关系性质。相反，两派都从这种关系（只要它存在于其术语之外）出发。然而，普通二元论的基础是一种消极的关系性，而正是这种特殊的关系性并不为利奥塔、德勒兹或拉图尔（甚至柏格森）所认同。因此，让我们继续更具体地关注关于普通二元论缺陷的论证设置。我们不得不再次回到柏格森那里，他的著作为我们提供了如何克服构成文化理论（人文学科）以及科学主义和常识的普通二元论的具体方法。然而，柏格森的著作也说明了非二元论哲学如何始终是 "to-epistemological"（巴拉德的术语）--即哲学如何涉及 "概念与创造相互关联 "的方式（德勒兹和瓜塔里 [1991] 1994, 11）。这又回到了德勒兹关于柏格森作品既是方法论的又是本体论的评论：柏格森不仅洞察了作为非革命思想结构原则的普通二元论，而且他还重写了现代主义，从而提供了一种由 "事物与概念的统一"（Deleuze [1956/2002] 2004, 33）所结构的非二元论本体论。

When Bergson introduces the concept of ordinary dualism in Matter and Memory, he works on the problem of the union of body and soul. The centrality of this union comes to the fore, according to Bergson ([1896] 2004, 235), on the basis of a distinction made between matter and spirit. This ontological distinction, and more importantly the specific way in which it is treated, constitutes Bergson’s analysis as exemplary of the (necessary) circumvention of ordinary dualism. Moreover, a distinction is still being made between terms:
当柏格森在《物质与记忆》中引入普通二元论的概念时，他研究的是身体与灵魂的结合问题。柏格森认为（[1896] 2004, 235），这种结合的中心性是在物质与精神的区分基础上凸显出来的。这种本体论上的区分，更重要的是处理这种区分的具体方式，构成了柏格森分析的典范，是对普通二元论的（必要）规避。此外，术语之间仍然存在区别：

We maintain, as against materialism, that perception overflows the cerebral state; but we have endeavoured to establish, as against idealism, that matter goes in every direction beyond our representation of it […] And against these two doctrines we invoke the same testimony, that of consciousness, which shows us our body as one image among others and our understanding as a certain faculty of dissociating, of distinguishing, of opposing logically, but not of creating or of constructing. Thus, […] it would seem that, after having exacerbated the conflicts raised by ordinary dualism, we have closed all the avenues of escape […] But, just because we have pushed dualism to an extreme, our analysis has perhaps dissociated its contradictory elements (ibid., 236; cf. Balibar [1989] 1998, 106 on Spinoza).
我们反对唯物主义，认为知觉超越了大脑状态；但我们反对唯心主义，认为物质的各个方向都超越了我们对它的表象[......]针对这两种学说，我们援引了同样的证据，即意识的证据，它向我们表明，我们的身体是其他形象中的一个形象，我们的理解力是某种解离、区分和逻辑对立的能力，但不是创造或建构的能力。因此，[......]在加剧了普通二元论所引发的冲突之后，我们似乎已经关闭了所有逃避的途径[......]但是，正因为我们将二元论推向了极端，我们的分析或许已经将其矛盾的元素分离开来（同上，236；参见 Balibar [1989] 1998, 106 on Spinoza）。

This lengthy quotation provides insight into the way in which the terms that are divided up by ordinary dualism are grafted upon one another, but also in the way in which ontology and methodology/epistemology are grafted onto one another. The two levels of analysis (for lack of a better term) indicated here are intrinsically intertwined. We want to underline that “all the avenues of escape” do exactly not end up being “closed,” because of the complexity with which Bergson shifts ordinary dualism and moves into the direction of thinking differently, of thinking a non-dualist ontology. Let us explain this complex move by seeking recourse to Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy?, this time read through the work of Barad.
这段冗长的引文不仅让我们了解到普通二元论所划分的术语相互嫁接的方式，也让我们了解到本体论与方法论/认识论相互嫁接的方式。这里指出的两个分析层次（由于缺乏更好的术语）在本质上是相互交织的。我们要强调的是，"所有的出路 "最终都没有被 "关闭"，因为柏格森改变了普通的二元论，转向了不同的思维方式，转向了非二元论本体论的思维方式，这一点非常复杂。让我们借助德勒兹和瓜塔里的《哲学是什么》来解释这一复杂的举动，这一次是通过巴拉德的作品来解读。

Deleuze and Guattari ([1991] 1994, 11) state that “the question of philosophy is the singular point where concept and creation are related to each other.” Not defining the nature of philosophy as such would seduce one into uncritically affirming commonsensical and scientistic representationalism, found also in the humanities, which is predicated upon an ordinary dualism in a two-leveled manner. Barad (though without referring to Deleuze and Guattari) elaborates upon precisely this point. In “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter” she states:
德勒兹和瓜塔里（[1991] 1994, 11）指出，"哲学问题是概念与创造相互关联的独特点"。如果不界定哲学的本质，就会诱使人们不加批判地肯定常识主义和科学主义的表象主义，而这种表象主义也存在于人文学科中，它是以普通的二元论为前提的，具有两重性。巴拉德（虽然没有提到德勒兹和瓜塔里）恰恰阐述了这一点。在《后人文主义的表演性：Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter "一文中，她指出

The idea that beings exist as individuals with inherent attributes, anterior to their representation, is a metaphysical presupposition that underlies the belief in political, linguistic, and epistemological forms of representationalism. […] representationalism is the belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they purport to represent […] (Barad 2003, 804).
众生作为具有先于其表象的固有属性的个体而存在，这种观点是一种形而上学的预设，是政治、语言和认识论形式的表象主义信念的基础。[......]表象主义相信表象与表象所要表征的事物之间存在本体论上的区别[......]（Barad 2003, 804）。

In other words: what she calls for is a “performative understanding, which shifts the focus from linguistic representations to discursive practices” (ibid., 807).2 We have alluded to these practices already, when we explained how philosophy both addresses and explains the structuring principles of the dominant, classificatory lines of thought. The work of Barad can explain that what Bergson ([1896] 2004, 260) calls thinking through scientism, or common sense, or the one pole of any dualism (in the humanities too) “in its remotest aspirations,” one affirms an onto-epistemology. According to onto-epistemologies, “[w]e do not obtain knowledge by standing outside of the world; we know because “we” are of the world. We are part of the world in its differential becoming” (Barad 2003, 829; original emphasis). Onto-epistemology demonstrates how philosophers do philosophy, which following Deleuze and Guattari ([1991] 1994, 11) is a discursive practice according to which
换句话说：她所要求的是一种 "表演性的理解，将重点从语言表述转移到话语实践"（同上，807）。 2 我们在解释哲学如何处理和解释占主导地位的分类思想的结构原则时，已经提到了这些实践。巴拉德的著作可以解释柏格森（[1896] 2004, 260）所说的通过科学主义或常识，或任何二元论（在人文学科中也是如此）的一极 "在其最遥远的愿望中 "进行的思考，人们肯定了一种 "到认识论"（onto-epistemology）。根据本位认识论，"我们不是站在世界之外获得知识的；我们之所以知道，是因为'我们'是世界的一部分。我们是世界差异化的一部分"（Barad 2003, 829；原文强调）。本体认识论展示了哲学家是如何进行哲学研究的，根据德勒兹和瓜塔里（[1991] 1994, 11）的说法，哲学是一种话语实践，根据这种实践
the concept is not given, it is created; it is to be created. It is not formed but posits itself in itself—it is a self-positing […] The concept posits itself to the same extent that it is created. What depends on a free creative activity is also that which, independently and necessarily, posits itself in itself: the most subjective will be the most objective.
概念不是给定的，它是被创造的；它将被创造。它不是被形成的，而是在自身中摆好姿势的--它是一种自我定位[......]概念摆好姿势的程度与它被创造的程度相同。依赖于自由创造活动的东西，也是独立地、必然地在自身中存在的东西：最主观的东西也将是最客观的东西。

Philosophers do philosophy in their work with concepts, when studying the concepts that arise in a specific practice and which are related to concepts that are at work in other practices with which they interfere. Elsewhere, Deleuze clearly states that when it comes to what philosophy does, he will not accept that it is any form of representational dualism structured by negative relationality. The created concepts, he claims, are no less “practical, effective or existent” (Deleuze [1985] 2000, 280) than the practices in which they happen. Thus “philosophical theory is itself a practice just as much as its object. It is no more abstract than its object” (ibid.). Doing philosophy, then, means engaging in this creation of concepts, and not relying on “referential signs” (our term).3 The latter is a representationalism, implying a negative relationality that does not do justice to matter as “the aggregate of images” and perception of matter as “these same images referred to the eventual action of one particular image, my body” (Bergson [1986] 2004, 8; original emphasis).
哲学家在研究概念的过程中，在研究特定实践中产生的概念，以及这些概念与其他实践中起作用的概念之间的关系时，也是在研究概念。在其他地方，德勒兹明确指出，当谈到哲学是做什么的时候，他不会接受哲学是任何形式的由消极关系性所构建的表象二元论。他认为，被创造出来的概念的 "实践性、有效性或存在性"（德勒兹 [1985] 2000, 280）并不亚于它们发生的实践。因此，"哲学理论本身就是一种实践，就像它的对象一样。它并不比它的对象更抽象"（同上）。因此，从事哲学意味着参与概念的创造，而不是依赖于 "指称符号"（我们的术语）。 3 后者是一种表象主义，意味着一种消极的关系性，不能将物质视为 "图像的集合体"，也不能将对物质的感知视为 "这些相同的图像指涉到一个特定图像--我的身体--的最终行动"（柏格森[1986] 2004, 8；原文强调）。

When Bergson ([1896] 2004, 243) invokes “consciousness” against materialism and idealism, and against empiricism and dogmatism, he claims that this concept can show that “a third course lay open,” which allows him to escape from the representationalist traps affirmed in any dualist philosophy. His conceptualization of consciousness, which shows in this case how the four epistemic classes are all predicated on ordinary dualism on the two levels of analysis simultaneously, breaks through ordinary dualisms by positing a continuity against discontinuity, that is, a “pure duration” (ibid., 243). Such a concept cuts across metaphysical classes, that is, it creates a third, and revolutionary course:
当柏格森（[1896] 2004, 243）援引 "意识 "来反对唯物主义和唯心主义，反对经验主义和教条主义时，他声称这一概念能够表明 "第三条道路是敞开的"，这使他能够摆脱任何二元论哲学所肯定的表象主义陷阱。他对意识的概念化，在这种情况下表明了四种认识论等级是如何在两个分析层面上同时以普通的二元论为前提的，他通过提出一种对抗非连续性的连续性，即 "纯粹的持续时间"（同上，243），突破了普通的二元论。这种概念跨越了形而上学的阶级，也就是说，它创造了第三条革命性的道路：

Homogenous space and homogenous time are then neither properties of things [materialism, realism] nor essential conditions of our faculty of knowing them [idealism, dogmatism]: they express, in an abstract form, the double work of solidification and of division which we effect on the moving continuity of the real in order to obtain there a fulcrum for our action, in order to fix within it starting-points for our operation, in short, to introduce into it real changes. They are the diagrammatic design of our eventual action upon matter (ibid., 280).
因此，同质空间和同质时间既不是事物的属性[唯物主义、现实主义]，也不是我们认识事物的能力的基本条件[唯心主义、教条主义]：它们以抽象的形式表达了我们在现实的运动连续性上进行的凝固和分裂的双重工作，以便在那里获得我们行动的支点，以便在其中固定我们行动的起点，简而言之，就是在其中引入真正的变化。它们是我们对物质的最终行动的图解设计（同上，280）。

The third course, then, opens the way for “the true power of creation” (ibid., 236), which we already encountered in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, and will find in the work of de Beauvoir as well. This power is not attributed to either body or mind, either matter or the perception/ representation of matter, or any other such alternative. The creation of concepts entails the breakdown of representationalism on two levels. This revolutionary shifting entails precisely the activity of “pushing dualism to an extreme,” which opens the way for a thinking in action that is affirmative, practical and thus necessarily revolutionary.4
因此，第三条道路为 "创造的真正力量"（同上，236）开辟了道路，我们已经在德勒兹和瓜塔里的作品中遇到过这种力量，在波伏娃的作品中也会发现这种力量。这种力量既不归于身体，也不归于心灵，既不归于物质，也不归于对物质的感知/表述，或任何其他类似的选择。概念的产生意味着表象主义在两个层面上的瓦解。这种革命性的转变正是 "将二元论推向极端 "的活动，它为行动中的思考开辟了道路，这种思考是肯定的、实际的，因而必然是革命性的。 4

Difference, or: The Shift to Affirmative Relationality
差异，或：向肯定关系性的转变

Pushing dualism to an extreme helps to further our thoughts about new materialist cultural theories and the way in which they are constituted. New materialism does not rely upon a representationalism; it shifts the representationalist metaphysical premises of Bergson’s ordinary dualism by invoking a discursive practice centered on the creation of concepts in their relationality. The often binary oppositions that dominated modernity, and that are still accepted as premises in much of the theory of our age (which can therefore be considered post-modern, as Lyotard defined it) are structured by a relation of negations, and by re-affirming these negations. New materialists instead install a philosophy of difference by engaging in the activity of creating concepts, which is an onto-epistemological activity. A relationality in the negative, dualistic sense presupposes the terms of the relation in question, whereas the creation of concepts entails a traversing of dualisms, and the establishment of a relationality that is affirmative—i.e., structured by positivity rather than negativity. What happens here is that “difference is pushed to the limit” (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 45). By “pushing dualism to an extreme,” “difference is pushed to the limit,” the latter movement being less evaluative and more performative. Let us now demonstrate the workings of the affirmative relationality and the philosophy of difference thus constituted.
将二元论推向极端有助于我们进一步思考新唯物主义文化理论及其构成方式。新唯物主义并不依赖于表象主义；它通过援引一种以在概念的关系性中创造概念为中心的话语实践，转移了柏格森普通二元论的表象主义形而上学前提。主导现代性的往往是二元对立，我们这个时代的许多理论（因此可被视为利奥塔定义的后现代理论）仍然接受二元对立作为前提，而二元对立是通过否定的关系以及对这些否定的再确认来构建的。新唯物主义者则通过创造概念这一认识论活动来建立差异哲学。否定的、二元论意义上的关系性是以相关关系的条件为前提的，而概念的创造则需要跨越二元论，建立一种肯定的关系性--即以积极性而非否定性为结构的关系性。这里发生的事情是 "差异被推向极致"（德勒兹 [1968] 1994, 45）。通过 "将二元论推向极端"，"差异被推向极限"，后者的运动少了评价性，多了表演性。现在，让我们来展示肯定关系性的运作以及由此构成的差异哲学。

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 20-1) state that they “[a]rrive at the magic formula we all seek—PLURALISM = MONISM—via all the dualisms that are the enemy, an entirely necessary enemy, the furniture we are forever rearranging.” Similar to Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari do not avoid or negate dualisms, but traverse or pass through them. This affirmative approach to the modern, ordinary dualisms is an instance of what Lyotard called a rewriting of modernity. It shows how dualisms are inherently untenable, whereas holding on to a negative relationality between terms appears historically to be seductive. (Even feminists have fallen into the trap of relying too much on such a dualist logic!) Bergson and Deleuze and Guattari effectuate an affirmative take on the way in which two terms relate, and this shifts dualism by pushing it to an extreme. In an affirmative approach, a dualism does not only involve a binary opposition, a relation structured by negativity according to which different-from is necessarily worth-less-than (Braidotti 1994, 147).5 The starting point is that “[r]elated terms belong to one another” (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 30). Only when this sense of belonging is affirmed are we able to work “towards an absolute concept, once liberated from the condition which made difference an entirely relative maximum” (ibid., 33). It is precisely the activity of working towards an absolute concept that defines the rewriting, the revolution in thought that interests us.
在《千高原》中，德勒兹和瓜塔里（[1980] 1987, 20-1）说，他们 "通过所有二元对立来达到我们都在寻求的神奇公式--纯粹主义 = 单子主义--二元对立是敌人，一个完全必要的敌人，是我们永远在重新安排的家具"。与柏格森相似，德勒兹和瓜塔里并不回避或否定二元论，而是穿越或通过二元论。这种对现代的、普通的二元论的肯定是利奥塔所说的现代性重写的一个实例。它揭示了二元论在本质上是如何站不住脚的，而坚持术语之间的否定关系在历史上似乎具有诱惑力。(甚至女权主义者也陷入了过于依赖这种二元论逻辑的陷阱！）。柏格森、德勒兹和瓜塔里对两个术语之间的关系采取了肯定的态度，这将二元论推向了一个极端，从而改变了二元论。在肯定式方法中，二元论不仅涉及二元对立，一种由否定性结构的关系，根据这种关系，"不同于 "必然是 "低于"（Braidotti 1994, 147）。 5 其出发点是 "相关术语彼此相属"（Deleuze [1968] 1994, 30）。只有当这种归属感得到肯定时，我们才能够 "一旦从使差异成为完全相对的最大值的条件中解放出来，就能朝着绝对概念的方向努力"（同上，33）。我们感兴趣的，正是致力于绝对概念的重写活动和思想革命。

Deleuze contends in Difference and Repetition that “The negative and negativity do not even capture the phenomenon of difference, only the phantom or the epiphenomenon” ([1968] 1994, 52). This phantom-like character of negation should be taken literally, because here Deleuze
德勒兹在《差异与重复》（Difference and Repetition）一书中指出："否定和否定性甚至不能捕捉差异现象，只能捕捉幻影或表象"（[1968] 1994, 52）。否定的这种幻影般的特征应从字面上理解，因为在这里，德勒兹
produces a critique of representationalism. Capturing difference can only be done when “difference” is “shown differing” (ibid., 56; original emphasis) when the thinking does not start with the respective phenomena that are then claimed to be different from one another, but with mapping difference in itself. How does this work? In “Postmodernism is a Humanism: Deleuze and Equivocity,” Claire Colebrook (2004, 287) asserts that “one should go beyond the fantasy and structure of signification to its possibility.” What we are looking at here is the invention of the conditions of invention (cf. Serres with Latour 1995, 86)—namely, the establishment of a non-dualist logic of univocity as opposed to the dualist logic of equivocity: whereas “equivocity posits two radically incommensurable levels” (that which signifies, e.g.
这是对表象主义的批判。只有当 "差异 "被 "显示出不同"（同上，56；原文强调）时，才能捕捉到差异，此时的思考不是从各自的现象开始，然后声称它们彼此不同，而是从映射差异本身开始。这是如何做到的？在《后现代主义是一种人文主义：克莱尔-科尔布鲁克（Claire Colebrook）（2004, 287）在《后现代主义是一种人文主义：德勒兹与等价性》一文中断言，"人们应该超越符号的幻想和结构，去探寻其可能性"。在这里，我们所关注的是发明条件的发明（参见 Serres 与 Latour 1995, 86）--即建立一种非二元论的单一速度逻辑，与二元论的等速度逻辑相对立：而 "等速度假定了两个根本不可通约的层次"（即符号，如 "符号"）。

gender, and that which is signified, e.g. sex/the body), “there is just one plane of expression” according to a static univocal logic (Colebrook 2004, 288). Colebrook goes on by stating that “both the simple image—as a world of simulation, signification, representation or social construction—and the criticism of this notion are equivocal without justification,”6 whereas under a univocal logic “truth may be intuited as that which expresses itself, not as that which is in itself and then belied by relations, but that which gives birth to—while remaining irreducible to—relations” (ibid., 290; original emphasis. Cf. Bleeker 2008). Under univocal logic, “a perception of x is perceived as a power to x” (Colebrook 2004, 297; original emphasis) which is to say that difference is shown differing. Here we see an affirmation that feminism as a practice has nothing to offer but paradoxes: it posits sexual difference and is emancipatory insofar as the hierarchical element (different-from as worth-less-than) is broken down. Equivocity, that is, is locked up in a dualist framework of thought, structured by negativity (and linear time: sexual difference implies that women/femininity should become equal to men/humanity), whereas univocity pushes difference to the limit, producing a shift to an affirmative relationality (producing a situation in which, as we will see that de Beauvoir envisioned, new and as-yet inconceivable carnal and affective relations between the sexes are born). By way of another example: in the concluding section of “Postmodernism is a Humanism” Colebrook talks about the work of Virginia Woolf who pushes equivocal gender to univocal sexual difference, thus evoking a situation in which “[t]here are no longer distinct kinds or generalities, or genders, so much as essences that are the power to differ, essences that are sexual precisely because they have their sole being in creation” (ibid., 304; cf. below).
根据静态的单义逻辑，"只有一种表达方式"（Colebrook 2004, 288）。Colebrook 接着指出，"作为模拟、符号、表征或社会建构世界的简单图像以及对这一概念的批判都是模棱两可、毫无道理的"， 6 ，而在单义逻辑下，"真理可以被直观为表达自身的东西，而不是自身存在然后被关系所掩盖的东西，而是产生关系同时又不可被关系所还原的东西"（同上，290；原文强调。参见 Bleeker 2008）。在单义逻辑下，"对 x 的感知被视为对 x 的权力"（Colebrook 2004, 297；原文强调），也就是说，差异被视为不同。在这里，我们看到了一种肯定，即女权主义作为一种实践，除了悖论之外别无其他：它假定了性差异，只要打破了等级因素（不同于价值低于价值），它就是解放性的。也就是说，等价性被禁锢在二元论的思维框架中，由否定性（和线性时间：性差异意味着女性/女性气质应与男性/人类平等）所构建；而单等价性则将差异推向极致，产生了向肯定关系的转变（正如我们将看到德-波伏娃所设想的那样，在这种情况下，两性之间会产生新的、尚无法想象的肉体和情感关系）。 另一个例子是：在《后现代主义是一种人文主义》的结尾部分，科尔布鲁克谈到弗吉尼亚-伍尔夫的作品，她将等义的性别推向了单义的性差异，从而唤起了这样一种情境："这里不再有截然不同的种类或通性，也不再有性别，更多的是具有差异力量的本质，具有性的本质正是因为它们在创造中具有唯一的存在"（同上，304；参见下文）。

The remaining question is how exactly differing or affirmative relationality is a non-dualist univocity? Deleuze demonstrates how representationalism is an identity politics or regime in what he calls the major History of Philosophy (with capitals). In case difference is thought of in terms of identity (under this dominant way of thinking, assuming one perspective or multiple perspectives), the Other (e.g. the woman), a concept so central in the work of other early philosophies of difference (think of Levinas and Derrida, for instance), can only be thought to exist in relation to the One, or Same, or Centre. Rejecting the idea that otherness can be reduced to a particular subject or object, thus refuting the idea that his philosophy starts with an ontology of the One (as Alain Badiou [1999] wrongly supposes), Deleuze ([1969] 1990, 307) then concludes that “the Other is initially a structure of the perceptual field, without which the entire field could not function as it does. […] It is the structure of the possible. […] The terrified countenance bears no resemblance to the terrifying thing. It implicates it, it envelopes it as something else, in a kind of torsion which situates what is expressed in the expressing.” This is when and where a dualism comes to be installed that is structured by negativity (distribution), and when and where different-from is transformed into worth-less-than (hierarchy or asymmetry). It is for that reason that Deleuze himself, contrary to his contemporaries, found it difficult to relate this concept to his thoughts. The Other is the expression of a possible world as he, reading Tournier’s Friday, developed this idea in Difference and Repetition.
剩下的问题是，差异的或肯定的关系性究竟是如何成为非二元论的单一性的？德勒兹在《哲学大历史》（大写）中展示了表象主义是如何成为一种身份政治或制度的。如果从身份的角度来思考差异（在这种占主导地位的思维方式下，假定只有一个视角或多个视角），那么他者（如女人）这个在其他早期差异哲学（如列维纳斯和德里达）中如此重要的概念，就只能被认为是相对于 "一 "或 "同一 "或 "中心 "而存在的。德勒兹（[1969] 1990, 307）拒绝接受 "他者 "可以归结为某个特定主体或客体的观点，从而驳斥了他的哲学从 "一 "的本体论出发的观点（正如阿兰-巴迪欧[1999]错误地假设的那样），他接着得出结论说："'他者'最初是知觉领域的一个结构，没有它，整个领域就无法像现在这样运作。[......]它是可能的结构。[......]惊恐的面容与惊恐的事物并不相似。它牵连着它，将它包裹成另一种东西，在一种扭转中将所表达的东西置于表达之中"。在这里，二元论的结构是否定性的（分配），在这里，"不同于 "被转化为 "价值低于"（等级或不对称）。正因如此，德勒兹本人与其同时代人相反，发现很难将这一概念与其思想联系起来。他在阅读图尔尼耶的《星期五》后，在《差异与重复》中提出了 "他者 "这一概念。
In an interview with Magazine Litteraire (reprinted in Deleuze [1988] 1995, 135-155) and in a letter he wrote to his Japanese translator Kuniichi Uno (reprinted in Deleuze 2006, 201-203) he continued this argument by making an implicit comment on Derrida’s “Letter to a Japanese Friend” ([1985] 1988) and his use of the Other as Deleuze comes up with a Japanese man whose words can function as the expression of a possible world. Contrary to Derrida (referring to Heidegger [1959] 1971) who emphasizes the non-translatability of his French text into Japanese and yet simultaneously the necessity to do so, Deleuze does not accept the relative existence of the One (the Same, the Centre) and the Other (here the
在《文学杂志》的一次采访（转载于德勒兹[1988] 1995, 135-155）和他写给日语译者宇野邦一的一封信（转载于德勒兹 2006, 201-203）中，他继续这一论点，对德里达的《给一位日本朋友的信》（[1985] 1988）和他对他者的使用进行了含蓄的评论，因为德勒兹提出了一个日本人，他的话语可以作为一个可能世界的表达。与德里达（指海德格尔[1959] 1971）强调其法文文本不可译成日文但同时又有必要译成日文相反，德勒兹不接受 "一"（同一、中心）与 "他者"（此处指 "日本人"）的相对存在。

French language and the Japanese language) and the negative relation drawn between them. In line with the anti-correlationism of Meillassoux, Deleuze ([1988] 1995, 147) stresses that the expression of a possible world (even when done in Japanese), “confers reality on the possible world as such, the reality of the possible as something possible […].”
德勒兹（[1988] 1995, 147）与梅亚索（Meillassoux）的反相关论一致，强调可能世界的表达（即使是用日语表达）"赋予了现实性"。德勒兹（[1988] 1995, 147）与梅亚索的反相关主义一致，强调对可能世界的表达（即使是用日语表达），"赋予了可能世界本身的现实性，即作为可能之物的可能的现实性[......]"。

In contrast to the negative dualism then, and in line with the Bergsonian virtual/actual pair, Deleuze proposes a logic according to which “[e]ach point of view must itself be the object, or the object must belong to the point of view.” (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 56; cf. Leibniz [1714] 1962, 263 §57, Deleuze [1956/2002] 2004, 39) That is to say, the moment we think differing or difference in itself a univocal logic is established. This occurs when we think dualism to an extreme—Deleuze states that it is within Kantianism, or “in the same stroke” (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 58; original emphasis) that such a shift is effectuated. Difference is then established as “the element, the ultimate unity,” that is, difference that “refer[s] to other differences which never identify it but rather differentiate it” (ibid., 56). Difference then comes awfully close to the (mathematical) object that speculative realists and materialists like Graham Harman and Meillassoux talk about. Meillassoux’s statement that “[t]here is no reason for anything to be or to remain selfidentical” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 88) emphasizes this difference in itself, this difference always already differing. Refusing the idea that “to be is to be in a correlate,” (as Harman [2011b, 15] summarizes Meillassoux’s critique of correlationist ontology), Deleuze states that difference is not in need of relations yet at the same time does not exist in a void. It is a thinking according to which
与当时的否定二元论相反，德勒兹根据柏格森的虚拟/实在对提出了一种逻辑，即 "每个观点本身必须是对象，或者对象必须属于观点"（德勒兹[1968]1994, 56；参见莱比锡[1714]1962, 263 §57, 德勒兹[1956/2002]2004, 39）。(Deleuze [1968] 1994, 56; cf. Leibniz [1714] 1962, 263 §57, Deleuze [1956/2002] 2004, 39)也就是说，当我们认为差异或不同本身的时候，一种单义的逻辑就建立起来了。德勒兹指出，正是在康德主义内部，或 "在同一笔画中"（德勒兹[1968] 1994, 58；原文强调），这种转变才得以实现。于是，差异被确立为 "元素、终极统一体"，即 "指涉其他差异的差异，这些差异从未识别它，而是将它区分开来"（同上，56）。这样，差异就非常接近格雷厄姆-哈曼（Graham Harman）和迈拉苏（Meillassoux）等推测现实主义者和唯物主义者所谈论的（数学）对象了。迈拉苏说："任何事物都没有理由成为或保持自我同一性"（迈拉苏[2006] 2008, 88），强调了这种差异本身，这种差异总是已经存在差异。德勒兹驳斥了 "存在就是存在于关联中 "的观点（哈曼[2011b, 15]总结了迈耶苏对关联主义本体论的批判），指出差异不需要关系，但同时也不存在于虚无之中。这是一种思维方式，据此

[e]ach difference passes through all the others; it must “will” itself or find itself through all the others. […] a world of differences implicated one in the other, […] a complicated, properly chaotic world without identity (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 57; original emphasis).
[每一个差异都通过所有其他差异；它必须 "将 "自己或通过所有其他差异找到自己。[......]一个彼此牵连的差异世界，[......]一个复杂的、适当的、混乱的、没有特性的世界（德勒兹[1968] 1994, 57；原文强调）。

Referring to the work of Nietzsche, Deleuze states that
德勒兹在谈到尼采的作品时指出

What is then revealed is being, which is said of differences which are neither in substance nor in a subject: so many subterranean affirmations. […] for a brief moment we enter into that schizophrenia in principle which characterises the highest power of thought, and opens Being directly on to difference, despite all the mediations, all the reconciliations, of the concept (ibid., 58).
然后揭示的是 "存在"，"存在 "指的是既非本质也非主体的差异：如此多的地下肯定。[......]刹那间，我们进入了原则上的精神分裂，这是思想的最高力量的特征，并直接向差异敞开了存在，尽管有概念的所有中介、所有调和（同上，58）。

In other words: what is established is the univocal logic (ibid., 67).
换句话说：确立的是单义逻辑（同上，67）。

It should not come as a surprise that it is not only Nietzsche who then practices philosophy as a creative act, but Bergson as well. In “Bergson’s Conception of Difference,” Deleuze ([1956/2002] 2004, 33; original emphasis) states that “either philosophy proposes for itself this means (differences of nature) and this end (to arrive at internal difference)” or else it would always end up in a representationalist, equivocal logic. Bergsonism, as said, is looking for “the unity of the thing and the concept,” that is, for a philosophy that practices a univocal logic. Such a logic enacts what we previously called an onto-epistemology whose concept of difference is predicated on affirmation. Deleuze is explicit about this when he says that Bergson “rais[es] difference up to the absolute” (ibid., 39) by thinking difference following a univocal logic, which entails a qualitative shift away from equivocity, that is, among other things, negation:
不仅尼采将哲学作为一种创造性行为来实践，柏格森也是如此，这一点不足为奇。德勒兹在《柏格森的差异观》（[1956/2002] 2004, 33；原文着重号）中指出，"哲学要么为自己提出这种手段（自然的差异）和这种目的（达到内在的差异）"，否则它将永远陷入一种表象主义的、模棱两可的逻辑之中。如前所述，柏格森主义追求的是 "事物与概念的统一"，也就是追求一种实践单义逻辑的哲学。这种逻辑就是我们之前所说的以肯定为差异概念前提的on-to-epistemology。德勒兹明确地指出了这一点，他说柏格森 "将差异提升到了绝对的高度"（同上，39），因为他是按照单义逻辑来思考差异的，这就意味着从等价性（也就是否定性）的质的转变：

If duration differs from itself, that from which it differs is still duration in a certain sense. It is not a question of dividing duration in the same way we divided what is composite: duration is simple, indivisible, pure. The simple is not divided, it differentiates itself. This is the essence of the simple, or the movement of difference. So, the composite divides into two tendencies, one of which is the indivisible, but the indivisible differentiates itself into two tendencies, the other of which is the principle of the divisible (ibid.; original emphasis).
如果持续时间与自身不同，那么与之不同的持续时间在一定意义上仍然是持续时间。这不是用划分复合体的方式来划分持续时间的问题：持续时间是简单的、不可分割的、纯粹的。简单的东西是不会被分割的，它会自我分化。这就是简单的本质，或者说是差异的运动。因此，综合体分为两种趋势，其中一种是不可分割的，而不可分割的自身又分为两种趋势，其中另一种是可分割的原则（同上；原文强调）。

The relational nature of the structuring logic is kept in place (previously we saw that Bergson continues to make distinctions). But relationality at work is not predicated on equivocal notions such as negation, or analogy for that matter, because the relationality is never predeterminable from the outside. Deleuze ([1956/2002] 2004, 40, 42) even explicates how “vital difference” for Bergson is “not a determination” but rather “indetermination itself,” which is not to say that it is “accidental” but rather that it is
结构逻辑的关系性得以保持（我们之前看到柏格森继续进行区分）。但是，工作中的关系性并不是以否定或类比等模棱两可的概念为前提的，因为关系性从来不是可以从外部预先确定的。德勒兹（[1956/2002] 2004, 40, 42）甚至阐释了柏格森的 "重要差异 "如何 "不是确定 "而是 "不确定本身"，这并不是说它是 "偶然的"，而是说它是

“essential.” In other words, “[d]ifferentiation is the movement of a virtuality actualizing itself.” This non-reductive, univocal take on difference cannot be a dialectic and cannot be structured according to dualism, because according to Bergson
"本质"。换句话说，"差异是一种德性实现自身的运动"。柏格森认为，这种对差异的非还原性、单一性的理解不可能是辩证法，也不可能按照二元论来构建，因为
the negation of one real term by the other is only the positive actualization of a virtuality that contains both terms at once. […] The opposition of two terms is only the actualization of a virtuality that contained them both: this is tantamount to saying that difference is more profound than negation or contradiction (ibid., 42-3).
一个实词对另一个实词的否定，只是同时包含两个实词的虚拟性的积极现实化。[......]两个术语的对立只是同时包含它们的良性的现实化：这等于说，差异比否定或矛盾更深刻（同上，42-3）。

Allowing for the virtual, for pure recollection, to be reflected in the actual, constantly exchanging the two into one another as it creates the circuit of duration—this is what Bergsonism does. Such a philosophy, which amounts to a new materialist rewriting of modernity, is the production of revolutions in thought not by negating ordinary dualism (the structuring principle or equivocal logic of modernist thought), but rather by pushing ordinary dualism to the extreme, thus installing a new take on difference, the univocal logic of which is an affirmative relationality. Such a philosophy is the activity of pushing difference to the limit by traversing dualism.
允许虚拟，允许纯粹的回忆，在现实中得到反映，不断地将二者交换为彼此，因为它创造了持续时间的回路--这就是柏格森主义所做的。这种哲学相当于对现代性的一种新的唯物主义改写，它不是通过否定普通的二元论（现代主义思想的结构原则或等价逻辑），而是通过将普通的二元论推向极端，从而建立一种新的差异观，这种差异观的单义逻辑是一种肯定的关系性。这种哲学就是通过穿越二元论将差异推向极致的活动。

When speculative realists and speculative materialists today propose to move away from Kantian correlationism to the “eternal-in-itself, whose being is indifferent to whether or not it is thought” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 63), they push dualism to the extreme in a similar way. When Harman (2010, 202) for instance notes a “[…] global dualism between the reality of objects and their more or less distorted or translated versions for other objects,” he follows Bergson’s distinction between difference in itself and ordinary difference. The latter is representationalist and negative, while the former demonstrates an interest in the true power of creation (Bergson), morphogenesis (DeLanda), or metamorphosis (Braidotti).
今天，当投机现实主义者和投机唯物主义者提出从康德的关联主义转向 "永恒的自身，其存在与是否被思考无关"（Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 63）时，他们以类似的方式将二元论推向了极端。例如，当哈曼（2010，202）注意到"[......]对象的现实与它们或多或少被扭曲或翻译成其他对象的版本之间的全球二元论 "时，他遵循了柏格森对差异本身和普通差异的区分。后者是表象主义的、消极的，而前者则表现出对创造（柏格森）、形态发生（德兰达）或变形（布莱多蒂）的真正力量的兴趣。

New Feminist Materialism Pushes Sexual Difference to the Limit
新女权主义唯物主义将性别差异推向极致

Let us close with a provocative example of a rewriting of modernity, which will be developed further in the next chapter. Previously we hinted at the possibility of transforming equivocal gender—which is structured by a negative relationality (distribution and asymmetry) between men and women, masculinity and femininity—into univocal sexual difference, which allows sexual difference to differ. New feminist materialism is the cultural theory that enacts this possibility. New feminist materialist cultural theorists work along the lines of affirmative relationality, the workings of which we have demonstrated in the previous section. In doing so, they push sexual difference to the limit by pushing the dualism that is ordinarily installed (gender) to an extreme. The new feminist materialism does practical philosophy and thus produces a revolution in (feminist) thought. In this final section we will address new feminist materialist cultural theory, not only because it can demonstrate the workings of difference structured by a univocal logic of affirmative relationality, but also because feminism per se is an interesting site for our expose about new mater-ialist cultural theory, that starts with difference as a practice, that is not “about” sexuality or gender (as a theory opposed to the practice or act) but that is a practice or act itself, by means of the concepts it gives rise to and through which it practices its power.
最后，让我们举一个改写现代性的具有启发性的例子，下一章将对此作进一步阐述。在此之前，我们曾暗示过一种可能性，即把等义性别--它是由男女之间、男性气质与女性气质之间的负面关系性（分布与不对称）所构建的--转化为单义性差异，它允许性差异的不同。新女性主义唯物主义是实现这种可能性的文化理论。新女性主义唯物主义文化理论家沿着平权关系性的思路开展工作，我们在上一节中已经展示了这种关系性的运作。在此过程中，他们将性别差异推向了极致，将通常所设定的二元论（性别）推向了极端。新女性主义唯物主义是一种实践哲学，因而是（女性主义）思想的一场革命。在这最后一节中，我们将讨论新女性主义唯物主义文化理论，这不仅是因为它可以展示由肯定关系性的单一逻辑所构建的差异的运作，而且还因为女性主义本身就是我们揭示新女性主义唯物主义文化理论的一个有趣的场所，它以差异作为一种实践为出发点，它不是 "关于 "性或性别（作为一种与实践或行为相对立的理论），而是通过它所产生的概念以及通过这些概念来实践其权力的一种实践或行为本身。

Feminism has always enveloped sexual difference in its ordinary dualist sense as well as the traversing thereof. Both movements were a necessity for feminism, as Joan Wallach Scott (1996, 3-4; original emphasis) explains:
女权主义始终包含普通二元论意义上的性别差异以及对性别差异的超越。正如琼-沃拉奇-斯科特（Joan Wallach Scott）（1996 年，3-4；原文强调）所解释的，这两种运动都是女权主义的必然选择：

Feminism was a protest against women’s political exclusion; its goal was to eliminate “sexual difference” in politics, but it had to make its claim on behalf of “women” (who were discursively produced through “sexual difference”). To the extent that it acted for “women,” feminism produced the “sexual difference” it sought to eliminate. This paradox—the need both to accept and to refuse “sexual difference”—was the constitutive condition of feminism as a political movement throughout its long history.
女权主义是对妇女在政治上被排斥的抗议；它的目标是消除政治中的 "性别差异"，但它必须代表 "妇女"（她们是通过 "性别差异 "在话语上产生的）提出主张。在为 "女性 "而行动的范围内，女权主义制造了它试图消除的 "性别差异"。这种悖论--既需要接受又需要拒绝 "性别差异"--是女权主义在其漫长历史中作为政治运动的构成条件。

The book in which Scott makes this complex diagnosis is entitled Only Paradoxes to Offer, and we want to demonstrate here why the situation she explores is in fact not at all paradoxical. Sue Thornham (2000, 188; original emphasis) makes exactly this point, when she explores the work of Irigaray:
斯科特在书中做出了这一复杂的诊断，书名为《只有悖论可言》（Only Paradoxes to Offer），我们想在此说明，为什么她所探讨的情况实际上一点也不悖论。苏-索纳姆（Sue Thornham）（2000 年，188；原文强调）在探讨伊里格瑞的作品时，恰恰提出了这一点：

One cannot, she writes, analyse the gendered nature of culture by stepping out of the identity “woman” into a gender-neutral discourse—by claiming an “equal right” to speak—because there is no gender-neutral discourse; the public discourse of analysis is thoroughly masculine. To write from outside that discourse is, however, to be ignored. To do either is to remain within the terms of the dominant discourse.
她写道，人们不能通过跳出 "女性 "身份进入性别中立的话语来分析文化的性别性质，也不能通过声称拥有 "平等权利 "来说话，因为不存在性别中立的话语；分析的公共话语是彻底的男性话语。然而，在这一话语之外进行写作则会被忽视。无论是哪种情况，都是停留在主流话语的范围内。

Despite the fact that many feminists, including Irigaray and Braidotti and Grosz and Colebrook, have found their individual and/or generational answer to the seeming paradox, we want to show here how feminism is Scott’s diagnosis, which is not a paradox that is in need of a solution.
尽管许多女权主义者，包括伊里格瑞（Irigaray）、布雷多蒂（Braidotti）、格罗斯（Grosz）和科尔布鲁克（Colebrook），都为这一看似悖论的问题找到了各自和/或各代人的答案，但我们想在此说明，女权主义是斯科特的诊断，这并不是一个需要解决的悖论。

Grosz (2005, 156), a feminist new materialist, states that major Philosophy, a philosophy structured by the dominant lines of thought, has traditionally excluded women, whereas it has produced a discourse that is implicitly gendered masculine. Philosophy has objectified women, thus erecting the male philosopher figure. The Irigarayian analysis of this onto-epistemological diagnosis proceeds as follows:
女性主义新唯物主义者格罗斯（Grosz，2005 年，第 156 页）指出，主要哲学（一种由主流思想体系构建的哲学）历来排斥女性，而它所产生的话语却隐含着男性的性别特征。哲学将女性物化，从而树立了男性哲学家的形象。伊里格瑞对这一认识论诊断的分析如下：

The question of sexual difference signals the virtual framework of the future. What today is actual is sexual opposition or binarism, the defining of the two sexes in terms of the characteristics of one. Sexual difference is that which is virtual; it is the potential of this opposition to function otherwise, to function without negation, to function as full positivity. It is the future we may be able to make, but which has not yet come into existence (ibid., 164).
性差异问题预示着未来的虚拟框架。今天的现实是性对立或二元论，即用一种性别的特征来定义两种性别。性差异是虚拟的；它是这种对立的潜能，以另一种方式发挥作用，在没有否定的情况下发挥作用，以完全积极的方式发挥作用。它是我们可以创造的未来，但它尚未出现（同上，164）。

That is to say, sexual difference functions prominently in feminist theory: namely, both as an ordinary dualism and as virtuality. Feminist theory will produce a revolution in dualist thought not by overcoming sexual difference (conceptualizing emancipation as a striving for equal gender relations or as the overthrow of a discourse that is gendered masculine) but by traversing it (allowing for sexual differing). Feminist theory has to push sexual difference as an ordinary dualism to an extreme precisely so as to push sexual difference to the limit. A sexual difference according to which women are worth-less-than men, to speak with Braidotti, has to be pushed to an extreme so as to release sexual difference as that which is virtual. This is precisely how we should read Simone de Beauvoir’s conclusion to The Second Sex, which indeed thinks through the emancipation of humanity in its most radical form. After a full description of the dialectic of sex (a dualism structured by a negative relationality), she concludes that: “new carnal and affective relations of which we cannot conceive will be born between the sexes” (de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 765). It is precisely by thinking through sexual difference to its remotest aspirations, thus alluding to difference structured by an affirmative relationality, that de Beauvoir came to produce the revolution in thought that has made her famous (and infamous), for constituting feminism as a rewriting of modernity—that is, feminism-as-differing. de Beauvoir exemplifies a new materialist take on difference, since by traversing the (sexual) dualism structuring modernist thought, modernity comes to be rewritten and difference is showndiffering.
也就是说，性别差异在女性主义理论中发挥着突出的作用：即既是普通的二元论，又是虚拟性。女权主义理论要在二元论思想中掀起一场革命，不是通过克服性差异（将解放概念化为争取平等的性别关系或推翻性别男性化的话语），而是通过穿越性差异（允许性差异）。女权主义理论必须将作为普通二元论的性差异推向极端，正是为了将性差异推向极限。按照布赖多蒂的说法，女性的价值低于男性的性差异必须被推向极端，这样才能释放作为虚拟性差异的性差异。西蒙娜-德-波伏娃（Simone de Beauvoir）在《第二性》一书中的结论正是如此，她确实以最激进的形式思考了人性解放。在全面描述了性的辩证法（一种由消极关系构成的二元论）之后，她总结道"我们无法想象的新的肉体和情感关系将在两性之间诞生"（de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 765）。德-波伏娃正是通过对性别差异及其最遥远的愿望进行思考，从而暗指以肯定关系性为结构的差异，才产生了使她声名鹊起（和声名狼藉）的思想革命，将女权主义构建为对现代性的改写，即作为差异的女权主义。德-波伏娃是新唯物主义差异观的典范，因为通过穿越构建现代主义思想的（性）二元论，现代性开始被改写，差异开始显现。

Notes
说明

- 1. The feminist point being that women are not “to deny […] the resources of prevailing knowledges as a mode of critique of those knowledges” (Grosz 2005, 165). When modernity can be (re) thought as thinking emancipation, women had better affirm it.
1.女权主义者的观点是，妇女不应 "否认[......]作为批判这些知识模式的主流知识资源"（Grosz，2005 年，165）。当现代性可以（重新）被视为思想解放时，女性最好予以肯定。

- 2. Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 66) use the concept of “discourse” similarly to how Barad does. Following Foucault, this long quote brilliantly explains how this does away with the linguistic representations that have been so important in academia up until today:
2.德勒兹和瓜塔里（[1980] 1987, 66）使用 "话语 "概念的方式与巴拉德相似。继福柯之后，这一长篇引文精辟地解释了这是如何摒弃迄今为止在学术界一直非常重要的语言表征的：

Let us follow Foucault in his exemplary analysis, which, though it seems not to be, is eminently concerned with linguistics. Take a thing like the prison: the prison is a form, the ‘prison-form’; it is a form of content on a stratum and is related to other forms of content (schools, barracks, hospital, factory). This thing or form does not refer back to the word “prison,” but to entirely different words and concepts, such as ‘delinquent’ and ‘delinquency’, which express a new way of classifying, stating, translating and even committing criminal acts. ‘Delinquency’ is the form of expression in reciprocal presupposition with the form of content ‘prison.’ Delinquency is in no way a signifier, even a juridical signifier, the signified would be that of the prison. That would flatten the entire analysis.
让我们效仿福柯的典范分析，虽然他的分析似乎与语言学无关，但却与语言学密切相关。以监狱为例：监狱是一种形式，即 "监狱形式"；它是一个层面上的内容形式，与其他内容形式（学校、军营、医院、工厂）相关联。这种事物或形式不是指 "监狱 "一词，而是指完全不同的词语和概念，如 "少年犯 "和 "犯罪"，它们表达了一种新的分类、陈述、翻译甚至实施犯罪行为的方式。犯罪 "是与 "监狱 "这一内容形式互为前提的表达形式。犯罪绝不是一个符号，甚至不是一个司法符号，被符号化的是监狱。这将使整个分析变得平淡无奇。

- 3. Grosz (2005, 123) reminds us of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of precisely the onto-epistemological aspect of the work of Bergson. He claims that it is a transcendentalism. We, however, do not define the onto-epistemological as “collapsing our knowledge of a thing with its being” and accept another onto-epistemology.
3.格罗斯（2005, 123）提醒我们莫里斯-梅洛-庞蒂（Maurice Merleau-Ponty）对柏格森作品中 "到 "的认识论方面的批评。他认为这是一种超验主义。然而，我们并没有将此认识论定义为 "将我们对事物的认识与事物的存在混为一谈"，并接受另一种认识论。

- 4. In an article that questions the monism of Bergson and claims that his work is Eurocentric and phallocentric, Rebecca Hill (2008, 132-3) ends with the following conclusion, thus undoing the argument presented in the article, yet affirming consciousness as a concept:
4.Rebecca Hill（2008，132-3）在一篇文章中质疑柏格森的一元论，并声称他的著作是欧洲中心主义和噬血中心主义的，她在文章的最后得出了如下结论，从而推翻了文章中的论点，但又肯定了意识是一个概念：

In my view these passages demonstrate the valorization of a hypermasculine theory of life and corresponding devaluation of matter as feminine. This is not a binary hierarchy because Bergson’s concepts of life and matter are never actualised as pure activity and pure space. […] matter’s inclination towards pure repetition is never fully achieved. […] At the same time, life is not manifested as pure creative energy. […] Moreover, Bergson admits that if materiality was pure repetition, consciousness could never have installed itself within matter’s palpitations.
在我看来，这些段落展示了一种超男性的生命理论的价值，以及相应的贬低女性的物质理论。这并不是二元对立的等级制度，因为柏格森的生命和物质概念从来都没有实现为纯粹的活动和纯粹的空间。[......]物质的纯粹重复倾向从未完全实现。[......]同时，生命也没有表现为纯粹的创造性能量。[......]此外，柏格森承认，如果物质是纯粹的重复，那么意识就不可能在物质的悸动中安放自己。

- 5. When different-from translates into worth-less-than, emancipation either means the inclusion of women, laborers, black people, and other Others in the hierarchically privileged domain (a strategy of equality) or the revaluation of the underprivileged domain (a strategy of difference). This binary opposition will be repositioned in the final section of this chapter.
5.当 "不同于 "转化为 "价值低于 "时，解放要么意味着将妇女、劳动者、黑人和其他 "他人 "纳入享有等级特权的领域（平等战略），要么意味着重新估价处于不利地位的领域（差异战略）。本章最后一节将对这种二元对立进行重新定位。

- 6. In other words: modern and post-modern cultural theories are both structured along the lines of an equivocal logic.
6.换句话说：现代和后现代文化理论都是按照一种模棱两可的逻辑来构建的。

- Chapter 7
第 7 章

Sexual Differing
性别差异

Feminist historiography writes histories of feminist thought as well as providing a specific definition of feminism. As such, “feminism” is not only reflected upon by feminist historiographers; feminism is also created in feminist historiography. We already saw how in Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man, Joan Wallach Scott (1996, 3-4; original emphasis) specifies how “sexual difference,” in turn, structures and is structured by feminism:
女性主义史学撰写女性主义思想史，并为女性主义提供具体定义。因此，"女性主义 "不仅被女性主义史学家所反思，女性主义也在女性主义史学中被创造出来。我们在《只有悖论可言》中已经看到了这一点：琼-沃拉奇-斯科特（Joan Wallach Scott，1996 年，3-4；原文强调）在《只有提供的悖论：法国女权主义者与人的权利》一书中指出，"性别差异 "是如何反过来构建和被构建为女权主义的：

Feminism was a protest against women’s political exclusion; its goal was to eliminate “sexual difference” in politics, but it had to make its claim on behalf of “women” (who were discursively produced through “sexual difference”). To the extent that it acted for “women,” feminism produced the “sexual difference” it sought to eliminate. This paradox—the need both to accept and to refuse “sexual difference”—was the constitutive condition of feminism as a political movement throughout its long history.
女权主义是对妇女在政治上被排斥的抗议；它的目标是消除政治中的 "性别差异"，但它必须代表 "妇女"（她们是通过 "性别差异 "在话语上产生的）提出主张。在为 "女性 "而行动的范围内，女权主义制造了它试图消除的 "性别差异"。这种悖论--既需要接受又需要拒绝 "性别差异"--是女权主义在其漫长历史中作为政治运动的构成条件。

Sexual difference, then, serves two purposes at the same time, which (as Olympe de Gouges already remarked) is the cause of a sense of paradox: on the one hand, “exclusion was legitimated by reference to the different biologies of women and men,” whereas on the other hand, “‘sexual difference’ was established not only as a natural fact, but also as an ontological basis for social and political differentiation.” (ibid., 3) This diagnosis implies a diversified and unusual ontology of sexual difference, an ontology not made explicit in the major historiographical tradition in gender studies. Its major tradition all too often involves the need to choose between (biological) essentialism and social constructivism as well as a critique of patriarchal politics, which does not allow feminism or gender studies to move beyond a merely reactionary stance. As we will show below, a critical stance re-affirms what is critiqued. A radical feminism does not allow itself to exist as encapsulated by the political mainstream. When feminism is constructed as inherently paradoxical, however, one’s ontological condition as a woman/female feminist is not seen as predetermined by either biology or social construction (whether this is a strategic essentialism or a diversification of the category of “women”). Rather, (biological) essentialism and social constructivism are two discourses that feminism traverses, which implies a performative understanding of ontology. In other words, the category of woman materializes through the traversing of nonfeminist and feminist discourses that make sexual differentiations. Here, feminism’s opposition to biological determinism, translating into a social constructivism as of the dominant Anglo-American reception of Simone de Beauvoir’s seminal work The Second Sex, is shifted by allowing for “natural facts” or “sex” to have a place on the conceptual map, the leaving behind of biological predetermination notwithstanding.
因此，性差异同时具有两个目的，这（正如奥利姆佩-德-古热所指出的）是产生悖论感的 原因：一方面，"排斥因男女不同的生物学而合法化"，而另一方面，"'性差异'不仅被确定 为一个自然事实，而且被确定为社会和政治区分的本体论基础"（同上，3）。(同上，3）这一诊断意味着一种多样化的、不同寻常的性差异本体论，这种本体论在性别研究的主要史学传统中并没有明确提出。性别研究的主要传统往往需要在（生物）本质论和社会建构主义以及对父权政治的批判之间做出选择，这使得女性主义或性别研究无法超越单纯的反动立场。正如我们将在下文指出的，批判性立场会重新肯定被批判的东西。激进的女权主义不允许自己被政治主流所囊括。然而，当女权主义被构建为内在悖论时，一个人作为女性/女权主义者的本体论条件就不会被视为由生物学或社会建构（无论是战略本质论还是 "女性 "类别的多样化）所预先决定。相反，（生物）本质主义和社会建构主义是女性主义所穿越的两种话语，这意味着对本体论的一种表演性理解。换句话说，"妇女 "这一类别是通过穿越非女权主义和女权主义话语而具体化的，这些话语对性别进行了区分。 在此，女性主义反对生物决定论，并将其转化为社会建构主义，正如英美人对西蒙娜-德-波伏娃（Simone de Beauvoir）的开创性著作《第二性》的主要接受方式一样，女性主义通过允许 "自然事实 "或 "性 "在概念图上占有一席之地而改变了这一立场，尽管留下了生物宿命论。
Such mappings of relations between the sexes do not seem to allow for nature and culture to be disentangled. An ontology that we have specified as “performative” implies diverting from the major tradition in feminist historiography (a tradition predicated on dualism structured by negation) and “reading for the historically specific paradoxes that feminist subjects embody, enact, and expose” (ibid., 16).
这种两性关系的映射似乎无法将自然与文化割裂开来。我们将本体论定义为 "表演性"，这就意味着要偏离女性主义史学的主要传统（以否定结构的二元论为前提的传统），"解读女性主义主体所体现的、制定的和揭露的历史性悖论"（同上，16）。

Unconfined by the parameters of the dominant feminist historiography, Scott’s analysis can be specified as an instantiation of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s “rewriting modernity.” Commenting on a teleological conception of the history of Marxism, Lyotard ([1988] 1991, 28) writes that whereas Karl Marx seems to have thought that by revealing the hidden source of “the unhappiness of modernity” humanity could reach full emancipation, the history of Marxism in fact shows nothing but the need for “opening the same wound again. The localization and diagnosis may change, but the same illness re-emerges in this rewriting.” “[C]losure or resolution” (Scott 1996, 17) is not to be found on the horizon of (the history of) Marxism and feminism; all we find is a perpetual offering of historically specific paradoxes. These paradoxes, in the context of feminism, concern the false opposition between biological essentialism and social constructivism, a problem inherent to “the dualist logic of modernity” (Lyon 1999, 169). The double bind of biological essentialism and social constructivism shows how “biology” and ontology feature prominently in the history and historiography of feminism, or: have been dominating its discourses for a very long time. Traversing the poles of this dualism constitutes a minor tradition in feminist historiography that allows feminism to move beyond the intrinsically dualistic and reactionary stance we identified above. This tradition is minor, in the words of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari ([1980] 1987, 105), when it is “different from that of the constant […] by nature and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or an outsystem.” A minor tradition never gets stuck as it always finds itself, like Scott’s paradoxes, in creative movement (ibid.: 105—6).
斯科特的分析不受主流女性主义史学参数的限制，可以说是让-弗朗索瓦-利奥塔（Jean-Francois Lyotard）"重写现代性 "的具体体现。利奥塔（[1988] 1991, 28）在评论马克思主义历史的目的论概念时写道，卡尔-马克思似乎认为，通过揭示 "现代性不幸福 "的隐秘根源，人类可以获得全面解放，但事实上，马克思主义的历史只显示了 "再次揭开同一伤口 "的必要性。定位和诊断可能会改变，但同样的疾病会在这种重写中重新出现"。在马克思主义和女权主义（历史）的地平线上找不到 "终结或解决"（斯科特，1996 年，17 页）；我们所发现的只是历史上特定悖论的永久性呈现。就女性主义而言，这些悖论涉及生物本质论与社会建构主义之间的错误对立，这是 "现代性的二元逻辑"（Lyon 1999, 169）所固有的问题。生物本质论和社会建构主义的双重束缚表明，"生物学 "和本体论是如何在女性主义的历史和史学中占据显著地位的，或者说：在很长一段时间里，它们一直主导着女性主义的话语。穿越这种二元论的两极构成了女性主义史学的一个次要传统，它使女性主义超越了我们上文指出的内在二元论和反动立场。用吉勒-德勒兹（Gilles Deleuze）和费利克斯-瓜塔里（Felix Guattari）（[1980]1987, 105）的话来说，这种传统是次要的，因为它 "本质上不同于常量[......]，无论数量多少，换句话说，是一个子系统或一个系统外"。小传统永远不会停滞不前，因为它总是发现自己就像斯科特的悖论一样，处于创造性的运动之中（同上：105-6）。
Exemplifications of this minor tradition in feminist historiography which work along these lines can be found in the so-called “French feminism” from the 1980s (think of Helene Cixous, Julia Kristeva, and especially Luce Irigaray) and in today’s new materialist writing as we see it at work in, for instance, Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz.1 This chapter seeks to hook onto this minor tradition, and to re-read the work of de Beauvoir along the lines that it sets out. This chapter, by presenting a new materialist case study on sexual difference, zooms in on the way in which new materialism, by way of its traversing of dualisms, is always already a feminism that is not identity political.
女性主义史学中的这一次要传统的典范，可以在 20 世纪 80 年代所谓的 "法国女性主义"（想想海伦-西克苏斯、朱莉娅-克里斯蒂娃，尤其是露西-伊里格拉伊）和当今的新唯物主义写作中找到，例如我们在罗西-布赖多蒂和伊丽莎白-格罗斯身上看到的新唯物主义写作。 1 本章试图抓住这一次要传统，并按照它所提出的思路重新解读德-波伏娃的作品。本章通过对性差异的新唯物主义案例研究，放大了新唯物主义通过穿越二元对立的方式，始终已经是一种非身份政治的女性主义。

According to Grosz, the majority of feminist theories, or feminist historiographies, which are theories of the history of feminism, are teleological. As Grosz (2005, 162) claims:
格罗斯认为，大多数女性主义理论或女性主义史学（即女性主义历史理论）都是目的论的。正如格罗斯（2005 年，162 页）所说：

The future of feminism, on this understanding, is limited to the foreseeable and to contesting the recognized and the known. This limited temporality characterizes all feminist projects of equalization and inclusion as well as a number of projects within postmodern feminism.
根据这种理解，女权主义的未来仅限于可预见的未来，仅限于对公认和已知的未来提出质疑。这种有限的时间性是所有平等和包容的女权主义项目以及后现代女权主义中一些项目的特点。

The sense of paradox experienced by feminists is understood as a consequence of the teleological dialectics structuring the relation between the two feminist waves, and between feminism and patriarchy. An alternative position involves a historically specific, or an-teleological take on the history of feminism in which feminist subjectivity is seen as materializing, that is, in which the ontology of sexual difference is strictly performative. Whereas Scott is still in the process of opening up feminism to this new ontology by critiquing the major tradition in the historiography of feminist thought, Grosz seems to map a radically new materialism that has structural links to French feminism. Grosz indeed starts from “Irigaray, whose work on sexual difference has signaled the indeterminate, and possible indeterminable, necessity of feminist thought, a necessity which parallels or, in her terms, is isomorphic with, that of sexual difference, one of the incontestable and most inventive forms of biological and cultural existence” (ibid., 163). For Irigaray, feminism consists of the wish to restructure the relations through which the sexes are created as well as of the traversing of prevailing sexual differentiations on the personal, social, and symbolic level. These traversings, in addition, are always already at work in the practice of making sexual differentiations. Feminism as a restructuring and traversing exercise is in no way a dialectic, since all dialectics are prevented from affirming “the development of modes of action, thought, and language appropriate to and developed by both of the sexes” (ibid., 164). William James’ radical empiricism already noted that any kind of position is necessarily preceded by a relationality thanks to which a position can be established. Along the same lines, while speaking about how gender, race, and sexual orientation also emerge and back-form their own realities, Brian Massumi (2002, 8) argues: “Passage precedes construction.
女权主义者所体验到的悖论感被理解为两个女权浪潮之间以及女权主义与父权制之间的目的论辩证关系的结果。另一种立场则是对女性主义的历史采取一种历史性的、或辩证的态度，将女性主义的主体性视为物质化的，也就是说，性差异的本体论是严格的表演性的。斯科特仍在通过批判女性主义思想史学的主要传统，向这种新的本体论开放女性主义，而格罗斯则似乎在描绘一种与法国女性主义有着结构性联系的全新的唯物主义。事实上，格罗斯的出发点是 "伊里格拉伊，她关于性差异的研究表明了女性主义思想的不确定性和可能的不确定性，这种必要性与性差异的必要性是平行的，或者用她的话说，是同构的，性差异是生物和文化存在的无可争议和最具创造性的形式之一"（同上，163）。在伊里格瑞看来，女权主义包括希望重构两性关系，以及在个人、社会和象征层面上穿越普遍存在的性别差异。此外，这些穿越始终在性别区分的实践中发挥作用。女权主义作为一种重组和穿越活动，绝不是一种辩证法，因为所有的辩证法都无法确认 "适合两性并由两性发展的行动、思想和语言模式的发展"（同上，164）。威廉-詹姆斯（William James）的激进经验主义已经指出，任何一种立场都必然以一种关系性为先导，而正是由于这种关系性，立场才得以确立。 布赖恩-马苏米（Brian Massumi）（2002, 8）在谈到性别、种族和性取向如何出现并反向形成自己的现实时，也提出了同样的观点："通道先于建构。
But construction does effectively back-form its reality. Grids happen. So social and cultural determinations feed back into the process from which they arose. […] To say that passage and indeterminacy ‘come first’ or ‘are primary’ is more a statement of ontological priority than the assertion of a time sequence.”
但建筑确实有效地反向形成了现实。网格发生了。因此，社会和文化的决定性因素会反馈到其产生的过程中。[......]说通道和不确定性'先行'或'主要'，与其说是对时间顺序的断言，不如说是对本体论优先性的陈述"。

Affirming such a development of traversing can engender what Irigaray calls a “revolution in thought,” which does not imply “the overthrow of all previous thought, the radical disconnection from the concepts and language of the past,” that is, a critique with reactionary consequences, but rather “a certain kind of insinuation of sexual difference back into those places where it has been elided, the insistence on the necessity that every practice, method, and knowledge can be undertaken in another way” (Grosz 2005, 165). Feminism is now seen as a “practical philosophy” that focuses on “the singular point where concept and creation are related to each other” (Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994, 11). The outcomes of such a practical philosophy remain unforeseen, because “[w]hat today is actual is sexual opposition or binarism, the defining of the two sexes in terms of the characteristics of one. Sexual difference is that which is virtual; it is the potential of this opposition to function otherwise, to function without negation, to function as full positivity” (Grosz 2005, 164). The practical philosophy it puts forward, then, is structured by a “performative understanding, which shifts the focus from linguistic representations to discursive practices” (Barad 2003, 807).
肯定这种穿越的发展可以产生伊里格拉伊所说的 "思想革命"，这并不意味着 "推翻所有先前的思想，与过去的概念和语言彻底断绝关系"，也就是一种具有反动后果的批判，而是 "将性别差异以某种方式暗示回那些被忽略的地方，坚持每一种实践、方法和知识都可以以另一种方式进行的必要性"（格罗斯 2005, 165）。女权主义现在被视为一种 "实践哲学"，其重点是 "概念与创造相互关联的独特点"（德勒兹和瓜塔里 [1991] 1994, 11）。这种实践哲学的结果仍然是不可预见的，因为 "今天实际存在的是性对立或二元论，即用一种性别的特征来定义两种性别。性差异是虚拟的；它是这种对立的潜能，可以发挥其他作用，可以不带否定性地发挥作用，可以作为完全的积极性发挥作用"（格罗兹，2005 年，164）。因此，它所提出的实践哲学是以 "表演性理解 "为结构的，"表演性理解 "将重点从语言表述转向话语实践"（Barad 2003, 807）。

In this chapter, we try to further the development of sexual difference as a performative ontology. We call this “sexual differing”: an allowance for sexual difference actually to differ. It involves a rewriting of sexual difference and sexuality not by means of dualist premises, but as a practical philosophy in which difference in itself comes to being. In a manner similar to how other important fields in contemporary cultural theory, circling around concepts like “race”/ethnicity, class, sexuality, and most recently age or generationality, are slowly crashing against the limits of critique, feminism too seems to get stuck within its emphasis on sexual difference as a social construction (gender) opposite to a biological essence (sex). Surrounded by a so-called post-feminist popular and academic imagery, gender studies scholars today find themselves paralyzed by the “paradoxes” that their pasts have offered on the basis of teleology, and dualism structured by negation. Earlier we argued for writing the modernist oppositions as a form of continuously rewriting them, and we can now add that there is no reason why feminism or gender studies should place themselves beyond or outside the dualist paradigms in which they have been circling for so long. Instead, the aim we set for ourselves is to find out in what way we are to develop a different feminism that sets itself to a radical and continuous rewriting of this opposition, postponing the epistemological finitude (to use Meillassoux’s term) that it suggests. The feminism to come then works with sexual difference not as a paradox that needs to be solved, but rather as a virtuality, or as a discursive practice of sexual differing.
在本章中，我们试图将性差异进一步发展为一种表演性本体论。我们称之为 "性差异"：允许性差异实际上是差异。它不是通过二元论的前提来重写性差异和性行为，而是将其作为一种实践哲学，在这种哲学中，差异本身就会产生。当代文化理论的其他重要领域，如 "种族"/族裔、阶级、性，以及最近的年龄或代际等概念，都在慢慢地受到批判的限制，与此类似，女权主义似乎也陷入了对性差异的强调之中，将其视为一种社会建构（性别），与生物本质（性）相对立。在所谓 "后女性主义 "的流行和学术意象的包围下，今天的性别研究学者发现自己被过去在目的论基础上提出的 "悖论 "和否定结构的二元论所麻痹。早些时候，我们主张将书写现代主义对立作为一种不断改写对立的形式，现在我们可以补充说，女性主义或性别研究没有理由将自己置于二元论范式之外，因为它们长期以来一直在二元论范式中打转。相反，我们为自己设定的目标是，找出我们发展不同的女性主义的方式，这种女性主义致力于彻底、持续地改写这种对立，推迟它所暗示的认识论上的终极性（用迈拉苏的话说）。因此，未来的女性主义不是将性差异作为一个需要解决的悖论，而是作为一种虚拟性，或者说作为一种性差异的话语实践。
Thus we set ourselves here to finding traces of sexual differing that can rewrite feminist theory, experimenting with the minor statements in the work of contemporary feminists, feminists of the past, and scholars who came from elsewhere but are equally engaged in the production of a performative ontology of sexual difference (e.g. Deleuze and Guattari, but also Rosi Braidotti and Karen Barad). For feminism to be indeterminate (infinite), not to be formed around critique, it has to allow for the provocation that practical philosophy offers sexual difference. This entails the affirmation of the fact that feminism materializes sexual difference described as paradoxical, and that feminism has to be understood precisely as such.
因此，我们在此着手寻找能够重写女性主义理论的性差异的踪迹，在当代女性主义者、过去的女性主义者以及来自其他地方但同样参与性差异表演性本体论生产的学者（如德勒兹和瓜塔里，还有罗西-布赖多蒂和卡伦-巴拉德）的作品中，对次要陈述进行实验。女性主义要想成为不确定的（无限的），而不是围绕批判形成的，就必须允许实践哲学为性差异提供挑衅。这就需要肯定这样一个事实，即女性主义将被描述为自相矛盾的性差异具体化，而女性主义恰恰必须被理解为自相矛盾的性差异。

Despite the fact that the major tradition in feminist historiography features her work differently, we aim to show that the conclusion to The Second Sex neatly mirrors the Irigarayan undecidability affirmed by Grosz. We justify this claim by following Sara Heinamaa (1997, 33-4, n. 4) who has suggested that “we should reject the sex/gender distinction and Sartre’s existentialism [which is also based on dualism structured by negation] as keys to de Beauvoir’s texts” without, however, fully affirming Heinamaa’s subsumption of the work under a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology instead.2 Following a full description of sexual difference, de Beauvoir ([1949] 2010, 765) states that “new carnal and affective relations of which we cannot conceive will be born between the sexes.” In other words, she finds that the asymmetries between the sexes are traversed while installed and maintained in patriarchy. Read as a practical philosophy, thus restructuring and traversing the gendered dualist logic of modernity, The Second Sex opens the way for the indeterminacy of sexual differing; right after the previous quote de Beauvoir claims that she “do[es] not see […] that freedom has ever created uniformity” (ibid., 765). We will demonstrate in this chapter that opening up the dominant historiography of feminism by re-reading de Beauvoir has the potential to break through the multiple paralyses experienced by contemporary feminists. Along with that, the re-reading can offer us a way out of dualist thought per se that might be equally important to other minor streams of culture, that is, to those interested in searching for a meaningful alternative to how the concepts of
尽管女性主义史学的主要传统对她的作品有不同的评价，但我们的目的是要表明，《第二性》的结论与格罗兹所肯定的伊里格拉亚的不确定性如出一辙。萨拉-海纳玛（Sara Heinamaa）（1997, 33-4, n.4）认为，"我们应该拒绝将性/性别区分和萨特的存在主义[也是基于否定结构的二元论]作为波伏娃文本的关键"，但我们并不完全赞同海纳玛将这部作品归入梅洛-庞蒂现象学的观点。 2 德-波伏娃（[1949] 2010, 765）在全面描述了性差异之后指出，"我们无法想象的新的肉体和情感关系将在两性之间诞生"。换句话说，她发现两性之间的不对称在父权制的设置和维持下得以穿越。作为一种实践哲学，《第二性》重构并穿越了现代性的性别二元逻辑，为性差异的不确定性开辟了道路；德-波伏娃在引用前一句话后声称，她 "不认为[......]自由曾创造过统一性"（同上，765）。我们将在本章中证明，通过重读德-波伏娃来打开女性主义的主流史学，有可能突破当代女性主义者所经历的多重瘫痪。与此同时，重读德-波伏娃还能为我们提供一条摆脱二元论思想本身的途径，这对其他次要文化流派，即那些有兴趣寻找一种有意义的替代方法，来取代德-波伏娃的概念的人来说，可能同样重要。

“race”/ethnicity, class, sexuality and age have been equally paralyzed by this “binary” take on dualism. Rewriting feminist historiography thus builds up to a materialist rewriting of academia as a whole.
这种 "二元 "的二元论同样使 "种族"/民族、阶级、性和年龄陷入瘫痪。因此，重写女性主义史学将导致对整个学术界的唯物主义重写。

Neither Sex Nor Gender But Sexual Difference
既非性也非性别，而是性差异

The received view on de Beauvoir^3 is laid out in Judith Butler’s “Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex,” which is a philosophical meditation on de Beauvoir’s famous statement that “[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes, woman” (de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 283). Butler (1986, 35) explains how de Beauvoir has disconnected sex and gender thus allowing for “a radical heteronomy of natural bodies and constructed genders with the consequence that ‘being’ female and ‘being’ a woman are two very different sorts of being.” “Gender,” then, “must be understood as a modality of taking on or realizing possibilities, a process of interpreting the body, giving it cultural form. In other words, to be a woman is to become a woman; it is not a matter of acquiescing to a fixed ontological status, in which case one could be born a woman, but, rather, an active process of appropriating, interpreting, and reinterpreting received cultural possibilities” (ibid., 36). This passage is important for its two implications that obviously structure Butler’s own later work on the concept of gender (cf. Sonser Breen and Blumenfeld 2005).
朱迪斯-巴特勒（Judith Butler）的《西蒙娜-德-波伏娃的《第二性》中的性与性别》（"Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir's Second Sex"）对德-波伏娃的名言 "女人不是天生的，而是后天形成的"（德-波伏娃[1949] 2010, 283）进行了哲学沉思，阐述了对德-波伏娃 3 的公认观点。巴特勒（1986, 35）解释了德-波伏娃如何将性与性别割裂开来，从而允许 "自然身体与建构性别的彻底异质性，其结果是'作为'女性与'作为'女人是两种截然不同的存在"。因此，"性别""必须被理解为一种承担或实现可能性的方式，一种诠释身体、赋予其文化形式的过程。换句话说，成为女人就是成为女人；这不是默许一个固定的本体论地位的问题，在这种情况下，一个人可能生来就是女人，而是一个占有、解释和重新解释所接受的文化可能性的积极过程"（同上，36）。这段话的重要意义在于它的两个含义，而这两个含义显然是巴特勒本人后来关于性别概念的研究的基础（参见 Sonser Breen 和 Blumenfeld，2005 年）。

First, Butler does not qualitatively shift ontology’s assumed fixed status. In gender theory, natural bodies are implicitly ascribed to, albeit that the traditional assumption that sex defines gender is reversed. When gender defines sex, sex or bodily matter, however malleable, is still assumed to be passive. Butler (1986, 35) argues that “the female body is the arbitrary locus of the gender “woman,” and there is no reason to preclude the possibility of that body becoming the locus of other constructions of gender.” In Butler’s reading of de Beauvoir, a strict dualism is installed, now articulated by gender as it refers to a form of expression, and sex as it refers to a form of content. The relation created between how both content and expression are formed is not relative but absolute. Extracting a signifier from the word (gender) and from the thing (sex), a signified in conformity with the word, subjected to the word, Butler restricts herself to an oversimplified idea of language which refuses to see how the politics active in sex and gender build upon a series of statements and states of things that have always already been intrinsically entwined with one another and that are always in processes of morphogenesis corresponding to one another. The everchanging flows of matter and meaning would never allow themselves to be reduced to one signifier and one signified creating one sign. When Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 67) speak of the “discursive multiplicities” of expression and the “nondiscursive multiplicities” of content they refer precisely to this infinite (not one-on-one) enfolding of matter and meaning, which has always already led to the “material-discursive,” as Barad (following Donna Haraway) conceptualizes it. In terms of Butler’s feminism, the (female) body is not understood to be performative, or, in Vicki Kirby’s terms, “telling flesh” (Kirby 1997).
首先，巴特勒并没有从本质上改变本体论假定的固定地位。在性别理论中，自然身体被隐含地归属于性别，尽管性别定义性别的传统假设被颠倒了。当性别定义性别时，性别或身体物质无论如何可塑，仍被假定为被动的。巴特勒（1986，35）认为，"女性身体是性别'女性'的任意位置，没有理由排除该身体成为其他性别建构位置的可能性"。在巴特勒对德波伏娃的解读中，一种严格的二元论被植入其中，现在，性别是指一种表达形式，而性别是指一种内容形式。内容和表达方式之间的关系不是相对的，而是绝对的。巴特勒从词语（性别）和事物（性）中抽取出一个符号，一个与词语一致、受制于词语的符号，这就把自己限制在一个过于简单化的语言观念中，拒绝看到活跃在性和性别中的政治是如何建立在一系列事物的陈述和状态之上的，而这些陈述和状态总是已经内在地相互纠缠在一起，并且总是处于相互对应的变形过程中。物质和意义不断变化的流动永远不会被简化为一个符号和一个被符号创造一个符号。当德勒兹和瓜塔里（[1980] 1987, 67）谈到表达的 "话语多重性 "和内容的 "非话语多重性 "时，他们指的正是物质和意义的这种无限（而非一对一）的缠绕，正如巴拉德（追随唐娜-哈拉维）所概念化的那样，这种缠绕总是导致 "物质-话语"。 就巴特勒的女性主义而言，（女性）身体不被理解为表演性的，或者用维姬-柯比（Vicki Kirby）的话说，是 "诉说肉体"（柯比，1997 年）。

Second, and following from its fixed position as a signifier (of a signified), gender gets a fixed meaning too by suggesting that it is a modality of taking on or realizing possibilities. Grosz (2005, 106) has argued for the need to import the Bergsonian distinction between the conceptual pairs virtual/actual and possible/real in feminist theory, conceptual pairs that are defined as follows:
其次，性别作为符号（被符号）的固定位置，通过暗示它是一种承担或实现可能性的方式，也获得了固定的意义。格罗斯（Grosz，2005，106）认为有必要在女性主义理论中引入柏格森（Bergsonian）关于虚拟/现实和可能/现实这两对概念的区分，这两对概念的定义如下：

The real creates an image of itself, which, by projecting itself back into the past, gives it the status of always-having-been-possible. The possible is ideally preexistent, an existence that precedes materialization. The possible, instead of being a reverse projection of the real, might be better understood in terms of the virtual, which has reality without being actual (ibid., 107).
现实创造了自身的形象，通过将自身投射回过去，赋予了它 "一直存在--可能 "的地位。在理想状态下，"可能 "是一种先于 "物化 "的存在。与其说 "可能 "是现实的反向投射，倒不如用 "虚拟 "来更好地理解。

Despite Butler’s great hopes, conceptualizations along the lines of the possible/real limit biological or anatomical sex to the culturally foreseeable, recognized, and known (which is the equally limited “gender”). Grosz claims that “[t]o reduce the possible to a preexistent phantom-like real is to curtail the possibility of thinking the new, of thinking an open future, a future not bound to the present, just as the present is itself a production of the past” (ibid., 108). Butler’s Lacanian re-reading of de Beauvoir, then, read along with Grosz, severely limits the potential of feminism to make a difference as its ontology and epistemology are confined by historically established gendered patterns, predicated on a linear and causal theory of time. Locating gender ultimately in the female body, that is, projecting the word into the thing like the present is projected back into the past, turns the future of feminism into a descriptive historicism, enslaved by a major History (Deleuze and Guattari’s abovementioned “constant”) according to which its paths are set out.
尽管巴特勒寄予厚望，但按照 "可能/现实 "的思路进行的概念化却将生物或解剖学上的性别限制在文化上可预见的、公认的和已知的范围内（这就是同样有限的 "性别"）。格罗斯声称，"将可能还原为一个预先存在的幻影般的现实，就是限制了思考新事物的可能性，限制了思考开放的未来的可能性，限制了思考不受现在束缚的未来的可能性，正如现在本身就是过去的产物一样"（同上，108）。因此，巴特勒对波伏娃的拉康式重读与格罗斯的重读，严重限制了女性主义有所作为的潜力，因为女性主义的本体论和认识论受限于历史上既定的性别模式，以线性和因果的时间理论为前提。将性别最终定位于女性的身体，也就是将文字投射到事物中，就像将现在投射回过去一样，将女性主义的未来变成了一种描述性的历史主义，受制于一个大历史（德勒兹和瓜塔里的上述 "常量"），而它的道路正是根据这个大历史设定的。

It is worth noting that Butler discusses ontology in de Beauvoir (and “women” in feminism; see Butler 1993, 187-222) in terms of paradoxes .4 She states that for de Beauvoir “[w]e never experience or know ourselves as a body pure and simple, i.e. as our ‘sex,’ because we never know our sex outside of its expression of gender. Lived or experienced ‘sex’ is always already gendered. We become our genders, but we become them from a place which cannot be found and which, strictly speaking, cannot be said to exist” (Butler 1986, 39). Here we see that, indeed, sex is the Lacanian signified which needs to be coded by a (linguistic) signifier which is gender (only revealing itself temporarily and fragmentarily through metonyms and metaphors). Later on in the article, Butler states that “[n]ot only is gender no longer dictated by anatomy, but anatomy does not seem to pose any necessary limits to the possibilities of gender” (ibid., 45), thus ultimately affirming the body as fully malleable. The temporality underlying all of this is one according to which “gender is a contemporary way of organizing past and future cultural norms, a way of situating oneself with respect to those norms, an active style of living one’s body in the world” (ibid., 40). This is where we find Grosz’s observations confirmed: the past (sex) is constituted in the present (gender) and so is the future along the lines of a realization of possibilities. The possible in Butler’s reading of de Beauvoir is a reverse projection of the real; we cannot know the possible outside of the real just as it has no active role in signification. The real, then, is sexual opposition or binarism indeed, which is projected back into the past. Flesh appears as mute; Butler’s seeming revolution in thought vis-a-vis de Beauvoir is undone by the representationalism implied by the possible/real and the signifier/ signified couplings (cf. Colebrook 2004). But how, then, should de Beauvoir be read so as to ascribe this Irigarayan undecidability, affirmed by Grosz, to the work?
值得注意的是，巴特勒从悖论的角度讨论了德-波伏娃（以及女权主义中的 "女性"，见 Butler 1993, 187-222）的本体论。 4 她指出，对于德-波伏娃来说，"我们从未作为纯粹和简单的身体（即我们的'性别'）来体验或认识我们自己，因为我们从未在性别表达之外认识我们的性别。生活或经历过的'性'总是已经被性别化了。我们成为我们的性别，但我们是从一个无法找到的地方成为它们的，严格地说，这个地方不能说是存在的"（巴特勒，1986 年，39 页）。在这里，我们可以看到，性的确是拉康意义上的符号，它需要用（语言）符号来编码，而（语言）符号就是性别（只是通过隐喻和隐喻暂时、零散地显现出来）。在文章的后面，巴特勒指出，"不仅性别不再由解剖学决定，而且解剖学似乎也没有对性别的可能性构成任何必要的限制"（同上，45），从而最终肯定了身体是完全可塑的。所有这一切的基础是一种时间性，根据这种时间性，"性别是当代组织过去和未来文化规范的一种方式，是根据这些规范定位自己的一种方式，是在世界上以自己的身体积极生活的一种方式"（同上，40）。格罗斯的观点在这里得到了印证：过去（性）构成了现在（性别），未来也是沿着实现可能性的方向发展的。在巴特勒对波伏娃的解读中，可能是现实的反向投射；我们无法了解现实之外的可能，正如它在符号中没有积极作用一样。那么，现实就是性对立或二元论，它被投射回过去。 肉体似乎是哑巴；巴特勒针对德-波伏娃的看似思想革命，被可能/现实和符号/被符号耦合所隐含的表象主义所抵消（参见 Colebrook 2004）。那么，应该如何解读德-波伏娃，才能将格罗斯所肯定的这种伊里格拉亚式的不确定性赋予这部作品呢？

In “de Beauvoir and Biology: A Second Look,” Moira Gatens (2003, 274) clearly states that de Beauvoir’s “point in The Second Sex is not that the natural body has no hold on social values or that it is ‘value all the way down.’” Gatens reads de Beauvoir as affirming “an interactive loop between bodies and values” (ibid., 274) and gives two examples from The Second Sex of the entanglement of, rather than the unilinear causality between, sex and gender, one of which she discusses at length (the post-menopausal woman [ibid., 278-9]) and the other she mentions only in passing (women’s eroticism [ibid., 273]). The post-menopausal woman, Gatens affirms, proposes an important challenge to the Butlerian grid laid over the work of de Beauvoir by allowing for the bodies (sex) of these self-identified women to influence their cultural interpretation, namely as non-feminine (gender). The body that is no longer menstruating is one of those examples that show how a body cannot be grasped with signifier/signified or possible/ real, as this sexed body refuses to conform to the word “gender” nor to a realization of sexual binarism. The same goes for women’s eroticism, the other example Gatens comes up with. Like Gatens, Karen Vintges ([1992] 1996, 47) clearly states in Philosophy as Passion: The Thinking of Simone de Beauvoir that intersubjectivity, despite Jean-Paul Sartre debunking the notion, “comes about because both partners undergo a metamorphosis into flesh (chair) through emotional intoxication, and experience themselves and the other simultaneously as subjectivity and as passivity.” In a slightly different register, then, making love allows for a “becoming ‘flesh’ [also: incarnation] through emotion” resulting in “a unification of body and consciousness” (ibid., 48).
Moira Gatens（2003，274）在 "de Beauvoir and Biology：Moira Gatens（2003，274）明确指出，德-波伏娃 "在《第二性》中的观点并不是说自然身体对社会价值没有任何影响，也不是说'价值一路向下'"。加滕斯认为德-波伏娃肯定了 "身体与价值之间的互动循环"（同上，274），并从《第二性》中举出了两个例子来说明性与性别之间的纠葛，而不是单线因果关系，其中一个例子她做了详细论述（绝经后的女性[同上，278-9]），另一个例子她只是顺带提及（女性的情欲[同上，273]）。加滕斯认为，绝经后女性对布特勒式的德-波伏娃作品提出了重要的挑战，允许这些自我认同的女性的身体（性别）影响她们的文化阐释，即非女性（性别）阐释。不再来月经的身体就是其中一个例子，它说明了身体如何无法用符号/被符号化或可能/真实来把握，因为这种有性别的身体既不符合 "性别 "一词，也不符合对性二元论的认识。加滕斯提出的另一个例子--女性的情色主义也是如此。与加滕斯一样，卡伦-文特奇斯（Karen Vintges）（[1992] 1996, 47）在《作为激情的哲学》一书中也明确指出："西蒙娜-德-贝弗利的思想，是一种'作为激情的哲学'：西蒙娜-德-波伏娃的思想》一书中明确指出，尽管让-保罗-萨特驳斥了主体间性这一概念，但 "主体间性之所以产生，是因为伴侣双方都通过情感陶醉而蜕变为肉体（椅子），并同时作为主体性和被动性来体验自己和对方"。因此，在一个稍有不同的层面上，做爱允许 "通过情感成为'肉体'[也指化身]"，从而实现 "身体与意识的统一"（同上，48）。
Vintges presents another convincing argument about de Beauvoir’s anti-representationalism and her usage of the virtual/ actual coupling; the love-making de Beauvoir finds enabling is not modelled on certain modes (e.g. the Marquis de Sade’s sadomasochism, or marital sex), and affects both sexes in unforeseeable ways (ibid., 48-9). Gatens (2003, 283) indeed states that the future, for de Beauvoir, is open and as yet unknowable to the mind (unfeelable by the body), due to her strong belief in truths as unfixed, as ambiguous, as inherently paradoxical. She affirms that “the incessant play between the two terms of a pair, say, nature and culture, is what constitutes our situation as always ambiguous, always involving a free ‘becoming,’ rather than mere ‘being’” (Gatens 2003, 282).
Vintges就德-波伏娃的反再现主义和她对虚拟/现实耦合的使用提出了另一个令人信服的论点；德-波伏娃所发现的做爱方式并不是以某些模式（如萨德侯爵的施虐受虐或婚姻性爱）为蓝本，而是以不可预见的方式影响着两性（同上，48-9）。Gatens (2003, 283) 确实指出，对波伏娃而言，未来是开放的，对心灵而言是不可知的（对身体而言是不可感知的），这是因为她坚信真理是不固定的，是模糊的，是内在矛盾的。她认为，"自然与文化这一对术语之间的不断博弈，使我们的处境总是模棱两可，总是涉及自由的'成为'，而不仅仅是'存在'"（Gatens 2003, 282）。

Here, then, we have arrived at a radically different reading of de Beauvoir, as her model of becoming a woman now involves something that is not to be grasped with social constructivism (gender defines sex).5 By not ascribing to biological essentialism (sex defines gender) either, de Beauvoir opens the way for a performative understanding of ontology, or better yet, of ontogenesis. de Beauvoir introduces a sexual differing, the fulcrum of which, we want to propose, is to be found in her concept “flesh.” In The Second Sex, flesh is one of those singular points at which the conceptual and the creative meet. It is a term usually associated with Georges Bataille, Antonin Artaud, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who also make use of it in order to come closer to the morphogenetic essence of the human body. With de Beauvoir the concept functions as the point of departure from which she taps into the ongoing rewriting of sexual difference, since flesh allows her to traverse the signs that stick to the body, that decide the “situation of woman.” In the end—and this is crucial—conceptualizing flesh allows her to be undecidable about the relations between the sexes that are to come.
在这里，我们对波伏娃的解读有了根本性的不同，因为她的成为女人的模式现在涉及到了社会建构主义（性别决定性别）所无法把握的东西。 5 德-波伏娃也不信奉生物本质论（性别决定性别），她为本体论的表演性理解，或者更好的是，本体生成的理解开辟了道路。德-波伏娃引入了一种性差异，我们想提出的是，这种差异的支点可以在她的概念 "肉体 "中找到。在《第二性》中，"肉体 "是概念性与创造性交汇的一个奇特点。这个词通常与乔治-巴塔耶（Georges Bataille）、安东宁-阿尔陶（Antonin Artaud）和莫里斯-梅洛-庞蒂（Maurice Merleau-Ponty）联系在一起，他们也使用这个词来接近人体的形态本质。在德-波伏娃那里，肉体这一概念是一个出发点，她从这个出发点出发，不断地改写性差异，因为肉体让她能够穿越那些粘附在身体上的符号，这些符号决定了 "女人的处境"。最后--这一点至关重要--肉体的概念化使她能够对即将到来的两性关系保持不确定性。

First she provides a diagnosis of sexual difference via flesh, or incarnation, engaging herself with the psychoanalytical idea of the phallus.6 The phallus involves signification—“the apprehension of a signification through an analogue of the signifying object” (de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 56). Signification is the source of alienation: “the anxiety of his freedom leads the subject to search for himself in things, which is a way to flee from himself” (ibid., 57). This process of “bad faith” differs for the two sexes. For man, “the fleshy incarnation of transcendence” (ibid.) happens through the flesh of the penis, whereas woman “does not alienate herself in a graspable thing, does not reclaim herself: she is thus led to make her entire self an object, to posit herself as the Other” (ibid., 57-8). So whereas de Beauvoir immediately reminds us that “[o]nly within the situation grasped in its totality does anatomical privilege found a truly human privilege” (ibid., 58), the relation between the sexes is dualist when considering the phallus. In the context of the phallus or the totem, women can do nothing but “perpetuat[e] carnal existence” (ibid., 82) whereas men can incarnate transcendence via the phallus, a dualism which has asymmetrical consequences:
首先，她通过肉体或化身对性差异进行了诊断，将自己与精神分析的 "阴茎 "概念联系在一起。 6 阴茎涉及符号化--"通过符号对象的类似物对符号的理解"（de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 56）。符号化是异化的根源："自由的焦虑导致主体在事物中寻找自身，而这是逃离自身的一种方式"（同上，57）。这种 "背信弃义 "的过程在两性中有所不同。对男人来说，"超越的肉体化身"（同上）是通过阴茎的肉体实现的，而女人 "并没有在一个可把握的事物中异化自己，并没有重新找回自己：她因此被引导着将整个自我作为客体，将自己定位为他者"（同上，57-8）。因此，德-波伏娃立即提醒我们，"只有在整体把握的情况下，解剖学特权才是真正的人类特权"（同上，58），而在考虑阴茎时，两性之间的关系是二元的。在阴茎或图腾的语境中，女性只能 "延续肉体的存在"（同上，82），而男性则可以通过阴茎实现超越，这种二元论造成了不对称的后果：

Woman is sometimes designated as ‘sex’: it is she who is the flesh, its delights and its dangers. That for woman it is man who is sexed and carnal is a truth that has never been proclaimed because there is no one to proclaim it. The representation of the world as the world itself is the work of men; they describe it from a point of view that is their own and that they confound with the absolute truth. […] since the coming of patriarchy, life in man’s eyes has taken on a dual aspect: it is consciousness, will, transcendence, it is intellect; and it is matter, passivity, immanence, it is flesh (ibid., 162-3).
女人有时被称为 "性"：她是肉体，是肉体的乐趣，也是肉体的危险。对女人来说，男人才是性和肉体，这是一个从未被宣扬过的真理，因为没有人去宣扬它。将世界表现为世界本身是人类的杰作；他们从自己的角度描述世界，并将其与绝对真理混为一谈。[......]自从父权制出现以来，人类眼中的生活就具有了双重性：它是意识、意志、超越，是理智；它是物质、被动、内在，是肉体（同上，162-3）。

The current representation of sexual difference, de Beauvoir shows, is projected back into the past—as if sexual binarism precedes and thus justifies patriarchy, and as if young girls are destined to become woman.
德-波伏娃指出，当前对性别差异的表述被投射到了过去--就好像性别二元论先于父权制，从而为父权制辩护，就好像年轻女孩注定要成为女人。

Second, the way out of sexual difference (that is, the road to sexual differing) presents itself equally in The Second Sex through the flesh, and we have already seen this in our discussion of eroticism. Only by starting with the flesh, de Beauvoir moves towards an Irigarayan undecidability of sexual difference, a true becoming woman. Examples of this are the experiences of women in natural environments. In women’s literature, among other things, de Beauvoir has found instances that, away from the house and the city, “show the comfort the adolescent girl finds in the fields and woods” (ibid., 376), which leads her to the important claim that here:
其次，在《第二性》中，性差异的出路（即通往性差异之路）同样是通过肉体来呈现的，这一点我们已经在对情欲主义的讨论中看到了。只有从肉体出发，德-波伏娃才能走向性差异的伊里格拉亚式的不确定性，也就是真正的成为女人。女性在自然环境中的经历就是一个例子。在女性文学作品中，德-波伏娃发现了一些远离家庭和城市的例子，"展示了青春期少女在田野和树林中找到的慰藉"（同上，376），这使她提出了一个重要的主张，即："在这里：

[e]xistence is not only an abstract destiny inscribed in town hall registers; it is future and carnal richness. Having a body no longer seems like a shameful failing […] Flesh is no longer filth: it is joy and beauty. Merged with sky and heath, the girl is this vague breath that stirs up and kindles the universe, and she is every sprig of heather; an individual rooted in the soil and infinite consciousness, she is both spirit and life; her presence is imperious and triumphant like that of the earth itself (ibid., 376-7).
[存在不仅是市政厅登记簿上的抽象命运，它还是未来和肉体的财富。拥有肉体不再是可耻的失败[......]肉体不再是污秽：它是快乐和美丽。女孩与天空和石南草融为一体，她是唤醒和点燃宇宙的模糊气息，她是每一株石南草；她是植根于土壤和无限意识中的个体，她既是精神也是生命；她的存在就像大地本身一样威严而胜利（同上，376-7）。

Much like Artaud (1971) and his use of flesh, de Beauvoir proposes to think from a very naive stance, which is not romanticizing a kind of youthfulness (think for instance how the same argument can be found when she talks about the post-menopausal woman), nor do we need to undo or forget how the processes of subjectification, of becoming a woman, are at work in our lives (a kind of Aristophanic return). What she instead asks us to do is to rethink sexual difference from a very pragmatic or empirical point of view. In fact, de Beauvoir introduces us to a naive ethics that, as its point of departure, is not willing to accept received sociobiological or socio-cultural differences between the sexes. As with Artaud, it is an ethics that starts from the soil within which a force of life that gives form to flesh and spirit is at work. In contrast to the way de Beauvoir is usually read in feminist theory, she takes here an affirmative stance, trying to think of feminism not as a critical but as a vitalist project.
与阿尔陶（1971 年）及其对肉体的使用一样，德-波伏娃提出了一种非常天真的思考方式，她并没有将一种青春浪漫化（例如，当她谈到绝经后的女性时，也可以找到同样的论点），我们也不需要取消或忘记主体化的过程，即成为女性的过程是如何在我们的生活中起作用的（一种亚里士多德式的回归）。相反，她要求我们做的是从实用主义或经验主义的角度重新思考性别差异。事实上，德-波伏娃向我们介绍了一种天真的伦理学，其出发点是不愿意接受两性之间的社会生物学或社会文化差异。与阿尔陶一样，这种伦理学的出发点是一种赋予肉体和精神以形式的生命力的土壤。与德-波伏娃通常在女性主义理论中的解读方式不同，她在这里采取了一种肯定的立场，试图将女性主义视为一种生命力计划，而不是批判。

Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 276—7) appear to be very much inspired by de Beauvoir’s materialist feminism of the flesh as they equate her becoming-woman with “the girl.” It is a thoroughly vitalist concept that performs the hysteric reality of all bodies-to-come:
德勒兹和瓜塔里（[1980] 1987, 276-7）似乎深受波伏娃的肉体唯物主义女性主义的启发，他们将波伏娃的 "成为女人 "等同于 "女孩"。这是一个彻底的生命主义概念，它表现了所有即将到来的身体的歇斯底里的现实：

Doubtless, the girl becomes a woman in the molar or organic sense. But conversely, becoming-woman or the molecular woman is the girl herself. […] She never ceases to roam upon a body without organs. […] Thus girls do not belong to an age group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce n molecular sexes on the line of flight in relation to the dualism machines they cross right through. The only way to get outside the dualisms is to be-between, to pass between. […] It is not the girl who becomes a woman; it is becoming-woman that produces the universal girl.7
毫无疑问，女孩成为了臼齿或有机意义上的女人。但反过来说，成为女人或分子女人就是女孩本身。[......]她从未停止在没有器官的身体上游荡。[......]因此，女孩并不属于某个年龄组、性别、秩序或王国：她们无处不在，在秩序、行为、年龄、性别之间游走；她们在与二元机器有关的飞行线路上产生了 n 个分子性别，她们直接穿过了二元机器。跳出二元对立的唯一途径就是介于二元对立和二元对立之间。[......]不是女孩成为女人，而是成为女人产生了普遍的女孩。 7

By opposing the molar to the molecular and by favoring this molecular stance, Deleuze and Guattari do the same as de Beauvoir: they favor becoming over being, they study movement and affect instead of signs and codes. Contrary to Butler, who seems to be chasing a molar narrative, Deleuze and Guattari affirm de Beauvoir (and Artaud) in proposing a feminism that is an equally materialist and equally vitalist search for de Beauvoir’s fleshy future.
德勒兹和瓜塔里将摩尔与分子对立起来，并倾向于这种分子立场，这与德-波伏娃的做法如出一辙：他们倾向于 "成为 "而非 "存在"，他们研究的是运动和影响而非符号和代码。与巴特勒似乎在追逐摩尔叙事相反，德勒兹和瓜塔里肯定了德-波伏娃（和阿尔托），提出了一种女性主义，这种女性主义同样是对德-波伏娃肉体未来的一种唯物主义和生命主义的追寻。

For it is no coincidence that de Beauvoir does not say that the girl becomes the woman. There is not a projection backwards of the woman, of sexual binarism, onto the girl. The sexed body of the girl is not fully captured by the word “woman.” de Beauvoir says here that there is becoming from the girl to the woman. It is a naivete to come, an Irigarayan undecidability. It is a discovery of the flesh that is always already taking place. The virtual (the girl: sexual differing) has reality without being actual (because we are subjected to femininity: sexual difference). de Beauvoir’s practical philosophy, which culminates in the flesh, asks us to commit ourselves to an ethics of rethinking feminism from its most elementary basis.
德-波伏娃并没有说女孩变成了女人，这绝非巧合。德-波伏娃并没有把女人、性的二元论反向投射到女孩身上。德-波伏娃在这里说的是从女孩变成女人。这是一种天真的来临，一种伊里格拉亚式的不确定性。这是对肉体的发现，而这种发现一直在发生。德-波伏娃的实践哲学在 "肉体 "中达到了顶峰，它要求我们致力于从最基本的基础上重新思考女权主义的伦理。

What Is Practical Philosophy?
什么是实践哲学？

In an interview Guattari tells us how he and Deleuze worked with this life force they found in the work of Artaud and de Beauvoir, amongst others, by always starting their analysis with “desire.” This is true not least place when they come to speak of the woman:
在一次访谈中，瓜塔里告诉我们他和德勒兹是如何利用他们在阿尔托和波伏娃等人的作品中发现的这种生命力的，他们的分析总是从 "欲望 "开始。当他们谈到女性时，也是如此：

If Gilles Deleuze and I have adopted the position of practically not speaking of sexuality, and instead speaking of desire, it’s because we consider that the problems of life and creation are never reducible to physiological functions, reproductive functions, to some particular dimension of the body. They always involve elements that are either beyond the individual in the social or political field, or else before the individual level (Guattari and Rolnik [1982] 2008, 411).
如果说吉尔-德勒兹和我采取的立场是实际上不谈论性，而是谈论欲望，那是因为我们认为生命和创造的问题永远不能还原为生理功能、生殖功能、身体的某个特定维度。它们总是涉及超越个人的社会或政治领域的因素，或者是在个人层面之前的因素（Guattari and Rolnik [1982] 2008, 411）。

By starting with desire, Guattari and Deleuze radically ward off the critical perspective that turned out to be so central to feminist theory built on the dominant (molar) reception of de Beauvoir. It places fundamental question marks after its emphasis on power, which they replaced by an emphasis on desire. Power ascribes to the representationalism underlying sexual difference, whereas with desire the qualitative shift towards sexual differing can be made. Only in a short comment regarding the work of Michel Foucault, Deleuze (1997, 186) explains in a nutshell this important shift when claiming:
通过从欲望入手，瓜塔里和德勒兹从根本上摒弃了建立在对波伏娃的主流（摩尔式）接受之上的女性主义理论的核心批判视角。他们在强调权力之后打上了根本性的问号，取而代之的是对欲望的强调。权力是性差异的表象，而欲望则是性差异的质变。德勒兹（1997 年，186 页）在对米歇尔-福柯作品的简短评论中简明扼要地解释了这一重要转变，他声称：

In short, it is not the dispositifs of power that assemble [agenceraient], nor would they be constitutive; it is rather the agencements of desire that would spread throughout the formations of power following one of their dimensions.
简言之，不是权力的构成要素聚集[agenceraient]，也不是权力的构成要素；而是欲望的构成要素按照权力的一个维度遍布整个权力形态。

Again, though we are now mainly concerned with feminist theory and sexual difference, this argument not only shifts the critical perspective as practiced in gender studies, it also offers an alternative to the way in which concepts like “race”/ethnicity, class, and age have been dominating the discussions within other fields in the humanities and the social sciences since the 1980’s.
同样，尽管我们现在主要关注的是女性主义理论和性差异问题，但这一论点不仅转变了性别研究中的批判视角，而且还为 20 世纪 80 年代以来在人文和社会科学其他领域中主导讨论的 "种族"/民族、阶级和年龄等概念提供了另一种选择。

Let us first of all ensure that this concept of desire, which traverses the aforementioned categories and which might give one the impression that only the mind is now at stake (and not the body), is actually a materialist concept with Deleuze and Guattari. For although Guattari especially has a strong background in (Lacanian) psychoanalysis, their idea of desire is without a doubt Spinozist. Spinoza, and most of all the Spinoza of the Ethics, might very well be considered the first (the foremost) new materialist. Especially his formula—being the mind is an idea of the body, while the body is the object of the mind—is undisputedly the starting point of all new materialist thinking, and it has for that reason appeared in various guises throughout the work of new materialists. Spinoza’s definition of desire starts from the sameness of the mind and body as it composes our nature, or as he puts it:
首先，我们要确保这个跨越了上述范畴的 "欲望 "概念在德勒兹和瓜塔里那里实际上是一个唯物主义的概念。尽管瓜塔里尤其具有深厚的（拉康式）精神分析背景，但他们的欲望观念无疑是斯宾诺莎主义的。斯宾诺莎，尤其是《伦理学》中的斯宾诺莎，很可能被视为第一位（最重要的）新唯物主义者。尤其是他的公式--心灵是身体的观念，而身体是心灵的对象--无可争议地成为所有新唯物主义思想的起点，也正因如此，它以各种面貌出现在新唯物主义者的著作中。斯宾诺莎对欲望的定义是从构成我们本性的心灵与身体的同一性出发的，或者正如他所说的那样：

All our efforts or desires follow from the necessity of our nature in such a manner that they can be understood either through it alone as their proximate cause, or in so far as we are a part of nature, which part cannot be adequately conceived through itself and without the other individuals (Spinoza [1677] 2001, E4App.1).
我们的一切努力或欲望都源于我们本性的必然性，而我们本性的必然性又是我们理解这些努力或欲望的唯一近因，或者说，我们是本性的一部分，而这一部分又不能通过它本身或离开其他个体而被充分理解（斯宾诺莎[1677] 2001, E4App.1）。

Desire, according to Spinoza and to Deleuze and Guattari, thus points at an essence that is formed in terms of the body and the mind created in its relation to other individuals which it is either affected by (that gives it joy) or that it tries to move away from (that offers it sadness). Of course, essence with Spinoza and Deleuze and Guattari is never the biological determinist type of essence re-affirmed in contemporary scholarship. It is a concept that allows them to express how our nature is taking up a form that necessarily re-creates itself in its relations to others, ad infinitum.
因此，斯宾诺莎以及德勒兹和瓜达利认为，欲望指向的是一种本质，这种本质是在身体和心灵与其他个体的关系中形成的，而身体和心灵要么受到其他个体的影响（给它带来快乐），要么试图远离其他个体（给它带来悲伤）。当然，斯宾诺莎、德勒兹和瓜塔里的本质绝不是当代学术界重新确认的生物决定论式的本质。这个概念使他们能够表达我们的本质是如何在与他人的关系中不断地再创造自身的。

Essence equals the desiring flesh that does not know (yet) of sexual difference. Essence is a cut-out in nature (as de Beauvoir would put it), and equally within God (as Spinoza would put it) that acts as one, yet always in relation to how it pertains to others, and vice versa. The emphasis on desire and essence, then, does not deny the existence of male and female, of sexual difference, but instead denounces the ignorance with which epistemologies have folded into nature and cut it up into genus and species. A vitalist emphasis on desire, essence and the flesh, allows us to rethink such categorizations in a most revolutionary way. Indeed a Spinozist or Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, as it claims that the essence is determined by what affects the thing and by how it is affected, starts from how life is being formed and how categories like sexual difference are created in it by the actions of the mind and the body.
本质等同于不知道（尚未知道）性别差异的欲望之肉。本质是大自然中的一个切面（如波伏娃所说），同样也是上帝内部的一个切面（如斯宾诺莎所说），它作为一个整体行动，但总是与它如何与他人相关相关，反之亦然。因此，对欲望和本质的强调并不否认男性和女性的存在，也不否认性别差异的存在，而是谴责认识论将自然折叠成属和种的无知。生命论对欲望、本质和肉体的强调，使我们能够以一种最具革命性的方式重新思考这种分类。事实上，斯宾诺莎主义或德勒兹-瓜田主义的观点，由于声称本质是由影响事物的东西和事物如何受到影响来决定的，因此它的出发点是生命是如何形成的，以及性差异等范畴是如何通过心灵和肉体的行动在生命中形成的。

Such an affirmative vitalism allows us to rethink feminism (and all other minor fields in cultural theory) not by critiquing the “being” of a woman, but rather by affirming the molecular ways in which the body and mind can be conceptualized as “female” in how they are created (as one), or in how they affect and are affected. That is why Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 291), re-reading de Beauvoir, claim that a becoming-woman “necessarily affects men just as much as women.” That is why the girl deterritorializes all forms of life (as well as the non-organic). For just as a becoming Jewish affects the non-Jew as it affects the Jew, as they stated before this last quote, men also, in the ongoing questioning of their essence, enter the trajectories of “femininity” as it moves them away from the dominant (molar) sociocultural (male-oriented) stance from which society is organized. Starting with the body, with the affections that befall the body and how they present us with ideas in the mind (see e.g. Spinoza [1677] 2001, E2P16), this then allows us a radical complexification of the asymmetry indicated by de Beauvoir, “For the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but the relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 213).
这种肯定的生命论使我们能够重新思考女性主义（以及文化理论中的所有其他次要领域），而不是通过批判女性的 "存在"，而是通过肯定身体和心灵可以被概念化为 "女性 "的分子方式，即它们如何被创造（作为一个整体），或如何影响和被影响。这就是为什么德勒兹和瓜塔里（[1980] 1987, 291）在重新解读波伏娃时声称，成为女性 "必然会像影响女性一样影响男性"。这就是为什么女孩将所有生命形式（以及非有机生命形式）去领土化的原因。正如他们在最后一句话之前所说的那样，成为犹太人会影响非犹太人，正如他们在最后一句话之前所说的那样，男人也会在不断追问自身本质的过程中，进入 "女性化 "的轨道，因为 "女性化 "使他们摆脱了社会组织的主导（臼齿）社会文化（男性导向）立场。从身体开始，从降临身体的情感开始，从它们如何在头脑中为我们呈现观念开始（参见德-波伏娃指出："因为两性意味着多种分子组合，不仅男人在女人中，女人在男人中，而且每个人与动物、植物等的关系都在发挥作用：千百种微小的性别"（德勒兹和瓜塔里[1980]，1987 年，213 页）。

Deleuze ([1981] 1988, 124) already noted that “[…] if you define bodies and thoughts as capacities for affecting and being affected, many things change.” In terms of its consequences for feminism, Grosz (1994) sees this as the starting point for a way of rethinking sexual difference not as a meaning imposed upon bodies, but as the expression of bodies (earlier we called this material-discursive). In other words, sexual differing is about the way the body is able to sediment itself or form itself within the socio-cultural according to the practices in which it acts:
德勒兹（[1981] 1988, 124）已经指出："[......]如果你把身体和思想定义为影响和被影响的能力，许多事情就会改变。就其对女性主义的影响而言，格罗斯（1994 年）认为这是重新思考性差异的起点，即性差异不是强加在身体上的意义，而是身体的表达（早先我们称之为物质表达）。换句话说，性差异是身体在社会文化中根据其行为实践沉淀或形成自身的方式：

So an animal, a thing is never separable from its relations with the world. The interior is only a selected exterior, and the exterior, a projected interior. The speed and slowness of metabolisms, perceptions, actions and reactions, link together to constitute a particular individual in the world (Deleuze [1981] 1988, 125).
因此，一种动物、一种事物永远无法从它与世界的关系中分离出来。内部只是经过选择的外部，而外部则是内部的投影。新陈代谢、感知、行动和反应的快慢联系在一起，构成了世界中的一个特殊个体（德勒兹[1981] 1988, 125）。

In sum, then, the move from sexual difference, as it has dominated feminism over the past half-century, to sexual differing, as we can already find in de Beauvoir, means an emphasis on the agencements of desire and the way they allow us to think of the flesh and its nature in the way it becomes actualized and realized within practices. Then power is an action upon an action, as Foucault already put it. Or rather, power sets itself to the structuring of the socio-cultural by means of prohibition, as Claire Colebrook describes it. For she claims: “There is only a phallus rather than a penis, through the process of collective inscription” (Colebrook 2002, 134). This materialist stance does not want to critique collective (molar) inscription, but rather asks us how, in life, the creation of the woman (and the man) comes about in the (mute, fleshy, molecular) affects to which these collective inscriptionsrespond.
总之，从过去半个世纪主导女性主义的性差异转向德-波伏娃（de Beauvoir）所说的性不同，意味着强调欲望的能动性，以及它们如何让我们思考肉体及其在实践中被现实化和实现的本质。那么，正如福柯所言，权力就是行动之上的行动。或者说，正如克莱尔-科尔布鲁克（Claire Colebrook）所描述的那样，权力通过禁止的方式来构建社会文化。因为她声称"通过集体铭文过程，只有阴茎而没有阳具"（Colebrook 2002, 134）。这种唯物主义立场并不是要批判集体（臼齿）铭文，而是要问我们，在生活中，女人（和男人）是如何在这些集体铭文所对应的（哑巴、肉体、分子）影响中产生的。

From Sexual Difference to Sexual Differing
从性差异到性不同

Let us end with a close reading of the conclusion to The Second Sex, as it is here that de Beauvoir’s practical philosophy comes to full fruition. In the text, de Beauvoir ([1949] 2010, 758) is truly opening up for a sexual differing, a pushing of sexual difference to the extreme, because she claims that neither men nor women have so far been willing to “assum[e] all the consequences of this situation that one proposes and the other undergoes.” What happens when we do assume all the consequences of sexual difference? When we no longer critique the collective inscription of sexual difference, but ask an affirmative question instead?
最后，让我们来细读《第二性》的结尾，因为德-波伏娃的实践哲学在这里得到了充分的体现。在文中，德-波伏娃（[1949] 2010, 758）真正开启了性差异，将性差异推向极致，因为她声称，迄今为止，男人和女人都不愿意 "承担这种一个人提出、另一个人经历的情况的所有后果"。如果我们真的承担了性别差异的所有后果，会发生什么呢？当我们不再批判性差异的集体铭刻，而是提出一个肯定的问题时，会发生什么？

First, de Beauvoir states that “today’s woman is torn between the past and the present” (ibid., 761). She is torn, that is, between collective inscriptions, and the linear, causal theory of time with which they work, and creative evolution, which, speaking with Henri Bergson, comes with the vitual/actual, with duree as it opens up a world to come. The collective inscriptions need not be critiqued as in equality or postmodern feminism, but one must ask to what materialist, fleshy desires these collective inscriptions respond. Patriarchy utilizes what it finds for its own selfperpetuation. But a revolutionary feminism does not have a model. We could say that for women, the molding into utilities of affects, of life forces leads to a being torn between past and present, between sexual difference and sexual differing. And this is actually something we can affirm, as it shows how sexual difference implies sexual differing all along. de Beauvoir describes the situation as follows:
首先，波伏娃指出，"今天的女性在过去和现在之间挣扎"（同上，761）。也就是说，她挣扎在集体铭文及其线性、因果的时间理论与创造性进化之间，而创造性进化与亨利-柏格森（Henri Bergson）一样，伴随着生命/现实（vital/actual），伴随着开启未来世界的杜蕾（duree）。我们不必像批判平等或后现代女权主义那样批判集体铭文，但我们必须问一问，这些集体铭文回应了哪些物质主义的、肉体的欲望。父权制利用它所发现的东西进行自我延续。但是，革命的女权主义并没有模式。我们可以说，对女性而言，情感和生命力的塑造导致她们在过去和现在、性差异和性不同之间纠结。德-波伏娃（de Beauvoir）对这种情况做了如下描述："我们可以肯定这一点，因为它表明了性差异如何一直意味着性不同：

[M]ost often, she appears as a ‘real woman’ disguised as a man, and she feels as awkward in her woman’s body as in her masculine garb. She has to shed her old skin and cut her own clothes. She will only be able to do this if there is a collective change. No one teacher can today shape a ‘female human being’ that would be an exact homologue to the ‘male human being’: if raised like boy, the young girl feels she is an exception, and that subjects her to a new kind of specification (ibid.).
[在很多情况下，她都是伪装成男人的 "真正的女人"，她觉得女人的身体和男装一样笨拙。她必须褪去旧皮，裁剪自己的衣服。只有集体改变，她才能做到这一点。今天，没有哪位教师能塑造出与 "男性 "完全相同的 "女性"：如果像男孩一样教养，年轻女孩会觉得自己是个例外，这使她受到一种新的规范（同上）。

An upbringing like a boy and masculine clothing (that is to say, emancipation) is what de Beauvoir’s woman wants to move away from, similar to the way in which she wants to move away from an unemancipated world. Neither the inscriptions of equality feminism nor those of an androcentric world fit her flesh. Woman, according to de Beauvoir, has to rid herself of these inscriptions. This means, following an ethics of affirmation, that she has to cut her own clothes. Despite the dominant reception of her work even in French feminism, de Beauvoir thus clearly speaks the language of difference. As she states:
德-波伏娃笔下的女性想要摆脱的是男孩子般的教养和男性化的服装（也就是解放），就像她想要摆脱一个没有解放的世界一样。无论是平等女权主义还是以男性为中心的世界，都不符合她的肉体。德-波伏娃认为，女性必须摆脱这些标签。这意味着，按照一种肯定的伦理，她必须裁剪自己的衣服。尽管德-波伏娃的作品即使在法国女权主义中也占据着主导地位，但她还是明确地使用了 "差异 "这一语言。正如她所说

Woman is defined neither by her hormones nor by mysterious instincts but by the way she grasps, through foreign consciousness, her body and her relation to the world […] it would be impossible to keep woman from being what she was made, and she will always trail this past behind her; if the weight of this past is accurately measured, it is obvious that her destiny is not fixed in eternity (ibid., 761; original emphasis).
女人的定义既不是她的荷尔蒙，也不是神秘的本能，而是她通过外来意识把握自己身体的方式，以及她与世界的关系[......]不可能让女人不成为她的本来面目，她将永远把过去的一切抛在脑后；如果能准确衡量过去的重量，那么很明显，她的命运并不是永恒不变的（同上，761；原文强调）。

This fragment, even though it has been read as existentialism par excellence, is not only crystal clear about collective inscriptions. It also clarifies how we could read the evolution de Beauvoir alluded to in the previously given quote. This evolution—which after postmodern feminism seems wholly individualized in this fragment, but throughout The Second Sex appears as (equally) collective—we can read in a manner similar to how we read de Beauvoir’s interpretation of young girls’ naivete. Equality feminism is a narrative of progress, predicated on the coupling possible/real, on a linear and causal theory of time. It wants sexual difference to be solved once and for all. Difference feminism thinks of emancipation differently: “To emancipate woman is to refuse to enclose her in the relations she sustains with man, but not to deny them” (ibid., 766). The latter feminism allows for bringing along the past that shadows woman for life; it has gotten rid of the habit of narratives of progress, and speaks the language of true duration, of becoming a thousand tiny sexes, of sexual differing.
尽管这个片段被解读为卓越的存在主义，但它不仅对集体铭文有着清晰的认识。它还阐明了我们如何解读德-波伏娃在前面引文中提到的演变。在后现代女性主义之后，这一演变在这一片段中似乎完全是个人化的，但在《第二性》中却表现为（同样）集体性的，我们可以用类似于解读波伏娃对少女天真烂漫的诠释的方式来解读这一演变。平等女权主义是一种进步叙事，以可能/现实的耦合为前提，以时间的线性和因果理论为基础。它希望一劳永逸地解决性别差异问题。差异女权主义对解放的看法不同："解放妇女就是拒绝把她封闭在她与男人的关系中，但不是否定这种关系"（同上，766）。后一种女性主义允许将女性终身蒙上阴影的过去带过来；它摆脱了叙述进步的习惯，使用的语言是真正的持续时间，是成为一千个微小的性别，是性的差异。

Where, then, is this new conceptualization of emancipation to be found? It is not to be found in our fearful imaginings of a future without sexual difference, because, says de Beauvoir: “Let us beware lest our lack of imagination impoverish the future; the future is only an abstraction for us; each one of us secretly laments the absence in it of what was” (ibid., 765). de Beauvoir does not want women to be confined by sexual difference, nor does she want to deny them relations with men. Although it has often been remarked in feminist scholarship that de Beauvoir seems to say that men are to liberate women by giving up their privileges, our reading of de Beauvoir suggests an alternative take on the following, oft-discredited fragment, in which she ends her masterpiece by saying:
那么，在哪里可以找到这种新的解放概念呢？在我们对没有性别差异的未来的恐惧想象中是找不到的，因为，德-波伏娃说"德-波伏娃并不希望女性受到性别差异的限制，也不希望否认她们与男性的关系。尽管女权主义学术界经常指出，德-波伏娃似乎在说，男人要通过放弃自己的特权来解放女人，但我们对德-波伏娃的解读表明，她对下面这段经常被人质疑的片段有另一种看法：

Within the given world, it is up to man to make the reign of freedom triumph; to carry off this supreme victory, men and women must, among other things and beyond their natural differentiations, unequivocally affirm their brotherhood (ibid., 766; emphasis added).
在特定的世界中，自由的统治要靠人类来取得胜利；为了取得这一最高胜利，男人和女人必须超越他们的自然差异，明确肯定他们的兄弟情谊（同上，766；着重部分由作者标明）。

What we see here is that it is in sexual difference that we can find sexual differing. Sexual difference is nothing but a collective molar habit of mind, and, up until the conclusion, The Second Sex has described this habit as well as where it undid itself. Sexual differing is not found in the future, but between the linguistic codes of sexual difference where it always already roams, materially and vitally.
我们在这里看到的是，正是在性差异中，我们才能发现性的不同。性差异不过是一种集体的臼齿思维习惯，《第二性》在结尾之前描述了这一习惯，也描述了它的自我解脱之处。性差异并不存在于未来，而是存在于性差异的语言代码之间，在那里，性差异始终在物质上和生命上游荡。

Notes
说明

- 1. For the intrinsic link between these exemplifications, see van der Tuin (2009).
1.关于这些范例之间的内在联系，见 van der Tuin (2009)。

- 2. Note, however, that Heinamaa (1997, 27) reads this phenomenology as breaking through the nature/culture divide. She also states that with de Beauvoir as well as Butler we can break through the divide between the mental and the bodily (ibid., 22).
2.但请注意，Heinamaa（1997，27）将这种现象学解读为突破了自然/文化的鸿沟。她还指出，通过波伏娃和巴特勒，我们可以突破精神与身体之间的鸿沟（同上，22）。

- 3. Let us state clearly that we are aware of the fierce criticism that the received view of de Beauvoir in general, and of The Second Sex in particular, has received from feminist scholars in both the United States and Europe. We are also aware of the translation problem surrounding The Second Sex prior to when Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier’s 2010 translation appeared. A huge body of work has been produced around these issues that is impossible to reference even when one privileges, with Donna Haraway, a partial perspective. We thus refrain from the referencing, albeit that these discussions form the background of this chapter. It might be argued that this chapter is to be placed in the tradition of post-poststructuralist scholarship on de Beauvoir, as Sonia Kruks (2005, 290) calls it, moving beyond biological essen-tialism and social constructivism indeed. It might also be seen as an attempt to move out of another double bind that is so often to be found around de Beauvoir. Attempts to free The Second Sex from Sartre often confine the text to another Master, and, consequently, it is again not subjected to a close reading (ibid., 294).
3.让我们明确指出，我们知道美国和欧洲的女权主义学者对德波伏娃的观点，尤其是对《第二性》的观点提出了猛烈的批评。我们也意识到，在康斯坦丝-博尔德和希拉-马洛瓦尼-切瓦利埃 2010 年的译本问世之前，围绕《第二性》存在着翻译问题。围绕这些问题已经产生了大量的作品，即使像唐娜-哈拉维（Donna Haraway）那样从片面的角度进行研究，也无法参考这些作品。因此，尽管这些讨论构成了本章的背景，我们还是避免引用。或许可以说，本章应被置于索尼娅-克鲁克（Sonia Kruks）（2005, 290）所称的关于波伏娃的后后结构主义学术传统之中，超越生物本质主义和社会建构主义。这也可以看作是试图摆脱另一种双重束缚的尝试，这种束缚在德-波伏娃身上经常出现。试图将《第二性》从萨特那里解放出来，往往会将文本局限于另一位大师，因此，也就无法对其进行细读（同上，294）。

- 4. Feminist scholarship dismissing or criticizing the paradoxes in the work of de Beauvoir is rampant. Although many scholars try to affirm the paradoxes as a necessary part of de Beauvoir’s feminist philosophy, it is hardly ever affirmed that these paradoxes actually are (her) feminism. For very recent examples, see Changfoot (2009a, 2009b).
4.女性主义学术界对波伏娃作品中的悖论进行否定或批判的现象比比皆是。尽管许多学者试图肯定这些悖论是德-波伏娃女性主义哲学的必要组成部分，但很少有人肯定这些悖论实际上就是（她的）女性主义。最近的例子见 Changfoot (2009a, 2009b)。

- 5. Note that by not accepting the sex/gender distinction as a key to The Second Sex, we arrive at conclusions that differ from those of Hughes and Witz (1997).
5.需要注意的是，由于不接受将性/性别区分作为《第二性》的关键，我们得出的结论与 Hughes 和 Witz（1997 年）的结论不同。

- 6. Remember that de Beauvoir is as ambiguous about Marxism as she is about psychoanalysis. Throughout The Second Sex, both are subscribed to for their accurate descriptions as well as utopianism and critiqued for their genderblindness. The virtue of the latter, in particular, is that it proposes that “the existent is a body” (de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 68), even that
6.请记住，德-波伏娃对马克思主义的态度和对精神分析的态度一样暧昧。在《第二性》中，两者都因其准确的描述和乌托邦主义而受到赞同，也因其性别盲点而受到批评。尤其是后者，其优点在于它提出了 "存在者是一个身体"（de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 68），甚至认为 "存在者是一个身体"（de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 68）。

[t]he existent is a sexed body; in its relations with other existents that are also sexed bodies, sexuality is thus always involved (ibid., 55).
[存在者是一个有性的身体；因此，在它与同样是有性身体的其他存在者的关系中，总是涉及到性（同上，55）。

- 7. Bergson ([1907] 1998, 313) makes the same argument concerning a boy which supports Deleuze’s argument all the more. His version runs as follows:
7.柏格森（[1907] 1998, 313）就一个男孩提出了同样的论点，这更加证实了德勒兹的论点。他的说法如下

The truth is that if language here were molded on reality, we should not say ‘The child becomes the man,’ but ‘There is becoming from the child to the man.’ […] In the second proposition, ‘becoming’ is a subject. It comes to the front. It is the reality itself; childhood and manhood are then only possible stops, mere views of the mind; we now have to do with the objective movement itself […].
事实是，如果这里的语言是根据现实塑造的，我们就不应该说'孩子变成了男人'，而应该说'从孩子到男人都在变成'。[......]在第二个命题中，"成为 "是一个主语。它走在前面。在第二个命题中，"成为 "是一个主体，它是现实本身；童年和成年只是可能的停顿，仅仅是思维的观点；我们现在要做的是客观运动本身[......]。

Chapter 8
第 8 章

The End of (Wo)Man
人类的终结

Although so far we have discussed large portions of the humanities, we have focused in particular on feminist theory. We have demonstrated how new materialism is being developed here, and how feminist theory allows us to rewrite the most common intellectual history in order to create concepts and produce insights that are less distortedly based on (gendered) hierarchies. Subsequently, these insights are less dependent on gaps between culture and nature, language and materiality, and body and mind—not by doing away with them, but by pushing them to the extreme. Due to the fact that “substance dualism” has been diagnosed as one of the most prominent ca(u)ses of gendering since Simone de Beauvoir’s seminal The Second Sex ([1949] 2010), feminist theory is one of the key sites of critical reflection upon substance dualism. Such reflection, if we can call it that, is also a key to the development of the new materialism. Yet feminist theory is not about critique, and therewith about reflection. As in many other parts of academia, one of the defining creative features of feminism in academia is its focus on theories of the subject (Braidotti 1991, 164). Albeit that this focus can easily be historically substantiated with a reference to women’s explicit exclusion from academic knowledge production until the late nineteenth century in most Western countries, the implied anthropocentrism does not suit new materialism’s metaphysics. It is even questionable whether substance dualism can be overcome epistemologically, because the defining feature of epistemology seems to be the presupposed hierarchical split between the subject and the object, and therewith the split between epistemology (knowing) and ontology (being). How then can the main conceptual creation in feminist theory be defined so that a new materialism gets to be fully enfleshed?
尽管到目前为止，我们已经讨论了人文学科的大部分内容，但我们尤其关注女性主义理论。我们展示了新唯物主义是如何在这里得到发展的，以及女性主义理论是如何让我们重写最常见的思想史，从而创造出不那么扭曲地以（性别）等级为基础的概念和见解。因此，这些见解不再那么依赖于文化与自然、语言与物质、身体与心灵之间的鸿沟--不是消除它们，而是将它们推向极致。自西蒙娜-德-波伏娃（Simone de Beauvoir）的开创性著作《第二性》（[1949] 2010）以来，"物质二元论 "一直被认为是性别问题最突出的原因之一，因此，女性主义理论是对物质二元论进行批判性反思的重要场所之一。这种反思（如果我们可以称之为反思的话）也是新唯物主义发展的关键。然而，女性主义理论与批判和反思无关。与学术界的许多其他领域一样，女性主义在学术界的一个决定性的创造性特征是其对主体理论的关注（Braidotti 1991, 164）。尽管这一重点很容易在历史上得到证实，即在大多数西方国家，直到 19 世纪末，女性一直被明确排除在学术知识生产之外，但这种隐含的人类中心主义并不适合新唯物主义的形而上学。物质二元论能否在认识论上得到克服甚至是个问题，因为认识论的决定性特征似乎是预设的主体与客体之间的等级分裂，以及认识论（认识）与本体论（存在）之间的分裂。 那么，如何定义女性主义理论中的主要概念创造，从而充分体现新唯物主义呢？
In this chapter we will propose that not all (feminist) theories of the subject imply a human-subject-centered epistemology, as our interviewees in Part One have already shown us. Mapping a new materialism by re-writing these theories is key to this final chapter.
在本章中，我们将提出，并非所有（女性主义）主体理论都意味着以人类主体为中心的认识论，第一部分中的受访者已经向我们表明了这一点。通过重写这些理论来描绘新唯物主义是本章的关键。

Sandra Harding’s The Science Question in Feminism from 1986, which is the standard reference text in feminist epistemology, does perform an anthropocentrism. Notwithstanding the fact that Donna Haraway’s famous response to Harding in “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective” discussed its limits and offered us a new feminist materialism as early as 1988, via concepts such as the “material-semiotic actor” and the “apparatus of bodily production” (Haraway 1988, 595), feminist epistemology in general has always been structured by the desire to make clear that humanism is in fact an androcentrism in need of alternatives. “Feminist standpoint theory” and “feminist postmodernism” are both examples of this move. In the former case a specific “woman’s way of knowing” was proposed, while in the latter, following a pluralization act, a plethora of women’s ways of knowing was put to the fore in order to shift gross generalizations about the nature and culture of women (Harding 1986, 1991). The fact that even feminist postmodernism has not been able to shift such humanism owing to a dualist response to both androcentrism and feminist standpoint theory, and has confined itself to an anthropocentric linguisticism as a result, has been demonstrated by Claire Colebrook’s “Postmodernism is a Humanism: Deleuze and Equivocity” from 2004, which was discussed in earlier chapters. The fundamental claim in that article is that
桑德拉-哈丁（Sandra Harding）1986 年出版的《女性主义中的科学问题》（The Science Question in Feminism）是女性主义认识论的标准参考文献，该书确实体现了人类中心主义。尽管唐娜-哈拉维（Donna Haraway）在 "Situated Knowledges：尽管唐娜-哈拉维（Donna Haraway）在《情境知识：女性主义中的科学问题与部分视角的特权》（Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective）一文中对哈丁做出了著名的回应，讨论了其局限性，并早在 1988 年就通过 "物质-半透明行为者 "和 "身体生产装置"（Haraway 1988, 595）等概念为我们提供了一种新的女性主义唯物主义。"女性主义立场理论 "和 "女性主义后现代主义 "都是这一举措的例子。前者提出了一种特定的 "女性认识方式"，而后者则在多元化行动之后，提出了大量的女性认识方式，以改变对女性本质和文化的粗暴概括（Harding，1986 年，1991 年）。克莱尔-科尔布鲁克（Claire Colebrook）的 "后现代主义是一种人文主义"（Postmodernism is a Humanism：克莱尔-科尔布鲁克（Claire Colebrook）2004 年发表的《后现代主义是一种人文主义：德勒兹与等价性》（Deleuze and Equivocity）一文已经证明了这一点，在前面的章节中已经讨论过。该文的基本主张是

[o]ne must recognize oneself as this or that gendered identity in order to take part in what [Judith] Butler refers to as the heterosexual matrix; but, precisely because this matrix is constituted through speech, acts and performatives, it is also always capable of being rendered otherwise, of producing new relations (Colebrook 2004, 292-3)
[一个人必须承认自己是这样或那样的性别身份，才能参与[朱迪斯] 巴特勒所说的异性矩阵；但是，正因为这个矩阵是通过语言、行为和表演构成的，它也总是能够被赋予其他含义，产生新的关系（Colebrook，2004 年，292-3）。

This outlines the fact that linguisticism (language, and “the interstices of language” as they reveal themselves with language, to use Butler’s concepts) as well as anthropocentrism are equally reductive results owing to a dualist argumentation (cf. Kirby 1997, 2006, 2011). We have spent enough time in earlier chapters of this part of the book situating and re-writing any linguisticism and the way its practitioners consider materiality intrinsically semiotic (that is, in itself mute) the time has now come for a radical elimination of any anthropocentrism from our materialism.
这概述了这样一个事实，即由于二元论的论证（参见柯比，1997 年，2006 年，2011 年），语言主义（语言，以及 "语言的间隙"，用巴特勒的概念来说，它们与语言一起显现出来）和人类中心主义都是同样具有还原性的结果。在本书前几章中，我们已经花了足够多的时间来定位和重写任何语言主义及其实践者认为物质性本质上是符号性的（即本身是无声的），现在是时候从我们的唯物主义中彻底消除任何人类中心主义了。

Here we might hook up with an early and apt diagnosis of the anthropocentrism that manifests itself in the aforementioned dualist response to a supposedly inclusive but in fact profoundly androcentric humanism that can be found in Genevieve Lloyd’s “Preface to the Second Edition” of the seminal The Man of Reason (originally published in 1984). Following the methodological gesture of contrasting Cartesian dualism and Spinozist monism, Lloyd ([1984] 1993, xii-xiii; original emphasis) claims as follows:
在此，我们可以从吉纳维芙-劳埃德（Genevieve Lloyd）的开创性著作《理性的人》（原著出版于 1984 年）的 "第二版序言 "中找到对人类中心主义的早期和恰当的诊断，这种人类中心主义体现在上述二元论对所谓的包容性但实际上是深刻的以雄性为中心的人文主义的回应中。劳埃德（[1984] 1993, xi-xiii；原文着重号）以方法论的姿态对比了笛卡尔的二元论和斯宾诺莎的一元论，并声称如下：

What must be the relation between minds and bodies for it to be possible for the symbolic content of man and woman to feed into the formation of our sense of ourselves as male or female? […] Spinoza’s rapprochement between reason and passion can […] be seen as a point where the grip of male-female symbolism might have been broken. And his treatment of the mind as an idea of the body suggests a starting point, too, for a clearer understanding of how the meanings given to bodies can be both metaphorical and rightly experienced as ‘real’ differences.
要使男人和女人的象征性内容成为我们形成男性或女性自我意识的基础，思想与身体之间的关系必须是什么？[斯宾诺莎在理性与激情之间的和解可以[......]被视为打破男女象征主义控制的一个点。斯宾诺莎将心灵视为身体的理念，这也为我们更清晰地理解赋予身体的意义如何既是隐喻性的，又能被正确地体验为 "真实 "的差异提供了一个起点。

Contrary to feminist (post)modernism, Lloyd thus asks how a gendered (dualist) organization and a linguisticism emerge from a monist multiplicity, just like Alphonso Lingis (1994), Arun Saldanha (2006), and Michael Hames-Garcia (2008) ask how a racial linguisticism emerges from the same flux. Although in the present book we do not equate new materialism’s metaphysics with a Spinozism, monism has run like an electrical current through our conceptualization. It is monist metaphysics that truly shifts anthropocentrism, and which is at work in one way or another in the materialisms of the authors discussed in this final chapter.1
与女性主义（后）现代主义相反，劳埃德追问的是，性别（二元）组织和语言主义是如何从一元多元中产生的，正如阿方索-林吉斯（Alphonso Lingis，1994）、阿伦-萨尔达尼亚（Arun Saldanha，2006）和迈克尔-哈梅斯-加西亚（Michael Hames-Garcia，2008）追问的是，种族语言主义是如何从同一流变中产生的。尽管在本书中，我们并未将新唯物主义的形而上学等同于斯宾诺莎主义，但一元论已像电流一样贯穿我们的概念化。正是一元论形而上学真正改变了人类中心主义，并以这样或那样的方式在本章最后讨论的作者的唯物主义中发挥作用。 1

Recently, cultural theory’s monist take on culture and nature, language and materiality, and body and mind has stirred an abundance of neologisms. These neologisms provide a first insight into the monist proposal, always in keeping with Lyotard’s, Deleuze’s, and Latour’s rewriting of modernity (see Chapter 6 above), to provide a non-anthropocentric mapping of the morphogenetic changes of the real. Let us give two examples. Karen Barad in Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning from 2007 has coined the term “intra-action.” Barad (2007, 33; cf. Barad 2010, 244) writes that “in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognizes that distinct agencies […] emerge through, their intra-action.” This process ontology shifts an atomist metaphysics of pre-existing entities, and suggests a world which Haraway (2003: 6), alluding to the work of Alfred North Whitehead, has been characterized as one in which “[b]eings do not preexist their relatings.” Similar to Lloyd’s, Lingis’，Saldanha’s and Hames-Garcia’s question after the emergence of a gendered/racialized (dualist) organization from a monist multiplicity, Barad (2010, 254) states explicitly “intra-actions necessarily entail constitutive exclusions, which constitute an irreducible openness,” which is not only to say that dualism can only happen within monism, and not the other way around, but also that dualism is never fully fixed. This is why Barad, while reading Niels Bohr through Jacques Derrida, terms ontology a “hauntology.” Barad frees Derrida from a possible linguisticist interpretation, just as Vicki Kirby (2011) does, since hauntology prefers neither the mind (or the immaterial, cultural, linguistic) nor the body (or the muted material, the natural).
近来，文化理论对文化与自然、语言与物质性、身体与心灵的一元论观点激起了大量新名词。这些新名词为我们提供了对一元论提议的初步了解，一元论提议始终与利奥塔、德勒兹和拉图尔对现代性的重写（见上文第6章）保持一致，为现实的形态发生变化提供了非人类中心主义的映射。让我们举两个例子。卡伦-巴拉德（Karen Barad）在《中途与宇宙相遇》（Meeting the Universe Halfway：量子物理学与物质和意义的纠缠》中创造了 "内部行动"（intra-action）一词。巴拉德（2007，33；参见巴拉德，2010，244）写道："通常的'相互作用'假定在相互作用之前存在独立的个体机构，与之相反，'内部作用'的概念承认，不同的机构[......]通过它们的内部作用而出现"。这种过程本体论改变了原子论形而上学中关于预先存在的实体的观点，并提出了一个哈拉维（2003: 6）暗指阿尔弗雷德-诺斯-怀特海（Alfred North Whitehead）作品的世界，在这个世界中，"事物并不预先存在其关系"。与劳埃德、林吉斯、萨尔达尼亚和哈梅斯-加西亚在从一元多元性中产生性别/种族化（二元）组织之后提出的问题相似，巴拉德（2010, 254）明确指出："内部互动必然包含构成性排斥，这构成了不可还原的开放性"，这不仅是说二元论只能发生在一元论之中，而不是相反，而且二元论从来都不是完全固定不变的。这就是为什么巴拉德在通过雅克-德里达解读尼尔斯-玻尔时，将本体论称为 "鬼魂学"。"巴拉德将德里达从可能的语言学解释中解放出来，正如维姬-柯比（Vicki Kirby，2011 年）所做的那样，因为鬼魂学既不喜欢心灵（或非物质的、文化的、语言的），也不喜欢身体（或缄默的物质的、自然的）。
It is therefore non-anthropocentric, insofar it works with an ontology of “the world’s radical aliveness” (Barad 2007, 33). Starting from the spectral and shadows that are “constitutive without belonging to” (Kochhar-Lindgren 2011, 25) the material, does not affirm the dualist desire to try to represent and thus the possibility of fully capturing the world while being radically separate from it. On the contrary, hauntology necessarily includes all of the unforeseen (un-human) radical powers.
因此，它是非人类中心主义的，因为它的本体是 "世界的根本生命力"（巴拉德，2007 年，33）。从 "构成而不属于"（Kochhar-Lindgren，2011 年，25）物质的幽灵和阴影出发，并不肯定试图表现的二元论欲望，因而也不肯定在完全捕捉世界的同时又与之彻底分离的可能性。相反，鬼魂学必然包含所有不可预见的（非人类的）激进力量。

A second example can be found in the work of Manuel DeLanda, whose “morphogenesis” from “The Geology of Morals: A Neo-Materialist
第二个例子可以在曼努埃尔-德兰达的著作中找到，他在《道德地质学》中提出了 "形态发生学"：新唯物主义

Interpretation” (1996) we borrowed in this book. In A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History DeLanda (1997, 32; original emphasis) speaks of “meshworks” in order to maintain a differentiation between “self-organized meshworks of diverse elements” and “hierarchies of uniform elements” which “not only coexist and intermingle, [but…] give rise to one another.” The creation of the concept of the meshwork, which equals the “collective” composed of “hybrids” coined in We Have Never Been Modern of Bruno Latour ([1991] 1993, 47), is part of a monist metaphysics. In A New Philosophy of Society DeLanda (2006, 6) says to focus on “the movement that in reality generates all these emergent wholes” in which “language plays an important but not a constitutive role” (ibid., 3). Furthermore, DeLanda makes clear that “the properties of a whole cannot be reduced to those of its parts [because] they are the result not of an aggregation of the components’ own properties but of the actual exercise of their capabilities” (ibid., 11). DeLanda (2002, 4) thus introduces a concept that not only “grants reality full autonomy from the human mind” but also one that comes very close to the neologisms put to work by Barad. DeLanda’s work demonstrates how Barad’s suggested contrast between inter- and intra-action is a methodological step. The dualism seemingly suggested is introduced in order to retain intra-action.
我们在本书中借用了 "解释"（1996 年）一词。在《非线性历史千年》中，迪兰达（1997 年，32；原文强调）提到了 "网状结构"，以区分 "由不同元素组成的自组织网状结构 "和 "由统一元素组成的层次结构"，后者 "不仅共存和交融，[而且......]相互产生"。布鲁诺-拉图尔在《我们从未成为现代人》（[1991] 1993, 47）中提出的网状结构概念，等同于由 "混血儿 "组成的 "集体"，是一元论形而上学的一部分。在《新社会哲学》一书中，DeLanda（2006, 6）说要关注 "在现实中产生所有这些新兴整体的运动"，其中 "语言扮演着重要但非构成性的角色"（同上，3）。此外，DeLanda 还明确指出，"一个整体的属性不能还原为其各个部分的属性，[因为]这些属性不是各部分自身属性的集合，而是各部分能力实际发挥的结果"（同上，11）。因此，DeLanda（2002，4）提出了一个不仅 "赋予现实以完全独立于人类思维的自主性"，而且非常接近巴拉德所使用的新概念的概念。德兰达的研究表明，巴拉德提出的行动间和行动内的对比是一个方法论步骤。提出二元论似乎是为了保留内部行动。

Apart from it being a rewriting, the introduction of neologisms does not aim at exchanging a seemingly “wrong” academic terminology for a terminology with which the world can be captured “better.” Such an epistemic stance would presuppose a subject independent of an object, and such a representationalist hierarchy or gap does not fit the proposed monist metaphysics. Combining Whitehead’s “event” and Deleuze’s “sense,” Mike Halewood (2009, 50) in “Language, Subjectivity and Individuality” states: “the world creates (or constructs) sense as an effect of the interrelation of singularities within the virtual. Given that all subjects are part of this world they are also created within such creativity.” Here we clearly see that the subject according to a monist metaphysics is a consequence rather than the full-fledged starting point of an epistemic experience. Albeit that Barad (2010, 247, 253) with “queer causality” warns us against any easy opposition to linear causality due to haunting, this departure from the prioritization of the subject breaks through anthropocentrism, and proposes a non-anthropocentric take on what supposedly forms the core of what is human (language, and subjectivity). Deleuze’s “The tree greens” (1990, 21 in Halewood 2009, 51) and Whitehead’s “We enjoy the green foliage of the spring greenly” (1967, 251 in ibid.) propose that greenness itself is an active expression, and that we prehend the greenness of the tree. It is the state of affairs that enables language, and this language or expression is not just human. Whitehead in Process and Reality ([1929/1978] 1985, 52) states that he has “adopted the term ‘prehension,’ to express the activity whereby an actual entity effects its own concretion of other things” which shows once more that the metaphysics proposed here is not an anthropocentric linguisticism. First, the focus is on the activity, process, event, and, second, cause and effect have been “queered” vis-a-vis a dualist metaphysics.
除了重写之外，引入新术语的目的并不在于用一个看似 "错误 "的学术术语来交换一个可以 "更好地 "捕捉世界的术语。这种认识论立场将预设一个独立于客体的主体，而这种表象主义的等级或鸿沟并不符合所提出的一元论形而上学。结合怀特海的 "事件 "和德勒兹的 "感觉"，迈克-哈勒伍德（2009，50）在《语言、主体性与个体性》中指出"世界创造（或建构）意义，是虚拟世界中各种奇异性相互关系的结果。鉴于所有主体都是这个世界的一部分，他们也是在这种创造性中被创造出来的"。在这里，我们清楚地看到，根据一元论形而上学，主体是认识论经验的结果，而不是完全的起点。尽管巴拉德（2010, 247, 253）以 "同性恋因果关系 "告诫我们不要轻易因困扰而反对线性因果关系，但这种对主体优先性的背离突破了人类中心主义，提出了一种非人类中心主义的观点，即所谓构成人类核心的东西（语言和主体性）。德勒兹的 "树绿了"（1990, 21 in Halewood 2009, 51）和怀特海的 "我们绿色地享受春天的绿叶"（1967, 251 in ibid.）提出，绿色本身就是一种积极的表达，我们预设了树的绿色。正是这种状态促成了语言，而这种语言或表达不仅仅是人类的。 怀特海在《过程与现实》（[1929/1978] 1985, 52）中指出，他 "采用了'prehension'一词来表达实际实体影响自身对其他事物的具体化的活动"，这再次表明这里提出的形而上学不是人类中心主义的语言学。首先，重点是活动、过程、事件；其次，相对于二元论形而上学，因果关系被 "阙如 "了。

Let us now fully immerse ourselves in the non-anthropocentric metaphysics of new materialism. Therefore we will read Michel Foucault’s birth and death of the subject via a discussion of parts of his secondary thesis, recently published as Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology from 2008 (though the thesis was submitted in 1961). Foucault addresses the question of how anthropocentrism has shaped dualism, and how it has in fact distorted our (representationalist) strategies of studying the real. Quentin Meillassoux, who, in After Finitude ([2006] 2008) re-reads Kant as well, offers us a different (yet equally non-humanist, non-anthropocentric) way out compared with Foucault’s famous thesis, as we have already seen in our interview with him in the first part of this book (Chapter 4). Putting the (dis-) connection between Foucault and Meillassoux at center stage in order to show in what directions new materialism’s anti-anthropocentrism leads us, we will then open up the notion of subjectivity by reading a mathematics in materialist thinking. Speculative materialism or realism, as it is being developed by Meillassoux, but also by Ray Brassier and Graham Harman (Bryant et al, eds. 2011), is then diffractively read with those new materialist scholars who are big in science studies today, several of whom have already been discussed in previous chapters of this book: DeLanda, Barad, Kirby, and Brian Massumi. By involving mathematics (set theory, geometry, topology) as a means of breaking open the Kantian definitions of epistemology and ontology, we are offered important new materialist claims that (implicitly) push those fundamental humanist oppositions—like (wo) man—to the extreme.
现在，让我们完全沉浸于新唯物主义的非人类中心主义形而上学之中。因此，我们将通过讨论米歇尔-福柯 2008 年发表的《康德人类学导论》（Introduction to Kant's Anthropology）（尽管论文是 1961 年提交的）中的部分内容，来解读福柯关于主体的诞生与消亡。福柯探讨了人类中心主义如何塑造了二元论，以及二元论事实上如何扭曲了我们研究现实的（表象主义）策略。昆廷-迈拉苏（Quentin Meillassoux）在《终结之后》（[2006] 2008年）中也重新解读了康德，他为我们提供了一条与福柯著名论点不同的（但同样是非人本主义、非人类中心主义的）出路，我们在本书第一部分（第4章）对他的访谈中已经看到了这一点。为了说明新唯物主义的反人类中心主义将我们引向何方，我们将把福柯与梅亚苏之间的（非）联系放在中心位置，然后通过解读唯物主义思想中的数学来打开主体性的概念。然后，我们将与当今科学研究领域的新唯物主义学者（其中几位已在本书前几章中讨论过）一起，对梅亚苏以及雷-布拉西耶和格雷厄姆-哈曼（Bryant et al, eds. 2011）提出的推测唯物主义或现实主义进行衍射式解读：其中几位已在本书前几章中讨论过，他们是：德兰达、巴拉德、科比和布赖恩-马苏米。通过将数学（集合论、几何学、拓扑学）作为打破康德认识论和本体论定义的一种手段，我们获得了重要的新唯物主义主张，这些主张（隐含地）将那些基本的人文主义对立面--如（和）人--推向了极端。
After all, science studies has been characterized as being an anthropology on/with objects (Mol 2002, 32), and thus has been implicitly criticized for an ongoing focus on the Kantian (subjectivist) problematic while trying to dualistically move away from epistemology as a representationalist practice (ibid., vii).
毕竟，科学研究已被定性为一种关于/有对象的人类学（Mol 2002, 32），因此，它一直被隐含地批评为在试图二元论地摆脱作为表象主义实践的认识论的同时，却一直关注康德（主观主义）问题（同上，vii）。

The Birth of the Subject = The Death of the Subject
主体的诞生 = 主体的死亡

(Part of) Foucault’s project has been to understand the coming into being of the sciences of man (Foucault [1966/1970] 1994). Immanuel Kant, that is, the anthropological turn in philosophy that started with Kant, is being rewritten in Foucault’s work. For Foucault, the birth of the subject equals the death of the subject, or in a Nietzschean mode, the death of God equals the death of man. Foucault states in his Introduction that an unfinished and unpublished correspondence with Kant’s (former) student Jakob Sigismund Beck in conjunction with the published version of the former’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View from 1798 makes clear that Kant managed
(福柯的（部分）计划是理解人类科学的产生（福柯 [1966/1970] 1994 年）。伊曼纽尔-康德，即从康德开始的哲学人类学转向，在福柯的著作中被改写了。在福柯看来，主体的诞生等同于主体的死亡，或者用尼采的模式来说，上帝的死亡等同于人的死亡。福柯在导言中指出，他与康德（前）学生雅各布-西吉斯蒙德-贝克（Jakob Sigismund Beck）未完成和未发表的通信，以及前者 1798 年出版的《从实用主义观点看人类学》，清楚地表明康德设法

[…] to define the space which an anthropology, in general, could occupy: a space in which self-observation bears not upon the subject as such, nor upon the pure ‘I’ of the synthesis, but upon “a ‘I’” that is object and present solely in its singular phenonemal [sic] truth. But this “‘I’-object,” […] is no stranger to the determining subject; for it is ultimately nothing more than the subject as it is affected by itself. [The space of anthropology] is entirely taken over by the presence of a deaf, unbound, and often errant freedom which operates in the domain of originary passivity (Foucault 2008, 39; original emphasis).
[......]确定人类学总体上可以占据的空间：在这个空间中，自我观察不是针对主体本身，也不是针对综合的纯粹的 "我"，而是针对 "一个'我'"，这个 "我 "是客体，并且仅仅存在于其奇异的表象[原文如此]真理之中。但是，这个"'我'--客体"[......]对于决定性主体来说并不陌生；因为它归根结底不过是受其自身影响的主体。[人类学的空间]完全被一种聋哑的、无拘无束的、往往是错误的自由所占据，而这种自由是在原初的被动性领域中运作的（福柯，2008 年，39；原文强调）。

Foucault notes that the Preface to the Anthropology states that Kant’s object was “what man makes of himself—or can and should make of himself—as a free-acting being” (Foucault 2008, 44) thus making anthropology pragmatic. Anthropology deals with the balancing act in which “man is considered to be a “citizen of the world,” as belonging, that is, to the realm of the concrete universal, in which the legal subject is determined by and submits to certain laws, but is at the same time a human being who, in his or her freedom, acts according to a universal moral code” (ibid., 42). And it shows “how a juridical relationship of the order of a possession, which is to say a jus rerum, manages to preserve the moral kernel of a person construed as a free subject” (ibid.). Pragmatics then deals not with human nature or essence, but with “a movement where nature and freedom are bound up in the Gebrauch—one of the meanings of which is given in the word ‘usage’” (ibid., 51). To be more precise, “in Anthropology, man is neither a homo natura, nor a purely free subject; he is caught by the syntheses already operated by his relationship to the world” (ibid., 54-5). Studying a different set of concepts (Gemut and Geist) allows Foucault to claim that in the Anthropology no space is given, however, to “being tied to the passivity of phenomenal determinations” (ibid., 63) since
福柯指出，《人类学序言》指出，康德的研究对象是 "作为一个自由行动的存在物，人是如何塑造自己的--或者说，人能够并应该如何塑造自己"（福柯，2008，44），这就使得人类学具有了实用性。人类学处理的是一种平衡行为，在这种平衡行为中，"人被视为'世界公民'，即属于具体的普遍领域，在这一领域中，法律主体由某些法律决定并服从这些法律，但同时又是一个人，在其自由中按照普遍的道德准则行事"（同上，42）。它表明了 "占有顺序的法律关系，也就是 jus rerum，是如何维护作为自由主体的人的道德内核的"（同上）。因此，语用学处理的不是人的本性或本质，而是 "一种运动，在这种运动中，本性和自由被结合在Gebrauch之中--'用法'一词赋予了这种运动的意义"（同上，51）。更确切地说，"在人类学中，人既不是自然的人，也不是纯粹自由的主体；人被他与世界的关系所产生的综合作用所束缚"（同上，54-5）。通过研究不同的概念（Gemut 和 Geist），福柯宣称，在《人类学》中，"被现象决定的被动性所束缚"（同上，第 63 页）是不存在的。

The Geist is […] the principle, in the Gemut, of a de-dialecticized, nontranscendental dialectic oriented towards the domain of experience and playing an integral part in the play of phenomena itself. It is the Geist which offers the Gemut the freedom of the possible, stripping it of its determinations, and providing it with a future which it owes to nothing but itself (ibid.).
大地论 "是[......]"Gemut "的去辩证化、非超越性辩证法的原则，它面向经验领域，在现象本身的游戏中扮演着不可或缺的角色。正是 "盖斯特 "为 "盖穆特 "提供了可能的自由，使其摆脱了自身的决定性，并为其提供了一个除了自身之外一无所有的未来（同上）。

On this basis, Foucault comes to claim that the “I”/Subject of the Kritik is wholly inverted in the Anthropology, in a way that is more complex than an exchange of cause and effect. Namely “it appears in the density of a becoming where its sudden emergence infallibly assumes the retrospectively constituted meaning of the already there” (ibid., 67).
在此基础上，福柯宣称，《批判》中的 "我"/主体在《人类学》中被完全颠倒过来，其方式比因果交换更为复杂。也就是说，"它出现在一种成为的密度中，在那里，它的突然出现不可避免地承担了已经在那里的回溯性构成的意义"（同上，67）。

In the introduction to the Logik, published in 1800 (nearly twenty years after his first Kritik) Kant famously summarizes his critical project in not three, but four questions. He summarized his three critiques by asking himself “what can I know?,” “what should I do?,” and “what may I hope for?.” He then added a fourth question to the list, namely: “what is man?” Only in his later notes (Notes and Fragments (2005)) he realizes that this sentence in fact captured his main contribution to thought. For whereas in those days it was still common to start thinking first and foremost from a thorough conceptualization of God, from which thoughts on nature and on the human being subsequently arose, Kant started his philosophy with the human being—or even better, with human thought and its relation to nature. In other words, Kant turned (theological) metaphysics into transcendental anthropology. Kant’s second Copernican revolution, as it revolves around concepts like the Subject, Geist and Gem证,was by all means a humanist revolution, since it turned the relations between the three poles mentioned around. This is clearly noted by Foucault (2008, 78):
在 1800 年出版的《逻辑学》导言中（距离他的第一部《批判》近二十年之后），康德用四个问题而不是三个问题总结了他的批判计划，这一点非常著名。他通过问自己 "我能知道什么？"、"我该怎么做？"和 "我可以希望什么？"来总结他的三个批判。然后他又加上了第四个问题，即："人是什么？"只有在他后来的笔记（《笔记与片段》（2005 年））中，他才意识到这句话实际上抓住了他对思想的主要贡献。在那个时代，人们仍然普遍首先从对上帝的彻底概念化开始思考，并由此产生对自然和人的思考，而康德的哲学则是从人开始的--或者更确切地说，是从人的思想及其与自然的关系开始的。换句话说，康德把（神学）形而上学变成了超验人类学。康德的第二次哥白尼革命围绕着 "主体"（Subject）、"本体"（Geist）和 "神证"（Gem证）等概念展开，它绝对是一场人文主义革命，因为它扭转了上述三极之间的关系。福柯（2008, 78）清楚地指出了这一点：

At last man emerges as universal synthesis, forming a real unity in which the personality of God and the objectivity of the world are rejoined, the sensible principle and the supra sensible; and man becomes the mediatory from which “einer absoluter Ganze” takes shape. It is from the starting point of man that the absolute can be thought.
最后，人作为普遍的综合体出现了，形成了一个真正的统一体，在这个统一体中，上帝的个性和世界的客观性、感性原则和超感性重新结合在一起；人成为中介，"绝对的世界 "由此形成。正是从人的起点出发，才有了对绝对的思考。

Foucault claims that it is with Kant that man has not only turned into the origin of thought, but that both God and the world (nature) subsequently arise. Yet as “[…] man immediately defines himself as a citizen of the world, as ‘Weltbewohner，: Deer Mensch geh6rt zwar mit zur Welt.y And completing the circle, all reflection on man involves reflection on the world” (ibid., 78—9), Foucault makes clear that this does not involve a naturalism (“where a science of man implies a knowledge of nature,” ibid. 79) nor a determinism “on the level of the phenomena” (ibid.) but rather “it is the development of self-awareness and of the ‘I am’: the subject self-affecting by the movement in which he becomes aware of himself as an object” (ibid.). This affirmative rewriting of Kant, contrary to how Meillassoux reads Kant (as we will see later) boils down to what we could call, with Barad, an intra-action between (social) world and Subject. Foucault even states that “the world, as a whole (Ganz)” seems to be excluded from language, yet has structure or meaning (ibid., 80). The way in which he then explains the world comes close to DeLanda’s immanent morphogenetic changes of the real, where the world is source, domain, and limit (ibid., 80-1). That is to say, the metaphysics according to which Foucault re-writes Kant is wholly monist: “the whole of existence defines what belongs to it necessarily and originarily” (ibid., 84). The death of the Subject is encapsulated in its Kantian birth.
福柯认为，正是在康德那里，人不仅成为思想的起源，而且上帝和世界（自然）也随之产生。然而，由于"[......]人立即将自己定义为世界的公民，是'世界的居住者'：y 而且，所有对人的反思都涉及对世界的反思"（ibid、78-9），福柯明确指出，这并不涉及自然主义（"人的科学意味着对自然的认识"，同上，79），也不涉及 "现象层面 "的决定论（同上），而是 "自我意识和'我是'的发展：主体通过运动自我影响，在运动中意识到自己是客体"（同上）。这种对康德的肯定性改写，与迈拉苏对康德的解读（我们稍后会看到）相反，归结为我们可以与巴拉德一起称之为（社会）世界与主体之间的内在互动。福柯甚至指出，"世界作为一个整体（甘孜语）"似乎被排除在语言之外，但却具有结构或意义（同上，80）。他解释世界的方式接近于德兰达的现实的内在形态变化，在这里，世界是源泉、领域和极限（同上，80-1）。也就是说，福柯重写康德所依据的形而上学完全是一元论的："存在的整体必然而原始地定义了属于它的东西"（同上，84）。主体的死亡包含在康德的诞生之中。

Anthropocentrism (Un)Solved, or: Critiquing Critique
人类中心主义（未）解决，或：批判的批判

In After Finitude, Meillassoux takes on a similar project as Foucault, which we might summarize as a rewriting of Kantian paradigms that concern the human being (the Subject) and the object. Yet he does so by asking a different opening question. Foucault is interested in Kant from what we might call a post-Nietzschean perspective. For although a historian, Foucault’s call for the End of Man is about a resistance against the Absolute powers from the pre-critical period, as they keep haunting man and the way in which man conceptualizes his newfound rationality. Foucault sets himself to a discovering of empirical reason, what Foucault earlier referred to as a pragmatics, and it is thus that he wants to push Kant’s dualist thinking to the limit. Foucault already notices this emphasis on the empirical in Kant himself when Foucault (2008, 63) summarizes Kant’s final steps: “The movement which, in the Critique, gave rise to the transcendental mirage is extended and prolonged in the Anthropology in the form of the empirical, concrete life of the Gemut. ”
在《终结之后》一书中，梅亚苏承担了与福柯类似的任务，我们可以将其概括为重写康德关于人（主体）与客体的范式。然而，他提出了一个不同的开场问题。福柯对康德的兴趣来自于我们可以称之为后尼采的视角。虽然福柯是一位历史学家，但他呼吁 "人的终结 "是为了反抗前批判时期的绝对权力，因为它们一直困扰着人类，也困扰着人类将其新发现的理性概念化的方式。福柯将自己定位于对经验理性的发现，也就是福柯早先所说的实用主义，因此他要将康德的二元论思想推向极致。当福柯（2008，63）总结康德的最后步骤时，已经注意到康德本人对经验的强调："在《批判》中产生了超验的海市蜃楼的运动，在《人类学》中以经验的、具体的格穆特生活的形式得到了延伸和延长。"

In the preface to After Finitude, Alain Badiou claims that Meillassoux’s approach to the three questions that summarize Kant’s Critiques, rather than re-reading their dynamics in the empirical, pushes them to the point of a “critique of Critique” (Badiou in Meillassoux [2006] 2008, vii) which is to say that Kantian anthropocentrism has not at all been “solved” by Foucault or his followers. For whereas the first and foremost Kantian question (“what can I know?”) has been attacked primarily (by Foucault for instance) for its use of the “I am,” or, the construction of Subjectivity (the “I think”) which it entails, Meillassoux’s critique of Critique focuses on the necessity of “knowledge” and the way Kant’s notion of knowledge is built on an odd kind of dualism. Foucault (2008, 78) already noticed clearly that “it is from the starting point of man that the absolute can be thought” and it is this idea in particular that Meillassoux considers corrupt. Thus, without doing away with the subject and the object (he actually affirms it rigorously), the latter sets himself to a rethinking of how this opposition relates to one another in terms of knowledge.
在《终结之后》的序言中，阿兰-巴迪欧称，梅亚苏对总结康德批判的三个问题的处理方法，不是在经验中重新解读它们的动态，而是将它们推向了 "批判的批判"（巴迪欧在梅亚苏[2006] 2008, vii中），也就是说，康德的人类中心主义根本没有被福柯或他的追随者们 "解决"。康德的首要问题（"我能知道什么？"）主要因其对 "我是 "的使用，或因其所包含的主体性建构（"我思"）而受到攻击（例如福柯），而迈拉苏对《批判》的批判则侧重于 "知识 "的必要性，以及康德的知识概念是如何建立在一种奇怪的二元论之上的。福柯（2008, 78）已经明确指出，"只有从人的出发点出发，才能思考绝对"，而迈拉苏尤其认为这种思想是腐朽的。因此，在不摒弃主体和客体的前提下（他实际上严格地肯定了这一点），梅亚苏开始重新思考这种对立在知识方面是如何相互联系的。

In Kant, Meillassoux sees a metaphysics being developed which he refers to as “correlationism.” He defines it as such: “Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 5). Meillassoux does not negate correlationism as such; later in his work it is in fact through “weak correlationism” that he sets up the necessity of his speculative materialism. But the way in which Kant introduced correlationism in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft in 1781 was, as Meillassoux ([2006] 2008, 124) calls it, a “catastrophe” for philosophy.
在康德身上，迈拉苏看到了一种形而上学的发展，他称之为 "关联主义"。他是这样定义的关联主义 "就是否定主观性和客观性领域有可能彼此独立的说法"（Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 5）。迈拉苏并没有否定关联主义本身；事实上，在他后来的著作中，他正是通过 "弱关联主义 "确立了他的推测唯物主义的必要性。但康德在 1781 年的《新认识论批判》（Kritik der reinen Vernunft）中引入关联主义的方式，正如迈拉苏（[2006] 2008, 124）所说，是哲学的一场 "灾难"。

Crucial for Kant’s correlationism is the idea that the objects in the world consist in themselves, independent of any observation, and at the same time have subjective qualities that allow them to reveal themselves in an observation (ibid., 31). For a human being, then, the things in themselves are not knowable but we can think them; whereas we can get rational knowledge (about a thing) only in the observation, in how the object allows itself to be represented. It is thus that the world as a whole (das Ganze) subjectively comes into being, from the perspective of the “I am.” Meillassoux’s critique of this Kantian relation between subject and object is twofold. First, he questions the limits that Kant puts to rational knowledge. Why can’t the object itself be known? How can thought ever be given “limited access” to the object (which thus in the presentation allows itself to be thought but not to be known)? Secondly, he asks himself why Kant demands the object to be presented in order for it to be thought. This notion of givenness (the object has to be confronted with the subject in order to become part of the world) also sounds questionable because it is deeply anthropocentric.
康德的关联主义的关键在于这样一种思想，即世界中的对象是独立于任何观察之外的自身存在，同时又具有主观的特质，使它们能够在观察中显现出来（同上，31）。因此，对于人类来说，事物本身是不可认识的，但我们可以对其进行思考；而我们只有在观察中，在对象如何被表述的过程中，才能获得（关于事物的）理性知识。因此，从 "我是 "的角度来看，整个世界（das Ganze）才是主观存在的。迈拉苏对康德的这种主客体关系的批判是双重的。首先，他质疑康德对理性知识的限制。为什么不能认识客体本身？思想如何才能 "有限地接近 "客体（因此，在表述中，客体允许被思想，但不允许被认识）？其次，他扪心自问，为什么康德要求对象必须被呈现才能被思想？这种给定性的概念（客体必须与主体面对才能成为世界的一部分）听起来也是有问题的，因为它具有深刻的人类中心主义色彩。

In order to clarify his reservations, Meillassoux gives us the example of what he calls the “arche-fossil” (a life that has ceased to be before the human being and its thinking came into existence) or the question of the ancestral. He wonders whether it could be possible, as Kantian thinking seems to presuppose, that “Science can think a world wherein spatiotemporal givenness itself came into being within a time and a space which preceded every variety of givenness” (ibid., 22). Or, how is correlationism liable to interpret ancestral statements? The answer of course is that it (philosophically) cannot, which is a serious critique of Kant and of the anthropocentrism that he proposes. The paleobiologist confronted with the arche-fossil has a problem thinking ancestral space-time that never “appeared” to him and to which he thus has no access (since it does not take place). Meillassoux’s critique of Critical (correlationist) thinking is a critique not of the being but of the knowing Subject. His alternative is a speculative metaphysics, which is not subjective, but rather demands that philosophy turn to objectivity again. The critique of Critique is thus a critique of epistemology as we know it.
为了澄清他的保留意见，迈拉苏给我们举了一个例子，他称之为 "原型化石"（在人类及其思维出现之前已不复存在的生命）或祖先问题。他不禁要问，是否有可能像康德思想似乎预设的那样，"科学可以思考一个世界，在这个世界中，时空给定性本身是在每一种给定性之前的时间和空间中产生的"（同上，22）。或者说，关联主义如何解释祖先的陈述？答案当然是（哲学上）不能，这是对康德及其提出的人类中心主义的严肃批判。面对原生化石，古生物学家在思考祖先的时空时遇到了问题，因为祖先的时空从未 "出现 "在他面前，因此他无法进入（因为它并未发生）。迈拉苏对批判（关联主义）思维的批判不是对存在的批判，而是对认识主体的批判。他的替代方案是一种投机的形而上学，这种形而上学不是主观的，而是要求哲学重新转向客观性。因此，对批判的批判就是对我们所知的认识论的批判。

Doing this he also comes back to God and the tripartite taxonomy of thought discussed earlier. Contrary to Foucault, whom we have called a post-Nietzschean, Meillassoux is by all means an anti-Nietzschean. For whereas Nietzsche, at the close of the nineteenth century claimed that the Age of Reason (introduced to us by Kant among others) has caused us to murder God, Meillassoux claims exactly the opposite. He states that Kantian thinking, in which the absolute has been closed off from thought for good, expelled from the metaphysical, has caused the remarkable return of religious fundamentalism today as it allowed for the absolute to be removed from knowing and thus to be revived in the form of believing (ibid., 45).
这样，他又回到了上帝和前面讨论过的思想的三元分类法。与我们称之为后尼采主义者的福柯相反，迈拉苏绝对是一个反尼采主义者。尼采在十九世纪末期声称，理性时代（由康德等人介绍给我们）使我们谋杀了上帝，而迈耶索的说法恰恰相反。他指出，康德的思想将绝对性从善意的思考中封闭起来，将其从形而上学中驱逐出去，导致了今天宗教原教旨主义的显著回归，因为它允许绝对性从知性中消失，从而以信仰的形式复活（同上，45）。

Both Foucault’s and Nietzsche’s comments are of course not correlationist, in Meillassoux’s opinion. Rethinking the Kantian “I am” empirically, they push the whole subject-object opposition to the extreme, introducing us to a new kind of thinking that has been able to firmly rewrite correlationism. Meillassoux calls this thinking a “subjective metaphysics,” which is all about absolutizing the correlate itself:
在梅拉苏看来，福柯和尼采的评论当然不是关联主义。他们从经验的角度反思了康德的 "我是"，将整个主客体对立推向了极致，向我们介绍了一种能够坚定地改写关联主义的新思维。迈拉苏称这种思维为 "主观形而上学"，其核心在于将关联本身绝对化：

A metaphysics of this type may select from among various forms of subjectivity, but it is invariably characterized by the fact that it hypostatizes some mental, sentient, or vital term: representation in the Leibnizian monad; Schelling’s Nature, or the objective subject-object; Hegelian Mind; Schopenhauer’s Will; the Will (or Wills) to Power in Nietzsche; perception loaded with memory in Bergson; Deleuze’s Life, etc. (ibid., 37).
这种类型的形而上学可以从各种形式的主体性中进行选择，但其特征无一例外都是将某些精神的、有知觉的或有生命力的术语虚构化：莱布尼茨一元论中的表象；谢林的自然，或客观的主客体；黑格尔的心智；叔本华的意志；尼采的权力意志（或意志）；柏格森带有记忆的知觉；德勒兹的生命，等等（同上，37）。

Meillassoux goes on defining this subjective metaphysics, in a mode that resembles the oppositional logic that we have discussed in chapter 6 of this book, and which also characterizes Barad’s reading of hauntology as affirmed through Bohr’s complementarity (Barad 2010, 253):
梅亚苏继续定义这种主观形而上学，其模式类似于我们在本书第 6 章中讨论过的对立逻辑，也是巴拉德通过玻尔的互补性对鬼魂学的解读（巴拉德，2010 年，253 页）：

Even in those cases where the vitalist hypostatization of the correlation (as in Nietzsche of Deleuze) is explicitly identified with a critique of ‘the subject’ or of ‘metaphysics,’ it shares with speculative idealism the same twofold decision which ensures its irreducibility to naive realism or some variant of transcendental idealism:
即使在生命论的相关性虚构化（如在尼采和德勒兹那里）被明确认定为对 "主体 "或 "形而上学 "的批判的情况下，它也与推测唯心主义有着同样的双重决定，而这双重决定确保了它与天真的现实主义或某种超验唯心主义变体的不可还原性：

The concepts created by subjective metaphysics, as they are nowadays increasingly popular within cultural theory, create a metaphysics that we could also call a metaphysics of the event (referring to Whitehead). It has no eye for individual objects, or at least these individual objects do not exist in their entirety but only insofar as they are actualized in the event. And it is this actualization which in the end, as Leibniz put it, is the only possible world. Foucault can be accused in a sense of forgetting the object, but we will get back to this later.
主观形而上学所创造的概念，正如它们如今在文化理论中越来越流行的那样，创造了一种我们也可以称之为事件形而上学（指怀特海）的形而上学。它不关注个体对象，或者说，至少这些个体对象并不完全存在，而只是在事件中被现实化了。正如莱布尼茨所说，正是这种现实化才是唯一可能的世界。福柯在某种意义上可以被指责为遗忘了对象，但我们稍后再谈这个问题。

It is important to understand that this twofold definition of subjective metaphysics makes any materialism impossible, as Meillassoux claims. Just before he confronts us with this definition of subjective metaphysics, which (as stated) cannot think the Epicurean atom, he says that Epicureanism is in fact the paradigm of all materialisms. In Epicureanism
重要的是要明白，主观形而上学的这种双重定义使得任何唯物主义都不可能，正如迈拉苏所声称的那样。就在他向我们展示这个主观形而上学的定义（如前所述）之前，他说伊壁鸠鲁主义实际上是所有唯物主义的典范。在伊壁鸠鲁主义中

[…] thought can access the absolute nature of all things through the notions of atoms and void, and which asserts that this nature is not necessarily correlated with an act of thought, since thought exists only in an aleatory manner, being immanent to contingent atomic compounds (for the gods themselves are decomposable), which are in-essential for the existence of elementary natures (ibid., 36; emphasis added).
[......]思想可以通过原子和虚无的概念获得万物的绝对本质，并断言这种本质与思想行为没有必然联系，因为思想只是以一种偶然的方式存在，它是偶然的原子化合物（因为神本身是可分解的）的内在存在，而原子化合物对于基本本质的存在是必不可少的（同上，36；着重部分由作者标明）。

The speculative materialism that Meillassoux proposes seems very different from the materialisms discussed so far, as indeed it does not seem to underpin the Spinozist monism which we have been developing up till now.
梅亚苏提出的推测唯物主义似乎与迄今为止讨论过的唯物主义大相径庭，事实上，它似乎并不是我们迄今为止一直在发展的斯宾诺莎一元论的基础。

When stating that absolute reality consists of entities without thought, or even of entities that necessarily precede thought (we now see why he started his argument with the arche-fossil, which indeed turns into the perfect example of an event preceding human thought), he radically does away with Spinoza’s pantheism. According to Meillassoux, Spinoza’s claim that God equals nature (since both are unlimited, they must be one) is a subjective metaphysical definition of God as it creates a larger whole which equals the absolute. Considering God as equivalent to nature also means that nature is rational (which, of course, paleobiologists also believe when they consider their readings of nature “real,” as in, the same as the objective materiality) and this too is an impossible anthropocentrism to Meillassoux. For him nature is contingent, especially because it precedes thought, or even better, because it precedes any system of logic that we could come up with (see his argument on “spatio-temporal givenness,” ibid., 22). Again in contrast with Spinozism, Meillassoux claims there is no such thing as the Principle of Sufficient Reason; every cause can have an endless amount of consequences and these consequences are in no way “given” in thought. In the end he therefore feels much closer to David Hume than to Kant’s correlationism in which knowledge of any synthethic proposition can never be a priori.
当他指出绝对实在包括没有思想的实体，甚至包括必然先于思想的实体时（我们现在明白了为什么他以原型化石开始论证，因为它确实是先于人类思想的事件的完美例子），他从根本上摒弃了斯宾诺莎的泛神论。迈拉苏认为，斯宾诺莎关于上帝等同于自然的说法（因为两者都是无限的，所以必然是一体的）是对上帝的主观形而上学定义，因为它创造了一个等同于绝对的更大的整体。将上帝等同于自然也就意味着自然是理性的（当然，古生物学家也相信这一点，他们认为自己对自然的解读是 "真实的"，即与客观物质性相同），这在迈拉苏看来也是一种不可能的人类中心主义。对他来说，自然是偶然的，尤其是因为它先于思想，或者更确切地说，因为它先于我们所能提出的任何逻辑体系（见他关于 "时空给定 "的论证，同上，22页）。与斯宾诺莎主义不同的是，迈拉苏宣称不存在 "充分理由原则"；每个原因都可能产生无穷无尽的结果，而这些结果绝不是思想中的 "给定"。因此，最终他觉得自己更接近大卫-休谟，而不是康德的关联主义，在康德的关联主义中，任何综合命题的知识都不可能是先验的。

This manifest stability of chaos, Meillassoux argues, “[…] would allow us to penetrate much deeper into the nature of a temporality delivered from real necessity” (ibid., 101).
梅亚苏认为，混沌的这种明显的稳定性"[......]将使我们能够更深入地探究从真正的必然性中解脱出来的时间性的本质"（同上，101）。

Pushing Kant’s weak correlationism to the extreme, Meillassoux composes a speculative materialism that is quite different from Foucauldian and post-Nietzschean thought, but which is nevertheless of the greatest importance for the new materialist project. For although his fiercely argumentative rewriting of the history of philosophy comes up with quite a different cartography compared to the sketches we have produced in the previous chapters—his appreciation of Descartes is especially hard to combine with what has been said above—his moves away from anthropocentrism contribute a great deal to the project announced by Foucault.
迈拉苏将康德的弱关联主义推向了极致，创造了一种与福柯和后尼采思想截然不同的推测唯物主义，但这对新唯物主义计划却具有极其重要的意义。尽管他以激烈的争论重写了哲学史，但与我们在前几章中勾勒的图景相比，他的图景却大相径庭--他对笛卡尔的赞赏尤其难以与上文所述结合起来--他摆脱人类中心主义的举动为福柯宣布的计划做出了巨大贡献。

Let us therefore take a closer look at the closing of his first chapter (and the start of the second) in which he discusses ancestrality. Here Meillassoux introduces us to the two grand speculative materialist themes. First, there is a radical break between objects (matter) and the thoughts that follow. With this claim, however, he does not accept linear space-time (which the word “follow” might suggest); he does away with linear space-time by stating: “to inscribe these conditions in time is to turn them into objects and hence to anthropologize them” (ibid., 23). The claim thus emphasizes the contingency of matter (nature, the object) and is interested in how thought is capable of accessing the uncorrelated, the world not-given.
因此，让我们仔细看看他讨论祖先性的第一章结尾（和第二章开头）。在这里，迈耶索向我们介绍了两大推测唯物主义主题。首先，对象（物质）与随之而来的思想之间存在着彻底的断裂。然而，他的这一主张并不接受线性时空（"追随 "一词可能暗示了这一点）：他摒弃了线性时空，指出："将这些条件铭刻在时间中，就是将它们变成对象，从而将它们人类化"（同上，23）。因此，这一主张强调了物质（自然、对象）的偶然性，并对思想如何能够进入无关联的、非给定的世界感兴趣。

Second, though it is not elaborated upon in After Finitude but employed as a recurring referent to speculative materialist futures, Meillassoux keeps stressing “mathematics’ ability to discourse about the great outdoors; to discourse about a past where both humanity and life are absent” (ibid., 26).
其次，虽然在《终结之后》中没有详细论述，但梅亚苏不断强调 "数学有能力论述伟大的户外；论述人性和生命都不存在的过去"（同上，26），并将其作为推测性唯物主义未来的一个反复出现的参照物。

The two “propositions” refer us once more to Spinoza and actually reveal a more similar approach. For although the first part of the Ethics elaborates on the existence of only One substance (which is necessarily both the absolute infinite God and Nature), it is immediately added that it holds in it the attributes (for instance a human being), and is organized in different modes (for instance thought and extension). Concerning the human being, mind and body are “the same thing” since they are the essence of the individual (and make up one attribute of God). This is sometimes referred to as Spinoza’s parallelism (although the term comes from Leibniz), yet this term is probably a bit too “equivocal,” as it seems to suggest a sort of similarity that cannot be observed. An important argument for its univocity is that although Spinoza claims that all that is action in the body is also action in the mind, an idea (an action of the mind) is a consequence of its body. This does not mean that the body can determine the mind to think (as the mind also cannot determine the body to move) ([1677] 2001, E3P2), it does mean that the body (res extensa) is what Brian Massumi (2002, 8) would call ontologically prior to the mind, since bodies “[…] have ontological privilege in the sense that they constitute the field of the emergence.” Much as with Meillassoux, this is not a temporal distinction, and thus it refuses anthropocentrism.
这两个 "命题 "再次让我们想到斯宾诺莎，实际上揭示了一种更为相似的方法。因为尽管《伦理学》的第一部分阐述了唯一物质的存在（它必然既是绝对无限的上帝，又是自然），但紧接着又补充说，它具有各种属性（例如人），并以不同的方式组织起来（例如思维和延伸）。关于人，思想和身体是 "同一事物"，因为它们是个人的本质（并构成上帝的一个属性）。这有时被称为斯宾诺莎的平行论（尽管这个词来自莱布尼茨），但这个词可能有点过于 "含糊不清"，因为它似乎暗示了一种无法观察到的相似性。支持其单一性的一个重要论据是，尽管斯宾诺莎声称身体中的一切行为也是心灵中的行为，但观念（心灵的行为）是其身体的结果。这并不意味着身体可以决定心灵去思考（正如心灵也不能决定身体去运动一样）（[1677] 2001, E3P2），但它确实意味着身体（res extensa）是布赖恩-马苏米（Brian Massumi, 2002, 8）所说的在本体论上先于心灵的东西，因为身体"[......]在构成出现的领域的意义上具有本体论的特权"。与迈拉苏一样，这不是时间上的区分，因此它拒绝人类中心主义。

This now requires a formal expressionism that, as Brian Rotman envisions, should push us “outside the domain of the sign.” Whereas Meillassoux claims that it is through mathematics that his philosophy is able to understand the object in itself (the absolute), the subtitle of Spinoza’s Ethics (Ordine Geometrico Demonstrate) shows that the latter makes use of geometry in order to achieve an understanding of the Absolute. Let us map the trajectories sketched.
现在，这需要一种形式表现主义，正如布赖恩-罗特曼所设想的那样，这种形式表现主义应该把我们推向 "符号领域之外"。梅亚苏声称，他的哲学是通过数学来理解对象本身（绝对）的，而斯宾诺莎《伦理学》的副标题（Ordine Geometrico Demonstrate）则表明，后者利用几何学来实现对绝对的理解。让我们绘制一下勾勒出的轨迹。

Mathematics, Geometry, Topology
数学、几何学、拓扑学

The relation between mathematics (which includes geometry and topology) and the body is now at stake. Of course Spinoza and Meillassoux are not reductive, nor do they practice a linguisticism. Yet “what mathematics can do” needs more thought.
现在，数学（包括几何学和拓扑学）与身体之间的关系岌岌可危。当然，斯宾诺莎和梅亚苏并不是还原论者，他们也没有奉行语言主义。然而，"数学能做什么 "还需要更多的思考。

Contrary to both Spinoza and Meillassoux, there are scholars who do not see how mathematics or a geometrical order would be able to make universal claims. George Lakoff and Rafael E. Nunez (2000, xvi) for instance claim that “[h]uman mathematics, the only kind of mathematics that human beings know, cannot be a subspecies of an abstract transcendental mathematics. Instead, it appears that mathematics as we know it arises from the nature of our brains and our embodied experience.” Their book entitled Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being intends to show that all thought, thus including mathematics, follows from our bodily motor existence (which they then presumably consider to be uniquely human). Their arguments are in line with Ricardo Nemirovsky and Francesca Ferrara who claim that “[t]hinking is not a process that takes place ‘behind’ or ‘underneath’ bodily activity, but is bodily activity itself” (in Rotman 2008, 33). Claims like these, since they seem to limit mathematics to a bodily interior, are obviously anthropocentric, since all forms of calculus, all formulas and geometrical figures (straight lines, curves, etc.) are then believed to be consequences of our bodily being. By suggesting that mathematical figures necessarily spring from a (human) body, it seems that the figures found outside of us are merely projections of our inside, which then indicates what Meillassoux would call a strong correlationism as it supports “the thesis of the essential inseparability of the act of thinking from its content. All we ever engage with is what is given-to-thought, never an entity subsisting by itself” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 36).
与斯宾诺莎和梅拉苏相反，有些学者不认为数学或几何秩序能够提出普遍性的主张。例如，乔治-拉科夫和拉斐尔-努涅斯（Rafael E. Nunez）（2000，xvi）声称："人类数学，即人类所知的唯一一种数学，不可能是抽象的超验数学的亚种。相反，我们所知的数学似乎产生于我们大脑的本质和我们的具身体验"。他们的著作名为《数学从何而来？他们在这本名为《数学从何而来：具身心灵如何使数学诞生》的书中试图说明，包括数学在内的所有思维都源于我们的身体运动存在（他们大概认为这是人类独有的）。他们的论点与里卡多-内米罗夫斯基（Ricardo Nemirovsky）和弗朗西斯卡-费拉拉（Francesca Ferrara）的观点一致，即 "思维不是发生在身体活动'背后'或'下方'的过程，而是身体活动本身"（见罗特曼，2008, 33）。这些说法似乎将数学局限于身体内部，显然是以人类为中心的，因为所有形式的微积分、所有公式和几何图形（直线、曲线等）都被认为是我们身体存在的结果。通过暗示数学图形必然来自（人类）身体，我们外部的图形似乎只是我们内部的投影，这就表明了梅亚苏所谓的强关联主义，因为它支持 "思维行为与其内容本质上不可分割的论点"。我们所接触的只是被赋予思考的东西，而不是一个独立存在的实体"（梅拉索[2006] 2008, 36）。

Read with Brian Rotman, however, this relation between mathematics and the human body seems to be less confined by the boundary of our skins. In Becoming Beside Ourselves: The Alphabet, Ghosts, and Distributed Human Being from 2008 Rotman introduces the concept of “gesture” in order to show how mathematics and the body are one non-linguistic materialist morphogenetic process, countering the general yet largely unacknowledged agreement that in mathematics “Platonism is the contemporary orthodoxy” (Rotman 1997, 18 in Kirby 2003, 422):
然而，与布赖恩-罗特曼（Brian Rotman）一起阅读，数学与人体之间的这种关系似乎并不局限于我们的皮肤边界。在《成为我们自己》（Becoming Beside Ourselves：中，罗特曼引入了 "手势 "的概念，以说明数学与身体是如何成为一个非语言的唯物主义形态发生过程，从而反驳了数学界 "柏拉图主义是当代正统"（罗特曼，1997 年，18 页，柯比，2003 年，422 页）这一普遍但大多未被承认的共识：

[…] gesture is outside the domain of the sign insofar as signs are coded and call for a hermeneutics, an interpretative apparatus separable from, and in place prior to, the act of signification.
[......]手势不属于符号的范畴，因为符号是编码的，需要一种解释学，一种可与符号化行为分离并在符号化行为之前就位的解释装置。

Rather, the mode of action of gesture is enactive, exterior to anything prior to its own performance: it works through bodily executed events, creating meaning and mathematical significance ‘before one knows it’ (2008, 36).
相反，手势的行动模式是主动的，它的外部是任何先于其自身表现的东西：它通过身体执行的事件发挥作用，"在人们意识到之前 "创造意义和数学意义（2008, 36）。

In line with Barad, DeLanda, Massumi, Lloyd, and Meillassoux as well, Rotman calls for mathematics as a key to the ontologically prior. And in contrast with the mathematical anthropocentrism suggested earlier, Rotman does not lock the argument into the body. A gesture always already suggests a kind of rhythm as it necessarily moves with the outside object (to come), and with the multiplicity in which it happens. Rotman thus proposes that what is at stake concerning a mathematical abstraction is “what it functions with” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 5) thus instead of opposing an abstraction’s (or a book’s) subject and object, the question is how “[i]t forms a rhizome with the world” (ibid., 11).2
罗特曼与巴拉德、德兰达、马苏米、劳埃德和梅拉苏一样，呼吁将数学作为通向本体论先验的钥匙。与之前提出的数学人类中心主义不同，罗特曼并没有将论证锁定在身体上。一种姿态总是已经暗示了一种节奏，因为它必然会与外部对象（即将到来的）以及发生姿态的多重性一起运动。因此，罗特曼提出，数学抽象的关键在于 "它的功能是什么"（德勒兹和瓜塔里[1980]1987, 5），因此问题不在于将抽象（或一本书）的主体与客体对立起来，而在于 "它如何与世界形成根茎"（同上，11）。 2

Would this necessarily take us “beyond” language? In fact, Kirby in “Enumerating Language: ‘The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics’” from 2003, has a strong argument for approaching mathematics as a language. This does not automatically lead Kirby to a linguisticism and away from the ontological prior. Defining mathematics as a “system of relational configurations that refers to itself,” Kirby (2003, 418) alludes to her attempt at rewriting the deflated, representationalist concept of “language” as it features in much of cultural theory, while rewriting “mathematics [as] the language of Nature […] divine[ly] author[ed]” (ibid., 419) along the way. Kirby thus also critiques Rotman in a manner similar to her and other new materialists’ critique of Butler (see Chapter 5 of the present book). Nevertheless, it is possible not to go along with Kirby’s negative reading of Rotman’s anthropocentrism, based on a simple reversal of a mathematics reated by Nature/God (ibid., 426-427).
这一定会让我们 "超越 "语言吗？事实上，柯比在 2003 年发表的《枚举语言："数学不合理的有效性"》一文中，就把数学作为一种语言来看待提出了有力的论据。这并不会自动将柯比引向语言主义，而脱离本体论的先验性。柯比（2003，418）将数学定义为 "指涉自身的关系配置系统"，暗指她试图改写文化理论中虚化的、表象主义的 "语言 "概念，同时改写 "数学[作为]自然的语言[......]神圣的作者"（同上，419）。因此，柯比对罗特曼的批判也类似于她和其他新唯物主义者对巴特勒的批判（见本书第五章）。然而，柯比对罗特曼的人类中心主义进行了负面解读，其依据是对自然/上帝所创造的数学的简单颠倒（同上，426-427）。

It is possible not to go along with Kirby’s negative reading of Rotman’s anthropocentrism, based on a simple reversal of a mathematics created by Nature/God (ibid., 426-7). That is, we can read the ontological prior into both Kirby and Rotman.
柯比基于对自然/上帝创造的数学的简单颠倒，对罗特曼的人类中心主义进行了负面解读（同上，426-7）。也就是说，我们可以从柯比和罗特曼身上读出本体论的先验性。

Famously, and counterintuitively via a Derridean detour, Kirby (2006, 84) states that “[f]or if ‘there is no outside of text,’ as Derrida suggests, then it is in ‘the nature of Nature’ to write, to read and to model.” “[M]atter” thus “appears within the horizon of our inquiry as a much more curious subject. And importantly, its appearance need not be veiled in substitute form as a cultural artefact” (ibid., 85; original emphasis). Echoing her rewriting of Ferdinand de Saussure in Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal (1997), Kirby states that Derrida’s “there is no outside of text” should be rewritten into “there is no outside of Nature” (Kirby 2008b, 229). Thus, in turn echoing Spinoza, Kirby proclaims a univocity (Colebrook 2004).3 In this way Rotman’s gestural, ontologically prior stance is to be found in Kirby’s work when she, via Derrida, states that
科比（2006，84）通过德里达式的迂回而反直觉地指出："如果像德里达所说的那样，'文本之外并不存在'，那么写作、阅读和建模就是'自然的本质'"。因此，"文本""作为一个更为奇特的主题出现在我们的研究视野中。重要的是，它的出现不需要以文化艺术品的替代形式来掩盖"（同上，85；原文强调）。柯比在《讲述肉体：肉体的实质》（Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal, 1997）一书中重写了费迪南德-德-索绪尔（Ferdinand de Saussure）的观点，她认为德里达的 "文本之外并不存在 "应改写为 "自然之外并不存在"（柯比，2008b, 229）。因此，柯比反过来呼应斯宾诺莎，宣布了一种单一性（Colebrook 2004）。 3 这样，罗特曼的姿态、本体论上的先验立场就可以在柯比的作品中找到，她通过德里达指出

[…] any “unit” is not so much a separate part of a larger whole to which it remains indebted, but rather a unique instantiation of the system’s own reinvention (or rewriting) of itself. Thus, every “instance” is “the whole,” and this imploded, holographic sense of identity confounds linearity as an unfolding sequence of separate, successive moments (Kirby 2003, 425; original emphasis).
[......]任何 "单元 "与其说是一个更大整体的独立部分，不如说是系统自身重塑（或重写）自身的独特实例。因此，每一个 "实例 "都是 "整体"，这种内嵌的、全息的身份感将线性混淆为独立的、连续的时刻的展开序列（Kirby 2003, 425；原文强调）。

We have encountered such theorizations many times in this book, starting with DeLanda’s work in the interview with him and in Chapter 5. According to Rotman’s “gesture,” “the exuberant bodily connectivities” are “mathematical practice” (ibid., 428). Kirby’s project of showing how “it is […] in the nature of corporeality to mathematize, represent, or intelligently take measure of itself” (ibid., 434), of “think[ing] of biology as a “unified field” of operational differentiations, a mathesis naturalis” (ibid., 438) does exactly the same thing. In both cases, the bodily force is what is ontologically prior.
在本书中，我们曾多次遇到过这样的理论，从对德兰达的访谈和第五章中的德兰达作品开始。根据罗特曼的 "姿态"，"旺盛的身体联系 "就是 "数学实践"（同上，428）。柯比的计划是要展示 "肉体的本质是如何将自身数学化、表征化或智能化的"（同上，434），"将生物学视为操作性差异的'统一领域'，即自然数学"（同上，438）。在这两种情况下，身体的力量在本体论上都是先验的。

Then in keeping with how Kirby rewrites the notion of language warding off linguisticism, we should (with Rotman and Deleuze and Guattari, among others) rewrite mathematics warding off a “mathematicism.” A necessary breakdown of any mathematical anthropocentrism in favor of any sort of materialism would probably mean, first of all, a move away from set theory, so dominant in mathematics these days (as Fernando Zalamea
那么，根据科比如何改写语言以抵御语言主义的概念，我们应该（与罗特曼、德勒兹和瓜塔里等人）改写数学以抵御 "数学主义"。为了支持任何一种唯物主义，必须打破任何数学人类中心主义，这可能意味着，首先要摆脱集合论，因为集合论如今在数学中占据主导地位（如费尔南多-扎拉梅亚所言

[forthcoming] also suggests). At least, this is a common move by those scholars interested in what we term a new materialism. Stengers (2000, 157) proposes two routes:
[即将出版]也表明了这一点）。至少，这是那些对我们所称的新唯物主义感兴趣的学者的共同举措。Stengers (2000, 157) 提出了两条路线：

[…]Rene Thom pleads for a form of ‘nomadic’ mathematics, whose vocation would not be to reduce the multiplicity of sensible phenomena to the unity of a mathematical description that would subject them to the order of resemblance, but to construct the mathematical intelligibility of their qualitative difference. The fall of a leaf, then, would no longer be a very complicated case of a Galilean register, but would have to provoke its own mathematics. One could also cite Benoit Mandelbrot’s fractal mathematics. Here as well, to ‘understand’ means to create a language that opens up the possibility of ‘encountering’ different sensible forms, of reproducing them, without for all that subjugating them to a general law that would give them ‘reasons’ and allow them to be manipulated.
[......]雷内-托姆恳求一种 "游牧 "数学，其使命不是将感性现象的多重性还原为数学描述的统一性，使其服从于相似性的秩序，而是构建其质的差异的数学可理解性。这样，一片树叶的飘落就不再是一个非常复杂的伽利略注册送68，而是必须引发其自身的数学。我们还可以引用贝努瓦-曼德尔布罗特（Benoit Mandelbrot）的分形数学。在这里，"理解 "也意味着创造一种语言，为 "遭遇 "不同的感性形式、再现它们提供可能性，而不是让它们屈从于一种赋予它们 "理由 "并允许它们被操纵的普遍规律。

The first option Stengers proposes is interesting, because of its call to develop a “new materialist” mathematics, focusing on differing (see Chapter 7 of this book), as a worthy alternative to set theory. The second is interesting, because this route is actually the most commonly followed, including by Rotman, DeLanda, and Massumi. Following Mandelbrot’s non-Euclidean geometry, it is especially topology that is considered as a fruitful ground for a materialist mathematical metaphysics. Topology might even be considered the very opposite of set theory, practicing a radical “difference in degree” as opposed to set-theory’s “difference in kind.” Bearing this in mind, DeLanda (2002, 24; original emphasis) defines topology as: “[…] the least differentiated geometry, the one with the least number of distinct equivalence classes, the one in which many discontinuous forms have blended into one continuous one.” Massumi, in his 2002 Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation explains very well how topology should be seen as the smoothest of the sciences, or as Elie Ayache (2010, 147) beautifully puts it: “Mathematics is a thought (and not just a calculus), and it is thought that asserts existence through the orientation of its discourse.” Massumi (2002, 135), recalling Kirby, adds to this:
斯特恩斯提出的第一种方案很有意思，因为它呼吁发展一种 "新唯物主义 "数学，以差异为重点（见本书第 7 章），作为值得替代集合论的数学。第二种方案也很有趣，因为这条路实际上是最常走的，包括罗特曼、德兰达和马苏米。继曼德布罗特的非欧几里得几何之后，拓扑学尤其被视为唯物主义数学形而上学的丰饶土壤。拓扑学甚至可以说是集合论的对立面，与集合论的 "种类差异 "相比，它实行的是彻底的 "程度差异"。考虑到这一点，DeLanda（2002，24；原文强调）将拓扑学定义为"[......]分化最小的几何，具有最少不同等价类的几何，许多不连续的形式融合为一个连续的形式的几何"。马苏米在其 2002 年出版的《虚拟的寓言：运动、情感、感觉》一书中很好地解释了如何将拓扑学视为最平滑的科学，或者正如埃利-阿亚奇（Elie Ayache）（2010, 147）所说的那样："数学是一种思想（而不仅仅是微积分），它是通过其话语的取向来主张存在的思想"。"Massumi（2002，135）在回顾科比的论述时对此作了补充：

Topology is not a qualitative science. It is not empirical, if empirical investigation is meant as progressing from description to prediction. It has no predictive value. Incapable of directly referencing anything other than its own variations, it is more analogical than descriptive. It is not, however, an analog of anything in particular. It is not an analog in the everyday sense of a variation on a model. Here, there is no model. Only infolding and outfolding: self-referential transformation. The analog is process, self-referenced to its own variations.
拓扑学不是一门定性科学。如果实证研究是指从描述到预测的进展，那么它就不是实证的。它没有预测价值。除了自身的变化之外，它无法直接参考其他任何事物，与其说它是描述性的，不如说它是类比性的。然而，它并不是任何特定事物的类比。它也不是日常意义上的 "模型变体"。这里没有模型。只有 "内折 "和 "外折"：自我指涉的转换。模拟是过程，是对自身变化的自我参照。

Although Meillassoux, in After Finitude, seems to be most interested in physics, and sometimes seems to be seduced by set theoretical problems (following the way his teacher Badiou has always been keen on such mathematical models) such as Cantor’s theorem, his speculative materialism seems to be in need of a mathematics that actually comes very close to the speculative pragmatism that Massumi has been working on in past years, and notably to the role topology plays in this type of thinking. And vice versa, Meillassoux’s interest in the absolute, in searching for the transfinite, or the “unclosed pluralization of the infinite qualities” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 142) might be just what Massumi needs when exploring what topology can do. The notion of the virtual (as Massumi takes this from Bergson and Deleuze) especially seems to him of the greatest importance, as affirmed in Meillassoux’s “Potentiality and Virtuality” (2011). As Massumi (2002, 135) puts it:
尽管梅亚苏在《有限性之后》中似乎对物理学最感兴趣，有时似乎还被集合论问题（跟随他的老师巴迪欧一直热衷于此类数学模型的方式）所诱惑，如康托定理，但他的投机唯物主义似乎需要一种数学，这种数学实际上非常接近马苏米在过去几年中一直在研究的投机实用主义，尤其是拓扑学在这种思维中所扮演的角色。反之亦然，在探索拓扑学的功能时，梅亚苏对绝对的兴趣、对无穷（transfinite）或 "无穷品质的非封闭复数化"（梅亚苏 [2006] 2008, 142）的探索可能正是马苏米所需要的。在马苏米看来，虚拟的概念（马苏米从柏格森和德勒兹那里学到的）尤其重要，这一点在梅亚苏的《潜在性与虚拟性》（2011 年）中得到了肯定。正如马苏米（2002, 135）所说：

A topological image center literally makes the virtual appear, in felt thought. It is more apparitional than empirical. Sensation, always on arrival a transformative feeling of the outside, a feeling of thought, is the being of the analog. It is matter in analog mode.
拓扑图像中心在有感觉的思维中让虚拟的东西显现出来。与其说它是实证，不如说它是表象。感觉，总是在到达时对外部的一种转换性的感觉，一种思想的感觉，是模拟的存在。它是模拟模式中的物质。

The smoothness of topology is nowadays mostly developed (in maths) in so-called “pointless topology,” continuing the traits of Peter T. Johnstone (1977), and mereotopology as it follows Whitehead ([1929/1978] 1985). Here we see most convincingly why Deleuze and Guattari considered mathematics (together with music) capable of producing the smoothest of smooth spaces, and thus as most suitable for a rewriting of the dualisms that haunt us. Johnstone’s concept of the “locales” for instance, as he opposes them to “frames,” allow us to rethink morphology in terms of “continuous maps” (Johnstone 1982, 39) as he calls them. No longer related to objects, “locales” allow us to do pure morphology that always already includes a multiplicity of bodies equaling physical nature. Mathematics (pointless topology) is then our route (among many unforeseen routes) that allows us to get rid of our vectorial (homomorphic) status “in favor of a spreading out on the surface,” as Cache (1995, 75) puts it. Our upright position, as the latter continues, would then only be a consequence of the morphologies at work on the continuous abstract map (or plane) that is realized.
拓扑学的平滑性如今（在数学中）主要是在所谓的 "无意义拓扑学 "中得到发展，延续了彼得-约翰斯通（Peter T. Johnstone，1977 年）的特质，以及遵循怀特海（Whitehead，[1929/1978] 1985 年）的单纯拓扑学。在这里，我们最令人信服地看到，为什么德勒兹和瓜塔里认为数学（连同音乐）能够产生最平滑的平滑空间，因而最适合改写困扰我们的二元论。例如，约翰斯通的 "局部 "概念（他将其与 "框架 "相对立）使我们能够从他所说的 "连续映射"（约翰斯通，1982 年，39 页）的角度重新思考形态学。不再与物体相关，"位置 "让我们可以进行纯粹的形态学研究，而这种形态学总是已经包含了等同于物理本质的多重体。因此，数学（无意义的拓扑学）是我们的途径（在众多不可预见的途径中），它让我们摆脱了矢量（同构）状态，"转而在表面上铺展开来"，卡奇（1995，75）如是说。我们的直立位置，正如后者继续说的那样，将只是在实现的连续抽象地图（或平面）上发挥作用的形态学的结果。

To close with an example, we could think of how Massumi (2002, 75) re-reads Michel Serres’ analysis of a soccer game, which concludes as follows: “The player’s subjectivity is disconnected as he enters the field of potential in and as its sensation. For the play, the player is that sensation. The sensation is a channeling of field potential into local action, from which it is again transduced into a global reconfiguration of the field of potential. Sensation is the mode in which potential is present in the perceiving body.” The manner in which Massumi does not take man as the starting point of analysis—or even of bodies—but rather the forces and surfaces that are being realized throughout the material practice, opens the way for a pointless topology similar to how Johnstone and contemporary Whiteheadians would have it. Massumi’s case proves Johnstone right in introducing a concept like “continuous mapping” when emphasizing the morphogeneses taking place with the creation of surfaces. Freeing us from the point, the line and even from movement (which in the end makes up a correlationist argument, as Meillassoux would put it), the virtual absolute is actualized. Pointless topology is then one of the “infinity mechanisms” in which Henri Michaux ([1972] 2002, 70) finds himself: the one infinite mechanism that is all. It liberates a new materialism.
最后，我们可以举例说明马苏米（2002, 75）如何重新解读米歇尔-塞雷斯（Michel Serres）对足球比赛的分析，其结论如下："球员的主观性被切断，因为他作为感觉进入了潜在领域。对于比赛而言，球员就是这种感觉。感觉是将场域潜能转化为局部行动的一种渠道，并由此再次转化为场域潜能的整体重构。感觉是潜能存在于感知身体中的模式"。马苏米没有把人作为分析的起点，甚至没有把身体作为分析的起点，而是把在整个物质实践中实现的力量和表面作为分析的起点，这种方式为无意义的拓扑学开辟了道路，类似于约翰斯通和当代怀特海主义者所希望的那样。马苏米的案例证明，约翰斯通在强调表面创造过程中发生的变形时，引入 "连续映射 "这样的概念是正确的。将我们从点、线，甚至从运动中解放出来（正如迈拉苏（Meillassoux）所言，运动最终构成了一种关联主义论证），虚拟的绝对便被现实化了。因此，无意义的拓扑学是亨利-米肖（Henri Michaux）（[1972] 2002, 70）发现自己所处的 "无限机制 "之一：一个代表一切的无限机制。它解放了新唯物主义。

Notes
说明

- 1. Here it should be mentioned once again that French feminist theories, in contradistinction to the works reviewed and synthesized by Harding, have dealt with Lloyd’s monist question, and that this minor tradition in feminist theory has been our main source of inspiration. When Braidotti (2011a) writes that “Colebrook (2000a) suggests that a younger feminist wave is looking at the question of sexual difference as not only or primarily a question that concerns the subject or the subject’s body,” she is referring precisely to the way in which a monism actually shifts anthropocentrism. Colebrook provocatively calls this new feminist materialism “a materialism without bodies.” Colebrook used this term at the conference “What is the Matter with Materialism?,” Utrecht University, October 25, 2010.
1.在此需要再次提及的是，法国女性主义理论与哈丁所评论和归纳的著作不同，涉及了劳埃德的一元论问题，而这一女性主义理论的次要传统一直是我们灵感的主要来源。当 Braidotti（2011a）写道："Colebrook（2000a）认为，年轻的女性主义浪潮正在将性差异问题视为不仅仅是或主要是一个涉及主体或主体身体的问题 "时，她指的正是一元论实际上转变人类中心主义的方式。科尔布鲁克挑衅性地将这种新的女性主义唯物主义称为 "没有身体的唯物主义"。科尔布鲁克在 2010 年 10 月 25 日乌得勒支大学举办的 "唯物主义是怎么回事？

- 2. Rather than implicitly accepting a humanism or anthropocentrism, Rotman (and Deleuze and Guattari)’s mathematics of gesture seem(s) to engage with what Stengers has called a “cosmopolitical network” or what Latour refers to as “the Parliament of Things” (see also Lischka 2007: 40). In line with Rotman, Latour ([1991] 1993: 142) considers the sciences to be of interest (to politics) because of its intensities that are both human and non-human, both material and immaterial, indeed, that flow contingently:
2.罗特曼（以及德勒兹和瓜塔里）的姿态数学并没有隐含地接受人文主义或人类中心主义，而是似乎与斯特恩斯所说的 "宇宙政治网络 "或拉图尔所说的 "事物议会"（另见 Lischka 2007: 40）相联系。与罗特曼的观点一致，拉图尔（[1991] 1993: 142）认为科学之所以（对政治）有意义，是因为它的强度既是人类的，也是非人类的，既是物质的，也是非物质的，事实上，是偶然流动的：

[…] we continue to believe in the sciences, but instead of taking in their objectivity, their truth, their coldness, their extraterritoriality—qualities they never had, except after the arbitrary withdrawal of epistemology—we retain what has always been most interesting about them: their daring, their experimentation, their uncertainty, their warmth, their incongruous blend of hybrids, their crazy ability to reconstitute the social bond.
[......]我们继续相信科学，但不是接受它们的客观性、它们的真实性、它们的冷酷性、它们的治外法权--除了在认识论被任意撤消之后，它们从未有过的品质--我们保留了它们一直以来最有趣的东西：它们的大胆、它们的实验、它们的不确定性、它们的温暖、它们不协调的混合体、它们重组社会纽带的疯狂能力。

- 3. This goes beyond the claim found in Telling Flesh, which reads: “[…] we think of the referent as neither preceding nor following language because it is an immanence within it” (Kirby 1997: 19). Where the earlier Kirby seems to prioritise language— the referent being an immanence within language—the later Kirby comes to evoke a univocity that comes close to Deleuze and Guattari when they state in A Thousand Plateaus: “There are variables of expression that establish a relation between language and the outside, but precisely because they are immanent to language” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 82; original emphasis). Here, we do not look at language, but at immediate circumstantial expression and implied collective assemblages. Mathematics’ “reference to itself” should be read in the latter manner.
3.这超越了《诉说肉身》中的说法，即"[......]我们认为所指既不在语言之前，也不在语言之后，因为它是语言的内在存在"（Kirby 1997: 19）。早先的柯比似乎优先考虑语言--所指是语言中的一种内在性，而后来的柯比则唤起了一种接近德勒兹和瓜塔里在《千高原》中所说的单一性："德勒兹和瓜塔里[1980] 1987: 82；原文强调）。在这里，我们关注的不是语言，而是直接的环境表达和隐含的集体组合。数学 "对自身的参照 "应按后一种方式解读。

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Table of Contents

- New Materialism
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction

- Part One: Interviews

- Chapter 1: Interview with Rosi Braidotti
- Chapter 2: Interview with Manuel DeLanda
- Chapter 3: Interview with Karen Barad

- Chapter 4: Interview with Quentin Meillassoux

- Part Two: Cartographies

- Introduction

- Chapter 5: The Transversality of New Materialism

- Chapter 6: Pushing Dualism to an Extreme
- Chapter 7: Sexual Differing
- Chapter 8: The End of (Wo)Man

- Bibliography